



Publications
CAI
PV 50
-1990
R 27

PS2000

August 14, 1990

Public Service 2000, Ottawa, Ontario K1A 0A3 Telephone: (613) 952-7551 Fax: (613) 954-6017

**REPORTS AND SUMMARIES
OF THE
TASK FORCES**

FOR DISCUSSION

Digitized by the Internet Archive
in 2023 with funding from
University of Toronto





News Release Communiqué

For Immediate Release

August 14, 1990

CONSULTATION ON PUBLIC SERVICE 2000 TASK FORCE REPORTS

Treasury Board President Robert de Cotret today announced the release of Public Service 2000 task force reports. The reports are being circulated to all departments and agencies of the Government of Canada, Public Service unions and other interested groups. The government will be examining the analysis and recommendations along with the feedback they generate in the broader context of its policy for the future of the Public Service.

Mr. de Cotret said: "The purpose in making these reports public at this time is two-fold: firstly, to inform Public Service employees of the thinking that has emerged over the past eight months; and secondly, to seek further feedback on this first part of the Public Service 2000 initiative.

"The task force recommendations do not represent official government policy or views. I want to encourage further discussion and feedback on these reports so that the government will have the benefit of the widest possible range of insights when it makes important decisions this fall aimed at renewing the Public Service and improving service to the public."

The task forces have already discussed issues of concern with Public Service unions, and have obtained the view of many employees across the country through surveys, telephone interviews, focus groups, meetings and calls for suggestions--particularly with respect to service to the public. They have also consulted a special committee of business people, academics, consultants, and representatives from various associations.

The documentation being made available today includes background material summarizing the major recommendations of the task forces and describing the progress they have made to date.

... /2

"The task forces have worked diligently to produce these reports," Mr. de Cotret said. "They have raised some fundamental questions. It is essential at this stage that we share their work with all concerned as we continue this important process."

For Further Information:

Yvon Bureau
Public Service 2000
Tel. (613) 952-6720

REPORT OF THE BOARD OF THE
NATIONAL YOUTH FOUNDATION

The Board of the National Youth Foundation was organized on June 1, 1964, and has since that time been actively engaged in the study and development of a program of youth development.

The Board has held several public hearings and has received many suggestions from the public. It has also held several private hearings and has received many suggestions from the private sector.

The Board has also held several public hearings and has received many suggestions from the public. It has also held several private hearings and has received many suggestions from the private sector.

The Board has also held several public hearings and has received many suggestions from the public. It has also held several private hearings and has received many suggestions from the private sector.

The Board has also held several public hearings and has received many suggestions from the public. It has also held several private hearings and has received many suggestions from the private sector.

The Board has also held several public hearings and has received many suggestions from the public. It has also held several private hearings and has received many suggestions from the private sector.

The Board has also held several public hearings and has received many suggestions from the public. It has also held several private hearings and has received many suggestions from the private sector.

The Board has also held several public hearings and has received many suggestions from the public. It has also held several private hearings and has received many suggestions from the private sector.

The Board has also held several public hearings and has received many suggestions from the public. It has also held several private hearings and has received many suggestions from the private sector.

FOR DISCUSSION

PUBLIC SERVICE 2000: REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE ON SERVICE TO THE PUBLIC

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

August 9, 1990

SYNOPSIS OF THE REPORT OF THE
SERVICE TO THE PUBLIC TASK FORCE

BACKGROUND

The Service to the Public Task Force was one of ten created as part of Public Service 2000, a program launched in December 1989 by the Prime Minister to revitalize the public service.

This summary report presents interim findings and conclusions; recommendations will be forthcoming this Fall in the draft report.

The objectives for the Service to the Public Task Force were:

1. To review existing literature and research material and consult with others in relation to the notion of service to the public, in order to come up with a satisfactory definition (s) of this concept in the public sector context;
2. To examine work done to date in connection with service and satisfaction enhancement in the public and private sectors, with a view to learning from the past experience of other organizations;
3. To conduct research (secondary or primary data collection) to establish some methods of measurement and benchmarks concerning actual and perceived quality of service to the public provided by federal government institutions. Such benchmarks would provide a basis for determining whether progress was being made;
4. To examine practices and attitudes currently prevalent with respect to consultation with the public in the development of policy and delivery of programs;
5. To consult with a sample of representative groups of employees, unions and others to benefit from their views and recommendations; and
6. To develop recommendations with respect to the service to the public mandate (service, satisfaction, consultation, communication).

METHODOLOGY

The Task Force embarked on a vigorous program of research and analysis designed, within the limits of available time and resources, to provide insight into a number of issues related to service to the public and to yield recommendations for improvement. The Task Force defined "service to the public" broadly to encompass both the direct delivery of service and consultation with the public on the design and implementation of programs, on the premise that such consultation will enhance public satisfaction with service quality. Driving the research program were questions such as:

- . What do we know at present about public perceptions of service quality?
- . What lessons can be derived about rendering good service by examining examples set by organizations doing an outstanding job of service delivery (in both the public and private sectors)?
- . How can information technology be used to improve service quality and satisfaction?
- . To what extent do front line workers, middle managers and senior public servants feel service quality is valued? What are their views about existing quality of service provided to the public? What might be done to improve service?

Field Work Programs

Four associated initiatives were implemented to collect information and ideas from public servants in the field, as described below.

a) Focus Groups

Thirty focus groups comprising 300 front line workers and middle managers involved in the delivery of service to the public were held in 12 cities.

b) Symposia

Symposia were organized and moderated by the Canadian Centre for Management Development (CCMD) on behalf of the Service to the Public Task Force. Seven groups of approximately 25 senior managers and departmental clients were conducted.

c) Workshops

The main focus of the workshop discussions were on issues related to consultation rather than service delivery. Participants included senior federal managers, some business representatives, and some non-government organizations, academic and research representatives experienced or interested in consultation practices or issues. Eight workshops, of approximately 21 participants each, were held. In addition, the Public Policy Forum sponsored two additional workshops: the Bryce-Lambert Forum and a session with industry association executives.

d) Telephone Surveys

To complement the qualitative information obtained in the focus groups, the Task Force conducted a telephone survey with a representative sample of public servants.

Specifically, a total of 1,248 federal public servants were surveyed over the telephone. This sample consisted of 425 front line staff, 422 middle managers and 401 senior managers.

FINDINGS

Overview of Key Messages

The findings and conclusions of the Task Force, although still in draft form, suggest a change strategy involving a coordinated campaign on a number of fronts.

1) Top Management Commitment: Shaping Culture and Values

- . We need to work towards a major and long-term shift in culture and values which provides for a reorientation (but not abandonment) of our current "control culture".
- . We need to move from an inward and secretive mode of operation to an outward and open orientation, both internally and externally.
- . Management must institute significant changes to the "command and control" philosophy utilizing more delegation, trust, and "empowerment".
- . Management needs to create the expectation of, and take responsibility for, developing an environment supportive of innovation.

- . Senior managers need to accept that demanding "error-free" management is an impediment to good service to the public.
- . We need a sustained, durable, persistent leadership determined to provide outstanding service to clients and to create an internal climate where people are the premium value.
- . Management must demonstrate a commitment to an open and collaborative relationship with the public.
- . It is critical to our success that management seek, obtain and retain political support for these changes.

2) Consultation with Clients: Shaping Policy and Service to Client Needs

- . Broadening of both the ethic and the process of consultation is required.
- . Consultation must become an engrained public service-wide value visibly undertaken, and openly encouraged by management.
- . Public servants must be trained to become skilled in the consultative process.
- . Consultation must be engaged in only if there is genuine willingness to listen and to adapt to input from others.
- . Members of the public want to be reassured that the process is open and authentic; they feel they have a right to comment on how the process is run as well as what should be discussed; and they see no reason why they should be precluded from organizing and launching discussions on matters of public concern.
- . Insufficient weight is given at the centre of government to the need for regional variations in policy.

3) How People are Managed

Improved management of "our most important resource" will require:

- . Simplified classification systems with greater value given to service to the public factors.
- . Reducing levels in the management category as an aid to organizational layering.
- . Greater managerial responsibility for staff deployment and job assignments.
- . Simplified and quicker staffing (recruitment and selection).
- . Improved selection criteria with service to the public as an essential criterion.
- . Simplified redress procedures with quicker resolutions.
- . Involvement of operational managers in collective bargaining negotiations to ensure service factors are considered.
- . Improved rewards and recognition for good service and its inclusion in performance ratings.
- . Improved training and development programs with service as the focus.

4) Organizing for Client Service

- . Systems and procedures need to be tested against the criteria of service relevance and be relentlessly simplified by constant attention to client-driven, in contrast to system-driven requirements.
- . We must ensure that organizational structures are not so hierarchical that decisions are made by people out of touch with clients.
- . Management must pay close attention to the service transaction as the time and place most likely to shape clients' perceptions of the organization. Resources should be devoted to the development and improvement of the "transaction environment" (facilities, access, etc.).

- . The development of standards and training must emphasize client-centred values.

5) Service Support Technology

- . We need strong commitment from senior management not only to the use of the technology, but also to the restructuring of business practices.
- . Technology should be recognized as a single component of an overall corporate approach to improved public service and a client-centred service philosophy.
- . We need to change from merely using technology to do the same things faster, to doing different things, in different ways.
- . More emphasis must be placed on the provision of service enabling technology tools for front line staff who work with the public.

6) Internal and External Monitoring

- . We need to monitor service to the public and public satisfaction, and reduce the monitoring of compliance and conformity.
- . There is a need to clearly define and manage client expectations.
- . Client satisfaction data should be made available to all staff.
- . We must establish field level intelligence systems and use this input to improve services.

FOR DISCUSSION

PUBLIC SERVICE 2000 : REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE
ON ADMINISTRATIVE POLICY
AND THE ROLE OF COMMON
SERVICE AGENCIES

July 13, 1990

Table of Contents

| | <u>Page</u> |
|--|-------------|
| Executive Summary and Recommendations | (i) |
| Chapter 1. Administrative Policies and Common Services for PS 2000 - Principles | 1 |
| Chapter 2. Role of Common Service Organizations | 8 |
| Chapter 3. Supply and Services Canada (SSC) | 13 |
| Chapter 4. Public Works Canada (PWC) | 20 |
| Chapter 5. Departmental Management | 28 |
| Chapter 6. Implementation | 38 |
| Annex 1 | |
| Annex 2 | |
| Annex 3 | |

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
AND
RECOMMENDATIONS

OVERVIEW

This Task Force reviewed administrative policies and common services in the federal government to determine how they could be changed to support the aims and objectives of PS 2000.

In the federal government, employees spend an inordinate amount of time and resources dealing with internal administration and cumbersome bureaucratic processes which have been established by central agencies, common service organizations (CSO) and departments. Administrative policies and the structure of common services in the federal government severely restrict the authority of managers and make it difficult for all public servants to devote their full energies to program and service delivery.

The major finding that emerges from the work of this Task Force is that employees have limited authority over many of the key aspects of their work. In areas such as office space or the procurement of goods and services, public servants have little authority and/or they are required to utilize the services of a CSO. To repair a rug or a leaky window, departments have to use Public Works Canada (PWC). To buy a typewriter or computer which costs more than \$1,000 they must use Supply and Services Canada (SSC). To lease art, translate their work or dispose of materiel, they must use other CSO's. The areas that concern public servants the most are those involving relatively small expenditures which are often critical to getting their programs delivered quickly and efficiently.

After surveying and consulting with public servants across Canada and reviewing private sector practices, the Task Force on Administrative Policies and Common Services has concluded that the federal government should adopt a new approach to the formulation of administrative policies and the delivery of common services. Such policies and services should improve service to the public by enabling public servants to spend less time on paperwork and more time on focusing on the needs of their clients. They should provide more choice, authority, responsibility and accountability for managers to determine how best to manage programs and activities in light of program requirements. The Task Force is of the view that such an approach would also be more cost-effective for the public service because it would reduce unnecessary layers of decision-making and put the authority closer to the point of delivery of programs.

The report of this Task Force contains our conclusions and recommendations. The following sections summarize these findings and present the detailed recommendations of the Task Force.

I. KEY THEMES

To achieve better administrative management, the Task Force believes that new themes are required to guide the policies and practices of central agencies, common services organizations (CSO) and departments. These proposed themes are as follows:

- Focusing on improvement of service to the public
- Giving managers the choice
- Listening to employees in order to remove unnecessary irritants
- Delegating authority to the level closest to the delivery of the service
- Creating the right incentives for innovation

II. COMMON SERVICES AGENCIES

The Task Force reviewed a number of common services. Our general conclusion was that the fundamental principles upon which mandatory common services have been established (i.e economies of scale, centralization) need to be questioned in the light of changing technology, changing management practices and operational requirements of departments. Because of such changes, there are more cost-effective ways for delivering services.

The federal government should place more emphasis on choice and flexibility for managers and departments in determining the status of common services. Therefore, the Task Force recommends a major shift from mandatory to optional services.

III. SUPPLY AND SERVICES CANADA (SSC) PROCUREMENT

One of the key Common Service Organizations (CSO) in the federal government is Supply and Services Canada (SSC). The Task Force focused mainly on the procurement or acquisition function of SSC. In reviewing SSC, the Task Force reacted positively to the efforts that SSC has been making to review its role and in proposing a vision for the nineties that will change and upgrade its current type and level of service. SSC calls this initiative Vision 2000. The recommendations are believed to be

consistent with and supportive of SSC's Vision 2000 and are aimed at increasing the flexibility of managers in procurement while maintaining the advantages of a central procurement function and the current mandate and responsibilities of SSC in this field.

IV. PUBLIC WORKS CANADA: THE REAL PROPERTY PROGRAM / A&E SERVICES

The services provided by PWC were of more concern to managers than any other common service area. Managers were particularly bothered by the inflexibility of the current system in dealing with minor repairs and services (i.e. cleaning) in government owned or leased buildings. They also had major concerns with the level of service provided by Architectural and Engineering (A&E) Services of PWC particularly for small jobs or unique departmental requirements. Because of the level of concern of managers, the Task Force has concluded that nothing less than a significant change in the relationship between PWC and departments will improve the situation. This can best be achieved by providing departments with a choice in whether they use the tenant and A&E services provided currently by PWC.

V. DEPARTMENTAL MANAGEMENT

As the work of the Task Force unfolded, it became increasingly evident that departmental administrative policies and practices were a major impediment to increased flexibility and authority. Based on departmental surveys and focus group meetings, it was clear that departments were not delegating many of the existing authorities provided to departments by central agencies or CSO's. In addition, managers pointed out that many of the processes that caused them problems were the result of internal management decisions. Consequently, the Task Force developed two recommendations to deal with this critical area.

VI. IMPLEMENTATION

To ensure the implementation of changes in administrative policies and common services, a concerted effort will be required by central agencies, CSO's and departments. A key implementation requirement for all three of these groups will be training and communications. In addition, adequate measures must be undertaken to enable the CSO's and their staff, as well as department managers and staff, to adjust and adapt to their new roles.

VII. RECOMMENDATIONS

A. Recommendations on Common Service Policy

1. In order to provide employees with sufficient incentive to carry out programs and provide services to the public, all common services should be made optional wherever possible (See Annex 3). To this end, the Task Force recommends that four mandatory services (ie., Crown Assets Disposal, Central Travel, Translation and the Art Bank) be made optional.
2. TBS undertake a review, in conjunction with the CSO's and departments, of how to make these four common services optional in a cost effective manner.

B. Recommendations for SSC

3. The Government and SSC make a firm commitment to provide, on a progressive basis, more purchasing delegation to departments, by commodity type and by client. Therefore, by April 1, 1991, the basic delegation level to client departments be increased from \$1000 to \$2500. In the event that the system referred to in Recommendation 4 cannot be implemented for whatever reason, then the increased delegation is to reach \$10,000 by April 1, 1994.
4. Over the next four years, SSC establish a method of procurement in which SSC provides departments with unlimited access to a technology-based system that permits clients to do much of their own purchasing. As a minimum, the system is to provide electronic access to standing offers and other basic contractual transactions as well as information gathering sufficient for SSC to carry out its functions and responsibilities. In effect, this would provide departments with virtually unlimited delegation to carry out their own transactions using information and pre-approved contractual arrangements provided by SSC.
5. In addition to the above, SSC consider a number of short term initiatives aimed particularly at reorienting SSC much more sharply towards client service and satisfaction. These initiatives should include:

- 5.1 For highly specialized or relatively unique requirements, SSC immediately providing more meaningful and selective delegation to client departments, based on the commodity type and the client.
- 5.2 Establishing a credit card system to eliminate requisitioning and billing paperwork and to facilitate data collection.
- 5.3 Establishing client portfolios, at least for extensive users;
- 5.4 Establishing a streamlined approach to deal with low dollar value procurement or stock item procurement.
- 6. SSC establish and maintain a centre of expertise from which departments can draw to carry out acquisitions as required, acquire advice and receive assistance with problems.
- 7. SSC develop proposals, within a one year period, for a new approach to replace the existing revenue dependency system to promote a cost-effective procurement system and to reduce internal billing costs. Any new system must take into account the new role and function of SSC under the regime proposed above.

C. Recommendations on PWC

- 8. The operations of the Real Property Program be revised to provide greater flexibility and autonomy to tenants within the landlord/tenant relationship by:
 - 8.1 developing the bilateral tenant specific standards which give priority consideration to tenant location requirements for those functions which provide direct service to the public;
 - 8.2 Providing tenants the option of carrying out tenant services either directly with contractors or through PWC, subject to PWC retaining the minimum level of control essential to protect the structural integrity of its buildings;
 - 8.3 redefining tenant services to include as many activities as possible under this category and transferring funds for these additional areas from PWC to tenants;

8.4 retaining ACCORD (Administration and Control of Contracts and Regional Data) as a mandatory system for small construction and service contracts but adapting it so that tenants have access to the system when they wish to contract directly.

9. The operations of PWC A&E services be designated as "optional" under the Treasury Board Common Services policy as of April 1, 1992 subject to:
 - PWC's SPEC (Selection Prequalification and Evaluation of Consultants) system being the sole method for engaging private sector A&E professionals;
 - the government ensuring that departments do not use the 'optional' status to recreate internal A&E organizations.

D. Recommendations on Departmental Management

10. Deputy Heads ensure that increased delegations and policy flexibilities provided by central agencies are well communicated and that they are matched by equivalent delegations, flexibility and accountability for managers.
11. Deputy Heads review internal delegations, procedures and accountability structures to ensure that managers have the maximum possible authority and flexibility to manage programs and provide services to the public or department clients.

E. Recommendations on Implementation

Recommendation For Central Agencies

12. The federal government adopt new principles for administrative policies based on maximum incentives, authority and commensurate accountability for managers at all levels and that central agencies and departments review their administrative policies and common services in this light. This will ensure that administrative policies and common services achieve a better balance between government wide management requirements and the need for departmental and managerial flexibility.

13. The Treasury Board Secretariat work with the Staff Training Agency and the Centre for Management Development and other appropriate institutions to develop the necessary training programs to implement the recommendations of this report.
14. Treasury Board Secretariat and Departments develop extensive communication programs to ensure that all employees are familiar with new or changed policies, their authority levels and the implications of these policies for their responsibilities.

Recommendations for Common Service Agencies

15. All common services be reviewed periodically by a series of TBS-led interdepartmental program evaluations with study team representation by Treasury Board Secretariat/Office of the Comptroller General, CSO's and client departments.
16. CSO's review all their operations on a regular basis to revise levels of delegations to departments and to ensure their services are being provided in a manner sensitive to the needs of clients.

Recommendations for Departments

17. Departments give high priority to developing a consistent internal communications thrust to complement government-wide communications initiatives. This will ensure that all departmental employees are aware of and understand the basics of the new or modified administrative policies, their authority levels, where to go for assistance and the implications of the changes for delivering departmental programs.
18. Departments provide or support the required training to ensure that all employees are able to take full advantage of increased authorities provided.

Accountability for Implementation

19. In order to implement these recommendations, it is further recommended that an evaluation report be prepared for the Treasury Board on an annual basis for the next three years.

CHAPTER 1

ADMINISTRATIVE POLICIES AND COMMON SERVICES FOR PS 2000 – PRINCIPLES

I. INTRODUCTION

The scope of the work of this Task Force (Annex 1 lists the Task Force members) included all of the major administrative policies (approximately eighteen policy areas listed in Annex 2) currently issued by the Treasury Board as well as the role of common service organizations that provide approximately 40 common services to departments. The main objective of the review was to facilitate improved service to the Canadian public through more flexibility, authority and accountability for all staff on the premise that regional and operational employees are in the best position to make the most appropriate decisions.

Because of the large number and diversity of these policy areas, the Task Force did not have the time to review all of the areas in-depth, or to review the activities of all common service organizations (CSO). Instead, the Task Force focused on the key policy areas or issues which were identified by public servants as being of greatest concern. For these areas, the Task Force developed principles that guided its evaluation. For those policy areas where significant changes were already well underway by TBS or were not the subject of complaints, the Task Force felt it was not necessary to comment further.

It should also be noted that recommendations to immediately address some of the identified operational irritants have already been made by the Task Force. These changes, which were included in the status report dated of April 30, 1990 presented by the President of the Treasury Board, are as follows:

- Doubling contracting authority for competitive contracts to \$200,000 for consulting services and \$400,000 for non-consulting services;
- Increased authority for departmental purchases from \$500 to \$1,000 for all departments and to \$2,500 for those entering an agreement with SSC;
- Delegated to departments the full authority for debt write-off;
- Length of temporary help contracts extended from eight (8) to twenty (20) weeks;
- A revised taxi policy that gives full responsibility to Deputy Heads in order to reduce the administrative burden and increase equal access by taxi companies to government business;

- Managers, especially in the regions, were concerned at the amount of time and unnecessary paperwork required regarding the authorization of hospitality expenditures. Treasury Board has agreed to give more options to managers;
- Treasury Board has agreed to provide managers the option of replacing the fingerprint check with a criminal records name check based on a risk assessment, and to extend to ten years the validity of Level I and Level II security clearances;
- Streamlining of travel procedures: A joint Committee of the Treasury Board Secretariat - Office of the Comptroller General are reviewing travel procedures. Recommendations of this Committee will simplify the processing of travel claims.

II. CONSULTATIONS

In order to arrive at valid and agreed-upon conclusions, the Task Force met with the two largest Common Service Agencies (SSC and PWC) and three major unions (PIPS, ESSA and PSAC). Also, before issuing its final report the Task Force wanted to make sure that the main recommendations reflected the views of employees throughout the public service. To this end, five focus groups were conducted (two in Ottawa, and one in Montreal, Winnipeg, Halifax). About 100 employees participated in these focus group discussions. Their input has been very useful to the Task Force in formulating its final report and recommendations.

III. WHY CHANGES ARE REQUIRED

Managers at all levels throughout departments face multi-layered decision making and detailed rules which interfere with their day-to-day operations and the timely delivery of their programs to the public. Participants in the focus groups felt that the best solution was to simplify the process as much as possible by reducing the paperwork burden, removing the cumbersome sign-offs and eliminating duplication and excessive verification of work.

The key irritants expressed by most of the employees in the conduct of the focus groups are listed below:

- Not being able to control or do anything about relatively minor expenditure items;
- Not enough delegation, particularly in regions;
- The procurement process is often too slow and the level of spending authority is generally inadequate to meet their operational needs;
- The lack of internal communication, the length of time it takes SSC to co-ordinate contracts and purchases as well as the role of Supply and Services as an intermediary;
- Not being able to manage their own office space. Complaints were expressed about response time, quality of service, quality of work, inadequate communication and the high cost of PWC;
- In the area of other common services, concerns were expressed about the length of time it takes to receive the services or invoices or differences in objectives between CSO's and departments.

IV. PRINCIPLES FOR POLICIES

To achieve better administrative management, the Task Force believes that new principles are required to guide the policies and practices of central agencies, common services organizations (CSO) and departments. These proposed principles are as follows:

- **Support service to the public**

Administrative policies must allow public servants to spend less time on their paperwork and more time focusing on the needs of their clients. The information should be easily "digestible". Process must be kept simple to avoid shifting the bureaucracy from one area to another.

Given the resources available, changes must ensure delivery of the best service possible to the Canadian public. Policy makers should also think "service" and "client satisfaction" and should be recognized and rewarded accordingly. As stated by a regional manager, there is a need to improve the service delivery:

"En tant que directeur général des services médicaux, je voudrais perdre moins de temps à pousser du papier et à me battre contre les gens du bureau central pour me consacrer à mon travail d'une façon intelligente. Je n'ai pas le temps de mettre sur pieds un comité pour étudier le problème. Le client demande une réponse immédiate, pas dans trois mois."

- **Giving managers the choice**

Managers should have the choice. Policies should not be a set of rules and should not be directive but instead provide options to managers.

Because of their knowledge of the work environment, managers are in the best position to make both sound judgements and appropriate decisions in implementing these policies. As voiced by regional managers in focus group discussions:

"If you as a line manager, can figure out a way of doing it better, you can do it better, you're allowed to do it. I think that's the sort of discipline that the CSO's need to be put under."

"My message is, I'm a manager and I can manage - I don't mind being held accountable. Give me the tools to manage."

- **Clearing the Underbrush**

Managers are most irritated with what could be called "underbrush". This refers to the plethora of procedures, checks and balances, committees, sign-offs, complex billing and verification procedures, and just plan trivia that they have to deal with for so little perceived benefit. They generally accept the need for central policies and service agencies, but are more discontented with the following kinds of problems:

- the requirement to fill out a travel claim for \$15 when it probably costs 6 times as much just to do the paperwork. Why not use petty cash for this?

- an amendment to an existing regional contract that had to be done through headquarters. The requirement was known in July, but it took until January to get the whole thing through the process;
- the endless forms and paper required for one part of government to charge another (e.g. SSC and PWC billing);
- the time it takes to get a leaky window fixed or a door knob repaired through a service agency;
- the time it takes to get a couple of computers when setting up a high-priority activity due to the requirements to use SSC;
- the requirements of managers to get committee approval to proceed with a contract or purchase a computer even when the expenditure is within their own authority level.

H. L. Laframboise, former Assistant Deputy Minister of Labour Canada, once called this tendency in government "counter-management". One can also call it "administrivia". Whatever it is called, it drives managers and employees crazy and it often leads to counterproductive behaviour and unproductive work.

Managers should have the authority

Policies should provide authorities that are flexible enough to be tailored to the needs of individual organizations.

The key principle to be adhered to in policy formulation is that departments/staff should be delegated as much authority and flexibility as possible, be it through increased delegation, deregulation, or removal of external constraints or irritants. As stated by participants in the conduct of the focus groups:

"I can sign contracts for substantial amounts of money in the hundred of thousands of dollars to have somebody to do something for us, to do the training or whatever, but I can't go out and buy a typewriter for my secretary, and I can't buy a flip chart.

I can't get the tools or make the small decisions that I need to get things going. Give us the authority and responsibility on budgets that go along with being able to deliver the program."

- **Get the incentives right**

Managers must be prepared to take calculated risks to achieve better results (learning from experience). Innovation is to be encouraged and rewarded, whereas failures should not mean that you go back into the straight jacket. The search for better ways of doing things will die a quick death if public servants are pounded for making mistakes in the search. As expressed by a manager:

"It's what leads to what I call the "belts and braces" syndrome in the departments. We're so scared of making a mistake and that one of the central agencies is going to dump on you, that you build in all the bureaucracy at the departmental level - just in case."

There should be some provision for recognition of and rewards for creativity and success. There should be high standards for excellence and rewards and recognition (well and quickly) to managers who manage in the spirit of PS 2000 (delegation, empowerment, attention to human resources, client satisfaction, risk-takers, innovators).

V. CONCLUSIONS

The administrative and common services policies of the government need to evolve rapidly to achieve the aim of Public Service 2000 (PS 2000). While the fundamental objectives of achieving economy, equity, probity and consistency across the Public Service will have to remain constant, the way of achieving them should change.

From administration to management:

The PS 2000 initiative will accelerate the process of change in administrative and common services policies already under way in Treasury Board. This shift from "administration" to "management" would allow more flexibility to manage, with emphasis on results. This change in the corporate culture throughout the Public Service is aimed to provide better service to the Canadian public.

The above stated principles should be viewed as key factors to the evaluation of administrative policies and common services to complement well-established principles such as prudence, probity and economy. The following chapters outline how the federal Public Service can ensure that public servants have sufficient authority and incentives to deliver their programs and serve the public in the best possible way.

CHAPTER 2

ROLE OF COMMON SERVICE ORGANIZATIONS

I. INTRODUCTION TO COMMON SERVICE ORGANIZATIONS

A common service organization (CSO) is a department, agency, branch or division wholly or primarily engaged in providing centralized activities to support the programs of departments and agencies. The primary role of the CSO is the provision of service to the client together with the achievement of certain standards of prudence and probity.

The common services provided by CSO's generally fall into two categories. (Historically, there has also been a "right of first refusal" category, but this is being eliminated):

- mandatory common service: A service that client departments must obtain from a CSO.
- optional common service: A service that clients may obtain from a CSO or another supplier. (In some cases, the standards for goods or services are mandatory, but selecting the supplier is optional.)

II. OBSERVATIONS

Approximately 40 common services (See Annex 3) are provided by twelve 12 CSO's. The delivery of these services falls within the framework of administrative policies (See Annex 2) established by the Treasury Board. The services are also subject to a variety of financial arrangements including revenue dependency and appropriations. These controls were originally developed and placed upon the CSO's to ensure that the government developed centres of expertise in specific areas, realized the benefits of economies of scale, promoted national objectives in a consistent manner and maintained a fair, transparent and risk averse process.

The Task Force recognizes that the managers and employees of CSO's are dedicated to the fulfilment of the current mandates of their departments and that they work hard and faithfully to meet all of the objectives that have been given to them. Nevertheless, extensive research in the area of common services has revealed that these same objectives have resulted in many structural problems. Specifically, the Common Service Policy review of 1985, the Nielsen Task Force and, now, the PS 2000 Task Force have all found that the intended advantages of CSO's have not been sufficiently weighed against other, equally important criteria.

These include:

- timeliness;
- quality service to the client;
- an impetus to provide results that are as effective as they are efficient; and,
- flexibility in responding to client departments' changing operational requirements;

During recent focus group meetings, a participant gave a very clear indication of his view of the level of control placed upon a supposed client department by CSO's:

"They have no idea of our business or who we're serving and yet they're telling us what we can and cannot do in the delivery of our program. Their service to us is based on a book of rules, not on whether or not that service meets the objectives of our program."

The values and objectives of PS 2000, as stated in Chapter 1, attempt to re-balance the relationship between CSO's and their clients. This will be accomplished by providing an environment that supports improved managerial performance and accountability throughout the federal public service with special emphasis on service to the public and productivity improvement.

The central premise of these changes is that objectives of PS 2000 can best be achieved by placing as much authority as possible in the hands of employees and managers as well as through new or more flexible arrangements between CSO's and line departments. To this end, the following services have already been changed from "mandatory" to "optional":

- The printing function of SSC is being changed to full "optional" status as a Special Operating Agency as of 1992.

- The Fleet Management Information System (Treasury Board decision on Motor Vehicle Policy of SSC).

In addition, SSC has recently increased its basic delegations to departments for purchasing from \$500 to \$1000 and to \$2500 when accompanied by special reporting requirements. Despite this change, it is recognized that success cannot be achieved without similar arrangements within departments between head office/staff functions and the responsibility centres for delivery of services.

The reform of the Common Services environment, while proceeding from general principles, involves important trade-offs in government objectives and relatively complex administrative and financial issues. One comment from the focus groups illustrates this point:

"Decentralization is great, but what are the various departments going to do to coordinate certain national objectives such as employment equity, regional development and 50 other national objectives?"

Based on a preliminary analysis of the situation, public servants surveyed across the country and in accordance with the principles developed in Chapter 1, the Task Force examined the mandatory status of all common services and recommends the changes shown in Annex 3. However, the Task Force found that the delivery of four specific common services requires further attention and analysis. These are:

Crown Assets Disposal:

The Task Force is concerned that there are not enough incentives for managers to dispose of surplus assets. Under the current system, departments must go through Crown Assets Disposal in SSC to dispose of an asset or even to provide a surplus asset to another department. Up until December 1989, any proceeds from the sale of such assets did not revert to the department but rather were consumed by service fees of SSC or returned to the Consolidated Revenue Fund. The extent of the disincentive to dispose of assets was indicated by stories that managers in remote locations found it more efficient to throw surplus assets away or, in one case, to dump them in lakes because the cost of disposal far outweighed the revenue derived from disposing of it.

Another example that came to the attention of the Task Force was the case of a manager who had a number of outdated computers. Because the district offices of another department could not buy any computers, they wanted to use these computers. However, when he asked his Administrative Services group if he could give these computers to that department, he was informed that departments cannot transfer assets without declaring them surplus. At that point, the manager figured it was not worth the time or effort to pursue the issue.

In December 1989, the federal government announced that 30% of the proceeds from the sale of surplus assets would be returned to departments in the form of a credit for SSC service fees. Notwithstanding this improvement in policy, the Task Force is of the view that departmental managers should receive the full value from the disposal or transfer of assets and that mechanisms should be found to enable departments to trade or sell assets directly to the private sector or to other departments.

Central Travel:

The need for a central travel service is outdated in the context of rapid advances in modern technology. The following is an example cited during a recent focus group meeting:

"The issue of travel is an interesting one. People rely on me to negotiate a contract in the hundreds of thousands of dollars, but, I've got to go to central travel to get a single ticket to go to Toronto."

Based on the five principles outlined in Chapter 1, the Task Force concluded that the mandatory status of central travel should be eliminated. As the central travel contract is up for renewal in approximately 1 1/2 years, this will provide an opportunity to review the need for a central travel service.

Translation:

The Task Force recommends that translation for the two official languages be made an optional service, subject to a phased implementation in the purchase of translation services by departments. However, the provision of translation services for international languages, other than the two official languages, was still seen as a valuable service not readily available in the private sector. Thus, it should remain mandatory.

Art Bank:

An evaluation of the Art bank has been recently completed by the Treasury Board Secretariat. The evaluation recommended that art rental become an optional service. Most individuals surveyed in this evaluation preferred more flexibility in the renting of art. The Task Force supports more options in the renting of art while continuing to support the objectives of the Canada Council and the role of the Art bank in assisting the artistic community. Therefore, the Task Force believes that the Art bank should become an optional service.

Implications:

Since any change in the status of common services requires the approval of Treasury Board, TBS will have to undertake a review of the implications of changing the status of these common services to ensure that any changes are cost effective for the federal government.

III. KEY RECOMMENDATIONS FOR COMMON SERVICES

The Task Force has proposed changes to the status of a number of common services. These changes are shown in Annex 3. In accordance with the PS 2000 philosophy, the Task Force also recommends that the following principles should govern the operation of common services:

1. In order to provide employees with sufficient incentive to carry out programs and provide services to the public, all common services should be made optional wherever possible (See Annex 3). To this end, the Task Force recommends that four mandatory services (ie., Crown Assets Disposal, Central Travel, Translation and the Art Bank) be made optional.
2. TBS undertake a review, in conjunction with the CSO's and departments, of how to make these four common services optional in a cost effective manner.

CHAPTER 3

SUPPLY AND SERVICES CANADA

I. INTRODUCTION TO SUPPLY AND SERVICES CANADA (SSC) AS A COMMON SERVICE AGENCY

SSC was established to supply the goods and services required by departments. However, in the last twenty years, SSC has been charged with an increasing array of other objectives. Many, if not most, of these objectives were introduced in response to various issues (eg., regional development, employment equity, small business), often without adequate attention to the impact on costs and service. The Minister of SSC, with the support of Cabinet colleagues, is currently trying to rationalize the forty or fifty national objectives that have made SSC a hybrid form of CSO with quasi-program responsibilities.

II. OBSERVATIONS

SSC is widely seen as having a good track record in maintaining the integrity of the procurement process (prudence and probity) and achieving economies in purchasing. However, recent studies such as the SSC Service Line Reviews, the 1989 AG report and this PS 2000 review indicate that SSC has focused too much on these two aspects at the expense of service to the customer. The department must now find an optimum balance between the two.

Specifically, the problems identified with SSC relate to its role as an intermediary. Even on low dollar value items, for example, departments find themselves unable to deal directly with suppliers in discussing their needs. One departmental focus group participant stated:

"We just can't get the kind of service we want. The firms won't even send you a catalogue because they know that with the SSC tendering system, we don't make the decisions. And if it's going to come from Ottawa, he won't make any commission to cover the time he spent with you".

This situation results in a lack of control and a sense of alienation from the consultation process which is needed to ensure that potential suppliers understand the needs of the clients. Departments feel that they are "doing all the work" and that SSC is often a redundant step in the process, particularly for low-dollar value items and specialized products. For the latter case, it was viewed that SSC provided little value added. A good example was cited:

"We use very specialized pressure gauges for testing pipelines and we know exactly what we need. There's a very limited supplier base and we talk to them about our requirements. SSC then modifies our specification to suit the tendering process and solicit bids nation- wide. But we know there's only two manufacturers in Canada and only one can modify their design to suit our needs. What's the value added?"

It is evident that departments would like to make their own transactions based on standing offers and electronic cataloguing. In addition, they believe that specialized services could be handled more efficiently by themselves in cases where the expertise resides in the department.

By contrast, regional concern over increased delegation lies in the lack of resources and expertise within departments. One focus group member explained it this way:

"We don't have any extra people at the moment. At the best of times, we're just getting by. So if we had to stick within the rules and regulations as they presently stand, we'd have to tender correctly, have people to open the tenders correctly, we'd have to have tender boxes and a gallery for viewing, we'd have to have everything and that takes PY's and we don't have them."

Another manager stated:

"We have only one person with the required expertise. If he or she should leave or fall ill, everything stops. SSC has enough trained people to fill that sort of gap".

Greater delegation by SSC would require extensive training and communication with departmental managers and employees. This is especially true where SSC provides a buffer against various pressures -- both internal and external. These pressures come from a wide variety of sources, the suppliers, the regions, trade policy imperatives and national objectives to name a few. If SSC were changed significantly, these pressures would not disappear, but would be applied directly to departments.

A secondary issue concerning delegation of contracting authority is the extent to which the delegation is disseminated within the client departments themselves. At present, SSC regional offices generally have much higher delegation than their clients, who must send their requisitions to their own HQ's. One example provided by a regional manager is very illustrative of the subsequent problems encountered:

"Often we'll find that we have a requirement that requires approval from head office. The requisition gets into the Ottawa acquisition stream and we end up with a company from another province supplying a PC to our office in Winnipeg. But the after sales service is non-existent, whereas if we could handle it locally, we could have had better service".

Hence, any increase in delegation by SSC would require a commensurate action within departments to realize any benefit. This issue is discussed further in Chapter 5.

On the issue of SSC's legislative mandate, SSC has expressed concern that substantially increasing delegation without a system of controls could compromise their Minister's accountability under the Supply and Services Act for the management of government procurement. Under current legislation, increased departmental authority requires increased accountability. The question is the manner in which the client department can be held accountable. Numerous authorities are currently delegated throughout the government based on accountability through MOU's, post-transaction audits and sanctions, none of which must necessarily be burdensome. SSC should use these approaches as opposed to controlling transactions.

The role of common service (and central) agencies must be to enable managers to make the right decisions. This will involve giving them the right tools, the necessary information (ie., standing offers), communicating in an effective manner the corporate goals and objectives that they must respect in their operations, and providing training and support where required. SSC should move toward an advisory, procurement and information related service agency.

III. REVENUE DEPENDENCY

Service fees for procurement also create an enormous amount of friction between the department and its clients. Apart from the nature of the fee structure, clients universally resent having to pay any fee for a service they cannot refuse and which they see as supporting objectives beyond their own. One regional materiel manager stated:

"There's a principle on this revenue dependency that just because you pay SSC, they will feel more accountable to you. That's nonsense".

On the issue of charging for mandatory services, another manager complained:

"If I use SSC for contracts within my own delegated limit, then charge me to discourage me from using it. But if I have to go through SSC, don't slap me in the face by charging me 15%"

The widespread frustration with the inflexibility and obvious anomalies of the present fee structure may account for the surprisingly strong negative attitude to revenue dependency. (In contrast, there are few complaints about revenue dependency for optional services.)

As long as SSC is driven by the current form of revenue dependency to maximize transactions in order to finance its operations, it cannot devote the resources required to provide better supply management and procurement planning, nor can it delegate a significant volume of transactions without a serious loss of revenue. Therefore, it is necessary to change the current system of revenue dependency in order to achieve a more flexible supply system.

IV. VISION 2000

In order to address these problem areas, SSC is promoting a new role for the department in which SSC would become, to a large extent, an advisor and facilitator by encouraging the development of common systems, promoting information-sharing within government and developing operational tools. This program is called Vision 2000. According to SSC, Vision 2000 will lead to the introduction of a technology-based system through which the client, the supplier and SSC personnel can interact with each other to the extent that clients can do as much of their own purchasing as they consider desirable. In addition, SSC would become a centre of expertise from which clients can draw to carry out acquisitions as required.

While the system is intended to offer automated ordering as well as paperless custom contracting, certain acquisitions are not currently planned for inclusion in Vision 2000. These include commodities which do not lend themselves to an automated ordering system (eg, commercially available products which are purchased in small quantities or those that are of sufficient complexity to warrant contracting as a custom item).

SSC hopes that, ultimately, clients will be able to opt into or out of the system at varying levels of dollar value or volume, for various parts of their organizations or at a select geographic location, all at the client's choice.

V. CONCLUSIONS

The basic reasons for establishing SSC - the need to promote solid procurement expertise and to capitalize on economies of scale and centralized supply management (as opposed to simply issuing contracts) - and the goals of supporting prudence and probity and other key national objectives remain valid. However, the nature and degree of client dissatisfaction make it abundantly clear that some changes are required in the approach SSC brings to its work, in the specific functions it performs to support these goals and, particularly, in the way in which it serves its clients.

For example, the need to ensure greater competition and openness in the bidding process can result in a divergence of objectives between SSC and the client wherein the client may not have acquired the product it really needed. However, it is clear that questions of timeliness, service levels and regional concerns must continue to be balanced against savings in procurement and total life cycle costs. Bulk buying and competition can clearly result in significant savings as well as in the preservation of integrity, fairness and openness. With procurement expenditures in the billions, savings to the taxpayer can be substantial. The issue is the method by which to achieve this balance.

The automated supply methods proposed under SSC's Vision 2000 to increase emphasis on service to clients should be continued. SSC needs to provide much faster, responsive service, so that managers making decisions will consider it as a viable option in the achievement of their aims. In addition, the automated system should free up SSC PY resources to devote more attention to management of the supply system, contract administration, supply planning, analysis, disposal, etc..

The degree of delegation, the extent to which departments take it up, and automation of low dollar value procurements will determine the impact on the SSC regional workload. Currently, just over 30% of regional transactions are under \$1000, about 54% under \$2500. The comparable percentages for SSC head office are 25% and 28%. As decision-making authority in the public service moves down and out through all departments, there should be greater scope for the client's regional operations. On the other hand, extension of the open bidding concept may tend to work against regionalization.

In reviewing SSC, the Task Force was impressed with the efforts that SSC has been making to review its role and in proposing a vision for the nineties that will change and upgrade its current type and level of service. The following recommendations are believed to be consistent with and supportive of this direction. They are aimed at increasing the flexibility of managers and employees in procurement while maintaining the advantages of a central procurement function and the current mandate and responsibilities of SSC in this field.

VI. KEY RECOMMENDATIONS ON SSC

It is recommended that:

3. The Government and SSC make a firm commitment to provide, on a progressive basis, more purchasing delegation to departments, by commodity type and by client. Therefore, by April 1, 1991, the basic delegation level to client departments be increased from \$1000 to \$2500. In the event that the system referred to in Recommendation 4 cannot be implemented for whatever reason, then the increased delegation is to reach \$10,000 by April 1, 1994.
4. Over the next four years, SSC establish a method of procurement in which SSC provides departments with unlimited access to a technology-based system that permits clients to do much of their own purchasing. As a minimum, the system is to provide electronic access to standing offers and other basic contractual transactions as well as information gathering sufficient for SSC to carry out its functions and responsibilities. In effect, this would provide departments with virtually unlimited delegation to carry out their own transactions using information and pre-approved contractual arrangements provided by SSC.
5. In addition to the above, SSC consider a number of short term initiatives aimed particularly at reorienting SSC much more sharply towards client service and satisfaction. These initiatives should include:
 - 5.1 For highly specialized or relatively unique requirements, SSC immediately providing more meaningful and selective delegation to client departments, based on the commodity type and the client.

- 5.2 Establishing a credit card system to eliminate requisitioning and billing paperwork and to facilitate data collection.
 - 5.3 Establishing client portfolios, at least for extensive users;
 - 5.4 Establishing a streamlined approach to deal with low dollar value procurement or stock item procurement.
-
- 6. SSC establish and maintain a centre of expertise from which departments can draw to carry out acquisitions as required, acquire advice and receive assistance with problems.
 - 7. SSC develop proposals, within a one year period, for a new approach to replace the existing revenue dependency system to promote a more cost-effective procurement system and to reduce internal billing costs. Any new system must take into account the new role and function of SSC under the regime proposed above.

CHAPTER 4

PUBLIC WORKS CANADA

I. INTRODUCTION TO PWC AS A COMMON SERVICE AGENCY

An effective Department of Public Works (PWC) is essential to the operation of all departments. As a landlord, PWC is responsible for providing facilities critical to the personal and organizational health of public servants and to the provision of services to the customers of tenant organizations. As a services agency, PWC professional expertise is essential in the planning, acquisition, design, construction and operation of the vast and varied portfolio of federal lands and facilities used to deliver government programs.

As a result of various studies and task forces, PWC has been in a constant state of reform for some 25 years, resulting in a number of new management initiatives. Since 1986, with the backing of Cabinet and Treasury Board, PWC has been singly committed to implementing a massive, coherent and integrated reform program focused upon improving its services to clients and tenants, its organizational effectiveness and its commitment to its own people. The reform has included a redefinition of the role and program structure of PWC, fundamental organization restructuring, the shift of many financial operations from an appropriation to revenue dependent mode and the overhaul of contracting practices. While structural elements of the reform have been implemented and are now being fine tuned, the required cultural change within PWC - towards greater client and tenant service and towards a commercial form of operation - will take more time.

The Task Force supports the direction of the PWC reforms to improve its sensitivity to client needs and service delivery. However, there are specific areas of reform which the Task Force believes should be accelerated and fine tuned in order to provide greater autonomy to PWC tenant organizations and greater optionality to users of PWC architectural and engineering (A&E) services.

II. TENANT AUTONOMY - REAL PROPERTY PROGRAM

Within the federal system the "administration" of special, program specific real property is assigned to user departments and 'administration' of general office facilities for use by departments is assigned to PWC and managed through its Real Property Program. (Organizations with administration are called Custodians and are empowered with the attributes of ownership; organizations housed in PWC buildings are called Tenants.)

The PWC Real Property Program is particularly sensitive because it includes the headquarters of all departments, contains the work location of about two-thirds of public servants, includes the points of service of many programs with high user publics

(EIC, NRC, HWC). Its facilities are also very visible, being located mainly in urban areas with almost 50% of the inventory in the National Capital Region. The program objectives are to provide safe and productive working environments for tenants while optimizing investments in real property assets. The program must also consider its contribution to broader objectives such as 'federal presence' and economic development in local communities.

Under this program, PWC performs the role of landlord responsible for acquiring and managing the facility while user departments carry out the role of tenants responsible for specifying requirements and requesting renovations from the landlord. Most tenants receive accommodation 'free of charge', while PWC is appropriated funds for capital and O&M for Crown-owned buildings and for payments for leased buildings. However, tenants are provided funds for 'tenant services' which are non-base building interior changes carried out during occupancy and have full discretion in how tenant services funds are allocated. As with a normal private landlord/tenant relationship, however, PWC (the landlord) must approve changes and carries out the tenant services using its own staff or contractors under its direction.

The program has historically been tightly controlled by Treasury Board due to the public sensitivity of the quality and quantity of office accommodation provided for public servants. Starting January 1, 1989, TB delegated authority to PWC for accommodation policy and standards and has increased fivefold PWC's authority for competitive leases. During the past year, PWC has been internally delegating much of its increased authorities from TB to its regional operations to empower its staff to serve tenants better.

Despite these changes, the Task Force found client frustration with the system, particularly with the slowness of PWC response in acquiring facilities, the costly and cumbersome process for making tenant services renovations, the location and quality of some facilities and the lack of control they have over the quality of cleaning services in general.

III. MANAGERS' CONCERNS

The following quotations illuminate some of the views expressed by managers on the delivery problems of PWC's Real Property Program:

"One of the major problems we find is when we need new space. PWC is not able to respond quick enough. The channels they have to go through, and we can't even talk to the realtor."

"PWC is a lousy landlord and they're even worse lease managers. We wind up having to manage our own leases. There's no support there at all. We almost had to go through Access to Information to get a copy of the lease on our building."

"The departments are always forced to justify things over and over again. We need room for drafting tables or space to meet with clients. The PWC response is, well, you're not entitled to a meeting room for clients. Well, we're not entitled to have clients I guess."

"We require movers a lot and that service has to be contracted by PWC. We can't do it ourselves. We're only talking about maybe \$500 per day for two men for example. Why do we have to go through PWC for \$500 to hire two men? And PWC won't take a phone call. They've got to see the actual requisition."

"A lot of time, I feel that what PWC charges is ridiculous. I wanted to get a counter built and I didn't know I had to go through PWC. But then PWC said it would cost \$3000. Well, I had it built by someone else for \$600. I nearly got fired, but I saved \$2400."

"For ordering a screen from PWC, they charge us 15% and then contract for it through SSC who charges them 4%. So they make 11% off our mistake in sending the requisition to PWC in the first place."

"Instead of telling PWC what we want, why don't we just tell the contractor?"

"In regards to tenant services, our department feels that we have a lot of expertise because we have 450 offices across the country. We think we can handle it ourselves."

IV. CONCLUSIONS

The Task Force recognizes the inevitable difficulty of the landlord/tenant relationship at the best of times and that the reforms implemented in 1989 have in many cases yet to affect the day-to-day operations of PWC and tenants. Two changes implemented as a result of the short term recommendations of the Task Force should assist PWC to provide more responsive service to clients. The change in the definition of "competitive contracts" to include cases when only one bid is received from a public tender will eliminate the need for TB approval of many small leases. Also, the change in the definition of "competitive" for non-consulting service contracts to include "best

value" as well as "least cost" will provide much opportunity to engage better quality cleaning contractors.

Although these changes will improve the delivery of the program, the Task Force concludes that additional reforms are needed if program managers are to have the ability to ensure their requirements are met and in a timely fashion. These reforms should take place in two areas - the priority PWC assigns to meeting tenant location needs and the flexibility provided to tenants to carry out tenant services.

In its mandate for providing productive space for tenants and maximizing the investment in its inventory, PWC is frequently caught between two conflicting objectives. Occasionally, the pressure on PWC to fill vacant Crown-owned facilities can override tenants' need for locations to serve customers. Providing priority to tenant location needs may increase PWC program costs, but doing otherwise is a case of economizing in a support program while producing uneconomic results for both the line organization and the general public. Providing priority to tenants location requirements will place special responsibility on tenants to exercise discipline and discretion in articulating needs.

There is no single formula to provide increased tenant autonomy regarding tenant services. Situations vary widely depending upon the size and capabilities of the tenant, Crown owned vs leased buildings, single-occupant vs multi-occupant buildings and remote vs urban locations.

Rather than create a single formula or designating a specific dollar threshold, the Task Force believes that tenants and PWC should develop building and tenant specific solutions based upon roles for both parties as follows:

- The landlord (PWC) should have exclusive responsibility for providing the required facility and for maintaining its structural integrity. The landlord should approve and/or post audit all changes to the interior environment of the facility to ensure structural integrity and other technical standards are observed.
- The landlord should ensure that administrative arrangements are in place (eg: standing offers) to permit the tenant to arrange for tenant services which the tenant wishes to carry out directly or to organize PWC realty services to provide prompt and efficient tenant services on behalf of the tenant.

- The tenant should have responsibility for and the option of determining the autonomy and discretion it wishes within this relationship for carrying out tenant services. The tenant should be accountable for following established technical standards and processes when carrying out tenant services directly and for obtaining required landlord approvals.

Although tenants would have authority to contract directly for tenant services under these recommendations, it would not reduce the tenants' responsibility to follow government public tendering practices. Currently for construction contracts above \$60K, public notice (newspapers, journals) are used and should be continued. For contracts under \$60K, PWC uses its ACCORD (Administration and Control of Contracts and Regional Data) system which is a computerized method of creating short lists of contractors bids. The Task Force considers that the ACCORD system should be retained in the new arrangements, but where appropriate, tenants should have direct access to the system.

PWC has raised the issue of whether ACCORD should be made mandatory for custodian departments that currently do their own similar services contracting. They have noted that at the present time, ACCORD provides a window for suppliers to work with the government and a level of "safety" in the contracting process. There is also some confusion as to the relative future roles of PWC and SSC in such contracting, particularly in light of the SSC Vision 2000 model. This is an area that should be reviewed by the Treasury Board Secretariat and the concerned departments.

V. ARCHITECTURAL AND ENGINEERING SERVICES (A&E)

Architectural and Engineering (A&E) are one of the several real property services provided by the PWC Services Program. Except for A&E, all other significant services are designated as 'optional' under the TB Common Services policy.

PWC A&E services are responsible for providing professional and technical services for the design, construction and project management of federal facilities and infrastructure. In most cases, PWC operates as a turnkey project manager for its clients, using private sector professionals to carry out the majority of the design function and private firms to deliver all construction.

In 1987-88, under the Cabinet approved A&E consolidation program, some 900 professional, technical and administrative staff responsible for A&E work in DOE (Parks), MOT (Air) and DINA were transferred to PWC. In addition, all PWC services were converted starting April 1, 1988 from partial cost recovery to full revenue

dependency using 'market based' fee structures approved by Treasury Board with departments given increased envelopes to pay for the new charges. During the past few years PWC A&E and its clients have been adjusting to the administrative, financial, organizational and cultural changes needed to operate \$1 Billion business of 2,300 employees on a commercial basis.

Another major area of reform for PWC A&E has been the use, starting April 1, 1989, of SPEC (Selection Prequalification and Evaluation of Consultants) as the process for contracting for architects, engineers and other real property related professionals. It provides a balanced system which preserves the concept of public right to opportunities to bid for government contracts, operates efficiently and minimizes bureaucratic and political patronage.

PWC clients accept the technical expertise of PWC and the need for PWC to manage large projects. Custodian concerns are focused on the fee cost and the timeliness of the PWC response to smaller assignments. Custodians consider that they are often capable of managing small projects and related construction contracting which only require A&E advice and that no value is added by PWC project and contract management in such circumstances.

The option of changing A&E services from mandatory to optional has been discussed with PWC. For a variety of reasons, PWC does not support the change at this time. They have argued that smaller projects are required for the training of staff; that optional services would lead to pressures to re-establish engineering groups in departments; that optionality would gradually erode the ability of PWC to maintain a centre of A&E expertise available to handle the unique requirements of government; and, that even if departments used the SPEC system of PWC, there is sufficient discretion in the use of that system to create some risk of contracting problems.

The Task Force has considered PWC's concerns, but has concluded that small A&E projects are a major irritant to clients and that the reasons provided by PWC are not sufficient to maintain the mandatory status of A&E. The Task Force is of the view that some of the risks associated with the move to optional service can be offset by the use of the SPEC system and ensuring that departments utilize it properly. In addition, the Task Force feels that PWC is over estimating the impact on its organization of the shift from mandatory to optional services. It is likely that most departments will continue to use PWC because it is either easier or does not require deploying scarce departmental personnel to manage the services. The areas where departments are most likely to undertake the work are the small or specialized project needs where PWC does not have a strong capability. Finally, the Task Force believes that by removing many of these "irritants", the relationship between PWC and departments will

improve and that PWC will be able to focus its energies on the most critical value-added A&E functions.

The Task Force does recognize, however, that to operate in this more competitive environment, PWC may require special "freedoms" from current government management policies. Also, if person year (PY) decontrol is implemented across government, Treasury Board may have to establish special rules to restrict the growth of departmental A&E organizations. The Task Force concludes that full optionality is preferred, while still retaining the concept of centralized contracting for private A&E professionals.

VII. RECOMMENDATIONS

The Task Force recommends that:

8. The operations of the Real Property Program be revised to provide greater flexibility and autonomy to tenants within the landlord/tenant relationship by:
 - 8.1 developing the bilateral tenant specific standards which give priority consideration to tenant location requirements for those functions which provide direct service to the public;
 - 8.2 providing tenants the option of carrying out tenant services either directly with contractors or through PWC, subject to PWC retaining the minimum level of control essential to protect the structural integrity of its buildings;
 - 8.3 redefining tenant services to include as many activities as possible under this category and transferring funds for these additional areas from PWC to tenants;
 - 8.4 retaining ACCORD (Administration and Control of Contracts and Regional Data) as a mandatory system for small construction and services contracting but adapting it so that tenants have access to the system when they wish to contract directly.
9. The operations of PWC Architectural and Engineering services be designated as 'optional' under the Treasury Board Common Services policy as of April 1, 1992 subject to:

- PWC's SPEC (Selection Prequalification and Evaluation of Consultants) system being the sole method for engaging private sector A&E professionals;
- the government ensuring that departments do not use the 'optional' status to recreate internal A&E organizations.

CHAPTER 5

DEPARTMENTAL MANAGEMENT

I. INTRODUCTION TO DEPARTMENTAL MANAGEMENT

The work of the Task Force on Administrative Policies and Common Services started by focusing on the role of central agencies and service departments. As our work progressed, it was evident that managers thought their own departments were also responsible for a large part of the problems they experienced in managing.

The themes of inadequate delegation within departments, and insufficient communication of new policy options emerged in surveys of regional councils conducted by the Task Force 2000 secretariat. These issues were also raised in various regional meetings held by Paul Tellier, John Edwards and the Secretariat staff. Finally, these problems came up frequently in the focus groups held by our Task Force across the country in May 1990.

While managers were very positive towards increased authority and flexibility in areas such as contracting, procurement and common services, they were also cautious about the resource implications of these changes. Many expressed concern about the ability of their relatively small offices to take full advantage of increased authorities and they expressed strong needs for good communication and training to accompany changes.

As one manager put it in the focus group discussion:

"I think that there are two points of caution that I would offer, just to reinforce what other people have said. The kind of change we are talking about is a fundamental change in the style of management in the federal Public Service. There's no point in tinkering with the system and changing bureaucracy from central agencies to some place else (i.e the departments). We're talking about a really fundamental change. If people don't appreciate and understand that then it is not going to work."

Without a major effort by departments to review how they develop their own management practices and procedures many of the aims of PS 2000 will not be achieved in the areas of administrative policies and common services.

II. MANAGERS' FEEDBACK

There were four major issues related to departmental management identified by participants in the focus groups.

Four Major Problems

1. Department Management Culture

The most pervasive problem identified by managers is the rule-bound, risk-averse culture of most departments. There are many contributing factors to this culture which are peculiar to the public sector:

- central agency policies have, up to now, promoted a control and compliance orientation in departments as opposed to achievement of results or program objectives.
- deputy ministers and senior executives who have so many demands on their time tend to rely on corporate groups to be "watch-dogs" to keep them and the Minister out of" trouble or respond to the needs of central agencies.
- the fish-bowl environment of government means that errors are highly publicized and can create questions for the Minister or senior officials. This is aggravated by the annual Auditor General's report and internal audit reports which usually call for more controls and regulations, rather than identifying areas where streamlining of regulations can be accomplished.
- the typical response of government in the past (both central agencies and departments) to problems identified is to issue new rules or controls limiting everyone's discretion and providing a clear signal reinforcing a risk-averse culture.

As a result of some of these tendencies in government, managers and employees often feel that they are not rewarded for innovation and are systemically discouraged from creating "problems" that could cause anyone at a superior level to have to answer questions. Overcoming this culture of risk avoidance and the preoccupation with errors as opposed to results will take sustained leadership and commitment within departments.

2. The Need for Department Streamlining to Parallel Changes in Central Agencies and Service Agencies

Treasury Board has already begun streamlining and reducing administrative regulations. If the recommendations of this Task Force are fully implemented,

the role of common service agencies will change considerably. The challenge in the next few years is for departments to do the same. Many of the departments developing IMAA MOU's found that a large number of the irritants they faced were a result of their own rules and had little to do with Treasury Board or other central agency requirements.

Managers at regional and Ottawa levels expressed concern during the focus groups that once departments had achieved increased authority from central agencies there was little incentive for them to pass it down and every reason to establish "mini-Treasury Boards."

Most participants in focus group meetings were still not aware of the recent change of SSC to increase procurement levels to \$1,000 and \$2,500. Many were not aware of the increases of authority and the options provided to departments under PS 2000 in areas such as contracting, hospitality and security. They were also not familiar with deregulations that had taken place by Treasury Board over a year ago and announcements of special operating agencies in December, 1989. There was some concern that the changes made under the PS 2000 initiative in March would take place in headquarters and that the regional operations would not benefit.

Participants in several focus groups noted that internal departmental procurement processes had to be streamlined before departments really could benefit from increased authority. This would involve a reduction of the number of signatures and approval levels required, and the number of people required to check a document before it proceeds to the next step.

In terms of both contracting and procurement, participants supported increased delegation but cautioned that such increases were only one (albeit significant) part of the solution to finding more efficient means of meeting departmental needs.

In many meetings, participants felt that departments could make significant progress by simplifying their processes as much as possible, reducing their paperwork burden, "getting rid of all the hoops we go through", removing the cumbersome accountability chain and avoiding the duplication and excessive verification of work in each step of the process. They also wanted their internal service groups to be more client and service oriented. Two senior regional managers put it this way:

"I have a nice sheet of delegation of authority between my department and myself which covers everything. But, I really cannot spend a cent without going to someone else or a committee within the department."

"I think that the real problem in most of the areas is in their own departments and this horrendous tendency to keep everything in Ottawa." Because we hold back authorities the regions are limited in the kind of contracting they can do. It seems to me that the whole thing is not going to succeed unless the whole bloody system is cleaned up...Get away from national controls."

Another frustration for service agencies is when their delegations within their own departments make it very difficult to be responsible to regional or district clients because they have to go to a regional headquarters office for approval of small items or to HQ in Ottawa. To overcome some of these problems, managers strongly supported widespread communications of the findings and recommendations of PS 2000 through the media, Treasury Board publications, and departmental publications. They suggested that central agency staff provide briefings to regional offices and staff across the country and that training programs be developed where possible to help departments and managers adjust to change.

3. Impediments to Change: Resource Implications

In our focus groups, the participants expressed considerable concern about the resource implications of further delegation and the implications for development of expertise and training requirements within departments. Generally, they welcomed more flexibility and authority in contracting, procurement and other areas, but were more cautious than the Task Force would have expected. They were genuinely concerned about their ability, given their resources, to perform additional functions. In some cases managers noted that they would like to have more procurement authority but that they would still tend to use DSS because it had the person-years and the expertise which would be hard to duplicate at the departmental level. Here are some examples of their views:

"If they do increase delegation to departments, we're going to have an added workload...it takes a certain amount of time before people are capable of providing advice and also coming up with alternatives."

"It is always nice to see things given to departments and for them to do it, but at the same time, it is also a certain amount of work. We have to stick within the rules and regulation as they stand presently at DSS, we have to tender correctly ...and that takes staff and its takes expertise that you haven't got in the departments." (Winnipeg)

"It is great to decentralize control, but unless the PY's come with that decentralization, you won't make things any more effective - and perhaps even less effective -because we simply don't have the people available to implement the process. If you are going to transfer control and responsibility you have to transfer PY's as well. (Halifax)

"I hope they take some caution and look at what the implications are before they make the changes. Know what the ramifications are in the departments and the PY allocations that will be required and the dollars that will be required to do the job in departments."

Given these concerns it will be important for the federal government and departments to recognize the resource implications of increased authorities and delegations. Although there are definitely some efficiencies to be gained from reducing paperwork and the number of agencies involved in low-dollar value procurements and tenant services expenditures, it should also be noted that many of the support groups in departments have been downsized to the point where additional responsibilities are very hard to accommodate without reducing their services to line operations in other areas.

4. Role of Managers and Departmental Support Groups

Most participants who attended focus groups felt that changes in central agency policies, more delegation and departmental reforms would require an increased emphasis on training and communication of new policies and their implications. It was also evident from our focus groups that many employees completely rely on their staff groups to know the rules and help them work through a very complex governmental system. If employees are to accept more responsibility and authority in areas such as contracting or procurement, there will be a requirement for increased training and/or more expertise and advice from support groups.

The following quotes are very typical of the comments of many of the line managers in Ottawa and the regions. The individuals have so many program demands and requirements that they rely extensively on various internal administration groups:

"Something odd and I find it interesting is that I know so few of the rules. All I do is go to somebody and say "I need or I want to do this. Tell me how I do it." They tell me how I do it and I do whatever they tell me as long as I get my results which is whatever I asked for in the first place. I don't really worry about their rules. So I don't even know how I would fix the rules if I tried because I don't know what these rules are."

"As a manager with all the increased delegation that's coming down, its a double-edged sword. Everybody wants me now to become an expert in everything. I cannot retain all the knowledge I should have in staffing or contracting. I find I'm getting quite burdened with all these details. I am lucky now I've got a support person. But, a lot of units don't. I can't be an expert in everything."

"Don't ever underestimate the power of training -it's not learning how to do something that you've never done before - although there is some of that -it is a whole mind-set change - you're not used to doing this the first time (it's) handed down."

"Make the delegation commensurate with the training."

"I think that as the government attempts to delegate more and force more decisions down and raise authority levels and these kinds of things, it's going to be essential that the message coming down expresses the accountability side - that managers in exchange for this are going to have to be more accountable and more training is needed to help make them more accountable."

It is likely that the support functions of most departments will be most affected by changes by central agencies and departments. To carry out a changed role, training and communication will be very important for both line and support groups.

III. DEPARTMENT MANAGEMENT: THE PROBLEM OF DELEGATION

There is a lot of misinformation about the question of departmental delegation. One of the most interesting parts of the work of the Task Force was that neither central agencies nor departments were aware of the extent to which various authorities had been delegated. It was obvious that the question of sufficient authority was not a primary concern except for those who did not feel that they had enough authority with which to operate.

To ensure that the Task Force had a solid idea of existing delegation levels, the PS 2000 Secretariat and the OCG surveyed authority levels in areas such as consulting contracts, non-consulting contracts, hospitality, and local purchase orders. Although it was expected that there would be major differences in authority levels due to differences in the size and nature of departments, the results of this survey confirmed the worst fears of the Task Force.

Highlights

To understand and summarize the data received, the Task Force developed Figure 1 which compares delegations in 14 departments for 5 policy areas (i.e consulting contracts, non-consulting contracts, goods contract, local purchase authority, and hospitality). By taking four levels in each department and determining the level of delegation in these policy areas for each, the extent of total delegation was determined.

Of the 14 departments surveyed, only four departments have delegated most of the authority to Director General (DG) and Responsibility Centre Manager (RCM) levels. The majority of departments have not delegated any authority, or have delegated only a small portion of the authority. Overall, within a department, the authority level of the Regional DG is lower than the authority level of the Headquarters DG. The same can be said about the Regional RCM and the Headquarters RCM. There is a marked difference between the authority levels of the DG vs the RCM; the RCM authority level being generally much lower than the one of DG.

Figure 2 summarizes these results of the 14 departments and the five policy areas surveyed. Only 29% of the positions surveyed had full authority delegated to them, while 32% of the authority has not been delegated at all. While it was not expected that the full authority would have been delegated to all positions, it was very surprising to find departments which have not delegated any authority to these levels. In some departments, the level of authority for contracting for regional directors and resource centre managers is miserably low.

In the context of the Task Force discussions about increased delegation by SSC, the numbers in Figure 3 showed why managers were complaining about delegation within their own departments. The delegation for Local Purchase Orders (\$500 at the time of the survey) illustrates that almost half of the Directors General and Resource Centre Managers did not have any of the existing authority provided by SSC in this area.

Because managers in many cases have limited authority or have to deal with numerous bureaucratic processes, they are often unable or even unwilling to provide much flexibility to staff. This is one of the main causes of morale problems in the public service.

IV. CONCLUSIONS

It is clear from the feedback the Task Force has received and the experiences of other organizations in making changes to reduce bureaucratic processes that there are many barriers to change. These barriers can be rooted in the culture of departments, the management style and approach of the department and in very specific areas such as resources, communications and training.

Many departments are becoming aware of the need to streamline their management procedures. The IMAA process has facilitated this to some extent and so has PS 2000. However, it is not yet clear that departments have been able to give this the time, energy and commitment that it requires to make change happen. Without a major effort by departments to review how they develop their own management practices and procedures, many of the aims of PS 2000 will not be achieved in the areas of administrative policies and common services. In addition, managers and employees must become much more aware of administrative policies and roles of common services and must desire to assume more authority in these areas.

These types of problems are not only restricted to government. The Task Force had a very interesting presentation from IBM describing their own organizational difficulties in this area and the initiatives that they have taken to provide an more innovative work environment. The conclusion of their work was that to counteract the tendency of organizations to become process-oriented and rule-bound, it is necessary to adopt a very strong initiative in which the senior executive of the organization and managers can reinforce as well as reward the desired change.

Challenges of Change

Because of the difficulty of changing the approach to administrative policies and common services in government, top-level commitment is absolutely required in a department to make change. The support of the Deputy Minister and the entire management team are critical to provide the right signals and sustained attention to these types of problems.

The requirement for top-level support and attention to the change process is all the more important because increased authority and flexibility is usually related to questions of accountability. The aim of PS 2000 can be achieved only if the recommended changes are combined with an extensive communications program throughout the entire organization and are enriched by the participation of all employees. In order to facilitate changes that would support the aims of PS 2000, departments should:

- Undertake a major communications program to involve staff in the change process by: seeking their views, identifying opportunities for improvement, and determining ways to change management processes that stifle initiative or create unnecessary constraints.
- Undertake reviews of procedures and look for ways to simplify the systems by reducing constraints on managers and clarifying authority, responsibility and accountability.
- Develop communication programs promoting key values or principles to ensure managers and employees understand how the department will approach increased delegation and streamlining and institute recognition programs and initiatives (formal and informal) to encourage the necessary changes.
- Assess the resource implications of delegation of increased contracting authorities and common service functions on department support service functions - particularly at the regional level to ensure that managers are able to respond to increases in authority and flexibility.
- Audit samples of transactions (e.g. contracts, procurements) as opposed to pre-transaction approvals to ensure accountability. They could also use audit and evaluation groups to review the efficiency of procedures and paperwork and identify better ways to manage and highlight good examples of where it is being done well.

- Develop and implement required training and development programs to support this change.
- Implement as much as possible automated procurement, contracting and assets management systems to streamline procedures, reduce paperwork and thereby free-up more resources for program delivery.

V. RECOMMENDATIONS

The Task Force recommends that:

10. Deputy Heads ensure that increased delegations and policy flexibilities provided by central agencies are well communicated and that they are matched by equivalent delegations, flexibility and accountability for managers.
11. Deputy Heads review internal delegations, procedures and accountability structures to ensure that managers have the maximum possible authority and flexibility to manage programs and provide services to the public or department clients.

Additional recommendations on communications and training are included in the following chapter on implementation.

RESULTS OF THE SURVEY ON THE DELEGATION OF AUTHORITY WITHIN DEPARTMENTS

| DEPARTMENT | CONSULTING | | | | NON-CONSULTING | | | | GOODS | | | | L. P. O. | | | | HOSPITALITY | | | |
|---------------|------------|-----|-----|-----|----------------|------|-----|------|-------|------|------|------|----------|----|----|----|-------------|-------|--------|------------|
| | *1 | *2 | *3 | *4 | *1 | *2 | *3 | *4 | *1 | *2 | *3 | *4 | *1 | *2 | *3 | *4 | *1 | *2 | *3 | *4 |
| NAT. REV. TAX | F | F | F | F | F | F | F | F | 50k | 50k | 50k | 50k | N | N | N | N | N | N | N | N |
| NAT. REV. C&E | 25k | N | N | N | 50k | 2k | 50k | 15k | 40k | 15k | 40k | 25k | N | N | F | N | \$100 | N | \$100 | N |
| E&I.C. | 10k | N | 10k | N | 10k | N | 10k | 2k | N | N | N | N | N | N | N | F | \$500 | N | F | \$200 |
| TRANSPORT | 30k | N | 50k | N | 50k | N | F | N | N | N | F | N | F | N | F | F | F | N | F | N |
| AGRICULTURE | 50k | 15k | 50k | 25k | 50k | 15k | 50k | 25k | 75k | 25k | 75k | 50k | F | F | F | F | \$500 | \$500 | \$500 | \$500 |
| CSC | F | N | F | F | F | N | F | N | F | F | F | F | F | F | F | F | \$500 | N | \$500 | N |
| NH&W | F | 20k | F | 20k | F | 8k | F | 20k | F | 10k | 100k | 25k | F | N | F | F | \$500 | N | \$500 | N |
| F&O | F | F | F | F | F | 100k | F | 100k | F | 100k | F | 100k | F | F | F | F | F | N | F | N |
| I&NC | 50k | 50k | 50k | 50k | 60k | 60k | 60k | 60k | 40k | N | 40k | 40k | F | N | F | F | \$500 | N | \$500 | N |
| ENV. | 50k | N | 25k | 10k | F | 50k | F | 25k | N | N | N | N | F | F | F | F | 1k | \$500 | 1k | N |
| COMM. | N | N | F | N | N | N | N | 5k | N | F | F | F | N | N | F | N | F | N | F | N |
| C&CA | 15k | 10k | 10k | 1k | 15k | 10k | 10k | 1k | 20k | 20k | 10k | 2k | N | F | N | F | F | F | F | N |
| PSC | 25k | 10k | N | N | 50k | 15k | N | N | 25k | 10k | N | N | F | F | F | N | \$200 | N | N | N |
| S.S. | 10k | 5k | 10k | N | 10k | 10k | 25k | N | 10k | 10k | 25k | 2k | N | N | N | N | \$250 | N | \$250 | N |
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| ** F | 4 | 2 | 5 | 3 | 5 | 1 | 6 | 1 | 4 | 2 | 4 | 2 | 8 | 6 | 10 | 9 | 4 | 1 | 5 | 0 |
| 76-99 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| 51-75 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 |
| 26-50 | 4 | 1 | 3 | 1 | 1 | 2 | 1 | 2 | 0 | 1 | 2 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 5 | 2 | 4 | 1 |
| 1-25 | 5 | 5 | 4 | 4 | 7 | 7 | 6 | 6 | 7 | 7 | 5 | 7 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 3 | 0 | 2 | 1 |
| | 1 | 6 | 2 | 6 | 1 | 4 | 1 | 5 | 3 | 4 | 3 | 4 | 6 | 8 | 4 | 5 | 1 | 11 | 2 | 12 |
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Total | number | in percent |
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | 82 | 29.3% | |
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | 0 | 0% | |
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | 2 | 0.7% | |
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | 31 | 11.1% | |
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | 76 | 27.1% | |
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | 89 | 31.6% | |
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | 260 | 100.0% | |

F = Full Delegation
N = No Delegation


Headquarter
*1-Directeur General
*2-Responsibility Center Manager
Region
*3-Director General
*4-Responsibility Center Manager

The survey covered 14 departments,
5 policy areas and 4 positions*
(2 in headquarters and 2 in the
regions)

** % of amount of authority delegated to departments

Figure 2


Delegation of Authority to 4 Titles within 14 departments for 5 Policy Areas (Consulting, Non-Consulting, Goods, LPO and Hospitality)



DG: Director General (HQ and Regions)
RCM: Responsibility Centre Manager (HQ and Regions)

Figure 3

Delegation of Authority within 14 Departments for L.P.O.



CHAPTER 6

IMPLEMENTATION

I. INTRODUCTION TO IMPLEMENTATION

This chapter presents an action plan to implement the recommendations of the Task Force and to monitor progress in a systematic manner.

II. RISK

One of the most difficult implementation problems faced by the federal government in the areas of administrative policies and common services is the management of the risks of errors and the potential problems this could cause for Ministers. Many of the current policies and mandatory services have developed from a requirement to centralize decisions or subject operations to processes which minimized public criticism or at least provided an easy defence against such criticisms. If major increases in delegation or changes in the roles of CSO's result in more "errors" or public revelations of problems, this will undoubtedly lead to demands for further controls or centralization.

But it must also be recognized that there are tremendous costs associated with reducing the risk of error to zero. To accomplish this requires complicated review processes such as auditing every travel claim. It limits the potential to delegate, which means that senior managers spend more time on paper work for small expenditures and less time managing. It means that staff groups, service agencies or central agencies are utilized to double-check everything that managers do. All of this consumes increasingly scarce resources at a time when departments are having difficulty finding the resources to deliver their basic programs.

The Task Force has been very aware of these potential problems from the outset of its work. Several of the recommendations have taken these concerns into account. In many respects the claims of increased risks of embarrassment are overstated and reflect the traditional tendency of government not to trust public servants or believe that they will act responsibly. This is not to say that there will not be some problems created by increased authorities. With the appropriate training, proper communications, better accountability, and the support of Ministers, departments should be able to create enough safeguards to provide more options and delegation.

III. RELATED INITIATIVES

Prior to discussing the Task Force's own views on implementation, we would like to underline other initiatives that were taken at the same time as the PS 2000 review. A

good example of the excellent work of these committees is the report produced on May 30, 1990 by the Payments Practices Sub-Committee. The terms of reference of this Sub-Committee were: to identify best practices related to the Accounts Payable processes; to communicate information to departments in order to enable them to adapt the suggested practices; and make recommendations to the Chief Accountant's Council on payment practices. Their report contains good recommendations that are in the spirit of PS 2000, and when put in place, will clear some of the underbrush that we talk about in this report. Here are a few examples of recommendations contained in this report:

- That departments pay regular day-to-day suppliers on the basis of a monthly billing rather than on a transaction-by-transaction basis;
- That the Chief Accountants Council endorse a risk approach to the verification of accounts and provide the Office of the Comptroller General with information/requirements in order that policy revisions be more practical;
- That departments use petty cash for travel refunds under \$100, and adopt the practice of issuing travel advances of less than \$100 from their petty cash accounts where it is cost effective;
- That departments and agencies adopt the best practise of varying the degree of verification for sections 33 and 34 of the Financial Administration Act on the basis of dollar value to provide greater cost/benefit in the verification of travel claims.

The Task Force fully endorses the efforts and recommendations of this Sub-Committee and encourages other groups in the government to make similar initiatives.

IV. IMPLEMENTATION

The changes proposed by the Task Force present significant challenges. Breaking the inertia of a rule-bound culture will require a sustained effort from Central Agencies, Common Service Organizations and departments as well as support from Ministers of departments for increased delegation. In addition, adequate measures must be undertaken to enable the CSO's to come to terms with their new roles in an orderly manner that will minimize the impact of these changes on their employees.

A) Central Agencies

Administrative policies and the roles of common service agencies must encourage effective and efficient delivery of departmental programs to the public. They must allow sufficient initiatives to make final decisions at the appropriate levels. Government-wide directives must be limited to instances where there is a clear benefit or "value added" to the process of decision-making.

The Task Force believes that Treasury Board Secretariat should commence a review of administrative policies to better balance concerns of prudence, probity and economy with the following sets of questions:

- i. Is there a requirement for this policy on a government/department-wide basis? Are we needlessly creating a government/department-wide rule to meet the particular needs of a special, limited operation?
- ii. What are the cost implications of implementing the policy for departments and government?
- iii. How will the policy be expected to affect on departmental operations, or on departmental management? Is it practical? Will it work? Is there any incentive to support policy?
- iv. To what extent does the proposed policy reduce managerial authority? Can it be made more flexible in order to assist front-line managers in carrying out their duties or achieving program objectives?
- v. Does it increase or reduce paper burden or routine bureaucratic requirements?
- vi. Can it be communicated and understood easily?
- vii. Will this policy allow the front-line manager to make the final decision, based on the circumstances?

Specifically, the Task Force recommends that:

12. The federal government adopt new principles for administrative policies based on maximum incentives, authority and commensurate accountability for managers at all levels and that central agencies and departments review their administrative policies and common services in this light. This will ensure that administrative policies and common services achieve a better balance between government wide management requirements and the need for departmental and managerial flexibility.
13. The Treasury Board Secretariat work with the Staff Training Agency and the Centre for Management Development and other appropriate institutions to develop the necessary training programs to implement the recommendations of this report.
14. Treasury Board Secretariat and Departments develop should extensive communication programs to ensure that all employees are familiar with new or changed policies, their authority levels and the implications of these policies for their responsibilities.

B) Common Service Organizations

Common Services must meet the need for managerial authority and flexibility as well as the need for economy, prudence and probity. The Task Force recommends:

15. All common services be reviewed periodically by a series of TBS-led interdepartmental program evaluations with study team representation by Treasury Board Secretariat/Office of the Comptroller General, CSO's and client departments.
16. That CSO's review all their operations on a regular basis to revise levels of delegations to departments and to ensure their services are being provided in a manner sensitive to the needs of clients.

C) Departments

Managers delivering programs are in the best position to apply their judgement and make decisions on the implementation of administrative policies. The Task Force sees the need to give managers maximum initiatives and authority to make decisions. Training and support to facilitate these judgements is essential. Building on the recommendation made in Chapter 5 regarding the need to delegate authority "down and out" within departments, the Task Force recommends that:

17. Departments give high priority to developing a consistent internal communications thrust to complement government-wide communications initiatives. This will ensure that all departmental employees are aware of and understand the basics of the new or modified administrative policies, their authority levels, where to go for assistance and the implications of the changes for delivering departmental programs.
18. Departments provide or support the required training to ensure that all employees are able to take full advantage of increased authorities provided.

V. Accountability for Implementation

To achieve the necessary changes, there must be in place clear responsibility for implementation of these changes and a framework for reporting on progress. The implementation of both the substance and the spirit of approved PS 2000 recommendations by Deputy Heads should be explicitly considered by PCO in annual performance reviews of Deputy Heads. The Task Force recommends that:

19. An evaluation report be prepared for the Treasury Board on an annual basis for the next three years.

The evaluation report will use the following evaluation criteria:

- a) the extent of delegation of increased administrative policy authorities by Treasury Board and departments (to clients) compared with the situation as of April 1, 1990;

- b) the extent of delegation of authority by DSS; by DPW;
- c) the extent of delegation of all authorities within departments compared with the situation as of April 1, 1990;
- d) the degree of progress in moving mandatory common services to the optional category;
- e) the success of streamlining initiatives with respect to the administrative policies of:
 - i) Treasury Board
 - ii) Common Service Organizations
 - iii) Departments

The Task Force should meet in the Fall of 1991 to review the draft report, assess progress against this framework, and as appropriate, make additional recommendations for consideration.

ANNEXES

TASK FORCE MEMBERSHIP

Ms. Margaret Catley-Carlson
Deputy Minister
Health & Welfare Canada
Chairperson

Mrs. Margaret Amoroso
Director General
Management Category Programs
Public Service Commission

Ms. Raymonde Dubois
Executive Assistant
Deputy Minister's Office
Health and Welfare Canada

Mr. Paul Gauvin
Executive Director
Finance & Administration
Employment & Immigration
Canada

Mr. Ghislain Leblond
Associate Deputy Minister
Agriculture Canada

Mr. Andy Macdonald
Comptroller General of Canada

Mr. Cliff MacKay
Assistant Deputy Minister
Industry, Science and Technology
Canada

Mr. Dann Michols
Director, Consultation and
Co-ordination
Royal Commission on New
Reproductive Technology

Mr. Reid Morden
Director
Canadian Security Intelligence
Service

Mr. Richard Paton
Assistant Secretary
Administrative Management
Division
Treasury Board Secretariat

Ms. Monique Plante-Boyd
Director General
Communications Directorate
Health & Welfare Canada

Mr. Derek Sweet
Public Service 2000

Mr. Frank Swift
Vice-President
Atlantic Canada Opportunities Agency
New Brunswick Office

Ms. Anne Wallis
Administrative Co-ordinator
Health & Welfare Canada

Mr. Jean-Pierre Wallot
National Archivist of Canada

DOMAIN OF ADMINISTRATIVE POLICIES & COMMON SERVICES

POLICY AREAS

Access to Information &
Privacy

Common Services

Communications

Contracting

Employee Services

Extramural Performance of
Science & Technology

Financial Management

Information Holdings

Information Technology

Internal Audit

Materiel Management

Procurement Review

Project Management

Program Evaluation

Real Property

SUBSIDIARY ELEMENTS

Access to Information
and Privacy

Travel
Hospitality

Materiel Management
Motor Vehicles
Furniture & Furnishings

Major Crown Projects

Assignment of Administration
Investment Planning
Disposal
Land Conveyance
Safe & Adequate Facilities
Accessibility For Disabled
Built Heritage
Environmental Protection
Provincial/Municipal Interface

Risk Management

Risk Management & Underwriting
Compensation & Restoration
Ex Gratia

Security

COMMON SERVICES PROVIDED BY CSO'S

The tables on the following pages set out the types of common services provided by the CSO's listed in Annex 2. It is important to add that these services, whether mandatory or optional are generally accompanied by extensive guidelines, reporting and monitoring systems which impact on departmental resources.

| <u>SERVICE</u> | <u>CURRENT STATUS</u> | <u>PROPOSED STATUS</u> |
|---|---------------------------|----------------------------|
| Advertising (1) | M | M |
| Architectural or engineering (A&E) service for real property | M | O |
| Art rentals | M | O |
| Assets management of movables | O | O |
| Audio-visuals production service (3) | M | O |
| Auditing (4) | O | O |
| Other communications services (5) | O | O |
| Compensation management (6) | M | M |
| Construction contracting associated with PWC's A&E services | M | O |
| Other construction contracting related to contracting services (tendering and award only) | O | O |
| Custody of securities | M | M |
| Disposal (surplus goods) | M | O |
| Disposal (surplus real property) | M | M |
| Property management (PWC provides service to custodians) | O | O |
| Expositions (7) | M | O |

| | | |
|---|-----|---|
| Financial, administrative, and other services | O | O |
| Information technology standards | M | M |
| Interpretation of spoken languages (see also - Translation) | M | O |
| Legal services to departments | M | M |
| Maintenance and repair of office equipment | O | O |
| Management consulting (4) | O | O |
| Management training | O | O |
| Media monitoring | O | O |
| Personnel management information systems | RFR | O |
| Printing (7) | M | O |
| Procurement: | | |
| a. goods (8) | M | M |
| b. special services (8) | M | M |
| Public opinion research | O | O |
| Public relations contracts | O | O |
| Publishing (7) | M | O |
| Other real property services | O | O |
| Receiver General: derivative services | O | O |
| Signage | M | O |
| Staff training and development (9) | RFR | O |
| Statistical services to departments (10) | RFR | O |

| | | |
|--|-----|---|
| Telecommunications (11) | | |
| - within Canada and USA | O | O |
| - international | O | O |
| Temporary Assignment Pool (TAP) (12) | O | O |
| Tenant Services (PWC provides service for tenants in PWC) | M | O |
| Traffic management (13) | M | O |
| Translation of written languages (see also - Interpretation) | M | O |
| Travel | - | O |
| Warehousing | RFR | O |

Notes:

- (1) Departments' paid announcements, such as public notices regarding tenders, sales, public hearings, offers of employment, business hours and addresses, may be placed dealing directly with the media provided an advertising agency is not used.
- (2) Mandatory with special optional arrangements, including direct contracting by departments with contractors, under special circumstances.
- (3) While some departments maintain in-house audio-visual services, private sector audio-visual services are available through SSC. The government intends to make the services available through SSC optional as of April 1, 1992, under a special operating agency.
- (4) The government intends to consolidate and to convert the Audit Services Bureau and the Bureau of Management Consulting into a special operating agency.
- (5) Other communications services include: strategic planning inputs, environmental assessment, writing, editing, multi-media project management, evaluation, graphic design, and creative services.
- (6) This refers to the function of administering employee compensation.

- (7) The government intends to have this service provided by a special operating agency.
- (8) Includes:
- science and engineering acquisitions
 - commercial acquisitions
 - stocked item supply
 - research and development and other scientific activities related to procurement
 - executive vehicles acquisition
 - non-competitive contracts over \$2,000 for former public servants receiving a pension
 - other services such as temporary help and commissionaire services
- (9) The government intends to have this service provided by a special operating agency.
- (10) "Statistical services" means the development of statistical information through surveys or use of administrative data, including:
- design, organization, statistical evaluation, interpretation and analysis, but not review;
 - development of statistical standards, classifications, registers, and sampling frames; and
 - dissemination of large statistical data bases for general access in electronic modes.

"Statistical services" do not apply to the mandatory review of departmental information collection proposals, which is the responsibility of Statistics Canada.

- (11) In this policy, "telecommunications" refers to transmissions used for communication by electrical, electronic or electromagnetic means, including voice (e.g. telephone, radio), messages (e.g. telegraph, teleprinter, electronic message or mail systems, fund transfer), images (e.g. facsimile, video), computer data, computer conferencing, networks supporting integrated office systems (e.g. local area networks or LANs), and other types of data (e.g. telemetry). The role of GTA is being reexamined at this time in relation to a possible architect function for telecommunications in government.

GTA obtains telecommunication services on request within Canada and the United States. The government intends to convert the Government Telecommunications Agency into a special operating agency.

EAC provides international telecommunication facilities on behalf of the Government of Canada.

- (12) The government intends to suspend this program as of December 31, 1990.

(13) Includes:

- Central Freight Service
- Central Removal Service
- Central Insurance Service
- Government Travel Service
- Overseas Traffic Service
- Fleet Management Information Service

Note: The Fleet Management Information Service will become optional as of April 1, 1991.

FOR DISCUSSION

PUBLIC SERVICE 2000: REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE ON
RESOURCE MANAGEMENT AND
BUDGET CONTROLS

August 7, 1990

Index

| | Page |
|--|------|
| Executive Summary | 3 |
| Introduction | 7 |
| A Framework for Resource Management | 7 |
| Consultation Process | 9 |
| Consultation with Unions | 9 |
| Consultation with Employees and Managers | 9 |
| Historical Perspective | 10 |
| Environmental Considerations | 10 |
| Accountability: | |
| A Cornerstone of Managing Resources Effectively | 11 |
| Critical Features of the Current System | 13 |
| Misconceptions and Myths | 14 |
| Improved Resource Management | 15 |
| Basic Budget Controls: | |
| PYs, Operating and Minor Capital Expenditures | 16 |
| The Problem of Lapsing: | |
| Its Impact on Resource Management | 20 |
| Resource Management and Parliament's Needs | 22 |
| Lack of Incentives for Better Resource Management | 25 |
| Annexes | |
| A - Historical Perspective | 27 |
| B - Accountability | 34 |
| C - Critical Features of the Current System | 44 |

Composition of the Resource Management Task Force

Members:

Marcel Massé
Jocelyne Bourgon
Andrew Macdonald
Alan Ross
Claude Bernier
Susanne Borup
Barry Carin
William J. Crandall
Barry Lacombe
Brent DiBartolo (Coordinator)
Pierre Gravelle (Leader)

Public Service 2000 Representatives:

Derek Sweet
Paul Royer

Advisors:

Bernie Gorman
Jim McCrindell
Evelyn Levine
Jim Smith
Dennis Kam
Jim Quinn

Executive Summary

This Report presents the results of the Resource Management Task Force deliberations undertaken as part of the broader Public Service 2000 Initiative to prepare the Public Service to better meet the challenges of the years ahead.

The Task Force has undertaken a detailed review, not only of specific budget controls being applied within our existing system, but of the broader aspects of resource management including assets, financial resources and people. In completing its review, the Task Force consulted extensively with a broad spectrum of Public Service employees to ensure that any recommendations would have a meaningful and positive impact on the efficient and effective delivery of programs.

The Task Force developed a philosophy of resource management along with a set of operating principles to serve as a lens through which all resource management issues were viewed.

A responsible resource management system that meets the needs of Ministers and Government must

- foster effective management;
- require managers to be accountable for results; and
- be based on the notion of trust and confidence in non-partisan, objective and professional Public Service managers and employees;

while respecting the supremacy of Parliament for approving spending.

Consistent with this philosophy, a sound resource management system should do four things:

- promote quality service and effective delivery of programs based on clear objectives and goals;
- promote efficient management by allowing as much flexibility in managing resources as possible;
- promote maximum delegation of decision-making authority to the lowest reasonable levels, with clear lines of managerial accountability; and

- restrict central regulation to those instances when it is essential to serve the broader corporate interest.

The Task Force recommendations and many others emerging within Public Service 2000 would give managers more authority and flexibility to make decisions. But with this freedom goes a need to hold managers accountable for the results they achieve. The Task Force enunciates three principles for effective accountability systems:

- Accountability must focus on results. It must be comprehensive and emphasize **personal** accountability.
- The proper selection of results is critical to the successful operation of any accountability system.
- Lines of accountability must be as clear as possible.

Departments are encouraged to build accountability systems with these characteristics into their planning, budgeting, performance appraisal, and management information systems. For many departments, it will be a matter of adjusting processes already in place.

Based on this philosophy and these principles, the Task Force makes the following recommendations:

1) Treasury Board should promulgate the Government's philosophy of management.

This recommendation would incorporate the principles and objectives contained in the Resource Management Framework outlined in this Report.

2) The Government should eliminate person-year (PY) controls and adopt single "Operating Budgets" starting in the 1992-93 fiscal year, to foster a more productive use of resources and to focus on the real cost of delivering Government programs.

This recommendation is based on the belief that giving Public Service employees the flexibility to choose the best mix of resources to deliver programs can improve efficiency, effectiveness and service. The current system of PY controls does not allow that flexibility, because one component, labour, is artificially constrained in order to limit the number of employees with little attention paid to the costs associated with those employees.

3) Treasury Board should provide more flexibility to departments and their managers by approving automatic carry-forward, to the next fiscal year, of up to two per cent of the "Operating Budget" set out in the Main Estimates.

This recommendation reflects the Task Force's view that the rigidity of the lapsing requirements in the current system causes distortions in resource management. This has been recognized by Treasury Board, and action has already been taken to allow for carry-forward of lapsing appropriations. This recommendation would add further flexibility to those provisions, since they have proven to be of limited benefit.

4) The purpose orientation of spending should be maintained, and the thresholds raised to \$250 million for the establishment of separate Capital Votes and \$100 million for separate Transfer-payment Votes within a given program.

This would maintain the purpose orientation of parliamentary appropriations, but would provide departments with increased flexibility to deploy broad categories of resources to meet program needs. The increase in the threshold would give Parliament separate vote control over capital and transfer payments, when such payments are significant enough to have a specific purpose themselves.

5) Treasury Board should review the question of annuality of the budget cycle, in consultation with Parliament and the Auditor General, and should look at specific options for multi-year budgeting proposed by the Task Force.

The Task Force believes that multi-year appropriations offer potential for improved resource management consistent with the philosophy and principles established earlier. However, changes to the current system could have significant impact on Parliament's control of spending. Accordingly, we believe that any proposals for change should be developed in consultation with Parliament and the Auditor General.

6) Treasury Board should encourage the development of an asset management policy that includes the sharing of resources as described in this Report. In addition, the incentives announced by the Treasury Board President on December 15, 1989, should apply automatically.

The Task Force believes that the resource management system should provide incentives to promote good management. We acknowledge the initiatives

recently announced by the Treasury Board President, and suggest that their application be made automatic.

7) All Government departments and agencies, if they have not done so, should implement an integrated accountability regime focused on personal accountability for the achievement of results, as described in this Report.

Introduction

The goal of Public Service 2000 in the broadest sense is to change management processes and practices in the Public Service, with a view to helping build the kind of Public Service that Canada needs to meet the challenges of the years ahead.

More specifically, the objectives of the initiative are to foster and encourage a Public Service that

- is professional, highly qualified, non-partisan, and imbued with a mission of service to the public;
- recognizes its employees as assets to be valued and developed;
- places as much authority as possible in the hands of front-line employees and managers; and
- provides scope for different organizational forms to meet differing needs, but in the context of a single Public Service.

These objectives guided the work of the Task Force on Resource Management and Budget Controls.

A Framework for Resource Management

The Task Force was originally asked to look at "Budget Controls". However, members of the Task Force considered this request too restrictive. Accordingly, we decided to broaden the examination to include all aspects of resource management. Only in this way, members believe, could the objectives of Public Service 2000 be addressed.

The Task Force began by defining the philosophy and principles that should guide the consideration of resource management issues. These would provide a framework for evaluating our existing resource management system, and a basis for testing our recommendations for improving that system.

We are convinced that the philosophy and principles articulated below can help build a better resource management system in the years to come.

A responsible resource management system that meets the needs of Ministers and Government must

- **foster effective management;**
- **require managers to be accountable for results; and**
- **be based on the notion of trust and confidence in non-partisan, objective and professional Public Service managers and employees;**

while respecting the supremacy of Parliament for approving spending.

Consistent with this philosophy, a sound resource management system should do four things:

- **promote quality service and effective delivery of programs based on clear objectives and goals;**
- **promote efficient management by allowing as much flexibility in managing resources as possible;**
- **promote maximum delegation of decision-making authority to the lowest reasonable levels, with clear lines of managerial accountability; and**
- **restrict central regulation only in those instances when it is essential to serve the broader corporate interest.**

By applying these principles, we can set the stage for a major cultural transformation based on new values and attitudes. However, this transformation will have to be accompanied by a sound plan for education and information directed at many different audiences including Parliament, the Government, the public, and certainly our employees and their unions. This is even more important in the context of meeting not just our legislative and program service requirements, but also those overarching responsibilities that are also a fundamental aspect of Public Service, including the need to ensure employment equity, to provide due process, and to respect the Official Languages Act, access and privacy laws, and the Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

Accordingly, the Task Force recommends that the Treasury Board promulgate the Government's philosophy of management which would incorporate the principles and objectives contained in the Resource Management Framework outlined in this Report.

The Consultation Process

Consulting with Public Service employees and managers and with union representatives was an important element of the Task Force's activities.

Consultation with the Unions

The Task Force contacted the heads of all 15 Public Service unions in early March. We explained our objectives and outlined the issues we were examining. The Task Force offered to meet with union representatives to hear their opinions on all issues related to resource management. Five unions responded, and three met with Task Force representatives.

Although the discussions were preliminary, they allowed us to exchange much useful information. The union representatives received detailed documentation that described the key items the Task Force was considering, and they agreed to review the documentation and give us their comments and feedback. To date, union representatives have raised no major concerns about the issues the Task Force is reviewing.

Consultation with Employees and Managers

When it comes to identifying problems and testing solutions for improvement, Public Service managers and employees are our greatest asset. Accordingly, the Task Force set up 11 focus groups covering every region of the country. More than 200 people participated in these groups, and their input was invaluable.

The groups allowed a free exchange of various views on the merits of individual proposals, their potential effects and impediments to their implementation.

The focus groups were genuinely interested in the PS2000 Initiative. Everyone clearly wanted to participate, and the exchanges were open, honest and constructive.

Conclusions and comments from the focus groups are reflected in later sections of this Report. However, some of the more general points participants raised are presented below:

- A fundamental objective of the PS2000 Initiative should be to align more closely the levels of authority and accountability of individual employees.

- The resource management and financial systems should support the needs of managers and employees. Many managers now consider that these systems control them.
- Streamlining the resource management system is not enough. Personnel and administrative systems must also be improved.
- Some of the existing restrictions and constraints to effective management are self-imposed within departments.

Historical Perspective

The recommendations of this Task Force build on a process that began almost 30 years ago with the Glassco Commission. The Glassco report and subsequent reviews and initiatives are all part of a trend towards delegating increasing authority and responsibility to managers while strengthening accountability. (Annex A briefly summarizes this evolution in resource management and the major reviews that influenced it.)

Significant progress has clearly been made in delegating authority and responsibility for resource management. One objective of the PS2000 Program, however, is to determine whether more progress is possible -- not only in improving resource management, but also in dealing with other issues that affect Public Service employees, and ultimately, service to the public.

Environmental Considerations

Many variables affect the question of resource management. Public sector resource management must fully acknowledge the need to provide adequate information for Parliament to enable it to maintain reasonable control over spending. At the same time, it must acknowledge the public's demand for services while encouraging continued improvements in efficiency and effectiveness in the delivery of those services, so as to minimize the burden on taxpayers.

Another variable affecting resource management is that Canadian society and the demands it makes on the federal government are changing. Our resource management system must, therefore, be flexible enough to accommodate such change within the framework described earlier, and it cannot limit the Government's ability to respond to these changing demands.

An example of our changing needs and the Government's ability to respond to them is the increasing globalization of issues. While the Government structure was developed in the 1950s and 1960s to address specific sectoral problems (e.g., agriculture, energy, etc.), the issues being faced by governments today are becoming more and more horizontal in nature, crossing not only sectoral and departmental boundaries, but also provincial and international ones.

Accountability: A Cornerstone of Managing Resources Effectively

A key aspect of the resource management philosophy which the Task Force advocates is that managers must have both authority and accountability for using resources to achieve results. We believe that accountability is fundamental to effective, responsible resource management in the public sector.

This issue of accountability is not new. It was advocated by Glassco in 1962, by Lambert in 1979, and by a number of Auditors General in subsequent years. In addition, it has been central to particular Government initiatives such as the current Increased Ministerial Authority and Accountability (IMAA) initiative introduced by the present government.

Given the continuing concern with the issue, as part of our review of resource management, the Task Force carried out a detailed assessment of the requirements for appropriate accountability in government. In doing so, we have examined various aspects of accountability in the Public Service. We have considered previous reviews on the subject and examined elements of the current accountability system that most departments are using. The Task Force leader also wrote to all Deputy Ministers to ask them for their personal views on the issue, and provided them with an outline of some of the main requirements for fostering accountability as envisaged at that time.

Taking all that information into consideration and, after engaging in much discussion and debate, the Task Force agrees that a suitable accountability system should be based on the following principles and characteristics:

- **Accountability must focus on results rather than processes wherever possible. It must be comprehensive and emphasize personal accountability.**

- **The proper selection of results is critical to the successful operation of a system of accountability. Accordingly,**
 - results should be challenging, agreed to by both parties, explicit and quantifiable whenever possible;
 - results statements should focus on a few key, expected results;
 - results specified should generally be controllable by those being held accountable;
 - results to be achieved should be clear, differentiating between the essential and the desirable; and
 - results to be achieved should relate to an agreed-upon resourcing level.
- **Lines of accountability must be as clear as possible.**

Within departments, an individual is usually accountable directly to one person at the next highest level in the organization, and so on, up to the Deputy Minister level. The Deputy is generally accountable directly to the Minister (and the Minister to Parliament) for achieving program results. However, at the same time, the Deputy is accountable directly to others (e.g., Treasury Board, the Public Service Commission and Parliament itself via general legislation) for fulfilling responsibilities assigned by those bodies or individuals, including adhering to and delivering broad corporate or government objectives. In addition, central agencies must often rely on departmental input to fulfil their direct responsibilities (e.g., Treasury Board's responsibility for resource allocation). In those cases, the Deputy is accountable to the Minister and, in turn, the Minister is accountable to the central agency for the integrity, quality and timeliness of the information from his or her department.

Although Ministers are accountable to Parliament, they cannot be expected to know about or be held responsible for everything that individuals in their organizations do, especially if these people act contrary to established procedures or policies. In such cases, while the Minister may be expected to account for the broader policies, the responsible individual must be held accountable for his or her actions.

Improved Accountability: Prerequisites are Already in Place

Existing processes and structures should permit departments and agencies to fulfil the requirements for integrated accountability. For example, the current planning and budget processes can continue to form the basis of organizational accountability. Organizational accountability can then be brought to the personal level through the existing appraisal process and individual job descriptions. Finally, the existing information network should be able to provide the information necessary for decision-making and for monitoring progress in achieving results.

Comments from Deputy Ministers indicated that a number of organizations have already developed accountability regimes that incorporate the principles noted above. We also found that different departments have developed their own approaches to maintaining accountability to suit various operational needs. All departments should be encouraged to learn from and build on the success of others.

Accordingly, the Task Force recommends that all Government departments and agencies, if they have not done so, implement an integrated accountability regime focused on personal accountability for the achievement of results, as described earlier.

It is also important not only that departments have accountability systems, but that Parliament and the public have continued assurance that these systems are in place and working. Deputy Ministers should provide that assurance.

Annex B describes our recommended accountability regime in more detail.

Critical Features of the Current System

Annex C outlines some critical features of the existing resource management system that will affect any reform effort. Annex C covers the key issues of the Government's relationship with Parliament, the responsibilities of the Executive (Treasury Board), and the actions of departments themselves.

The recommendations that follow have taken full account of the features of the current system and the principles on which it is based.

Misconceptions and Myths

Our current resource management practices do not necessarily conform to a philosophy and set of principles of the kind we have set out. In fact, the current system is characterized by

- a failure to consistently delegate authority to a low enough level while requiring a commensurate degree of accountability, and
- artificial constraints to productive management.

The Task Force believes that some of these rigidities or constraints are rooted in misconceptions or myths about what constitutes good resource management, notably the "person-year" myth, the "lapse" myth, and the "error-free environment" myth.

The "Person-year" Myth

- Person-years are a good measure of the size of the Public Service.
- Person-years are a good indicator of the cost of running the Public Service.
- Removing person-year controls resolves all problems.
- Person-year controls are the solution to containing the growth of the Public Service.

Our focus group discussions and the views of Task Force members confirmed that the concept of the person-year (the equivalent of 12 months of employment for an individual) does not really provide a sound basis for measuring the size of the Public Service. More importantly, person-years offer only an incomplete measure of the cost of delivering programs and, in many cases, provide a misleading picture of these costs.

The "Lapse" Myth

- Lapses of appropriations will automatically result in a reduction to the program budget.
- Lapses of appropriations are indicators of poor management.
- Good fiscal policy means banking on year-end lapses.

Our focus group discussions confirmed that lapses in budgets occur for a variety of reasons, many of which are beyond the scope of management decision-making. However, it was clear that managers try to avoid lapses, if at all possible. Sometimes their efforts result in expenditures that they may have been able to target more effectively if year-end pressures had not been present.

The "Error-free Environment" Myth

- Risk-free management is good management.
- Innovation can occur without risks.

Our focus groups, like so many others in the Public Service 2000 review, emphasized that good management means intelligent risk-taking, which demands more tolerance of errors.

Improved Resource Management

The Task Force has carefully considered a number of elements of the current resource management system that could be improved, or which pose constraints to effective resource management.

In all instances, we have assessed the existing system and options for change in light of the resource management philosophy and principles that we articulated earlier in this Report. We have also assumed, in formulating our recommendations, that a comprehensive system of accountability is or will be in place and **functioning in all departments**.

The Task Force also recognizes that the Government will likely continue to face expenditure restraint, and that the need will continue for the Public Service to deliver its programs more efficiently and effectively. Accordingly, we made the following assumptions on which we have based our work and developed our recommendations:

- 1) Parliament's supremacy in approving spending and controlling the public purse must be respected. Parliamentary appropriations will continue to relate to purpose-oriented programs.
- 2) Our proposals should result in wiser, not more, spending. They should **not add to the deficit over the long term**. Instead, these proposals should increase the productivity and efficiency of Government operations.

3) Fiscal accountability must be maintained. Therefore, departments must continue to measure and monitor their use of resources and the results they achieve with those resources.

4) The general approach to resource management must continue to be responsive to Government-wide priorities, departmental mandates, public expectations, and the need to provide quality services to individual Canadians.

From these assumptions flow the comments, observations and recommendations in the following sections.

Basic Budget Controls: Person-years, Operating and Minor Capital Expenditures

Issue

As noted in Annex C, Treasury Board controls person-years and budgets. The Task Force has identified three basic problems with the current person-year control system:

- 1) **Person-years are an artificial control focusing on the size of the Public Service rather than the cost of delivering Government programs.**

This focus hinders managers from using the best mix of resources (labour, operating, capital) to get the job done, and can lead to uneconomical practices. For example, departments sometimes cannot meet the demand for fully cost-recovered programs because of the lack of person-years, even though these activities pose no incremental cost to the taxpayer.

Similarly, programs which generate revenues and which could help to reduce the deficit are being constrained by lack of person-years. We believe that, because of the limits on person-years, some services are being contracted-out at costs that exceed those of providing the service in-house with Government employees.

Our focus group discussions have confirmed these views. Clearly then, the constraint on person-years prevents managers from optimizing the mix of resources to deliver their programs most effectively.

2) Person-year controls relieve managers of responsibility for the salary components of their budgets (often the largest portion of the budget).

More specifically, managers focus on "headcount" (i.e., numbers) rather than personnel costs. For example, they are not concerned with personnel costs because an \$80,000-a-year employee and a \$30,000-a-year employee each consume just **one person-year**. Further, given the lack of concern with personnel costs, managers focus only on the operating and capital costs of delivering their programs, making true accountability difficult to achieve.

3) Person-years do not accurately measure the "size" of the Public Service.

Person-year information or forecasts do not include employees of Crown corporations (even if they depend on public funding), the military, certain parliamentary agencies, Parliament itself, the RCMP, and other small components of the public sector.

Because these organizations are not included, the person-year figures are less reflective of the size of the public sector than the general public might think.

Discussion

For these reasons, person-year controls are not the best tool for managing resources. A system that exerts control on the basis of the cost of delivering services (rather than on a headcount), and which requires managers to recognize the cost of labour and to be accountable for those costs within their control, would be more appropriate. A system that does these things would encourage more efficient management decisions.

The Task Force considered various control options. These included continuing with existing person-year controls, instituting separate wage budgets for each program, and establishing a single operating budget for resources required to deliver programs. We even considered removing all such controls.

The "Operating Budget" Approach

The idea of controlling costs through a single "Operating Budget" for each program was the only option that the Task Force felt offered the right balance of increased flexibility, while maintaining an appropriate level of control over various categories of expenditure.

England and Australia have already adopted this approach. They call it a "Running Costs" system, whereby a single operating budget for departments encompasses

the personnel, operating and minor capital and equipment budgets for a given program. Eliminating the controls on "headcount" and the barriers between the components has led to more efficiency, and has enabled managers to focus more on the cost of delivering programs. For greater understanding, we have chosen to call it the "Operating Budget".

Under an Operating Budget approach, person-year controls would be eliminated. Each departmental program would get a separate budget called the Operating Budget, which would include salaries, operating expenditures and minor capital costs. Departments would have full flexibility to move funds amongst these various components to achieve the most effective and efficient use of resources in delivering their programs. In doing so, however, departmental managers would have to consider and weigh the short-term and longer-term financial implications of all of their decisions, including personnel-related costs over which managers have control such as re-classification and overtime. Figure 1 on page 19 depicts the existing control system and a system envisaged for an Operating Budget regime. The system calls for one budget only, and a nominal split between salaries and other operating expenditures. Funds can be transferred from one component to the other but are based on a rate called the "transfer price". A transfer price is necessary because not all components of the salary budget are in a department's appropriations (e.g., employee benefit costs) and because the use of salary funds results in direct costs to and expenditures by certain central agencies such as Public Works' costs for accommodation. The transfer price will probably be set at about 30 per cent; that is, a \$1 transfer from "Salaries" to "Operating" would result in a credit of \$1.30 to that component. Conversely, an increase of \$1 to the salary component would require a reduction of \$1.30 to operating expenditures.

Each of our focus groups discussed this idea fully. Managers and employees strongly supported the Operating Budget concept. They felt that it offered a significant opportunity for improving the delivery of programs for which resources are limited. They also recognized that moving toward such a system would not make more resources available, and that any gains in productivity would depend a great deal on the quality of their management information systems.

The Operating Budget concept is a very straightforward idea. However, implementing it will be technically challenging. Each department will have to negotiate an agreement with the Treasury Board Secretariat on an individual basis. Agreements will have to define the level of resources available and the split between the salary component and other expenditures. They will also have to deal with the effects of inflation, the base workload upon which the funding level is to apply, and so on.

FIGURE 1

Current Resource Controls

1. Elements

Separate treatment of

- person-years
- operating costs
- program capital costs over \$5 million

2. Treasury Board funds all salary costs including salaries, performance pay, bilingual bonus, vacation pay, severance pay, maternity leave, shift differentials, and other allowances.

3. Departments are not free to transfer between salaries and other components.

Proposed Operating Budget

1. Elements

Single budget for

- salaries
- operating costs
- minor capital costs

Nominal split between salaries and other components

(Separate treatment of major capital costs)

2. Departments continue to be "insured" against personnel costs beyond their control (e.g., negotiated pay changes and benefits established by Treasury Board).

3. Transfers would be allowed between salaries and other components based on established "transfer price".

Conclusions and Recommendations

The Task Force believes that the Operating Budget system would be a more effective approach to resource management in the federal Public Service than would the existing system of person-year controls.

Accordingly, we recommend that the Government should eliminate person-year controls and adopt single "Operating Budgets" starting in the 1992-93 fiscal year, to foster a more productive use of resources and to focus on the real cost of delivering Government programs.

In implementing the system, Treasury Board should negotiate the technical details on timing and the application of the Operating Budget system with departments.

As part of the transition to the new system, a number of issues would have to be addressed carefully. For example, the public will continue to be interested in the size of the Public Service. Therefore, the Government must find a way to report usefully on this subject. In addition, during the transition phase, there may well be an adjustment period during which departments will review the economic implications of their actions in the past because of the artificial constraints of person-years. If reviews of this nature lead to decisions to transfer operating dollars into salary dollars, there would be an increase in the size of the Public Service. Special steps may be needed to ensure an orderly and well-managed approach to controlling any significant growth, if it should occur, in the public sector.

The Problem with Lapsing: Its Impact on Resource Management

Issue

Many managers believe that budgets must be spent entirely before the end of a fiscal year. Otherwise, if funds remain unspent, they think that programs will be perceived as either not needing the funds in the first place (providing a rationale for budget cuts), or as being poorly managed. In some cases, unavoidable delays are experienced in projects during the course of a fiscal year (e.g., planned work is delayed so that it will extend over two fiscal years when it was intended to be completed.) This will free up funds in one year, but create budget pressures in the second.

In an effort to balance available resources with the workload experienced in these situations, managers sometimes buy goods and services that they would ordinarily acquire in the subsequent fiscal year. Accordingly, spending decisions can, in some instances, be driven by the existence of potentially lapsing cash balances rather than how to make the best use of funds.

Ultimately, the rigidities of the existing resource management system may hinder managers from spending carefully and delivering their programs as efficiently as they might.

Treasury Board has recognized this problem and has acted constructively to provide flexibility in the transfer of unused funds from one fiscal year to the next through

- approval of a capital carry-over provision that allows departments to roll up to five per cent of their capital funds (to a maximum of \$75 million) into the next fiscal year, provided they ask permission to do so by December 15 of any year; and
- approval of a three per cent carry-forward for non-salary O&M on a case-by-case basis, provided requests are made by February 1.

While these actions represent a significant step, the need for managers to submit requests to take advantage of these two provisions well ahead of year-end (by December 15 and February 1 respectively) limits the benefits for individual managers. In the focus groups, managers argued that true flexibility would result only when rollover provisions could be based on year-end, or very close to year-end, data. The nine months of data available in January to meet the February 1 deadline are often not sufficient to support the decisions that have to be made.

Discussion

Once again, the Task Force considered various options. These ranged from maintaining the status quo to providing non-lapsing appropriations. We recognized, however, that any option would have to maintain the delicate balance between managerial flexibility and the Government's control of annual spending, on the one hand, and Parliament's unquestioned right to control spending on the other. Under the circumstances then, extending the existing administrative mechanism to provide for carrying forward a portion of lapsing funds seemed most appropriate. This concept, combined with the Operating Budget system described earlier, would allow managers the flexibility to adjust not only the mix of inputs but, to some extent,

the timing of expenditures to achieve the most efficient and effective use of available resources:

Conclusions and Recommendations

We have concluded that the automatic carry-forward option has a number of benefits. For example, it would remove many of the distortions resulting from the lapsing of funds at year-end. Public Service employees would be better able to match their workload with their budgets, and avoid the practice of purchasing goods and services in advance of need. For its part, Parliament would maintain full control, as Supplementary Estimates would be used to obtain approval for funds carried into the next fiscal year. Departments would also continue to provide detailed financial information to Parliament through the Public Accounts.

Accordingly, the Task Force recommends that Treasury Board provide the necessary flexibility to departments and their managers by approving automatic carry-forward to the next fiscal year of up to two per cent of the "Operating Budget" set out in the Main Estimates.

Treasury Board has ensured that its existing carry-forward provisions can be accommodated within the fiscal framework. It will also want to ensure that measures are taken so that this proposal for automatic carry-forward can be accommodated as well.

Resource Management and Parliament's Needs

Issue: The Vote Structure

Separate controls over capital expenditures and transfer payments (grants and contributions) prevent departments from delivering programs as efficiently as they might. During the year, departments have limited flexibility to reallocate funds between Votes in response to changing needs. This problem persists even when funds provided by Parliament are for the same program or general purpose. We believe that a single Vote for each program would offer the greatest potential for giving Ministers and their departments the flexibility they need to determine the most effective and productive strategies for delivering their programs. Such flexibility would translate into more productivity and better service to the public.

Options/Discussions

In recent years, the level and quality of information provided to Parliament have improved greatly with the introduction of Part III of the Estimates. Because

Parliament now has better information about how departments are spending, it may no longer have to maintain separate controls on capital and transfer payments throughout the course of a fiscal year. This could substantially reduce the number of Supplementary Estimates items, especially those which are likely of marginal importance to parliamentarians.

The Task Force has considered the possibility that providing only one Vote per program would still permit Parliament to approve spending for given purposes, while giving managers more flexibility to use funds for those purposes. In 1979, the Public Accounts Committee recommended the adoption of one Vote for each program. This has not been acted upon.

In some cases, one Vote per program would include very large expenditures on capital or transfer payments themselves. For those programs, Parliament may want to maintain separate control over the expenditures.

Therefore, the alternative is to increase the "threshold" for separate Votes to in effect implement the one Vote per program concept, except in cases of very significant capital or transfer-payment expenditures.

We reviewed the current distribution of **Capital and Transfer-payment Votes** (see Figure 2 and Figure 3 on the following pages). We found that 80 per cent of the Votes are under \$250 million each, and that this 80 per cent of the volume represents less than 20 per cent of the value of the expenditures in each area.


Increasing the threshold from \$5 million to \$250 million would remove 80 per cent of these Votes from separate control. However, Parliament could still maintain specific controls over 80 per cent of the expenditures.

Thresholds could be modified slightly in light of Parliament's traditional and continuing interest in **transfer payments**. For these payments, a threshold of \$100 million would release 40 per cent of the existing Votes from separate control. The 60 per cent of Votes that would remain controlled would still constitute 90 per cent of the value of the expenditures.

The Task Force recommends that the purpose orientation of spending be maintained, and that the thresholds be raised to \$250 million for the establishment of separate Capital Votes, and \$100 million for separate Transfer-payment Votes within any given program.


FIGURE 2: GRANTS & CONTRIBUTIONS

Distribution of G&C Votes by Size



This chart displays the number of Votes in each interval compared to the total number of G&C Votes (36).


Value Distribution of G&C Votes by Size



This chart displays the total voted dollars in each interval compared to the total G&C dollars (\$12.6 billion).


FIGURE 3: CAPITAL VOTES

Distribution of Capital Votes by Size



This chart displays the number of votes in each interval compared to the total number of capital votes (23).

Value Distrib. of Capital Votes by Size



This chart displays the total voted dollars in each interval compared to the total voted capital dollars (\$4.5 billion).

Issue: The Annual Expenditure Budget Exercise

A fixed annual budget cycle hinders managers from making the "best" program decisions, because it imposes constraints on the efficient use of resources. The annual cycle may be an unnecessary impediment in modern government operations.

Many employees have responsibilities for managing major long-term initiatives, be they capital projects, ongoing contribution programs, or other projects of extended duration. Because they are long-term, these initiatives are often subject to many external influences that affect the timing of their delivery or completion.

Focus group members noted that the annual budget exercise is extremely time-consuming. It involves detailed reporting in background documentation and in Part III of the Estimates, even for stable programs with little or no change in funding levels, and little deviation from the previous plans. Parliament, in turn, is bombarded with all the documentation on an annual basis. Therefore, it has little opportunity to review spending plans in specific programs more selectively in order to satisfy its own priorities.

Conclusions and Recommendations

The Task Force discussed a number of alternatives to the current annual budgeting cycle, including the following:

- Annual appropriations could be maintained, but with changes in reporting to Parliament. Departments could, for example, provide detailed information through Part IIIs, perhaps only every three years. On an annual basis, they would provide only brief updates or reports on major deviations from plans.
- Departments could request annual appropriations but with parliamentary authority to spend over a longer period of time, perhaps two years. This practice would alleviate some of the pressure, but maintain the annual appropriation process.
- Departments could seek multi-year (perhaps three-year) appropriations. Parliament would provide funding for longer periods of time and reduce the frequency of the budget process for departments.

The Task Force recognized that any option considered must respect the legitimate need for Parliament to authorize spending and to do so on the basis of current, factual and meaningful information. Clearly, a need exists to provide annual information to Parliament. Some of the options we considered did offer the potential for annual parliamentary review, with much more detailed review and accounting on a cyclical basis. Such options seem to have the potential to streamline the system, while allowing for proper parliamentary control and information.

The Task Force is not able to recommend an alternative to the current annual budgeting system at this time. Such a recommendation should be made only after all interested parties, including Parliament and the Auditor General, have been fully consulted.

Nevertheless, we do recommend that Treasury Board should review the question of annuality of the budget cycle, in consultation with Parliament and the Auditor General, with a view towards addressing the problems noted.

The Lack of Incentives for Better Resource Management

Background/Issues

So far, the issues discussed in this Report have been related to perceived constraints to efficient, effective resource management. But another issue deserves to be explored. Some employees have suggested to the Task Force that there are actually disincentives, or at least a lack of incentives for better resource management in the current system. Frequently cited examples include the "scooping" by central organizations (central agencies or headquarters) of savings achieved through higher productivity. Other employees noted that departments are expected to increase their revenues, but are not credited with any of the revenues they raise, even if there is an increased administrative cost associated with doing so.

Recommendations

The Task Force considered the "incentives" issue. It was agreed that, in general, incentives to manage resources efficiently and effectively should be built into the system.

Accordingly, we conclude and recommend the following:

- Responsibility centres that realize savings as a result of productivity improvements should normally be allowed to keep them.

- For joint initiatives where, for example, one organizational unit has provided initial funding that allows another to improve or increase its productivity, the savings should be equitably shared. Sharing would not only provide an incentive for productivity improvement, but would promote the practice of collaborative management.
- If a department carries out activities to recover costs or generate revenues, it should keep those revenues, or as a minimum, a share of those revenues.
- In the interest of optimizing the use of Government resources, particularly equipment and facilities, departments should be encouraged to share these assets. However, resulting productivity gains should benefit the department.

The Task Force acknowledged the December 15 announcement by the President of the Treasury Board, which noted the implementation on a case-by-case basis of some of the proposals in our first two recommendations above. The announcement also noted that an asset management policy is currently being developed.

The Task Force recommends the following:

- Treasury Board should encourage the development of an asset management policy that includes sharing of resources as described in our last recommendation.
- The incentives announced by the Treasury Board President should apply automatically to all departments and agencies. Applying incentives universally would eliminate the need to consider each case individually.

ANNEX A

Historical Perspective

Federal Public Service Resource Management

Historical Perspective

General

The current resource management system in the federal government has evolved over the years in response to a number of influences. Clearly, two prime influences affecting that evolution were the changing needs of Parliament in relation to the maintenance of parliamentary control of public expenditures, and the needs of Public Service managers to allow them to deliver the increasingly complex range of federal government programs.

Significant initiatives to bring about necessary change have resulted from major reviews undertaken on behalf of the Government either by specific Commissions established for that purpose, or as part of ongoing Government activity (e.g., by the Auditor General). A number of reviews have been completed in the last 30 years, sometimes with contradictory results. However, all have had significant impact on the current resource management regime, as noted in the sections that follow.

While these major reviews have been important influences on our general approach to resource management, many elements of our current system were developed in direct response to particular criticisms noted in the press, in the Auditor General's annual reports, in the House of Commons and elsewhere. When particular abuses or errors were identified, no matter how infrequent or unique the situation, often the tendency was to develop a control procedure, applicable within a given organization or across Government, to ensure that the situation would not develop again. In many cases, the cure has been worse (and more costly) than the disease. For example, detection of some abuses in the use of taxis led to the implementation of an extremely cumbersome control system.

Glassco

Before Glassco's 1960 review, the basic approach to administration and resource management had remained unchanged for a considerable period of time. Resource management was guided by the Consolidated Revenue and Audit Act of 1931, and later by the Financial Administration Act of 1951. The federal government's resource management system during that period relied heavily on centralized control of Government expenditures by the Department of Finance with subsequent audit by the Office of the Auditor General. This regime, combined with centralized control of the personnel management system by the (then) Civil Service Commission, meant that departments and Public Service managers had only limited discretion in the resource management decisions affecting their operations.

Growth in both the size and complexity of Government operations over that period, however, resulted in concern over the Government's ability to exercise direction and control. This concern led to the establishment, in 1960, of the Royal Commission on Government Organization (Glassco Commission) to review management systems in the Public Service.

The Commission's recommendations were based on a philosophy that supported increased authority for Deputy Ministers and Public Service managers, and a reduction in central controls over both financial and personnel management. At the same time, the Commission recommended that departments be held accountable for the effective management of financial resources entrusted to them.

In addition to the recommendations on increased delegation and accountability, the Commission recommended the separation of Treasury Board from the Department of Finance. Treasury Board would become responsible for establishing, in a less restrictive manner, broad policies and standards for financial planning and for the control of expenditures.

The Commission noted that: "Departments should, within clearly-defined terms of reference, be fully accountable for the organization and execution of their programmes, and enjoy powers commensurate with their accountability. They must be subject to controls designed to protect those general interests of government which transcend departmental interests. But every department should be free of external controls which have no such broad purpose."

The Commission also made a series of recommendations relating to accountability to Parliament, which essentially suggested the development of a purpose orientation for appropriations and Estimates.

By and large, the Government accepted the Glassco Commission's recommendations, including the "let the managers manage" philosophy, and embarked on a period of implementation. Central agencies began to focus more on long-term issues than individual transactions, strict central controls were removed, and departments were given more authority to manage resources.

In 1970, the format of the Estimates was changed to reflect a "purpose" orientation for each program, resulting in a reduction in the number of parliamentary-controlled votes from some 500 in 1963-64, to just slightly over 200 in 1970-71. This reduction continued the trend of providing departments and managers with increased resource flexibility.

The Auditor General's 1976 Report

While the Glassco recommendations for increased authority were being implemented, the associated requirement for managerial accountability noted by Glassco did not receive the same level of attention, in part because no means of exacting such accountability had been developed. In his 1976 Report, the Auditor General was forced to conclude that "...Parliament -- and indeed the Government -- has lost, or is close to losing, effective control of the public purse." He further noted that "Control over public funds would appear to have been deteriorating for at least the last 15 years." As a result, the Auditor General recommended establishing the Office of the Comptroller General, and strengthening the role of the Senior Financial Officer within departments.

One of the main Government reactions to the report was to establish the Lambert Commission to review financial control in the federal government. On a more informal basis, however, the report was followed by not only an increasing reluctance on the part of central agencies to delegate authorities to departments, but a growing tendency to impose central controls in an attempt to avoid such criticism in the future.

The Lambert Commission

The Lambert Commission was established to review financial management in the Public Service primarily as a result of the observations of the Auditor General in his 1976 report.

The Lambert Commission undertook a detailed review and, in 1979, submitted a report recommending sweeping changes to the Government's management system. The major thrust of the Lambert recommendations is somewhat familiar: there should be increased delegation of authority to Public Service managers. The report

noted: "A fundamental requirement is that the constituent components of Government be granted all the powers essential to manage their affairs in such a way as to undertake the responsibilities assigned to them as economically and as effectively as possible."

The Lambert Commission also focused its attention on the associated question of accountability: "Substantial delegation of authority demands a comparable degree of accountability for the use of that authority. Delegation of authority without accountability is an abdication of responsibility on the part of those conferring it, whether Government or Parliament." As part of its package, the Commission recommended the transformation of Treasury Board into a Board of Management with specific responsibility for exacting accountability from departments.

For whatever reason, the Lambert Report did not result in the sweeping changes contemplated by its authors. What it did do, however, was reinforce the belief of public servants and the public that delegation of authority to lower levels in the Public Service could lead to better management of Government programs.

A number of recommendations of the Lambert Commission were adopted; the Government had, for example, already agreed to establish the Office of the Comptroller General before the Lambert recommendations. The Lambert recommendations, however, lost momentum as the Government introduced the Policy and Expenditure Management System (PEMS).

The Auditor General's 1983 Report

As noted previously, the 1976 Report of the Auditor General led to a tightening of central controls in the federal government. His 1983 report, however, suggested that a move in the other direction would be appropriate.

In a chapter devoted to constraints to productive management in the federal Public Service, he identified three major constraints:

- the impact of political priorities on the achievement of productive management,
- the many administrative and procedural constraints with which management is burdened, and
- the few incentives but many disincentives which influence productive management.

While some of the specific constraints identified can be attributed to the nature of Government, the Auditor General did stress the importance of removing excessive controls on managerial authority and establishing an appropriate mechanism for holding managers accountable: "We are not advocating a return to an unlimited 'let the managers manage' philosophy or an indiscriminate reduction of regulations and controls. In the absence of incentives that exist in the private sector, central controls will continue to be necessary in the Public Service to achieve a satisfactory level of prudence, probity, and equity. The challenge is to achieve a balance between the requirement for central control and the need for an adequate level of managerial authority, so that managers can be responsible and accountable."

Again, this report was not immediately followed by massive changes in the management system. However, it was effective in making the point about the need to eliminate unnecessary controls and increase delegation to managers to enable them to deliver their programs as effectively and efficiently as possible. It certainly was a key factor leading to the introduction of the initiative for Increased Ministerial Authority and Accountability a few years later.

Increased Ministerial Authority and Accountability (IMAA)

IMAA was introduced by Treasury Board in 1986 to give Ministers and senior managers the increased authority and flexibility they need to deal with changing circumstances and to manage effectively, while enhancing the accountability of Ministers and senior managers for achieving results. Under the program, Treasury Board reviewed a series of policies and control systems with a view to eliminating those that were no longer appropriate. Significant streamlining resulted from this review, with a reduction in administrative burden on all departments.

In addition, the Secretariat began negotiating with individual departments in an attempt to provide further delegation as appropriate, while ensuring adequate accountability to Ministers and Parliament. Under this process, once an agreement had been reached with the department on appropriate levels of delegation and an accountability process, the two organizations would enter into a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) regarding the approach to be followed during the period of the agreement.

Although the IMAA process was limited by the fact that it was introduced and administered within the existing control framework, it has resulted in a significant reduction in the administrative burden on departments, both through general delegations and through individual MOUs. To date, six MOUs have been signed. The process is continuing, with another seven MOUs currently under discussion.

The Auditor General's 1987 Report

In 1987, the Auditor General again reviewed the state of financial management in the federal government. He discovered that significant improvements had been made in the system of financial controls, but cautioned that there was a need for significant progress in the development of financial management, based on a linkage of objectives, results and resources. Again he made the point that managers should be responsible for financial management and held accountable for the achievement of results:

"Several of the departments we examined have made considerable progress in the past two years. But there is a need for continued, strong senior management commitment and direction to ensure that managers at all levels are aware of their financial responsibilities, are given the tools to carry them out, and are held accountable for the results produced."

Conclusion

The evolution of the current resource management system in the Public Service has been influenced not only by the changing needs of Parliament and Public Service managers themselves, but also by a series of external reviews carried out over the years. Although one of those reviews did lead to more central controls, the major finding has been that the current range of Government programs and initiatives can be most effectively managed and delivered if unnecessary central control is eliminated, and managers are provided an adequate level of authority. It has also been consistently noted that such a system can function effectively only if there is a reasonable system through which managers can be held accountable for their decisions and for the exercise of their authority.

That is precisely the thrust of the current PS2000 Initiative. One of its key objectives is to reduce central administrative controls to give Deputy Ministers and managers greater freedom to manage, with clearer accountability for and proper focus on results. This initiative addresses not only resource management, the focus of this Report, but the broader range of management issues being faced by the Public Service now and in the future.

ANNEX B

Accountability

Accountability

Introduction

The Resource Management Task Force articulated a philosophy intended to guide resource management in the federal Public Service as follows:

Responsible resource management which meets the needs of Ministers and Government must

- **foster effective management;**
- **require accountability of managers for results; and**
- **be based on the notion of trust and confidence in non-partisan, objective and professional Public Service managers and employees;**

while respecting the supremacy of Parliament for approving spending.

This annex focuses on the second element of the philosophy, the requirement for managers to be accountable for results. It will attempt to define the requirements of an adequate accountability system, with particular emphasis on the results-based focus.

Historical Perspective

The concept of a Public Service operating with extensive delegation of authority and a clear system of accountability is by no means new.

The concept was advocated by the Glassco Commission in 1962:

"Above all, departments should, within clearly-defined terms of reference, be fully accountable for the organization and execution of their programmes, and enjoy powers commensurate with their accountability. They must be subject to controls designed to protect those general interests of Government which transcend departmental interests. But every department should be free of external controls which have broad purpose."

The Lambert Report of 1979 had this to say about accountability:

"Having determined its priorities, established a fiscal plan, and allocated resources for carrying out the policies and programs formulated to give effect to its priorities, the Ministry must assign to departments and agencies, responsibility for implementing its plans. While it may establish certain guidelines and controls, and reserve certain rights as to direction, it should be up to the individual departments and agencies to manage their affairs in a way that will best achieve the objectives assigned to them with the resources available. What is crucial to this system of management is that the centre should hold the constituent parts to account fully for the manner in which they have discharged the responsibilities assigned to them. Parliament, in turn, should hold the Government equally accountable for the management of the nation's affairs."

This same theme has been repeated a number of times since and has, in fact, formed the basis of specific Government initiatives. The most recent example is the IMAA Initiative undertaken by the current government.

There is no suggestion then, that this is a new idea. It should also be acknowledged that much of the current system has been developed based on this concept.

Since Glassco, there has been significant progress at improving both the level of delegation and the system of accountability in Government. It is appropriate, however, in the context of the Public Service 2000 Initiative, to review not only the levels of delegation, but the system of accountability, not to reinvent the wheel, but to refine the system's application to current needs.

Characteristics of an Accountability System

It is neither possible nor desirable to develop in detail a system of accountability which can be applied universally throughout the federal Public Service. However, we can both identify some general conditions necessary for such a system to be successful, and describe some of its basic characteristics.

Any system of accountability must be directly linked not only to the level of authority but also to the style and mandate of the organization's management. Therefore, as the Government moves to a management framework that both allows managers more freedom to make decisions according to program requirements, and focuses on the achievement of desired results, so too must the associated accountability regime focus on results.

Such a results-based accountability system must focus on **key** results, and all parties must understand it. In short, to be effective, **it must be kept simple**. Moreover, to ensure that lines of accountability are clear, it must link organizational and **personal** accountability and clearly identify the accountability of each manager.

A system of accountability that fulfils these conditions and has the characteristics we have identified above could serve the needs of individual departments and agencies, and Government as a whole.

Specification of Results

The most critical task in successfully implementing any results-based accountability system is the selection and identification of a meaningful set of results.

The following criteria should be used in the selection of results, to ensure that they are meaningful and suitable for use in a system of accountability:

- Results should be challenging, agreed to by both parties and explicit, but not necessarily quantifiable. (**Ongoing requirements such as those specified in job descriptions should implicitly form the base**, with short-term, specific, challenging results being clearly articulated.)
- The statement of results should focus on a few key results expected from an individual or organization. In this manner, the results statement can be kept simple and meaningful.
- Results should be clear and differentiate between the essential and the desirable. (The primary focus should be on program results, not process or central policy requirements.)
- Results specified should be controllable. (Managers should be held accountable only for those items they can control.)
- Results forecasts should be related to an agreed resourcing level. (Since achievement of specific results depends on resourcing, resource levels should be specified at the outset. Subsequent assessment of the achievement of results should also be related to the level of resource utilization.)

Challenges

While the criteria established for the selection of results seems to be straightforward, situations arise in which various criteria or other external requirements could create

tensions in the selection of results. These result, in part, from the complexities associated with managing in the public sector, and are really no different than a host of other ambiguities or tensions which Public Service managers deal with on a daily basis. It is important, however, that we recognize and manage these tensions as we select our desired results.

The most obvious situations where such tensions could develop relate to the following criteria:

a) Results should be agreed to by both parties and should be challenging.

In selecting results for which someone is willing to be held accountable, the natural tendency would be for that person to underestimate and choose results that are easily achievable. This practice would ensure that the individual is recognized for achieving the stated objectives. However, it would conflict with the notion of choosing challenging results. This must be kept in mind as managers and their subordinates **negotiate** the results expected.

b) Results should be controllable, yet we are likely to operate more and more through "partnership" arrangements with others.

As we move into partnership arrangements with third parties in which responsibility for the delivery of goods and services is shared, we must also share control over the programs. The concept of selecting results that are controllable seems inconsistent with such arrangements.

In these situations, we appear to have two choices. First, we can identify the anticipated results from the joint effort, recognizing both the shared nature of the endeavour, and the fact that there is more "influence" than control. Alternatively, we can define the results in terms of the federal contribution to the project. If we do, the results definition may reflect inputs (or results of individual efforts) more than it reflects project results. However, again, if we recognize this fact at the outset, and involved parties agree to it, accountability can be attained. Moreover, in such situations, it is important at the outset to recognize the co-operative nature of the endeavour, and to reflect this requirement.

c) Accountability must be based on results, not process or inputs.

As we saw in the previous example, if someone is not in a position of control, it may be necessary to define the results more in terms of inputs than outputs. It may also be necessary to recognize that there may be a hierarchy of

appropriate results depending on the nature and degree of control exercised. As federal involvement varies from situations in which it has full direct control to those in which it exercises influence or persuasion, the nature of the result specified may vary.

It is also argued that certain functions in government exist for which it is difficult if not impossible to identify results with any precision. Policy development organizations are often cited as examples. It is recognized that there may be such organizations, but they are likely to represent a small portion of the Public Service (less than 20 per cent) and an even smaller portion of resources. It may well be necessary in these limited situations to focus more on inputs than results in establishing the accountability framework.

In establishing the results that are to form the basis of any accountability system, it is extremely important to recognize the limitations of the criteria established, and ensure that any deviations from them are consciously selected. The key is that all parties must recognize their responsibilities and the anticipated results and agree on them at the outset.

Elements for an Integrated Accountability System

While the proposals listed above would result in a change in the focus of the current accountability regime, it would not necessarily have to be revamped. Rather, it is expected that the requirements for an integrated accountability system can be fully met by existing processes (i.e., planning and budgeting, employee appraisal and information systems). The current planning and budget processes will continue to form the basis of organizational accountability, which would then be brought to the personal level through the appraisal process, and be based on individual job descriptions. An information network is the final key element of a sound accountability system. Such a network would provide the information necessary for decision-making, and would allow for monitoring of progress in achieving results.

a) The Planning and Budgeting Process

The departmental planning and budgeting process is critical to any system of broad-based accountability. The planning and budgeting process is the process through which goals and objectives are established at an organizational level to form the basis of some subsequent assessment of achievement.

Through planning and budgeting based on long-term strategic objectives, short-term goals are established for a department or agency and for all

organizational units within it. Through such planning, individual responsibility centre budgets are established for a given period, and the direct link between the resource levels to be provided and the results to be achieved is established.

b) Appraisal Process and Job Description

Under the proposed accountability regime, individuals would be held personally accountable for achieving results with a specified level of resources. While current planning processes are generally used to identify results and resources at an organizational level, the establishment of objectives as part of the appraisal process personalizes these plans. In effect then, the departmental plans establish the framework for accountability at the organizational level, and the appraisal system provides a means for both establishing targets or objectives at the personal level, and holding individuals accountable for achieving them.

While the appraisal process can be used quite effectively to focus on the personal achievement of results, the process has additional objectives such as the determination of training needs, career and succession planning, and other goals. The accountability aspect then is but one component of a broad appraisal process, and must be viewed accordingly. It is, however, a key aspect of the process.

The statement of results articulated through the appraisal process builds on but does not normally repeat all of the objectives outlined in an individual's job description.

A job description establishes the basis of an employment "contract". It describes in some detail the responsibilities an employee assumes in accepting a position and, at least in general terms, the results that the employee is expected to produce. As an employment contract, the job description also establishes the baseline for the accountability regime and specifies the general "performance criteria" (i.e., what the employee is expected to do in his or her job) against which an individual will be assessed. It would not be necessary in establishing specific objectives for a given period to repeat the job description. Rather, the results specification should focus on the key objectives for the planning period and perhaps add specificity to the job description objectives in certain areas.

The links between job descriptions and the accountability regime are strong. One process builds upon the other. This "building" assumes consistency

between the statement of duties as outlined in the job description, and the objectives established for a given period. If, for whatever reasons, the statement of duties and the job description conflict, the individual could end up with conflicting objectives and ultimately not be held to account for either. It is important then to ensure consistency in this area.

c) Information

A critical element of any comprehensive system of accountability is a meaningful information base that supports both decision-making and accountability processes.

Such an information system must meet a number of needs:

- It must provide information to assist in decision-making at the planning stage both at the organizational level and, ultimately, for individuals.
- It must also provide a means of monitoring progress throughout the implementation period, to allow for operational adjustments as necessary.
- Finally, it must provide an analysis of the achievement of results (and resource utilization) to allow for a final assessment of progress and provide input to the next iteration of the planning process.

Although such information is clearly important to the successful implementation of any program, it becomes even more important as a monitoring tool as authorities are delegated and less central control is imposed.

It follows that the roles of central organizations, which have traditionally exercised central controls, must evolve toward carrying out monitoring functions as authority is further delegated. This shift will require a significant change in attitude in, and approach by, such organizations. Successful implementation of the new regime will require a fairly intensive educational process.

It is important to ensure that appropriate information systems are in place to meet the needs of managers both in initial planning, and also in monitoring the achievement of results. It is equally important that roles and responsibilities for both control and monitoring be clearly identified and understood by all parties.

Existing Systems

While the accountability system described earlier may sound revolutionary, it simply represents the integration of various processes currently in place in all Government departments. A number of organizations operate with just such integrated systems, and use them as basic tools for management and accountability.

Lines of Accountability

The accountability system described above establishes a chain of accountability within a department. An individual at any level in the organization is accountable directly to his or her immediate supervisor for the achievement of certain agreed results. That person is, in turn, accountable to the next level in the organization, and so on, right up to the level of Deputy Minister. Accordingly, the lines of accountability are quite clear, and each individual is directly accountable to someone for all results. These results include direct program and broader "corporate" results. (Broader "corporate" requirements, such as employment targets, sometimes make the achievement of program results more difficult in the public sector.)

Unfortunately, the lines of accountability for Deputy Ministers are not always so clear. While each person within a department is ultimately accountable to the Deputy Minister, the Deputy is accountable to a number of individuals or organizations for the wide range of both program and corporate results for which he or she is responsible. What is the basis for these lines of accountability?

The Deputy is accountable for achieving results, and is accountable to the individual or organization to whom Parliament has assigned responsibility for those results. In practice, this means that the Deputy is usually accountable to his or her Minister for achieving program results. Deputies can also be held accountable to central agencies for achieving or contributing to broader corporate results **for which those agencies are responsible to Parliament**. For example, Deputies are accountable to Treasury Board for many aspects of human resource management. This accountability relationship exists because Parliament has assigned that responsibility to Treasury Board under the Financial Administration Act (FAA), and in turn, Treasury Board has assigned that responsibility to Deputies.

In other cases, Deputies have specific corporate responsibilities assigned directly by Parliament through legislation. An example of this is the requirement under Section 32(2) of the FAA for control of commitments.

Program results are often specific achievements, while the corporate objectives often relate to the **manner in which program objectives are achieved**. In these cases, we

could describe a Deputy Minister as being accountable to the Minister for **what results are achieved**, and to central agencies for **how the results are achieved**.

There are, however, other dimensions of accountability for results. Parliament assigns particular tasks to certain central agencies. To carry out these tasks, the central agencies need departmental input or information. In these cases, the Deputy is accountable to the Minister who, in turn, is accountable to the appropriate central agency for the integrity of the information provided. One example of this situation is the Treasury Board's role in resource allocation. Departments provide Treasury Board with information on their programs, results, effectiveness, and so on, which Treasury Board needs to determine spending priorities and establish the Estimates for the Government. In this and other similar cases, while Ministers' primary accountability is not to Treasury Board for achievement of specific results, they must be accountable for the quality of the information they give to Treasury Board on those results.

In summary, the proposed system should result in direct accountability from the individual on the front lines through each level in the organization to the Deputy Minister. Depending on the nature of the results and the source of delegation of authority, the Deputy is then accountable to the Minister or to a central agency. In addition to this direct accountability based on results, the Deputy is also accountable, through the Minister, for the integrity of information provided by his or her department to assist central agencies in fulfilling their broader corporate mandates.

Conclusion

The resource management system must ensure that managers are held personally accountable for the results they are expected to achieve. An accountability system, as described above, will serve just such a purpose, and must be implemented throughout Government.

Two points are worth noting about the Government's accountability mechanisms:

- a) There are examples of such accountability systems within Government now. We must ensure that they be continued and expanded to cover all departments and agencies.
- b) It is important not only to have functioning accountability systems, but also that Parliament and the public have continued assurance that they exist and are functioning. Accordingly, Deputy Ministers should provide that assurance.

ANNEX C

Critical Features of the Current System

Critical Features of the Current System

The use of resources by the Public Service is controlled at three different levels: Parliament, the Executive (Treasury Board), and the Minister and the department itself.

Parliamentary Controls

A fundamental tenet of our parliamentary democracy is that the authority of Parliament is required before any expenditures can be made.

The federal government plans and records its revenues and expenditures on the basis of a fiscal year which covers the period April 1 through March 31. The Government advises Parliament of its spending plans through the "Main Estimates" well in advance of the beginning of the fiscal year.

For the 1990-91 fiscal year, the Government's planned expenditures total almost \$148 billion, as follows:*

| <u>Main Estimates</u> | <u>\$ Billion</u> |
|---|------------------------|
| Statutory | 103.3 |
| Voted | 44.3 |
| <hr/> | |
| Total Main Estimates | 147.6 |
| <u>Other planned spending</u> | |
| Planned Statutory Reductions announced in the Budget | (1.0) |
| Reserves | 2.4 |
| Allowance for Lapse | (1.2) |
| <hr/> | |
| Total Budgetary Expenditures | \$ <u>147.8</u> |

*1990-91 Part 1 of Estimates

By far the largest component is statutory expenditures for which ongoing parliamentary authority has already been granted through specific Acts of Parliament. It includes items such as family allowance payments, old age security payments, public debt charges and payments to the provinces for health care and post-secondary education. While financial controls and probity on these expenditures are very important, they are not normally affected by the resource management issues being addressed by the Task Force.

The voted component refers more generally to expenditures incurred in the day-to-day operation of government including operating expenditures, capital, salaries, and transfer payments for which ongoing parliamentary expenditure authority has not been granted. For these items, Parliament will grant authority in legislation referred to as an Appropriation Act to spend **up to** a certain amount of money during the course of a fiscal year. This spending authority expires at the end of the fiscal year and funds authorized but not spent in the period are said to "lapse" as the spending authority expires.

Total voted expenditures include major capital expenditures, some large transfer payments (such as official development assistance) and payments to dependent Crown corporations such as the CBC.

The Government accesses the "reserves" identified by tabling Supplementary Spending Estimates in Parliament throughout the fiscal year; the required spending authority is then obtained from Parliament through related Appropriation Acts.

As noted earlier, the Task Force's review of resource management applies primarily to the **voted** component of the expenditure plans and the manner in which departments exercise these spending authorities.


Budgets for individual departments are divided into Programs (combinations of activities undertaken in pursuit of a common objective.) While a department is often responsible for just one program -- e.g., Transport Canada (Department) and Revenue Canada, Taxation (Taxation Program) -- some departments are responsible for two or more -- e.g., Agriculture (Management and Administration; Agri-Food, and Grains and Oilseeds Program) and External Affairs (Canadian Interests abroad and World Exhibitions Programs).

Programs form the basic building blocks for presenting the Government's expenditure plans to Parliament. Programs have a strong purpose orientation, usually rooted in specific legislation. This point is an important one from a resource management perspective. It means that Parliament votes funds **for specific purposes** rather than **to specific organizations**. This purpose orientation sets the

framework for a chain of results-based accountability that begins with Parliament and works its way through the entire Public Service.

Program funding technically includes both Statutory and Voted expenditures. However, as noted, we will focus only on the Voted expenditures within Programs. Parliament votes funds for particular purposes as described in the Program structure. However, in addition to the general purpose orientation of the Votes, Parliament exercises a further level of control over programs and all expenditures over \$5 million for capital or transfer payments.

The diagram below depicts the manner in which Parliament votes funds for a program:



The amount of money in these Votes cannot be adjusted without the specific authority of Parliament. In effect, Parliament establishes "fences" around funds that are to be spent for these specific purposes. These Votes, or fences, constitute a limit on the resource management flexibility available to the Government and its departments. The limits established have not been increased since 1970-71, even though Part III of the Estimates now provides much more detailed information to Parliament on capital and transfer payments.

Treasury Board Controls

It is not just the relationship with Parliament that affects resource management. The executive itself (through Treasury Board) exercises control over resources using its specific powers in the Financial Administration Act (i.e., Section 31, Allotments) as well as its more general resource management authority. (The Financial Administration Act gives Treasury Board the authority to act for the Queen's Privy Council on all matters relating to financial management.)

Treasury Board controls are applied within the Vote structure approved by Parliament (i.e., they represent a further level of parliamentary controls). Within a Vote, Treasury Board establishes a separate allotment (or "fence") for the salary component of the budget. Treasury Board can also establish a separate allotment for any other portion of a Vote and specify more precisely the purposes for which expenditures on this portion can be made. Allotments cannot be adjusted without the authority of Treasury Board. Accordingly, allotments limit the flexibility available to departments on how they use resources.

However, Treasury Board does much more than fence off the salary-related portion of a Vote. It also superimposes an additional restriction on the number of persons that can be employed -- it controls "person-years".

Under the person-year control system, Treasury Board authorizes departments to utilize a certain number of person-years (defined as the employment of one individual for 12 months or the equivalent thereof) in a given fiscal year. Departments are given salary budgets associated with the person-year authorities granted, and are protected by Treasury Board for shortfalls in their salary budget, provided that they stay within the person-year authority limit. Even in some cases where the shortfall is attributable to factors within the department's control (e.g., reclassifications, reorganizations, or service improvements), this protection is continued.


The person-year authorities granted by Treasury Board are identified, for information purposes, in the Main Estimates tabled in Parliament. Treasury Board can authorize adjustments to this level throughout the fiscal year. Parliament is advised of these adjustments in Supplementary Estimates only if a department is asking for more salary funds from Parliament. (If the funds can be found elsewhere in the same Vote -- for example, from other operating costs -- they can be moved to the salary component with Treasury Board authority only, and departments need not inform Parliament.)

Over the years, the Main Estimates person-year levels have been used as the basis for measuring changes in the size of the Public Service. Government-wide targets are frequently set based on this measure (e.g., two per cent reduction, one per cent growth, etc.).

Ministers and Departments

Authority to spend parliamentary appropriations is vested in Ministers, who are accountable to Parliament. Ministers delegate this authority to departmental managers who are, in turn, accountable to the Minister or to a senior official.

The Minister places controls on the use of resources within the department. By and large, such controls are intended to ensure the best corporate use of the limited resources available. The systems used for this kind of control can sometimes impose even more severe and restrictive constraints on the effective delivery of programs than the centrally imposed mechanisms, which apply Government-wide. "Central regulation" (including controls imposed centrally within departments) should be restricted to those instances where it is essential to serve the broader corporate interest. It is important that departments review existing systems to ensure that such broader interests are being served if central controls are in place.





Report of the Task Force on Staff Relations

For Discussion

Public Service 2000

August 6, 1990

Report of the Task Force on Study Relations

January 1, 1971

The following is a summary of the findings and recommendations of the Task Force on Study Relations, as presented in its report to the Board of Trustees on January 1, 1971.

Page 2

Report of the Task Force on Staff Relations

Introduction

1. In mid-December 1989, The Prime Minister launched "Public Service 2000" to renew the Canadian Public Service. The Task Force on Staff Relations was one of the nine established at that time. This report describes the objectives, methods, conclusions and recommendations of the Task Force on Staff Relations.
2. In annex, readers will find
 - Annex A Task Force Members
 - Annex B Scope of the work, described in a "Statement of Issues" which was widely circulated by the Task Force
 - Annex C A list of contributors who were invited to write or meet with The Task Force

Summary of recommendations

3. Major recommendations of the Task Force are summarized below. Each is given fuller explanation in the main body of the report beginning with the paragraph indicated in parentheses.
 - a) Bargaining Unit Organization (Paragraph 24):
 - (i) The Task Force reaffirms the right of employees to organize in their own best interests following any significant changes in Occupational Categories and classification structure as a result of PS2000.
 - (ii) There should be a transition period followed by Public Service Staff Relations Board (PSSRB) certification of bargaining agents.
 - b) Right to Strike (Paragraph 27):
 - (i) The Task Force reaffirms the basic right to strike but recommends measures to protect the public in the case of public services seen as essential.
 - (ii) The Task Force proposes that criteria be developed defining essential services and that a body be established to administer these criteria and to determine the numbers of employees designated to perform essential duties.
 - (iii) Designations should be determined between bargaining rounds and should be applied to positions, not persons, remaining in force until functions change.
 - c) Dispute Resolution (Paragraph 31)
 - (i) The Task Force concludes that the overriding

objective of dispute resolution processes should be to help the parties to settle disputes themselves.
(ii) Bargaining agents should select binding arbitration or conciliation/strike at the outset of negotiations, but the parties and the PSSRB should be given flexibility to employ a wider variety of techniques at appropriate times to facilitate the negotiating process.

(iii) The scope of arbitration should be equal to the scope of bargaining.

(iv) Particular arbitrators or Boards of Arbitration should be imposed by the PSSRB only when the parties cannot agree themselves on the person or persons.

(v) The PSSRB should be empowered to:

(a) Provide mediation, conciliation, or fact finding services upon request or to impose these when negotiations break down.

(b) Supply arbitration services only when satisfied that other methods will not help and negotiations are at an impasse.

(c) Supply arbitration services, including final offer selection, upon request from both parties on the conciliation/strike route, and when other methods do not seem likely to lead to agreement.

d) Penalties for Illegal Strikes (Paragraph 42):

Penalties should be raised to the levels contained in the Canada Labour Code.

e) Strike Votes (Paragraph 44):

There should not be a mandatory, secret ballot process. However, the PSSRB should investigate and rule on employee complaints of unfair process.

f) Duty of Fair Representation (Paragraph 45):

The Public Service Staff Relations Act (PSSRA) should impose a duty of fair representation on the unions similar to that in the Canada Labour Code.

g) Grievance and Adjudication (Paragraph 46):

(i) Subject to the results of a review of experience in other Public Service jurisdictions, the application of the employer's classification plan should be grievable and adjudicable. If major changes to the present occupational group and classification structure occur, this recommendation should be implemented following an appropriate vestibule period.

(ii) There should be consolidation of redress provisions. In particular, release for incompetence and incapacity and demotion should be grievable and adjudicable just as is discharge for disciplinary reasons.

(iii) National Joint Council (NJC) approved policies should be grievable only through the ordinary grievance process culminating in adjudication by the PSSRB.

(iv) Mediation services requested by the parties jointly should be provided by the PSSRB prior to adjudication.

h) Mass Grievances (Paragraph 52):

The PSSRB should be empowered to hear one grievance (or a representative number) at the request of either party instead of a large number of similar grievances.

The decision taken would apply to all.

i) Review of Adjudication Decisions (Paragraph 54):

The PSSRB should be empowered to review adjudication decisions for consistency and equity across issues.

j) Exclusions (Paragraph 56):

(i) Positions, not individuals, should be excluded.
(ii) The main basis of exclusion should be the performance of significant management duties.

(iii) The number of "confidential" exclusions is excessive and should be substantially reduced. The Task Force recommends the reconsideration of "confidential" exclusions beyond those for positions involved in the operations of staff relations.

(iv) Exclusions should be deemed to be in effect when proposed until the PSSRB renders a contrary decision.

k) National Joint Council (NJC) (Paragraph 58):

The Task Force endorses and wishes to enhance the important policy consultation role of NJC but recommends that grievances of NJC policies follow the departmental/PSSRB route.

l) Notice to Bargain (Paragraph 62):

The notice to bargain period should be extended to 90 days from 60.

m) Departmental role in Collective Bargaining (Paragraph 63):

(i) The Departmental role in bargaining should be enhanced especially in the development of the employer's mandate and in trade-off decision-making.

(ii) The government should give careful consideration to two-tier bargaining.

(iii) Departments should handle most grievance adjudication cases except those with public service wide effects.

n) Public Service Staff Relations Board (PSSRB) (Paragraph 66):

Bargaining agents should be consulted on the nomination of the Chairperson, Vice-Chairperson and Deputy Chairpersons of the PSSRB.

o) Training of Managers (Paragraph 69):

(i) Managers should receive effective, formal training in Staff Relations.

(ii) The employer should make available to managers full interpretations of new collective agreements, together with any necessary training.

p) Consultation (Paragraph 70):

Departmental and service wide consultation should be improved by enlarging the scope of consultation and ensuring that it occurs early in the policy development process. Senior management should demonstrate a willingness to consult.

Objectives and philosophy

4. The Task Force was guided by the objectives and spirit of Public Service 2000, and in particular the Public Service 2000 principle that relations with staff should be founded on a visible concern for their welfare and interests.

5. The Task Force believes that the objective of a Staff Relations regime for the public sector, or the private sector for that matter, cannot be to provide a framework for a test of wills and economic strength between labour and management. Rather, the objective should be to establish a process for determining the rules and conditions of service which assumes fairness and equity to employees, as represented by their bargaining units, and to the Canadian public, whose employees we all are, as represented by the government.

6. Accordingly, the spirit which informs a public service staff relations regime should not be confrontation in a zero-sum game with a winner and loser, but a search for the optimum balance of benefits to ensure that both elements of the partnership, employees and the public, derive the maximum benefit from it.

7. At the outset, the Task Force made a conscious decision to avoid minutiae and to provide its views on measures of broad significance to the collective bargaining system. Our recommendations therefore invite further study and attention to operational detail by experts before adoption would be possible. Further, this Report precedes the final conclusions of a number of other Task Forces which might have a significant impact on particular aspects of our work. For example, bargaining unit structures and other union concerns will be influenced by the work of the Task Forces on Occupational and Classification Structure, on Workforce Adaptation, and on Compensation and Benefits.

8. Having heard the interested parties, The Task Force concluded that the best results will usually be obtained by a minimum of prescriptions and imposed solutions, and by a flexible, multi-faceted array of negotiating tools to help the parties to help themselves. This principle is reflected in a number of our recommendations.

9. The Task Force also recognized that there are important differences between collective bargaining in the private sector and in the Public Service. In the latter, unions are less constrained by concerns about the employers' ability to pay and the potential impact of over-generous settlements on the future health of the enterprise. The adverse effects of strikes and lock-outs are felt not so much by the employer as by the public. On the other hand, the relationship is fundamentally unequal because the employer is also the government: it therefore is able to prescribe the rules for collective bargaining and, in the event of a strike, has the option of presenting to Parliament the terms of a legislated settlement.
10. All that having been said, the Task Force came to the view that the present regime exaggerates the differences between collective bargaining in the private and public sectors, and that a thinning out of various prescriptions and supposed safeguards, far from placing the public's interests in jeopardy, would very likely make the overall system work better than it presently does.

Overview of the state of staff relations today

11. No one who appeared before us suggested that collective bargaining in the Canadian Public Service is in crisis or on the point of collapse. On the other hand, there was also general agreement that the relationship between unions and management over perhaps the last decade has become more confrontational, more aggressive, and more frustrating. The process of collective bargaining is not seen by either side to be working as well as it should.
12. Some of the problems are structural. On the employer's side, the centralization of collective bargaining power in the Treasury Board has been considered essential because of the importance of maintaining a consistent approach across the Public Service. One consequence, however, has been to create a gulf between Treasury Board and the operating concerns of departmental managers, who tend to see themselves as helpless to influence collective bargaining and poorly informed by the central authority. On the union side, some complex and unwieldy structures, particularly in the larger unions, can make it difficult for the leadership to speak with confidence for member components and to negotiate with an assured mandate.
13. In some areas, the Task Force found substantial common ground between unions and the employer. The limits placed on the scope and procedures of collective bargaining in the Public Service are often a source of frustration for both sides. Some of the provisions of the PSSRA which seemed sensible in 1967, today seem paternalistic and overly prescriptive; often seeming to promote process over common sense, to reduce flexibility in seeking resolutions to problems, and to provide insufficient incentive to the parties to settle without external intervention.
14. Among the most important issues in federal Public Service collective bargaining are the restrictions placed on the right to strike in areas of "essential services" and the process of designating the staff members who must remain at their posts. The Supreme Court decision empowering the employer to designate all operational Air Traffic Controllers enabled managers across the government to over-designate the number of staff to perform "essential services" and has in effect deprived various groups of the threat of striking as a bargaining weapon. All parties are agreed that the original intention of the sections of the PSSRA dealing with designations was not to permit "business as usual" during a strike, but this is in fact what has happened.
15. The perceived unfairness of this situation is made worse by the restrictions in the PSSRA on what can be arbitrated; basically limited to pay rates, hours, leave and discipline. Thus, unions can legitimately argue that they must negotiate across the entire scope of bargainable issues without a meaningful ability to withdraw services, but if they choose the arbitration route instead of conciliation/strike they know that they are thereby deprived of the right to take many areas of disagreement to neutral arbitration.
16. An important area of disagreement is the scope of collective bargaining. Unions generally wish to bargain matters precluded under the PSSRA such as selection standards and processes, classification systems, superannuation plans and performance review. As these issues are bargainable under the Canada Labour Code, a number of unions proposed that the Code be adopted for the Public Service. The employer, on the other hand has held that these matters are managerial rights or, as is the case with staffing selection standards and the merit principle, are regulated by law because of the particular needs of the Public Service.
17. The Task Force also found that managers are not well trained in Staff Relations. Union - management consultation in the work site is often nothing more than information given about conclusions already reached. When local union officials and managers do agree they both often lack the authority to make effective decisions. The Task Force believes that improvements in this area could do a good deal to produce a healthier relationship between management and employee representatives.
18. Those most adversely affected by the deficiencies of the present staff relations system are neither the unions nor the Treasury Board, but the rank and file of the Public Service. It is they who must wait for their benefits while negotiations drag out for 18 months and sometimes longer beyond the expiry of collective agreements. It is also they, together with

departmental managers, who must live with the consequences when various frictions and disputes cannot be dealt with at the departmental level.

19. Without wishing to minimize the complexities of operating a collective bargaining system within a government structure, the Task Force believes that a number of practical improvements to the system can be made which would better serve the interests of the government's employees without prejudicing the principal interests of the government as employer.

Overview of recommendations

20. The general impact of the recommendations in this report would be to move collective bargaining in the Public Service substantially towards the less regulated private sector model.
21. Some whom we consulted advocated going the whole distance, and bringing Public Service collective bargaining under the Canada Labour Code. The Task Force weighed this option but concluded that, in one form or another, special legislative provisions governing the Public Service would be necessary. This being so, the Task Force opted for a "lightened" PSSRA, rather than the potentially more disruptive approach of a transfer of jurisdiction accompanied by legislative amendments.
22. The recommendations which follow are designed to:
- provide improved means to identify essential services and the resultant designation processes;
 - provide both sides and the PSSRB with an array of mediation, conciliation, arbitration and other tools when they are needed and in the best form to help parties;
 - restore better balance in the respective negotiating strengths of the parties;
 - improve departmental involvement in staff relations and collective bargaining;
 - reduce unnecessary regulation; and
 - remove irritants in the system.

These measures are all based on the Task Force view that the best possible collective agreements or resolution of disputes are those arrived at by the parties themselves. The primary function of the regulating bodies should be to facilitate this process.

23. The Task Force did not set out with the preconceived notion that its recommendations should conform to Public Service 2000's emphasis on de-regulation, loosening of central control, and greater assumption of responsibility by individuals. This however is where we ended up after extensive discussions with the various interested parties and then among ourselves. Accordingly, the recommendations set out below are intended to create a more flexible and less

regimented system which at the same time should be more even-handed and fair.

Specific recommendations

Bargaining Unit Organization

24. Under the existing legislation, the PSSRB may certify a bargaining unit on application by an employee organization taking into account such factors as the duties and classifications of employees. The bargaining unit may not contain employees in more than one occupational category. The Task Force could not find a demonstrably better basis on which to establish criteria applicable to the general right of employees to organize.
25. The governing concept should be that employees are left as free as possible to decide for themselves what bargaining agents they should have subject to reasonable oversight by the PSSRB on the basis summarized above. It will be particularly important for this principle to be observed if Public Service 2000 leads to important changes to existing occupational groups and/or to the classification system. The government should not seek to determine what union structures shall exist, but rather should to the fullest possible extent leave this matter to be determined by employees themselves. In addition, there should be a transitional period following any significant change in existing categories and groups to allow employees and their representatives to work out the structures they deem best for effective collective bargaining. During such a period, it may be necessary for the government to prescribe a bargaining structure temporarily in order to provide stability during the transition.
26. The PSSRB should then certify unions on the basis of the standard tests which take into account community of interest, duties, classification plans, the desires of employees, the employer's administrative structure, and other relevant factors as established in labour board jurisprudence.

The Right to Strike, Essential Services, and Designations

27. No one with whom we met suggested that employees of the Public Service should not have the right to strike. However, the impacts of strikes in certain parts of the Public Service may have severe effects on the public by denying essential services for which acceptable substitutes are not available. Such strike may also endanger the safety and security of the public.
28. The Task Force recognizes that the designation of staff members to provide "essential" services in the past decade has exceeded a reasonable definition of those required to provide the minimum level of services for the legitimate protection of the Public. The

problem is to find an alternative to the present system which will restore balance to the powers of the employer and employees at the bargaining table, while protecting the legitimate interests of the Public.

29. There is no area of collective bargaining which so clearly demonstrates that we live in an imperfect world. All known approaches to the maintenance of essential public services have serious defects. An unfettered right to strike is unacceptable, but a complete prohibition can simply give rise to illegal strikes, as experience in a number of jurisdictions has demonstrated. As alternatives to the right to strike, traditional compulsory arbitration and newer forms such as final offer selection both have their limitations. The most one can do is make the best choice between unpalatable alternatives.
30. With the above limitations in mind, the Task Force concluded that measures such as those described below may offer a workable balance between protecting the interests of the public and establishing a more equitable system of collective bargaining than exists at present:
 - a) The government should establish legislated criteria to decide on those services which should continue and the level at which services should continue during a strike, for reasons of the safety and security of the public or other important public purpose.
 - b) Accompanying this step would be the creation of a body to apply these criteria to Public Service bargaining units to ensure that essential services are maintained. This body could be a Commission analogous to the Conseil Des Services Essentiels in Quebec. It would be for consideration whether the Commission should be permanent, or should be set up with a fixed term to implement the new measures and make an initial determination for each bargaining unit; in the latter eventuality, continuing responsibility could subsequently be assumed by the PSSRB. If a Commission is created, it should include adequate representation of the parties including the public.
 - c) The determination of which employees should be prohibited from striking should be made by the Commission following meaningful consultation between the parties. The Commission should be empowered to investigate and conduct hearings as it sees fit and should encourage the parties themselves to agree on designated positions, reserving for itself the right of final decision where appropriate and necessary.
 - d) Subsequent determinations should be made in the same manner, using the previous determination as a starting point.
 - e) The present system of designating individuals should be replaced by designations of positions.

- f) The designation process should be carried out between rounds of collective bargaining, rather than at the beginning of bargaining as at present.

- g) Whatever body is assigned these responsibilities, it should be empowered and responsible, during a strike, to ensure that essential services are maintained at a level consistent with the established criteria.

The fundamental purpose of measures along the foregoing lines would be to create a more open and orderly process than exists at present for dealing with the complex issue of essential services.

Dispute Resolution

31. The Task Force concluded that the present dispute resolution processes are inflexible and may not be helping the parties to agree so much as encouraging them to put off decision-making until someone else is forced to impose a solution. Therefore, the intention of the following proposals on arbitration and conciliation is to provide assistance when required and in the form desired by the parties, while placing a greater onus on them to find agreement themselves.
32. Arbitration has fallen into disfavour in recent years, largely because it is limited to rates of pay, hours of work, leave entitlement and standards of discipline. In order to improve the fairness of arbitration as a method of dispute resolution, particularly for those bargaining units where the effectiveness of the conciliation/strike route is reduced by large numbers of designations, the Task Force recommends:
 - a) that binding arbitration be available for all matters which may legally be the subject of negotiation;
 - b) that boards of arbitration be constituted by the parties each selecting a representative who then select a mutually agreeable chairperson. In the event of disagreement, the PSSRB would name a chairperson; and
 - c) that the parties be permitted, by mutual agreement, to use single arbitrators, final offer selection, or other variations of arbitration.
33. Under the current procedure, either party may request arbitration at any stage in the negotiating process. The PSSRB has little option but to comply, even if the parties have not seriously attempted to resolve as many issues as possible. The Task Force proposes that the PSSRB be given more flexibility in this area. At the same time, the PSSRB should be empowered not only to supply mediation, conciliation and fact-finding services to the parties at their request, or to withhold them, but also to impose these services at its discretion.
34. In the absence of a decision to invoke arbitration, the conciliation/strike procedures would apply. These procedures should however be improved. In their existing form, they lock the parties into a conciliation

board as virtually the only means of dispute resolution. This contrasts with procedures under the Canada Labour Code where the parties have considerable latitude to select their own procedures. Further, under the Canada Labour Code the Minister of Labour has broad discretion to intervene and direct the process when the parties cannot agree. The Task Force recommends that the conciliation/strike route under the PSSRA be modified to conform as closely as possible to that contained in the Canada Labour Code. The role of the Minister of Labour under the Code should be assumed by the chairperson of the PSSRB.

35. Features of this process would include:

- a) The parties would be free, by mutual agreement, to request a variety of mediation, conciliation, or fact-finding services.
- b) The parties would be free to select voluntary arbitration on any or all issues. Variations such as final-offer selection would also be available by mutual agreement.
- c) The PSSRB would have discretion at any time to appoint mediation, conciliation or fact-finding services in an attempt to assist the parties to resolve their differences. Such discretion might also be exercised when the parties have not mutually agreed, but application is made by either.
- d) The final dispute resolution method would be either a conciliation commissioner or a conciliation board, at the discretion of the PSSRB.
- e) The PSSRB would be able to refuse a request for a conciliation commissioner or conciliation board, or, prior to appointing such a body, appoint a mediator to assist the parties.
- f) The PSSRB would be empowered to return for clarification the report of a conciliation commissioner or a conciliation board.
- g) The right to strike would be acquired seven days following the receipt by the PSSRB of the report of a conciliation board or conciliation commissioner or following notice in writing by the PSSRB that such a body would not be appointed.

36. The PSSRB should provide conciliators/fact finders either from its own staff or from lists of professionals from the private sector or the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service developed after consultation. On either dispute resolution path, the PSSRB should have discretionary authority to appoint conciliation or fact-finding assistance at any stage in order to aid the parties.

The Scope of Bargaining

37. The PSSRA provides that the employer has the "right or authority...to determine the organization of the Public Service and to assign duties and to classify

positions therein." Other provisions exclude from the scope of bargaining issues which would require the alteration or amendment of an act such as the Public Service Superannuation Act.

38. These restrictions on the scope of collective bargaining are due to deliberate decisions of Parliament. For example, in the Public Service Employment Act (PSEA) selection standards and processes are prerogatives of the Public Service Commission and stand allied with the "Merit Principle" as cornerstones of public service staffing and promotion. Similarly, release for incompetence and incapacity and for certain proscribed political activities is legislated in this act. Further, the processes of transfer, layoff and probation are provided for under the PSEA. All these provisions have been the result of the legislators' concerns for the preservation of a professional and non-political Public Service.

39. The scope of bargaining was the subject of very different and strongly held views heard by the Task Force. A number of unions expressed a strong desire to be regulated under the Canada Labour Code in order to escape the more restricted scope of the PSSRA. A few matters, most especially classification plans and processes, seem to be responsible for much of the desire to change the collective bargaining regime.

40. In passing the PSSRA in 1967, Parliament recognized basic differences in the roles of the private and public sectors. The Task Force found no basis for concluding that these differences are less important today than they were when the act was passed. Accordingly, we recommend that the government should retain the right to organize the Public Service, to assign duties and to classify positions as currently provided for in the PSSRA. We note that, within this definition of the employer's rights, there is room for a very substantial range of issues to be brought to the bargaining table; examples of subjects discussed in recent years include technological change, training, and workforce adjustment.

41. Classification regimes are held by the employer to be an important element in the right to organize and to structure duties and allocate work. Given the size of the Public Service and the potential costs and other impacts if collective bargaining were to result in a variety of classification schemes differing from collective agreement to collective agreement, the Task Force did not conclude that classification schemes should be bargainable. However, recognizing the frustration that the application of classification plans can produce, the Task Force recommends that subject to the results of a review of the impact of classification grievance in other jurisdictions, the application of the employer's plan be subject to grievance and adjudication. (See paragraph 46)

Role of Departments

63. The Task Force recommends that serious consideration be given to finding ways to involve senior departmental managers more extensively in collective bargaining processes - and most particularly in mandate building and "tradeoff" decision-making.
64. Furthermore, the Task Force recommends that the government study the possible adoption of so-called two tier bargaining in which Treasury Board and union executives would bargain wages and major monetary items, while departments and union components would bargain many matters affecting the workplace. This concept may be particularly relevant in light of possible impending changes in bargaining unit structures.
65. Departments should also be given more authority to deal with issues between negotiations and to handle most grievances at the adjudication level.

Other Factors in the Role of the PSSRB

66. The Task Force recommends that the primary role of the PSSRB should be to facilitate the processes by which the parties themselves come to agreement. Thus, greater discretion is suggested to enable the Board to assist the process of dispute resolution while providing less intrusive direction on matters of detail and choices of methods.
67. Further, the Task Force recommends that unions be consulted on the nomination of PSSRB members including its Chairperson, Vice-Chairperson and Deputy Chairpersons, just as they are with other members.

General Measures

68. The Task Force recognizes that the climate of Staff Relations owes at least as much to the working relationships of supervisors and employees as to the rules, processes and institutions of collective bargaining. The latter can however provide a framework for greater collaboration, or less; they can stimulate partnership in the workplace, or antagonism. Therefore, much of the Task Force's attention has been directed toward the law and structure as indicated by the preceding sections.
69. However, there is no doubt that managers in the Public Service require more and better training in planning and managing Staff Relations and in the processes and principles of collective bargaining and contract administration. Furthermore, when significant changes occur in collective bargaining agreements, it is the operational manager who must thoroughly understand their application. Therefore, the employer must provide thorough interpretations of the terms of new agreements and any necessary training in their application.

70. The Task Force is also of the view that there should be far more focus on improving consultative mechanisms. Much of what passes for consultation with employees today is a substitute for the departmental bulletin board. True consultation takes place early enough in the process of planning to be influenced by the views of those consulted and entails a willingness to acknowledge the validity of the views presented. Senior management, as always, must lead by demonstrating a commitment to consultation and to improving Staff Relations.
71. Finally, the Task Force is encouraged by the emerging recommendations in other Task Forces to enhance the authority and scope of decision-making at lower operational levels so that dialogue can lead to effective decisions. Such changes should also be conducive to improved staff relations.

Impact of the recommendations

Cost and Other Effects

72. The number of grievances will certainly rise if the proposal that specific classification decisions be adjudicable is accepted. On the other hand, without detailed study of the caseload factors, staff salaries and private adjudication fees and so on, the exact costs are difficult to establish but unlikely to be sizeable.
73. Other recommendations such as those on mass grievances may well reduce present costs. On balance, the Task Force believes its proposals to be cost neutral with the exception of the "Essential Services Commission". The recommendation to study the establishment of such a Commission would result in greater certainty as to the necessary size of such a body, operational workload and administrative structure.
74. The Task Force foresees no increases in the size of the Public Service as a result of its deliberations, nor are the proposals likely to affect government operations or service to the public except to the extent that an improvement in staff relations makes a positive contribution to both.

Conclusions

75. Unions and managers alike will most likely find some elements in these proposals to cheer, and some to reject. Unions may believe the report does not go far enough in terms of scope of bargaining or in reducing frustrations associated with the concept of essential services and designations. Managers may find the idea of classification grievance, among other ideas, difficult to accept. Each institution, the Treasury Board negotiators, the NJC and the PSSRB may find gains and losses. The Task Force particularly hopes, however, that employees in the Public Service will

be encouraged by the attention we have tried to give to situations that adversely affect them as individuals as well as in their capacity as members of bargaining units. Implementation of our recommendations will leave plenty of problems unresolved, but should also effect a number of important pragmatic improvements in relations between managers and staff in the Canadian Public service.

Penalties for Illegal Strikes

42. The penalties for illegal strikes should be raised to the level provided for in the Canada Labour Code. The Task Force could see no reason for differences between public and private sector practice in this case.
43. The Task Force appreciates the argument that lock-out is an appropriate balance for the right to strike. However, the right to strike in the Public Service has been partially fettered, and in view of the fact that the losers in a lockout situation include especially the Canadian public, the Task Force saw no compelling reason to specifically provide for lockouts. It noted that other measures had been successfully used in the past to deal with problems such as rotating strikes.

Strike Votes

44. While the Task Force was not persuaded that secret ballot strike votes should be mandatory, it recognized that they can provide an important protection for employees. The PSSRB should be empowered to receive, investigate, and rule on employee complaints of unfair or improper process by bargaining agents. Such a provision could protect the rights of employees without imposing onerous regulations.

Duty of Fair Representation

45. The Canada Labour Code requires, among other things, that a bargaining agent may not act in a manner that is arbitrary, discriminatory or in bad faith in representing employees in the unit. The PSSRA contains no such provision. The Task Force could see no reason to maintain these public/private sector differences, and therefore recommends that the PSSRA similarly require a duty of fair representation by the unions.

Scope of Grievance and Adjudication

46. It is widely accepted that the organization of work and the allocation of duties are basic responsibilities of management. The discharge of these responsibilities requires that management should also have the right to establish systems and criteria for the classification of positions. The Task Force was however conscious that employee representatives attach great importance to making the application of classification schemes subject to grievance and adjudication procedures, and concluded that such a step could materially enhance fairness and equity in the classification system. It would however be advisable to assess fully the likely practical implications of such a step before decisions are made. Accordingly, the Task Force recommends that the government examine the experience of provincial and other governments with such arrangements and, subject to the findings, that it make classification schemes subject

to grievance and adjudication procedures. If major occupational group changes occur as a result of other Public Service 2000 proposals, a reasonable transition period before implementation of classification adjudication will also be needed.

47. In addition, the Task Force recommends that demotion and release for incompetence and incapacity (now regulated under the PSEA) fall within the scope of grievance and adjudication under the PSSRA along with suspension and discharge for disciplinary reasons.

Redress Processes

48. The Task Force heard a number of representations to the effect that over the years there has been a proliferation of redress mechanisms. The present system is unnecessarily complex and open to abuse. The Task Force recommends that there should, wherever possible, be a single process of redress by employees against actions of the employer. That process should be grievance culminating in adjudication.
49. While proposing the single redress process as a Staff Relations principle within the Public Service, the Task Force noted that individuals could also invoke the protections provided by the Charter of Rights and access to the Human Rights Commission.

Grievance Processes and Grievance Mediation

50. The Task Force endorses the view that there are too many levels in the present grievance process. In some cases inadequate delegation of authority can be an obstacle to resolving issues at the appropriate level. In addition, the reluctance of senior managers to over-rule decisions made by those at more junior levels can lead to fewer grievances being settled prior to adjudication than reasonable parties might be expected to solve.
51. The Task Force therefore recommends that consideration be given to the provision of mediation services at the unopposed request of either party or upon joint request. Mediators could be selected by the parties or named by the PSSRB from within PSSRB staff or from a list of competent labour relations officers prepared in consultation with the parties. Information presented to the Task Force indicated that in some jurisdictions very high percentages of grievances, which would otherwise have reached adjudication, have been resolved by the parties when mediation is provided. This may be particularly important if the Task Force recommendation on allowing classification grievances is accepted.

Mass Grievances

52. There have been instances in which large numbers of employees have grieved essentially the same issues,

or in which, lacking legal status in the proceedings, the unions may have arranged for employees to grieve so as to resolve an issue. Even though a decision on one such grievance should logically apply to all like it, at present all must proceed individually through all steps including adjudication if the issue is adjudicable. Large amounts of time can be wasted in such proceedings.

53. The Task Force recommends that at the request of either party, the PSSRB may hear one “sample” grievance or the minimum number required to provide adequate description of the issue. The law should permit others to be held in abeyance **pro tem** and the eventual adjudication decisions should then be applied to all.

Choice of Adjudication

54. Today the PSSRB names adjudicators, usually from among its members. The Task force recommends that the parties be allowed to propose the use of particular adjudicators on the PSSRB staff or outside it on a case-by-case basis in addition to their existing rights to negotiate a list of acceptable adjudicators in collective agreements. In turn, the PSSRB should remain free to name adjudicators both from within its own ranks and outside when these rights have not been exercised by the parties.
55. Whatever the source, adjudication decisions can have very significant effects and poorly informed judgements can be made by adjudicators working in isolation. The PSSRB, therefore should be given adjudication review powers to ensure consistency and quality. These powers should extend to the jurisdiction taken by the adjudicator and the decision rendered.

Exclusions

56. Many managers complain of excessive difficulty and delay in excluding management representatives from membership in bargaining units. Problems seem particularly prevalent at lower levels of management. Yet, the conflict of interest which is produced by a failure to exclude can be serious. The Task Force therefore recommends that the criteria for exclusions in the PSSRA should be broadened to include all those positions which require the exercise of significant management functions. Positions would be deemed to be excluded pending union objection leading to a final decision by the PSSRB. Once excluded, a position would remain excluded until an organizational change or a change in the allocation of duties occurred leading to voluntary withdrawal by the department or a challenge by the union. Successive incumbents would therefore normally be excluded.
57. At the same time, the Task Force recognizes that there have been far too many “confidential” exclusions. For example, all members of the PE com-

munity are automatically excluded even though the duties of various individuals may have little or nothing to do with sensitive management matters or Staff Relations. The Task Force recommends that this matter be studied with a view to reducing the numbers substantially. The Task Force notes that the Canada Labour Code excludes, on a confidential basis, only those directly involved in Staff Relations.

58. Consistent with the recommendation for designations, exclusions should apply to positions rather than to individuals.

National Joint Council

59. The National Joint Council (NJC) is a forum of long standing wherein unions and employer representatives deal with matters having common application transcending all bargaining units in the Public Service. Negotiations are conducted and concluded with regard to issues such as Relocation Policy, Foreign Service Directives, Clothing Policy, Travel Policy and so on. Should impasses occur in these NJC negotiations there is a third party dispute settlement process. All unions are represented in the NJC and have equal standing.
60. The Task Force supports the National Joint Council policy consultative role and the enhanced consultation process it can represent. At the same time, the Task Force recognizes that agreed policies are deemed to have the status of terms in collective agreements. Following the Task Force conclusion that there should be fewer redress processes we recommend that grievances related to such policies should not be handled by the council but should go through the normal departmental procedure culminating in PSSRB adjudication.
61. While the NJC already performs a useful and positive role as a consultative body and in the bargaining of matters that have universal interest and application it may be handicapped in some respects by the lack of a statutory base. The government may accordingly wish to include in any general legislation presented to parliament a section defining the role of the NJC.

Delays in Settlements

62. The Task Force recommends the extension of the present 60 days Notice to Bargain to 90 days to allow more adequate preparation time and hopefully to reduce the sometimes lengthy delays between the expiry of one contract and the conclusion of a new one. The Task Force recognizes, however, that future reductions in delays will depend primarily on changing the approaches that both sides bring to the bargaining table, and, to a lesser extent, on the instruments available to help them arrive at settlements.

Members of the Task Force on Staff Relations

A. Kroeger _____ Task Force Chairman
Deputy Minister/Chairman
Employment and Immigration Canada

V. W. Barbeau
Assistant Deputy Minister
Airports Group
Transport Canada

D. Broadbent
Deputy Minister
Veterans Affairs Canada

D. J. Fowler
Assistant Secretary, Collective Bargaining Division
Staff Relations Branch
Treasury Board of Canada

R. S. Lafleur
Assistant Deputy Minister
Realty Services
Public Works Canada

D. J. Lindley
Associate Assistant Deputy Minister
Personnel
Department of National Defence

D. Morley
Executive Director
Ontario Region
Employment and Immigration Canada

J. S. Stanford
Deputy Solicitor General
Ministry of the Solicitor General Canada

B. J. Morrissey
Assistant Deputy Minister of Sciences
Fisheries and Oceans

Task Force Support

The Task Force was supported by a Secretariat under the direction of Don Quiring, of the Public Service Commission of Canada, Tom McCready of National Defence, Penny Driscoll of Employment and Immigration Canada and Johanne Laplante of Public Works Canada. In addition public relations assistance was provided by Robert Land, Director General, Public Affairs, Employment and Immigration Canada.

Scope of the examination of Staff Relations

The first major step taken by the Task Force was to develop a “Statement of Issues” which described the specific objectives of the work and the scope of study which the group intended to pursue. The “Statement of Issues” was then widely circulated to notify interested parties of the subjects of review and to elicit responses to the specific issues raised.

The Task Force held consultative meetings on these comprehensive issues with unions and managers, other Task Forces, academics, Staff Relations specialists, outside experts and the officers of the main collective bargaining institutions which affect the Public Service. Written submissions were received from almost all of the unions and institutions and face to face discussions were held with all but two unions. However, all views were received in confidence and the conclusions and recommendations in this report are those of the Task Force alone.

Statement of issues underlying Staff Relations in the Federal Public Service

The Primacy of the Public Interest

The purpose of the Public Service is to serve loyally a democratically elected government and to deliver its programs efficiently and effectively to the Canadian public.

Staff Relations legislation and practices must not be inconsistent with the public interest. Legislation should also recognize the role of Treasury Board as employer and of Unions, as representatives of their membership.

The Objective of the Staff Relations Task Force

The Task Force approaches its work within the framework and spirit of Public Service 2000, which recognizes the importance of creating a climate where relations with staff are founded on a visible concern for their welfare and interests. The Task Force’s primary objective, therefore, is to determine how the staff relations climate can be improved in the sense of fostering cooperation, and by establishing mechanisms for the resolution of differences in a manner that is fair, even-handed and reflective of the public interest.

While long outstanding concerns related to current legis-

lation must be addressed, the Task Force wants interested parties to give their views on two specific questions.

- What has caused past conflicts and confrontations?
- What can be done to minimize conflict in the future and establish more effective dialogue, openness and trust?

Within the context of the Task Force’s primary objective, interested parties are invited to present their views on the following issues.

1. Scope of Bargaining

- What additions, if any should be made to the matters currently bargainable under the PSSRA?
- What matters should be excluded from collective bargaining and why?
- How should matters related to termination of employees currently included in other legislation (PSEA, FAA) be treated?

2. Rights to Strike

- Should the right to strike be maintained?
- Should there be a right to lock-out?
- Should employees be temporarily laid off if strikes result in no work being available?
- What procedures, if any, are required for the holding of strike votes?
- Are penalties sufficient to discourage illegal strikes?
- What changes, if any, should be made to the principles and processes governing the designation of employees prohibited from striking by reason of providing essential services (safety & security designations)?

3. Collective Bargaining Dispute Resolution

- What changes or additions should be made to the current dispute resolution processes to expedite collective bargaining?
- What additional matters, if any, should be subject to binding arbitration?
- Are present guidelines adequate and, if not what guidelines to third parties are necessary to facilitate reaching a settlement and protect the public interest?
- How should the costs of dispute resolution processes be allocated?

4. Grievance and Adjudication Mechanisms

- What changes, if any, should be made to the current grievance and adjudication processes to make them more efficient and effective?
- What additional matters, if any, should be subject to grievance and/or adjudication?
- Should adjudicators continue to be members of the PSSRB or should they be selected by the parties?
- How should the costs of adjudication be allocated?
- What formal role, if any, should departments have in the adjudication process?

5. Collective Bargaining Framework

- What formal role, if any, should the National Joint Council have in the collective bargaining process?
- What provisions, if any, should there be for service-wide master agreement bargaining?
- What should be the dispute resolution process for service-wide bargaining?
- What formal role, if any, should departments have in the collective bargaining process?

6. Labour Management Consultation

- Should there be formal consultation mechanisms at national, regional, and local levels?

full interpretations of new collective agreements, together with any necessary training.

p) Consultation (Paragraph 70):

Departmental and service wide consultation should be improved by enlarging the scope of consultation and ensuring that it occurs early in the policy development process. Senior management should demonstrate a willingness to consult.

7. Facilitating the Collective Bargaining Process

- What changes, if any, should be made to the current occupational group and bargaining unit structure?
- What changes can be made to other processes and practices to simplify and expedite collective bargaining and dispute resolution?

8. Role of the PSSRB

- What changes, if any, should be made to the current functions, powers and structure of the PSSRB?
- Should responsibility for the Public Service be transferred to the Canada Labour Relations Board?

9. Exclusions

- What principles and practices should govern the identification of persons excluded from collective bargaining (managerial and confidential exclusions)?

10. Rights and Prohibitions

- What changes or additions, if any, should be made to the rights and prohibitions currently contained in the PSSRA?
- Should bargaining unit members have a right to representation, and unions a duty of fair representation?

List of Contributors Formally Invited to Brief the Task Force on Staff Relations

1. All Deputy Ministers of the Federal Public Service were provided with a copy of our **Statement of Issues** and invited to organize a Departmental response.

2. Unions:

Aircraft Operations Group Association

Association of Public Service Financial Administrators

Canadian Air Traffic Control Association

Canadian Association of Professional Radio Operators

Canadian Merchant Service Guild

Council of Graphic Arts Unions of Public Service of Canada

Economists', Sociologists' and Statisticians' Association

Federal Government Dockyard Trades and Labour Council (Esquimalt)

Federal Government Dockyard Trades and Labour Council (East)

Federal Government Dockyard Chargehands Association

International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers

Professional Association of Foreign Service Officers

Professional Institute of the Public Service of Canada

Public Service Alliance of Canada

Syndicat canadien des employés professionnels et techniques

3. Staff Relations Specialists

Mr. J. C. Cloutier

Director Staff Relations and Compensation
Revenue Canada

Mr. G. M. Allen

Director General
Staff Relations and Compensation
Transport Canada

Ms. L. Brown

Director Staff Relations
Customs and Excise
Revenue Canada

Ms. J. De Laat

Director
Employee Relations and Compensation
Correctional Services Canada

Mr. R. E. Smart

Chief
Staff Relations and Compensation Division
Indian and Northern Affairs

Mr. J. K. Gibson

Manager
Employee Relations
National Research Council

4. Managers who were invited to brief the Task Force because of their special experience of particular aspects of collective bargaining, consultation or contract administration:

Captain (N) C. Baker

Commanding Officer
Ship Repair Unit (Atlantic)

Dr. G. Dittberner

Inspector General of Operations Directorate
Food Production and Inspection Branch
Agriculture Canada

Mr. Mike Hancock

District Director
Employment and Immigration Canada
Brantford, Ontario

Mr. Trefle Lacombe

Executive Director
Quebec Region
Employment and Immigration Canada

Mr. J. Phelps

Deputy Commissioner
Correctional Programs and Operations
Ministry of the Solicitor General of Canada

Mr. Serge Rainville

Executive Director
Ste. Anne de Bellevue Hospital

5. Special advisors on Staff Relations:

Mr. Brian Keller

Keller and Associates

Mr. William Kelly

Formerly Associate Deputy Minister
Labour Canada

Mr. Mike McDermott

Senior Assistant Deputy Minister
Federal Mediation and Conciliation Services
Labour Canada

6. **Mr. Ian Deans**

Staff Relations Board Chairman
Public Service Staff Relations Board

7. **Mr. L. M. Tenace**
Deputy Secretary Staff Relations Branch
Treasury Board of Canada
8. **Ms. Shirley Goldenberg**
Consultant in Staff Relations
9. **Mr. Jim Thomas**
Assistant Deputy Minister
Human Resources Secretariat Management Board of
Cabinet, Ontario

10. **Mr. Des Davidge**

General Secretary
National Joint Council

11. The other Task Forces of Public Service 2000
12. Many others contributed advice, articles, opinions and general assistance during the course of Public Service 2000 activities or because of a particular interest in Staff Relations.

Synopsis of the Report Of The Task Force on Staff Relations

Background

In mid-December 1989, the Prime Minister launched Public Service 2000 to renew the Canadian Public Service. The Task Force on Staff Relations was one of nine established at that time. This paper provides a synopsis of the objectives, methodology, findings, and conclusions of the Task Force. Its summarized recommendations are provided in Annex A. For those readers wishing a fuller explanation of any recommendations, the paragraph references refer to the full text in the Report itself.

Objectives

The Task Force on Staff Relations was guided by the objectives and spirit of Public Service 2000 and in particular, the principle that relations with staff should be founded on a visible concern for their welfare and interests.

Methodology

At the outset, the Task Force made a conscious decision to avoid being caught up in procedural detail but instead to provide recommendations of principles and measures of broad significance to the collective bargaining system. The Task Force therefore developed a "Statement of Issues" which in general terms described the broad scope of Public Service collective bargaining and the most significant questions which arise out of consideration of the issues.

The "Statement of Issues" was circulated to unions, Staff Relations experts, outside consultants, institutions involved in the processes of collective bargaining, all Deputy Ministers, and other Task Forces for reactions, comments, and advice. The Task Force met with many representatives of these interested parties and reviewed a great deal of written material describing the views of many interested parties as well as the Staff Relations regimes, problems and developments in other jurisdictions internationally and elsewhere in Canada. Written proposals for change as well as oral presentations were not confined to our original Statement of Issues but provided broad insights about the state of Staff Relations in the Public Service today and what might be done to improve it.

Overview of the State of Staff Relations

The Task Force was made aware that Staff Relations and collective bargaining in particular were not in crisis or in

danger of collapse. However, the relationship between the employer and bargaining agents does appear to have worsened in recent times and the processes are sometimes hampered by overly rigid and inflexible rules and procedures. Further, in some cases the course of events over the years has led to imbalances of power in the system, some favouring the employer and some hindering efficient and effective management.

Furthermore, the governing Public Service Staff Relations Act (PSSRA) today seems to be overly prescriptive, rigid, and somewhat paternalistic. Many would argue that it goes too far in protecting the Public Service from the effects of a more open approach to collective bargaining, perhaps similar to the private sector.

Within the structure of departmental and collective bargaining institutions, it is evident that there is room for improvement in the involvement of managers in the processes of bargaining and a requirement to improve staff relations within departments where consultation is often superficial at best and officers are often unprepared or poorly trained to deal with Staff Relations matters.

Conclusions

The Task Force believed that its objective should be to determine the principles and broad measures which would ensure fairness and equity to employees, as represented by their bargaining units, and to the Canadian public whom we all serve, as represented by the government.

We concluded that the best results will usually be obtained, not by imposed solutions, but by practices which help the parties to mutually agree on solutions to their differences by themselves, aided as required by the application of a flexible array of negotiating tools sensibly applied as and when needed.

The Task Force recognized that there are important differences between the Public Service and the private sector which merit consideration in the legislation governing Staff Relations. In the public sector, unions are less constrained by concerns about the employers' ability to pay and the potential impact of over-generous settlements on the future health of the enterprise. Further, the impact of strikes or lockouts in the public sector falls heavily on the public. There are legitimate concerns about the need to preserve similar conditions across the multitude of departments and so preserve a single Public Service and enhance efficiency and service to the public. However, there is also the fundamental inequality of the employer also having the legislative capacity to alter the rules and outcomes of collective bargaining.

We concluded that there should continue to be specific rules for the Public Service but a significant lessening of prescriptions and safeguards and the promotion of a fair balance of power, more akin to a private sector approach.

Within Public Service administration, we recognized problems owing to the relative centralization of collective bargaining responsibilities. We therefore propose greater involvement of departmental management in all Staff Relations matters and increased efforts to ensure appropriate attention to operational concerns in collective bargaining. We noted that Public Service managers should be fully informed about new collective agreements and should receive training in Staff Relations and matters such as grievance handling and union/management consultation.

The Task Force noted that a very significant source of Bargaining Agent frustration has resulted from the over-designation of "essential" staff to provide services during any strike. To restore a sensible balance between the legitimate right of employers to withdraw services and the need to protect the public from the worst consequences of strikes in essential services, the Task Force has recommended that the government consider the establishment of an independent Commission and the development of legislated criteria for the Commission to apply in determining those services which should be protected and the level of service which can legitimately be described as essential.

The Task Force has also recognized the administrative problems associated with both designations and exclusions of people rather than positions and the need to determine these at a time other than during collective bargaining negotiations. Thus, recommendations are made to resolve both the timing and application problems.

We examined the tools available to the Public Service Staff Relations Board (PSSRB) to regulate the conduct of negotiations and to bring about agreement. We concluded that the PSSRA and present practice seems overly rigid and, to some degree at least, aimed at imposing solutions as opposed to urging and helping the parties to eventually agree. To that end, we propose the addition of considerable flexibility of approach and the inclusion of a variety of optional tools to assist negotiations to be applied at the request of the parties or by decision of the Board.

The Task Force has also concluded that there are too many redress avenues available to deal with employee complaints and that, in principle, there should be only one commonly used process, that being grievance, culminating in adjudication. Therefore, the Task Force has also proposed that demotion and release for incompetency and incapacity should be removed from the Public Service Employment Act and made grievable and adjudicable as is dismissal under the PSSRA.

A significant source of employee dissatisfaction stems from the application of classification schemes without access to impartial adjudication. The Task Force concluded that there were good reasons to continue to withhold classification schemes themselves from the scope of bargaining. However, subject to a review of the experience of other Public Service jurisdictions with classification adjudication, it would seem reasonable to allow employees to bring grievances on the application of the employer's classification plan to adjudication. Of course, there may well be significant changes to the present occupational group structure and, therefore, a need to delay implementation of classification adjudication for a transitional period.

Summary of recommendations

Major recommendations of the Task Force are summarized below. Each is given fuller explanation in the main body of the report beginning with the paragraph indicated in parentheses.

a) Bargaining Unit Organization (Paragraph 24):

(i) The Task Force reaffirms the right of employees to organize in their own best interests following any significant changes in Occupational Categories and classification structure as a result of PS2000.

(ii) There should be a transition period followed by Public Service Staff Relations Board (PSSRB) certification of bargaining agents.

b) Right to Strike (Paragraph 27):

(i) The Task Force reaffirms the basic right to strike but recommends measures to protect the public in the case of public services seen as essential.

(ii) The Task Force proposes that criteria be developed defining essential services and that a body be established to administer these criteria and to determine the numbers of employees designated to perform essential duties.

(iii) Designations should be determined between bargaining rounds and should be applied to positions, not persons, remaining in force until functions change.

c) Dispute Resolution (Paragraph 31)

(i) The Task Force concludes that the overriding objective of dispute resolution processes should be to help the parties to settle disputes themselves.

(ii) Bargaining agents should select binding arbitration or conciliation/strike at the outset of negotiations, but the parties and the PSSRB should be given flexibility to employ a wider variety of techniques at appropriate times to facilitate the negotiating process.

(iii) The scope of arbitration should be equal to the scope of bargaining.

(iv) Particular arbitrators or Boards of Arbitration should be imposed by the PSSRB only when the parties cannot agree themselves on the person or persons.

(v) The PSSRB should be empowered to:

(a) Provide mediation, conciliation, or fact finding services upon request or to impose these when negotiations break down.

(b) Supply arbitration services only when satisfied that other methods will not help and negotiations are at an impasse.

(c) Supply arbitration services, including final

offer selection, upon request from both parties on the conciliation/strike route, and when other methods do not seem likely to lead to agreement.

d) Penalties for Illegal Strikes (Paragraph 42):

Penalties should be raised to the levels contained in the Canada Labour Code.

e) Strike Votes (Paragraph 44):

There should not be a mandatory, secret ballot process. However, the PSSRB should investigate and rule on employee complaints of unfair process.

f) Duty of Fair Representation (Paragraph 45):

The Public Service Staff Relations Act (PSSRA) should impose a duty of fair representation on the unions similar to that in the Canada Labour Code.

g) Grievance and Adjudication (Paragraph 46):

(i) Subject to the results of a review of experience in other Public Service jurisdictions, the application of the employer's classification plan should be grievable and adjudicable. If major changes to the present occupational group and classification structure occur, this recommendation should be implemented following an appropriate vestibule period.

(ii) There should be consolidation of redress provisions. In particular, release for incompetence and incapacity and demotion should be grievable and adjudicable just as is discharge for disciplinary reasons.

(iii) National Joint Council (NJC) approved policies should be grievable only through the ordinary grievance process culminating in adjudication by the PSSRB.

(iv) Mediation services requested by the parties jointly should be provided by the PSSRB prior to adjudication.

h) Mass Grievances (Paragraph 52):

The PSSRB should be empowered to hear one grievance (or a representative number) at the request of either party instead of a large number of similar grievances.

The decision taken would apply to all.

i) Review of Adjudication Decisions (Paragraph 54):

The PSSRB should be empowered to review adjudication decisions for consistency and equity across issues.

j) Exclusions (Paragraph 56):

(i) Positions, not individuals, should be excluded.

(ii) The main basis of exclusion should be the performance of significant management duties.

(iii) The number of "confidential" exclusions is excessive and should be substantially reduced. The Task Force recommends the reconsideration of "confidential" exclusions beyond those for positions involved in the operations of staff relations.

(iv) Exclusions should be deemed to be in effect when proposed until the PSSRB renders a contrary decision

k) National Joint Council (NJC) (Paragraph 58):

The Task Force endorses and wishes to enhance the important policy consultation role of NJC but recommends that grievances of NJC policies follow the departmental/PSSRB route.

l) Notice to Bargain (Paragraph 62):

The notice to bargain period should be extended to 90 days from 60 .

m) Departmental role in Collective Bargaining (Paragraph 63):

(i) The Departmental role in bargaining should be enhanced especially in the development of the employer's mandate and in trade-off decision-making.

(ii) The government should give careful consideration to two-tier bargaining.

(iii) Departments should handle most grievance adjudication cases except those with public service wide effects.

n) Public Service Staff Relations Board (PSSRB) (Paragraph 66):

Bargaining agents should be consulted on the nomination of the Chairperson, Vice-Chairperson and Deputy Chairpersons of the PSSRB

o) Training of Managers (paragraph 69):

(i) Managers should receive effective, formal training in Staff Relations.

(ii) The employer should make available to managers full interpretations of new collective agreements, together with any necessary training.

p) Consultation (Paragraph 70):

Departmental and service wide consultation should be improved by enlarging the scope of consultation and ensuring that it occurs early in the policy development process. Senior management should demonstrate a willingness to consult.

*Rapport du
Groupe de travail
sur les relations
de travail*

Document de travail

Fonction publique 2000

le 6 août 1990

FOR DISCUSSION

**PUBLIC SERVICE 2000: REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE ON
WORKFORCE ADAPTIVENESS**

**Peter Glynn
Dan Goodleaf
Robert Gordon
Bruce Howe
Martha Hynna
Howard Ladd
Alain Landry
Kristina Liljefors
Jennifer McQueen
Peter Meyboom
Ken Sinclair
Harry Swain (Chair)**

**Ruth Cardinal (Communications)
John Edwards (Ex officio)
Roberta Santi (Secretary)
Stuart Wightman (Coordinator)**

July 1, 1990

FOR DISCUSSION

PUBLIC SERVICE 2000: REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE ON
WORKFORCE ADAPTIVENESS

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

July 1, 1990

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Introduction

"Why do we need adaptive organizations? Because we can't predict the future."

Like many private companies, public sector organizations must become adaptive to maintain their relevance. While bureaucracies have been traditionally characterized by inertia, there is an emerging awareness all over the world that they must evolve by strategic choice instead of by simply reacting to their environments. The term "adaptive", after all, does not connote merely passive accommodation. Rather, it suggests an attempt to alter the environment and influence matters substantially. Adaptivity is synonymous with effectiveness and is a central feature of healthy organizations.

For example, public institutions have to move away from pre-programmed repertoires to a capacity to act purposively, from a departmental to a corporate orientation, from power-based to task-based solutions. They need to become more decisive (as opposed to analytical), to bring about quick, creative solutions that best serve the public and its various constituencies, all the while under endless scrutiny.

Part 1 of the Report of the Task Force on Workforce Adaptiveness briefly summarizes qualities of an adaptive organization. Part 3, to be completed, will focus on ways that departmental leaders may achieve these qualities. Nine-tenths of what needs to be done is in the domain of management practices rather than system failures, and is therefore at the level of departments and agencies. Statutory or central administrative constraints are not generally important, and where they are, they are usually dealt with by other task forces. Nevertheless, there are some residual changes to the system as a whole that ought to be considered with a view to fostering adaptiveness. These are dealt with in part 2 of the Report and the more significant are as follows.

Recruitment

(1) In the labour market of the 1990s and beyond, recruiting and retaining entry-level officers coming out of the universities will be our single biggest challenge. **We recommend that the PSC enlist departmental leaders and role models in an aggressive, long-term campaign aimed at producing a steady stream of highly adaptive applicants from Canada's universities.**

(2) **The PSC should develop methods for measuring personal adaptiveness.**

(3) Aggressive recruitment means being on campus early, with a capability for making early, concrete job offers. **We recommend that special entry pools offering accelerated developmental opportunities be set up for the new Administration and Analysis groups**, replacing the vanished AT and expanding the present ES programs.

(4) Until the running cost approach is implemented, the pools should be constituted with py's from departments and the center on a 50:50 basis, but **once running costs are in place, the pools should be constituted solely on the basis of the aggregate of departmental commitments to hire.**

(5) Resilient, self-learning organizations embody a diversity of experience and backgrounds. It is the need for adaptiveness, as much as the requirement of a representative public service in a democratic society, that drives employment equity. Thus special emphasis should be given to over-representing women, natives, visible minorities, and the disabled in the Administration and Analysis developmental groups. **TBS, as manager of the pools, should monitor their composition with a view to ensuring their graduates will make a substantial contribution to the future representativeness of the Public Service.**

(6) Selection boards for recruitment, promotion, and developmental opportunities should include women, men and minorities.

Opportunity

(7) It is recommended that a fully professional career counselling service be set up within the Public Service Commission which will:

- a) identify to management appropriate candidates for specific competitions and developmental assignments;
- b) assist individuals to set realistic career objectives and establish a personal development plan; and
- c) be made available to all employees in the Public Service with priority attention being given to affirmative action target groups at officer entry levels and at the feeder levels into the Management Category.

(8) We recommend that CCMD establish, on an experimental basis, an inventory of Executives -- not all of them women -- willing to spend an hour or two a week counselling career women.

(9) We recommend that an assessment centre program be available once, at the employee's discretion, to all career employees with at least seven years' experience. Assessment centers should be chosen not on the basis of whether they are in the

private or public sectors, but rather on whether they deal effectively with adaptiveness in an overall program of high repute.

(10) The present distinction in the incidence of costs between training and development should be lessened so that more of the total cost of development is borne by the employer.

(11) Access to **developmental** opportunities is a cornerstone of employment equity, which means that **preferential access should be given on the basis of the employee's adaptiveness and future value to the Public Service**, as opposed to specific work experience.

Empowerment

(12) No single thing more annoys front-line employees than the time and paperwork required to access tools. **DSS should have the mandate, resources and incentive to move to a completely paper-free system for routine purchases, so that any officer with delegated authority in a department can draw electronically on stocked items and standing orders at a dramatically lower service charge and delivery time.**

(13) **There should be no mass, system-wide approach to delaying, or to dispensing with the services of many of the present SM-EX category.** It is too expensive, tends to encourage the wrong people to leave, ignores the widely varying realities departments face, and on past experience would not even result in a more representative cadre afterwards.

(14) Instead, **delaying should be seen as a consequence of decentralization and empowerment.** It must be done at the department or branch level. It should not be the most urgent priority in 1991 and 1992, because swallowing all the other reforms of PS 2000 should take precedence. For senior managers who are moving to decentralize, the key thing will be to catch and redeploy the newly redundant before they invent new and more damaging busy work.

Incentives

(15) **Part-time indeterminate workers should be able to contribute to a pension account, and accumulate years of service, in proportion to their time on the job.**

(16) **Career wind-downs should be possible without pension penalty.**

(17) From time to time a specially valued employee accumulates the necessary age and service to render further effort in the Public Service truly a labour of love. To overcome the financial incentive to inopportune departures, **we recommend that at the**

discretion of the employer, either (a) the maximum entitlement of 70 percent of the best six years' salary be increased up to 80 percent, with the employee still paying into the fund as before, or (b) the employer have discretion to offer a separate contributory pension.

(18) In a world of running costs and performance pay, collective bargaining needs to take better account of the unique circumstances of departments so that employees can share directly in the gains to the whole community that come from increased productivity. The collective bargaining process should allow for supplements to the agreements to be worked out between major bargaining rounds to cover particular productivity schemes.

(19) We recommend that the awards policy incorporated in the Treasury Board's Incentive Award Plan (Chapter 365 of the Administrative Policy Manual) be revised to provide deputy heads with discretion to establish recognition and reward programs tailored to their departments. Operational restrictions and award criteria currently included in the Incentive Award Policy should be eliminated.

Resources

(20) When a redistribution of Hay points during decentralization increases the number of Executive category positions, TBS should be prepared to adjust the complement.

(21) More generally, the Executive complement should automatically be adjusted to match the number of jobs classified at the level, plus the normal flex.

Appraisals

(22) The roles and reasonable expectations of both parties in the PREA process should be made clear during orientation programs for new employees.

(23) For all members of the Executive Category, and starting with deputy ministers, the views of subordinates on the quality of leadership supplied over the appraisal period should be taken into account by those responsible for the evaluation.

Dealing with Poor Performers

(24) Section 31 of the Public Service Employment Act be deleted and all causes for termination, excepting only rejection on probation and political interference which should remain under the Public Service Employment Act, should come under the Financial Administration Act.

(25) **For any FAA discharge, there should be a single redress procedure specified under the Public Service Staff Relations Act.** Nothing in that procedure should derogate from the rights of an individual under the Canadian Human Rights Act.

(26) There is a conflict between the PSEA, which gives PSC the exclusive authority to appoint, and the PSSRA, which gives an arbitrator the power to reinstate -- that is, to also make appointments. This should be resolved in favour of the PSSRA arbitrator. **Where reappointment to the Public Service is deemed appropriate by an arbitrator, the arbitrator should have the authority either to reinstate to the original job or to grant priority for appointment to an equivalent position.**

(27) **Deputy Ministers should have authority to negotiate cash settlements to avoid formal termination and redress proceedings.**

TABLE OF CONTENTS

| | Page |
|--|------|
| PREFACE | 2 |
| PART 1 : THE ADAPTIVE PUBLIC SERVICE ORGANIZATION | 3 |
| Leadership | 4 |
| Vision | 6 |
| Feedback | 7 |
| Outward Orientation | 6 |
| Exploration | 7 |
| Creativity and Risk | 7 |
| Clients | 8 |
| PART 2 : MAKING IT WORK: SYSTEM RECOMMENDATIONS | 9 |
| Recrutment | 9 |
| Opportunity | 11 |
| Empowerment | 15 |
| Incentives | 15 |
| Resources | 17 |
| Appraisals | 18 |
| Dealing with Poor Performers | 19 |
| PART 3 : GUIDE FOR THE PERPLEXED (available September) | |

PREFACE

This draft report of the Task Force on Workforce Adaptation is organized into three sections. Part 1 briefly summarizes some qualities of an adaptive organization. A review of the literature identified approximately 25 key characteristics, 14 of which are considered both fundamental and relevant to the adaptive public service organization. These characteristics are grouped and discussed as follows.

- (a) Encapsulating the themes of Leadership and Outer-Directedness, about nine features are described in Part 1. They represent the broader attitudinal and cultural aspects of an adaptive organization, which go beyond the concerns of workforce adaptation in some cases. It is anticipated that specifics in these areas will be covered by several of the other PS 2000 Task Forces.
- (b) The remaining features are addressed in Part 2 of this draft, as they deal with the actionable, policy-related and human resources considerations, where relatively direct intervention can occur in the short term. All recommendations for specific legislative or central administrative change are in this section.
- (c) Part 3, to be written this summer, will focus on ways that departmental leaders may choose in order to bring their organizations closer to the desired state. It will be exemplary rather than prescriptive -- a source of proven ideas rather than a set of recommendations.

PART 1: THE ADAPTIVE PUBLIC SERVICE ORGANIZATION

Introduction

"Why do we need adaptive organizations? Because we can't predict the future."

The onrushing future contains a lot of surprises. Some of them should not be too surprising, for their shadows are already visible. For example:

- . the public requires ever more sophisticated services, delivered at ever lower cost
- . the labour force in coming decades will be relatively depleted of young people, especially those with advanced technical training, at a time when global economic forces will challenge Canada's competitiveness as never before
- . that labour force will be increasingly multicultural, and its largest pool of not fully tapped creativity will be female
- . attitudes toward work and careers are changing
- . old issues in new guises - - environmental management, the relations between groups in Canadian society, regionalism, relations with the U.S. -- will rise to prominence

These matters, and their consequences, are at least foreseeable, though timing, intensity, and the result of their happening at the same time as some other unrelated things are less predictable. But most of what really matters will still be a surprise. Think of the rude jolts the world has held for statesmen since 1970: oil crises, the resignation of a U.S. President, the rise of Islamic fundamentalism, the collapse of Communism all over Eastern Europe, the coming reunification of Germany. In all of these cases, it has been resilience and adaptiveness that have distinguished swift and effective governmental responses from hesitant, fumbling opportunity losers.

Like many private companies, public sector organizations must become adaptive to maintain their relevance. While bureaucracies have been traditionally characterized by inertia, there is an emerging awareness all over the world that they must evolve by strategic choice instead of by simply reacting to their environments. The term "adaptive", after all, does not connote merely passive accommodation. Rather, it suggests an attempt to alter the environment and influence matters substantially. Adaptivity is synonymous with effectiveness and is a central feature of healthy organizations.

For example, public institutions have to move away from pre-programmed repertoires to a capacity to act purposively, from a departmental to a corporate orientation, from

power-based to task-based solutions. They need to become more decisive (as opposed to analytical), to bring about quick, creative solutions that best serve the public and its various constituencies, all the while under endless scrutiny.

There are certain qualities possessed to varying degrees by adaptive organizations, whether private or public. This chapter addresses certain key characteristics from two perspectives: Leadership and Outer-directedness.

Leadership

In the most effective enterprises, **purpose and mission are articulated, along with a shared inner core of values.** "Mission" encompasses what needs to be done and the organization's long-term objectives.

Day-to-day concerns are contrasted with enduring norms affecting the organization's future; the larger the gap, the greater the likelihood those concerns hinder both morale and performance. If allowed to continue, these gaps permit work groups to resist any attempt at change and improvement, and maintain the status quo at all costs. An adaptive public organization needs a focus on objectives, as opposed to programs and projects. It needs a realistic statement of goals, so that it can point out attainable achievements. It has to move away from the norms of objectivity and neutrality about policies (as opposed to politics), because those norms discourage the passionate commitment so very essential to and evident in the adaptive enterprise. The organizational culture, moreover, must attach high priority to leadership and management of people.

There is a distinctive, supportive culture which everyone understands and owns. Departments can -- and should -- develop the subcultures which conduce to overall enhanced performance. Each branch or division is encouraged to adopt and expand on those organization-wide norms that promote organizational success.

Though individuals contribute and are rewarded differently, all members know about the ideal type of organization they are working towards ("one enterprise"). The sharing of values is promoted by the organization's leaders, as culture-transmitters, who take a very active role in this process. Rather than letting it happen or helping it happen, they **make** it happen. They are committed to consensus, and "purpose" is used to connect everyone together. The end result is goal congruence between the various internal groups, e.g. central agencies and departments, or headquarters and regions.

Adaptive organizations also **manage change; they are more active than reactive.** In public institutions, change can often be perceived unfavourably (for example, a re-organization); it is usually a source of considerable anxiety. However, change is a way of life, not an exception to it. The conflict associated with change must be managed rather than avoided, and affected employees have to be equipped to deal with many change-related difficulties. Adaptive, self-designing organizations know the world is messy; they invent or adapt solutions opportunistically, and do not spend time defending past actions.

People are induced to love change as much as they hated it in the past. Change is viewed as an opportunity, rather than a threat. In adaptive organizations, leaders know how to sense the latent energy and create the momentum for implementing critical changes.

Leaders are **change masters with vision**. They are good internal role models, who can view issues from all angles. Their authority comes from expertise, achievements and relationships, more than from status and rank. They are more than managers or administrators, and their vision means more to them than their image. They are opportunity-focused, rather than problem-focused. They think, plan and behave "contextually" rather than getting caught up in day-to-day activities. They seek and initiate needed changes instead of being primarily reinforced for protecting the status quo. They take personal responsibility for maintaining and increasing the organization's effectiveness.

As leaders, these adaptive individuals set an example by treating everyone with respect and as a source of valuable insight; by congratulating those who suggest new ideas; by bringing uncomfortable issues out in the open, listening to those with divergent viewpoints; and by encouraging novel perspectives ensure that nothing has been overlooked. They speak with pride about their organization and avoid criticizing it publicly. They use power in untraditional ways, by tapping into sources of good ideas and figuring out whose collaboration is needed to act on those ideas, rather than relying on hierarchy. Adaptive managers initiate cross-functional projects and strategic partnerships with their clientele. They serve as integrators and facilitators, not as watchdogs and interventionists. They anticipate the responses of other groups and are motivated by challenging projects more than standard reward systems. They enhance others' reputations. They create excitement about mission, a share of the glory and the gains of success.

Their staff are typically creative and flexible, more in the line of "prospectors" than "defenders". They too can manage ambiguity. These employees tend to think of other employees as their customers; there is strong organizational identity.

In adaptive organizations, **opportunities are always challenging**. Flexible institutions offer an endless array, providing incumbents are able to go beyond the extrinsic motives of pay raises and promotions. Intrinsic motives take precedence -- for example, the chance to exchange ideas with other units, departments and private industry. The most effective public organizations develop career systems centered around talent, rather than filling positions in the hierarchy. Access to the most challenging opportunities is based on results achieved by the individual, rather than his or her next most logical step in the occupational classification system. There is instead commitment to the achievement of a particular project that can show results.

The most adaptive people in public organizations are less concerned about career plateauing or even losing position in the hierarchy. In fact, they tend to maintain visibility, marketability, generality, credibility and mobility. They cultivate networks, avoid over-specialization and long-term assignments. They seek to acquire and develop the most portable skills and they realize their institutional affiliations may mean little elsewhere. These individuals rely less on the organization and more on their own abilities, and so they have an easier time adjusting. They thrive on being able to make an impact on the

process of government; attracting and retaining them means conveying these values to them.

Another key feature of most adaptive organizations is that they have **built-in, periodic feedback mechanisms at all levels**. There is continual self-review; leaders of the organization believe in this, do not fear the outcomes and invariably act on them. They go beyond diagnosis to action, with a view to fine-tuning the enterprise. Regular opinion surveys or focus groups may be used to assess morale

-- the organization is receptive to the inputs and suggestions of its members. There are forums to enable staff to raise their concerns without fear of retribution; they are deeply involved in continual scrutiny of their organization as a whole.

Communication is most effective when it has to pass through the minimum number of layers to reach its target. Effective leaders adopt participative management; they involve employees in decisions which will affect them and they also encourage staff members to share information with all other levels in the organization. In this way, members are continually learning; no one can say he or she is being left out of the picture.

High-commitment work systems often use outsiders to clarify values, amplify concerns, test the adequacy of proposed changes and help legitimize these changes. Consultants are viewed as important agents of change, bringing a broad perspective, offering objective advice, and going beyond prescribing solutions to facilitating them.

Outer-directedness

A notable feature of the most successful organizations is their responsiveness. Almost without exception, they are oriented toward their environments, outward rather than inward-looking. The challenge of managing change has made many realize they cannot afford to be constrained by rules and procedures; consequently, there is **self-control by empowered members**. Effective project teams, for example, are allowed to work unencumbered by formal plans, committees, board approvals and other bureaucratic delays. Doing the right thing is a priority, which takes precedence over doing things right (without replacing this). So the organization is not always run as a tight ship, with close control over resources and procedures. Leaders know this will too often stifle creativity and dampen enthusiasm for risk-taking.

Empowerment is a key theme in these organizations. There is shared decision-making, diffused responsibility, and collective commitment. People are given the power to act, and tend to represent the organization based on their own best judgment. On an individual level, this can mean, for example, that employees have a chance to perform an "entire" service or produce an identifiable piece of work on their own. They do not simply feel they are faceless contributors to a briefing paper which is ultimately unrecognizable once it has moved through levels of approval in the hierarchy. On an organizational plane, there is ample trust; departments are empowered to develop strategies fitting their own unique culture and mandate.

Associated with this theme is the **encouragement of risk-taking and innovation, rather than error-avoidance**. Individuals are allowed to challenge the common wisdom and use unconventional methods to achieve results. The atmosphere is opportunity-focused, so that ideas are evaluated on their merits, not the status of the originator. There is freedom to fail; the climate tolerates a reasonable number of mistakes, and insists on learning from them.

Public organizations often value tradition, process and adherence to rules; adaptive public organizations respect these values, but alter them when necessary. There is more tolerance for error, which frees up creative energy and often brings out the best efforts of latent performers. High quality services and innovative policies have both evolved in this way. To make it happen, lengthy time periods are allowed to measure the success or failure of innovation, and adequate resources are provided to support it, in every case.

Less adaptive enterprises typically spend less time and effort on discussing how an idea can work, and more on what is likely to go wrong. New ideas are not adopted because they do not seem to be better than present ones, or there is no proof. In addition, a bad scheme may be adopted out of desperation because it seems to be the only (or expedient) alternative, or because the alternative is perceived to be system collapse. However, either-or thinking is not a characteristic of adaptive organizations. They always provide mechanisms for carrying out an active search for alternatives, for questioning the status quo. Positive value is given to behaviours leading to change, to diversity, and even to disagreement. In fact, leaders can have no worse fate than having subordinates decide they will do exactly, and only, what they are told to do. Incentives play a large part; dreaming up and trying innovations is rewarded, but the rewards are not seen as contingent on the success of the innovation. Mistakes provide the most valuable source of learning, and it is considered important to understand them.

Another central feature is that **different perspectives are explored and differences of opinion are encouraged**. For example, there is continuous regrouping of people, functions and services, to produce unexpected, creative new combinations. Individuals are urged to tune into other environments inside and outside the organization. They practice horizontal, cross-functional thinking. They find synergies that multiply value.

Leaders take steps to make sure they hear more than just what subordinates want them to hear -- usually agreeable tidings. Adaptive organizations have an atmosphere in which staff are made to feel comfortable speaking up. Leaders listen and provoke dissension so that they can see all sides of an issue before a decision is made. Policy committees try to solicit opposing views, without installing gatekeepers to filter this information. Leaders tolerate eccentricity. They are accessible and practice "management by wandering around". They do not erect barriers or convey any sense of retribution or negative sanctions.

Organizations acting with these norms find themselves more anticipatory to change; it does not come as an unwelcome surprise. They are proactive in their stance, increasingly

finding ways to build coalitions with groups and entities --alliances they may once have considered unthinkable.

Finally -- and fundamentally -- adaptive public service organizations have a **strong client orientation**. They listen carefully and regularly to their customers. The customer is identified and made central to all affairs. Individuals receive satisfaction from serving clients more than from serving the bureaucracy. This is an organization-wide norm, conveyed by leaders and consistently monitored. Written and verbal communication is geared to the language of the consumer of services, rather than the jargon of internal interest groups. All stakeholders are consulted when policies are researched, developed and implemented.

Because the ultimate criterion of success in a public service organization is satisfaction of clients, there are mechanisms to assess this, formally or informally. Client satisfaction surveys may be used. Results are used to improve services -- quantity, quality, modes of delivery, and so on. The public repute of the adaptive enterprise is the value driving the improvement efforts. But these improvements are more substantial than cosmetic; the result is "least-cost excellence".

PART 2: MAKING IT WORK

Nine-tenths of what needs to be done is in the domain of management practices rather than system failures, and is therefore at the level of departments and agencies. Statutory or central administrative constraints are not generally important, and where they are, they are usually dealt with by other task forces. Nevertheless, there are some residual changes to the system as a whole that ought to be considered with a view to fostering adaptiveness. It is this gap-filling role that makes the recommendations in this section less comprehensive than they would have been without nine other task forces and a basically sensible organization of the Public Service to begin with.

Recruitment

Adaptive organizations are full of adaptive people. Though not all members have to be adaptive for the organization to be effective, its leadership must be, and that ethos must permeate the organization. People can learn; inflexible attitudes and behaviours can change, in the right environment. Still, it helps when recruiting or promoting to search for certain characteristics, particularly at the graduate entry level. The people we seek to recruit should have higher than average amounts of many of the following traits:

Versatility: these people have (or want to develop) **multiple skills**, become **diversely experienced**; they are **generalists** at heart, though they often build outward from a specialist training. They are **energetic** and **persistent**.

Curiosity: they are **intellectually curious**, **honest** and **open-minded**; **active listeners** and **lifelong learners**. They have a taste for **complexity**, **novelty** and **ambiguity**. They are **undogmatic**. More than tolerating **unconventional ideas**, they enjoy them and seek them out.

Sharing: They are good at **collaborating**, **sharing**, and **teaming**, and they form and dissolve partnerships easily as the problem changes. Their **egos are strong**, because **self-confidence** is key, but also **resilient**, since in the cut and thrust of new ideas, a brittle or fragile person is too easily wounded. They have a **sense of humour**, enjoy **play**, and tend toward **irreverence**.

Future orientation: Adaptive people are oriented to the future; they **anticipate** rather than react. They are **comfortable with taking risks**; security is not their top concern.

At the entry level, these predispositions may be more latent than manifest in experience, but they can and should be prospected for.

(1) In the labour market of the 1990s and beyond, recruiting and retaining entry-level officers coming out of the universities will be our single biggest challenge.

We recommend that the PSC enlist departmental leaders and role models in an aggressive, long-term campaign aimed at producing a steady stream of highly adaptive applicants from Canada's universities.

(2) **Across the whole Service but particularly at the post-secondary entry level and on hiring executives from outside, screening and selection criteria should include the several dimensions of adaptiveness, under the general heading of personal suitability.**

(3) **The PSC should develop methods for measuring personal adaptiveness.**

(4) Aggressive recruitment means being on campus early, with a capability for making early, concrete job offers. **We recommend that special entry pools offering accelerated developmental opportunities be set up for the new Administration and Analysis groups, replacing the vanished AT and expanding the present ES programs.**

(5) There is a tendency in setting up developmental programs to concentrate overly on headquarters staff experience. **It is important that the experience gained by trainees include service in the regions on the front lines of program delivery.**

(6) Until the running cost approach is implemented, the pools should be constituted with py's from departments and the center on a 50:50 basis, but **once running costs are in place, the pools should be constituted solely on the basis of the aggregate of departmental commitments to hire.**

(7) **The new training programs should be centrally managed by TBS, under a "board of directors" composed of senior officers of departments guaranteeing the positions.**

(8) **Applications to these developmental positions should be accepted on a competitive basis from persons now in the Public Service.**

(9) Resilient, self-learning organizations embody a diversity of experience and backgrounds. It is the need for adaptiveness, as much as the requirement of a representative public service in a democratic society, that drives employment equity. Thus special emphasis should be given to over-representing women, natives, visible minorities, and the disabled in the Administration and Analysis developmental groups. **TBS, as manager of the pools, should monitor their composition with a view to ensuring their graduates will make a substantial contribution to the future representativeness of the Public Service.**

(10) **Selection boards for recruitment, promotion, and developmental opportunities should include women, men and minorities.**

Opportunity

A feature of public service which the private sector cannot match is the diversity, challenge, and social importance of the tasks to be done. This is particularly true for younger people, who often find themselves in charge of files of a kind their private sector contemporaries do not get to handle until they have accumulated a good deal more seniority. The sheer magnitude of the opportunities to make a measurable, visible contribution in the Public Service is one of its most attractive features. The challenge is how to exploit this diversity in ways which (a) keep people continually energized, (b) reward adaptive people with the diversity that attracted them in the first place, in a world where promotion will inevitably be slow, and (c) give running room to the most capable, especially those who are female, native, handicapped or visible minorities.

A special word with regard to these latter groups. As noted, a public service fully representative of the population it serves is usually (and sufficiently) justified on grounds of equity alone. This ignores the equally compelling efficiency argument -- that a key ingredient of adaptiveness is diversity. An organization that can draw on people with varied life experiences has richer sources of creativity than a homogeneous one. Remember, it was limited and specialized repertoires that did in the dinosaurs. They were replaced by diverse, crafty, swift, omnivorous and unspecialized mammals. Organizations, too, ignore at their peril the usefulness of internal diversity.

It will take continued attitudinal change throughout the system, rather than magic bullets from the center, to fully realize representational goals. We therefore refrain from numerical targetting, with the sole exception of the university recruitment pools, preferring instead to focus on processes that are likely to move the system in the right direction.

In this regard, one of the most important reforms of PS 2000 is the great simplification of the baroque job classification system being recommended by the Task Force on Classification. Breaking down walls improves mobility and attacks (female especially) ghettoization. It is a crucial reform.

Most of the things that need to be done with respect to employment equity are at the department or branch level. There are no systematic constraints to better performance. Still, there are some positive measures that could be improved or undertaken anew.

Career counselling in the Public Service is inadequate. It requires highly developed skills and sensitivity and it must be integrated with the staffing function.

(11) **It is recommended that a fully professional career counselling service be set up within the Public Service Commission which will:**

- a) identify to management appropriate candidates for specific competitions and developmental assignments;**

- b) **assist individuals to set realistic career objectives and establish a personal development plan; and**
- c) **be made available to all employees in the Public Service with priority attention being given to affirmative action target groups at officer entry levels and at the feeder levels into the Management Category.**

Most people who rise rapidly in large organizations have had the benefit of mentors: senior people who get to know the individual through work situations and who expand the relationship through providing career advice, information on how the system really works, and developmental opportunities. Many women feel cut off from this informal system, this "old-boys' network," just when they feel that marginality and competing social roles make such counsel all the more crucial. Now, the Canada Centre for Management Development has a reputation as a shining new beacon on the upward path, and a mandate to develop the future leaders of the Public Service.

(12) **We recommend that CCMD establish, on an experimental basis, an inventory of Executives -- not all of them women -- willing to spend an hour or two a week counselling career women.** While this cannot be a substitute for the mentoring relation that arises out of working together, there is a feeling among many women that the sources of good personal advice need to be sharply increased.

(13) An intensive assessment of an officer's strengths and weaknesses by an objective third party can be exceptionally useful in career planning. For example, the assessment done of candidates for the Career Assignment Program is sometimes said to be more useful than all the subsequent steps in the program. **We recommend that an assessment centre program be available once, at the employee's discretion, to all career employees with at least seven years' experience. Assessment centers should be chosen not on the basis of whether they are in the private or public sectors, but rather on whether they deal effectively with adaptiveness in an overall program of high repute.**

The generally smaller number of steps in the new classification system, together with the current age structure of the Service, mean that promotions will be less frequent, and correspondingly lateral movement more important, in providing new and varied challenges. We agree with the recommendations of the Staffing Task Force in regard to lateral movements: grievable deployment by the employer within the same commuting region, and active assignment offices at departmental and system levels to match employees seeking deployments with managers looking for employees.

This would be consistent with a limited move toward appointment to level. We join the Staffing Task Force in recommending that the PSEA be amended to allow, but not require, appointment to level below the Executive category. It would also be consistent with job rotation and career enhancement schemes at the departmental level.

* * *

The costs of mobility, especially for two-career families and families with offspring in local colleges, are not fully reimbursed. The informal system does not, as a rule, deal badly with these cases nor with other kinds of episodic (or episodically immobile) careers, but these phenomena will become more common.

(14) **We do not recommend variable reimbursement based on regional differentials in costs of housing.** While it is true that Toronto and Vancouver are currently expensive, the differential is largely in housing costs. When employees buy their own housing, the private benefits rise with the private costs. It is the future rate of change of housing prices that makes the difference: an employee entering a rising market does well, but one entering a static or declining market faces a relative penalty. Given the long time periods over which these income effects take place, it would be very difficult to design a system which one could be certain would be less inequitable than the present. From the point of view of the Service as a whole, it is fortunate that the differentials always seem to arise in large metropolitan areas, so that local recruitment is generally an alternative to moving in a public servant from elsewhere.

(15) Nevertheless in the context of a running cost world, **Treasury Board should delegate to deputy heads the latitude to make one-time top-ups of normal reimbursements in individual cases.** This is not meant to deal with the problem of uncompetitive pay rates for certain job classifications, which remains a general responsibility of Treasury Board as employer.

* * *

Jobs markets work best when irrigated with lots of information. Unhappily it is the rare Multi-Year Human Resource Plan that goes beyond short-term projections of employment equity targets to actually engage in human resource planning. Basic to real planning in any large organization is the statistical projection of vacancies in the evolving organization over several years. This requires management to have a rolling model of what competencies, in what quantities, it will need for several years into the future, and requires the personnel specialists to forecast retirements, promotions, departures, and deaths. The difference between the two is the field of opportunity for present employees seeking new challenges, and for managements to reshape the organization through planned recruitment and staff development.

(16) **We recommend that large departments, and TBS on behalf of the whole Public Service, annually publish reports showing the number of jobs by category and level expected to open up for each of the next five years.** These would be statistical projections, and aggregations of small categories would be expected.

* * *

Continuous learning is the leitmotif of the adaptive organization. For the Public Service this means renewed attention to staff training and development, in all the ways that occurs.

Much of the problem is attitudinal. At DIAND, one slogan in general use by senior management is "Everyone a student, everyone a teacher." This means that every single employee has some unique piece of mission-relevant information and an obligation to share it, and that every single person has a positive obligation to learn something new every day. A week that passes without some memorable epiphany is a lost week. It also means that one of the classic bureaucratic styles -- hoarding information to ensure job security through monopolization -- will be an unrewarding behaviour.

A Task Force on Training and Development has just been named. The total recorded cost for training and development for all agencies under section 1.1 of the PSSRA for 1984-85 was \$274 million. This covered all operating costs, including the salaries of trainees, for all purposes except language training. Of this total, less than 1/3 went for staff development, as opposed to strictly job-related training. Training, especially for technically demanding jobs that have few analogues in the private sector, will continue to increase in importance. However, the investment in development, a key to adaptiveness, is clearly inadequate. We have four general recommendations for the new Task Force:

(17) **The Task Force on Training and Development should consider recommendations that would increase the emphasis on development in a generally increasing overall investment.**

(18) **The present distinction in the incidence of costs between training and development should be lessened so that more of the total cost of development is borne by the employer.** Both are routes to adaptiveness, and developmental experiences should be encouraged rather than restricted.

(19) Access to **developmental** opportunities is a cornerstone of employment equity, which means that **preferential access should be given on the basis of the employee's adaptiveness and future value to the Public Service**, as opposed to specific work experience.

(20) **All training curricula for supervisors and managers should include training on how to operate effectively in a Service that rejoices in multiple cultures and values equal opportunity.**

Empowerment

Empowerment is a central theme in all adaptive organizations. With recent reforms at TBS and the common service organizations, most of the remaining action is at the level of the department. The system no longer strongly constrains good sense, though there are areas where some creative rule destruction could yet occur. For example:

(21) **Requiring deputy ministers to sign WFA cash-out forms, or to personally petition the Secretary of the Treasury Board for a waiver of pension reduction for surplus employees over 55 and with more than 20 years' service adds no value, only wastes time, and should cease.**

(22) **No single thing more annoys front-line employees than the time and paperwork required to access tools. DSS should have the mandate, resources and incentive to move to a completely paper-free system for routine purchases, so that any officer with delegated authority in a department can draw electronically on stocked items and standing orders at a dramatically lower service charge and delivery time.**

(23) **There should be no mass, system-wide approach to delayering, or to dispensing with the services of many of the present SM-EX category. It is too expensive, tends to encourage the wrong people to leave, ignores the widely varying realities departments face, and on past experience would not even result in a more representative cadre afterwards.**

(24) **Instead, delayering should be seen as a consequence of decentralization and empowerment. It must be done at the department or branch level. It should not be the most urgent priority in 1991 and 1992, because swallowing all the other reforms of PS 2000 should take precedence. For senior managers who are moving to decentralize, the key thing will be to catch and redeploy the newly redundant before they invent new and more damaging busy work.**

Incentives

The most effective incentive for employees is the nature of the work to be done. Employees should be engaged in useful and challenging tasks which demonstrate their value to the organization and support their sense of self-esteem.

For this they should be paid at rates comparable to private sector norms. We fully support the three-pronged approach to compensation and benefits recommended by the task force on the subject. We specifically support their recommendations for changes to the PSSA and its management regimes which would more fully take into account the growing desire for episodic careers -- careers which allow time off or part-time work for family responsibilities, sabbaticals, travel, volunteer or community work, career wind-downs, and the like.

(25) **Part-time indeterminate workers should be able to contribute to a pension account, and accumulate years of service, in proportion to their time on the job.**

(26) **Employees returning from leave without pay should be able to elect longer superannuation payback periods, while being responsible for the time value of money, or to elect to forego both payment and benefit.**

(27) **Career wind-downs should be possible without pension penalty.** For example, a person of 63 should be able to accept two years of half-time work and have the total salary for that period count as one of the best six years for pension calculations, or alternatively, accept a less demanding and lower-paid position for a period before retirement without pension penalty -- perhaps by having the employer top up the account. Such arrangements would be subject to operational requirements, but would offer benefits in terms of flexibility to the employer, and would make particular sense in a running cost regime.

(28) From time to time a specially valued employee accumulates the necessary age and service to render further effort in the Public Service truly a labour of love. To overcome the financial incentive to inopportune departures, **we recommend that at the discretion of the employer, either (a) the maximum entitlement of 70 percent of the best six years' salary be increased up to 80 percent, with the employee still paying into the fund as before, or (b) the employer have discretion to offer a separate contributory pension.**

(29) In a world of running costs and performance pay, collective bargaining needs to take better account of the unique circumstances of departments so that employees can share directly in the gains to the whole community that come from increased productivity. **The collective bargaining process should allow for supplements to the agreements to be worked out between major bargaining rounds to cover particular productivity schemes.**

Bread is important, but so is jam. Honour and recognition are critically important motivators and have an expanded place in modern organizations. Effective recognition and reward programs require that departments have the flexibility to design schemes matching their missions and which permit managers to provide timely and individualized rewards.

(30) **We recommend that the awards policy incorporated in the Treasury Board's Incentive Award Plan (Chapter 365 of the Administrative Policy Manual) be revised to provide deputy heads with discretion to establish recognition and reward programs tailored to their departments. Operational restrictions and award criteria currently included in the Incentive Award Policy should be eliminated.** Departments would, however, be expected to operate their programs within the general Treasury Board policy whereby such programs are "to provide recognition to persons employed in the Public Service for outstanding performance of their duties, for other meritorious contributions in relation to their duties, and for practical suggestions for improvements." To this we would only add, "... and for outstanding service to the public."

Finally -- and it seems odd to have to say it in this age of heightened concern for personal and environmental health -- there needs to be a comprehensive review of facility standards and management. Sick buildings and stale air are far too common, especially in buildings constructed after the 1973 oil crisis, when standards went from energy-extravagant to niggardly. Fresh air and cooling declined just as the addition of office machinery was dramatically raising heat loads. One employee told us that the plants in her office get better care than she does. "At least they get watered, washed and debugged every week! And I can't even turn the lights on or off."

(31) Sick buildings mean sick employees. **We recommend that the Bureau of Real Property Management and the Department of Public Works undertake as a matter of urgency a comprehensive reassessment of their standards for materials, air, heat and lighting in federal buildings, and that they take the healthiest and most effective private sector examples as the norm for new buildings and the model for retrofitting existing ones.** In so doing they should take account of the fact that the ability to affect one's own space is an important element of employee empowerment. Task lighting, windows that open and a modicum of privacy are all important in organizations that value productivity.

Resources

"You ask for a duck. Treasury Board gives you a plucked chicken, with full accountability to make it fly."

Of all the recommendations flowing in to PS 2000, only a few are of first-order importance. Among these very few is the concept of switching away from our present patchwork of free, fungible, and infinitely priced resources to one based on **running costs**. Efficiency is only accidentally and irrationally possible without it. The idea is fundamental to many specific reforms elsewhere, from investing in training to allocating the cost of mismanagement in a visible and accountable way.

In a running cost world, there is no need for arbitrary limits on the size of the Executive category. We strongly support the recommendation of the Management Category Task Force in this regard. Under present rules, departments can wind up with many more legitimately classified management category positions than they are allowed complements to fill them. It has long been known that this is a natural consequence of growing workload or span of departmental responsibility. What has not been widely appreciated is that decentralization and delayering can work to increase the number of management level jobs. Take for example a department with eight regional offices and a certain function being done by PM-6s in the field, tightly controlled by an EX-2 in headquarters. Decentralizing the function puts, say, half the PM-6s over the magic 835 Hay point mark and eliminates the EX-2. The net result: lower total salary costs, one position eliminated, one layer gone -- and, net, three new members of the management category.

The following two recommendations are offered as a poor second best, in the event the much better recommendation of the Management Category Task Force is not accepted.

(32) **When a redistribution of Hay points during decentralization increases the number of Executive category positions, TBS should be prepared to adjust the complement.**

(33) **More generally, the Executive complement should automatically be adjusted to match the number of jobs classified at the level, plus the normal flex.**

(34) Adjusting the Hay system to the circumstances of the federal Public Service seems to have overvalued staff vs. line jobs, with the result that the more highly classified jobs are in the NCR vs. the regions, and in the central agencies vs. the line departments. This needs objective examination, discussion, and (probably) correction. **We applaud the commitment of the Personnel Policy Branch to bring the results of the necessary studies to TBSAC this fall.**

(35) **The advent of a new classification system provides a unique opportunity to do away with rules, like "a PM-3 cannot report to a PM-4" and "only PM-3 level people can compete for PM-4 jobs," which make nonsense out of departmental career ladders.**

From the point of view of adaptability, deputy ministers need to put discretionary resources in the hands of their best people, regardless of seniority or rank. These resources include money, people, space, equipment, recognition, even promotion. And those people ought to be tasked with the most difficult and urgent problems.

Appraisals

The basic function of the Performance Review and Appraisal process is to provide the employee with feedback on how well the tasks of the last period were accomplished, to recognize and strengthen those behaviours that lead to high effectiveness, and to provide counsel about those that could stand some improvement. Where performance pay or other specific rewards are involved, a grading system is necessarily involved.

Now that the PREA process has been delegated to departments, little remains to be done at the system level. The Task Force on Training and Development may wish to consider the following:

(36) **The roles and reasonable expectations of both parties in the PREA process should be made clear during orientation programs for new employees.**

(37) **Core coursework for supervisors and managers should include PREA skills.**

There is, however, one rather far-reaching recommendation which we would like to make:

(38) For all members of the Executive Category, and starting with deputy ministers, the views of subordinates on the quality of leadership supplied over the appraisal period should be taken into account by those responsible for the evaluation.

The views of subordinates should not be the only input into appraisals of managers, nor necessarily the dominant ones -- especially for deputy ministers, with their multiple accountabilities. Still, if improving the quality of management, especially the human side of it, is the sine qua non of PS 2000, the people best placed to comment are those who experience it.

This can be a frightening process, which is why it should begin with deputy ministers. But experience in numerous private and public sector organizations indicates that the use of a neutral third party can preserve candour and preclude retribution. At AECL, for example, the third party report is the subject of a discussion between appraiser and subordinates, which often leads to a new level of understanding and a plan of action. In some companies the report never goes beyond the person being appraised. We believe it should: only then can the superior spot and correct problems, and know in some detail and certainty the array of talents available for dealing with the next challenge.

Dealing with Poor Performers

One of the most perplexing problems for public service managers is the successful management of unsatisfactory employees. Unsatisfactory performance disrupts the organization, has significant negative influence on co-workers and consumes an inordinate amount of managerial time and resources. In the majority of instances, managers now possess the necessary authorities to act and require only the encouragement to do so. Often the employee can be stimulated to improve performance. Motivational techniques include the establishment of goals, job enrichment, immediate performance feedback, rewards or tangible incentives, and using counselling or even assessment centre services.

Public Service managers are neither properly trained nor motivated to utilize the tools they have at hand.

(39) Supervisors should be trained in the proper use of probationary periods, coaching, interviewing in sensitive situations, identification of performance deficiencies and techniques for handling problem employees.

There is a particular problem in the minority of disciplinary cases where remedial measures are unsuccessful and termination of employment is sought.

Termination for misconduct is both rare and relatively well understood. There is a body of law and arbitral decisions which offers reasonably precise guidance. It is the grayer areas of incompetence, incapacity, abandonment, sloth, and persistent poor performance that bedevil the system. Nothing is more vexing to hard-working and dedicated employees than having to do the work of a shirker or an incompetent. In a world where teamwork is key, all members have to pull their weight or the morale of the whole team suffers.

Managers accept that the decision to terminate employment is a grave one, to be taken after sustained attempts to improve persistently unsatisfactory performance have proved fruitless. Moreover there is acceptance that all the steps leading up to discharge must be carefully documented, since the employee is owed an avenue for redress in the case of unjust dismissal. What is less than satisfactory is the present multiplicity of appeal routes and the time it can take to produce finality.

These observations lead to the following recommendations:

(40) **Section 31 of the Public Service Employment Act be deleted and all causes for termination, excepting only rejection on probation and political interference which should remain under the Public Service Employment Act, should come under the Financial Administration Act.**

(41) **For any FAA discharge, there should be a single redress procedure specified under the Public Service Staff Relations Act. Nothing in that procedure should derogate from the rights of an individual under the Canadian Human Rights Act.**

(42) **The expeditious settlement of disputes is in the best interest of all parties. Parties are encouraged to utilize more fully the existing authority under the PSSRA to employ private arbitrators. In those instances of termination for cause, a time limit should be included in the PSSRA, perhaps along the lines of the Ontario Labour Relations Act, Section 45.**

(43) **There is a conflict between the PSEA, which gives PSC the exclusive authority to appoint, and the PSSRA, which gives an arbitrator the power to reinstate -- that is, to also make appointments. This should be resolved in favour of the PSSRA arbitrator. Where reappointment to the Public Service is deemed appropriate by an arbitrator, the arbitrator should have the authority either to reinstate to the original job or to grant priority for appointment to an equivalent position.**

(44) **Deputy Ministers should have authority to negotiate cash settlements to avoid formal termination and redress proceedings.**



FOR DISCUSSION

PUBLIC SERVICE 2000: REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE ON
COMPENSATION AND BENEFITS

July 1990

FOR DISCUSSION

PUBLIC SERVICE 2000: REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE ON
COMPENSATION AND BENEFITS

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

July 1990

1. MANDATE

The mandate of the Public Service 2000 Task Force on Compensation and Benefits is to establish a set of principles to guide the development of a modern compensation, benefit and rewards system for the Federal Public Service.

2. BACKGROUND

Major changes in demographics and changing employee needs and values, along with continuing competitive, economic, technological and legislative pressures on employers, has forced a re-examination of the traditional employer-employee relationships and contract. Modern employers in the private sector are currently reviewing their compensation and benefit packages to reduce costs and to ensure that they are "competitive employers"; i.e. able to compete for the best employees, while maintaining a competitive edge in a highly competitive global economy.

The federal government, as an employer, has not escaped these pressures. It also is living through a period of fundamental and rapid change; it also must review its management practices and organizational structures if it is to maintain and improve its effectiveness. The Public Service 2000 Initiative recognizes this reality and is prompting:

- . a re-evaluation of the traditional management of human resources,
- . a re-thinking of the strategic role of compensation and benefits, and
- . a fresh focus on new and innovative methods to recognize and reward employees.

It is within these boundaries that the Task Force on Compensation and Benefits tackled the challenge.

3. CONCLUSIONS

The **current** Public Service approach to compensation and benefits is highly uniform, centralized and rigidly controlled. Such an approach:

- . tends to treat all employees (exceptional and mediocre) alike, therefore it cannot be utilized in any *strategic manner as a management tool* to influence the effectiveness of the Public Service. It makes little attempt to recognize or reward exceptional efforts, initiatives or

accomplishments, nor does it provide disincentives for poor performance;

- . provides limited flexibility to individual employees in choosing benefits in a manner best-suited to their particular needs; and
- . is not designed to respond to specific departmental needs, values and goals. For example, it does not have the *flexibility* to adequately cope with difficulties in areas such as recruitment and retention of specialists, special markets (locations), geographical redeployment and, the changing benefit interests of individual employees.

As a result, the current Public Service approach to compensation and benefits fails to instill in employees or in managers a sense of partnership with the goals, objectives and values of a department or of the Government.

The Task Force believes that the *modern* Public Service should have a flexible and comprehensive approach to basic compensation, benefits and performance-based rewards. This approach should be *managed strategically* to provide:

- . individual employees or groups of employees with recognition and reward for their special contributions or efforts, and choice over their benefit package.
- . departmental management with some strategic tools designed to enhance performance levels of employees and consequently over the effectiveness of the Public Service;
- . organizations with the flexibility to cope with difficulties in areas such as special recruitment and retention, and geographical redeployment.

Overall, a *modern* Public Service compensation and benefits system would provide a strategic management tool to: attract the best available recruits, motivate employees to achieve their full potential, and retain competent employees.

4. RECOMMENDATIONS

The **challenge** for the Federal Public Service in the 1990s will be to develop compensation packages that

ensure operational effectiveness and meet the divergent needs of the workforce. To accomplish this task and meet the challenge, the Federal Public Service will need to strategically choose, plan and manage remuneration from a gamut of pay plans, benefits, bonuses, incentives, and recognition and reward programs.

The Task Force on Compensation and Benefits thus recommends that the contribution of compensation and benefits to successfully meeting the **human resources challenge** lies in:

the adoption of a "strategic rewards management approach" designed to motivate employees to achieve their full potential and a high level of performance through performance-linked awards and rewards.

The report of the Task Force on Compensation and Benefits further recommends principles and goals for the "strategic reward management approach" and proposes a comprehensive "Reward System" structured on three components:

- . core remuneration (basic compensation and benefits),
- . flexible benefits, and
- . awards and rewards:
 - . incentive and recognition awards,
 - . productivity gainsharing rewards, and
 - . performance rewards.

The Task Force on Compensation and Benefits also recommends

- . corporate changes and improvements to address:
- . balancing worklife and family responsibilities,
- . mobility,
- . departmental flexibility to respond to special recruitment and retention issues,
- . sick leave credits,
- . separation pay, and
- . legislative changes to the Public Service Superannuation Act to deal with part-time employment and leave without pay.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

| | <u>Page</u> |
|---|-------------|
| ACKNOWLEDGEMENT | i |
| FOREWORD | ii |
| MANDATE | iii |
| | |
| 1. INTRODUCTION | |
| 1.1 Background..... | 1 |
| 1.2 Activities of the Task Force..... | 1 |
| 1.3 About this report..... | 2 |
| | |
| 2. COMPENSATION AND BENEFITS | |
| 2.1 Definition..... | 3 |
| 2.2 Role of Compensation and Benefits..... | 3 |
| 2.3 The Changing Compensation and Benefits Environment..... | 4 |
| 2.4 Compensation and Benefits in the Private Sector..... | 5 |
| 2.5 Compensation and Benefits in the Federal Public Service..... | 6 |
| 2.6 Conclusions..... | 7 |
| | |
| 3. STRATEGIC REWARDS MANAGEMENT | |
| 3.1 The Challenge..... | 9 |
| 3.2 The Reward System..... | 11 |
| 3.2.1 Basic Compensation and Benefits..... | 11 |
| 3.2.2 Flexible Benefits..... | 13 |
| 3.2.3 Awards and Rewards..... | 17 |
| | |
| 4. MORE ON 'AWARDS AND REWARDS' | |
| 4.1 Incentive and Recognition Awards..... | 19 |
| 4.2 Productivity Gainsharing Rewards..... | 24 |
| 4.3 Performance Rewards..... | 26 |
| 4.4 Conclusions..... | 30 |

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

5. ADDITIONAL CHANGES AND IMPROVEMENTS

| | | |
|-------|--|----|
| 5.1 | Corporate Changes and Improvements..... | 31 |
| 5.1.1 | Balancing Worklife and Family Responsibilities..... | 31 |
| 5.1.2 | Mobility..... | 37 |
| 5.1.3 | Departmental Flexibility - A Response To Special Recruitment and Retention Issues..... | 38 |
| 5.1.4 | Sick Leave Credits..... | 40 |
| 5.1.5 | Separation Pay..... | 42 |
| 5.1.6 | Part-time Employment..... | 43 |
| 5.2 | Legislative Changes and Improvements..... | 47 |
| 5.2.1 | Part-time Employment and the PSSA..... | 47 |
| 5.2.2 | Leave Without Pay and the PSSA..... | 49 |

6. THE CHALLENGES

| | | |
|-----|---|----|
| 6.1 | Recommendations of Other Task Forces..... | 51 |
| 6.2 | Communications and Consultations with Employees | 51 |
| 6.3 | Communications and Consultations with Unions... | 52 |
| 6.4 | Cost Implications..... | 53 |
| 6.5 | Implementation Challenges..... | 54 |
| 6.6 | Future Activities of The Task Force..... | 54 |

7. ANNEXES

- 1- Compensation Policy for Collective Bargaining
in the Federal Public Service.
- 2- The Policy of Aggregate Comparability for
Public Service Management Compensation.
- 3- Survey Results - EKOS Research Associates Inc.
- 4- Flexible Benefits/Cafeteria of Benefits
- 5- Recognition and Rewards
- 6- A History of Performance Pay in the Public Service
- 7- Pay For Performance: Does it Work?
- 8- Departmental Flexibility Options
- 9- Administration of the Reward System

Note Bene: The Annexes are available from Transport Canada,
Office of the Deputy Minister. Please telephone
(613) 990-7127 or fax (613) 991-0851 your request for the
Annexes.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

The members of the Public Service 2000 Task Force on Compensation and Benefits would like to thank the many Public Service employees from across the country who took time to write and express their views and experiences and, more importantly, offer suggestions for improvement.

Special appreciation to Supply and Services Canada employees, who under the direction of Georgina Wyman and of Jill Stern, prepared and presented to the Task Force a report on "Balancing Worklife and Family Responsibilities". Also, appreciation to Andre Desjardins of the Treasury Board Secretariat for contributions to the section on recognition awards, to Len Slivinski and Linda Grauer, Public Service Commission, and Inez Clark, Treasury Board Secretariat, for the section on performance rewards.

Appreciation is conveyed to the leaders and members of the other Task Forces who attended our meetings and shared information on their activities. Also, appreciation to the Public Service 2000 team who, under the management of John Edwards, provided impetus to our discussions, and a flavour as to the tone and direction of the overall Public Service 2000 Initiative.

Special thanks are also due to the many behind the scene public service employees who, within their respective departments, supported the research work and efforts of the individual members of the Task Force. In particular, the expertise of Cliff Cullen, Transport Canada in such areas as pay, benefits, pensions and leave entitlements and, the administrative support provided by June Johnston and Lise Charbonneau, Transport Canada, to the smooth operations of the Task Force were greatly and sincerely appreciated.

The Task Force wishes to extend a special note of gratitude and appreciation to Sylvie Lauzon of Transport Canada and her staff. Her contribution to the organization and work of the Task Force, and to the production of this Report, has been central and enormous.

FOREWORD

Accepting the responsibility to chair the Public Service 2000 Task Force on Compensation and Benefits has been, without a doubt, a time-consuming yet dynamic challenge.

The challenge to modernize the Public Service to respond to the needs of the changing Canadian society and environment was made easier by the efforts and dedication of the members of the Task Force:

- . Ivan P. Fellegi, Statistics Canada;
- . Peter B. Lesaux, Atlantic Canada Opportunities Agency;
- . Georgina Wyman, Supply and Services Canada;
- . John D. McLure, National Defence;
- . Shirley Serafini, Multiculturalism and Citizenship Canada;
- . Lynne Pearson, Public Service Commission of Canada;
- . Dr. J.J. Whiting, Canadian International Development Agency;
- . Dennis Wallace, Western Economic Diversification Canada (Winnipeg);
- . Don Love, Treasury Board Secretariat;
- . Alan Ross, Supply and Services Canada;
- . Pat McLaughlin, Statistics Canada;
- . Rhoda Barrett, Transport Canada;
- . Sylvie Lauzon, Transport Canada; and
- . Cliff Cullen, Transport Canada.

The members of the Task Force readily and earnestly embraced in early December 1989 the goals of Public Service 2000, i.e. to foster a Public Service that:

- . is professional, highly qualified, non-partisan and imbued with a mission of service to the public;
- . recognizes its employees as assets to be valued and developed;
- . places as much authority as possible in the hands of front-line employees and managers; and
- . provides scope for different organizational forms to meet differing needs, but in the context of single Public Service.

This report is the result of the dedication and commitment of Task Force members.

Glen Shortliffe
Task Force Leader

MANDATE

The mandate of the Public Service 2000 Task Force on Compensation and Benefits is to:

establish a set of principles to guide
the development of a modern compensation,
benefits and rewards system for the Federal
Public Service.

1. INTRODUCTION

1.1 BACKGROUND

Major changes in demographics and changing employee needs and values, along with continuing competitive, economic, technological and legislative pressures on employers, has forced a re-examination of the traditional employer-employee relationships and contract. Modern employers in the private sector are currently reviewing their compensation and benefit packages to reduce costs and to ensure that they are "competitive employers"; i.e. able to compete for the best employees, while maintaining a competitive edge in a highly competitive global economy.

The federal government, as an employer, has not escaped these pressures. It also is living through a period of fundamental and rapid change; it also must review its management practices and organizational structures if it is to maintain and improve its effectiveness. The Public Service 2000 Initiative recognizes this reality and is prompting:

- a re-evaluation of the traditional management of human resources,
- a re-thinking of the strategic role of compensation and benefits, and
- a fresh focus on new and innovative methods to recognize and reward employees.

It is within these boundaries that the Task Force on Compensation and Benefits tackled the challenge.

1.2 ACTIVITIES OF THE TASK FORCE

Since the Prime Minister launched Public Service 2000 on December 12, 1989, the Task Force has held 18 plenary meetings and many sub-committee meetings, commissioned and received a report from the Conference Board of Canada on compensation and benefits in the private sector, met with researchers of the Conference Board and with representatives of Public Service unions, and discussed performance-pay plans and incentive/suggestion award programs with IBM (Canada) and cafeteria-type benefits with Cominco. A telephone survey of some 400 Public Service employees was conducted by EKOS Research to gauge the relative importance placed on benefits and the interest for a cafeteria approach.

The Task Force also met with representatives of the Task Forces on Staff Relations; Staffing; Management Category; and on Occupational and Classification Structure to ensure inter-linking and meshing of conclusions and recommendations.

1.3 ABOUT THIS REPORT

During the course of its deliberations, the Task Force realized that a modern compensation and benefits system entailed much more than the dollars and cents paid to employees for services rendered. It should also encompass the monetary and non-monetary awards and rewards at the disposal of an employer, address the para-compensation and benefits issues such as family related programs and relocation assistance, and include a fresh view as to "how" the Public Service should administer remuneration.

The Task Force also considers that this report is part of an on going process. Members are of the view that their work will not be completed with the tabling of their report but rather with the implementation of a modern approach to compensation and benefits.

To this end, the Task Force members will be available over the coming months to work with Central Agencies and experts to design a modern system and, more importantly, to meet with employees and with union officials to discuss their conclusions and recommendations.

2. COMPENSATION AND BENEFITS

2.1 DEFINITIONS

The traditional definition given to "Compensation" is "any form of payment provided to employees in exchange for the work performed for their employer".

Specifically, "compensation" includes wages, salaries, overtime pay, commissions and bonuses.

Employees are also compensated for their efforts through the provision of "benefits", such as pensions, vacation, insurance, other types of leave, dental plans and so on.

2.2 ROLE OF COMPENSATION AND BENEFITS

Whether it be in the private sector or in the public sector, the principal objective of a compensation and benefits package is to further organizational effectiveness. This is achieved by:

- attracting qualified recruits: a compensation and benefits package that is valued more highly than one offered by a competitor can attract more qualified applicants (other things being equal).
- motivating employees: recognition of performance through compensation, benefits and rewards can motivate employees and lead to higher performance and productivity.
- retaining competent employees: keeping pay and benefits competitive (ensuring external equity) and maintaining internal fairness (internal equity) are major factors in employee retention.

In addition, benefits can lead to greater organizational effectiveness by enhancing an organization's ability to be a caring employer.

In meeting these goals, an organization's compensation and benefits system must also operate within the constraints of sound financial management and legal requirements.

2.3 THE CHANGING COMPENSATION AND BENEFITS ENVIRONMENT

In recent years, the fundamental goals of attracting, motivating and retaining employees have become increasingly difficult to accomplish. The current experiences of some federal government departments in attracting and retaining employees in the greater Toronto area is a case in point.

Conference Board of Canada* research reveals that a market shift in compensation directions and practices is taking place in Canada. Highlights of these changes are:

- . more organizations are using variable compensation: linked to performance and extended throughout the organization;
- . greater percentage of total compensation being made variable;
- . greater use of award and reward vehicles, such as suggestion plans, gainsharing, profit-sharing, stock options, special achievement awards and recognition programs to encourage employee involvement;
- . more emphasis on creating a blend of individual, team and system wide incentives and rewards needed to drive and support strategic corporate objectives;
- . more specialized plans for different organizational units, particularly as firms enter into new markets and develop new products and client groups; and
- . introduction of alternative methods of paying people, such as pay-for-knowledge or skill-based pay.

The Conference Board of Canada also indicates that compensation planning in general, has not yet become an integral part of the strategic planning process in most organizations and few have used rewards proactively at the strategic level.

* Conference Board of Canada research involves only the private sector and mainly non-unionized environments.

However, there is ample evidence of a shift, albeit cautious, towards a variable or performance-linked compensation approach; Canadian organizations are increasingly aware that a strategically-designed compensation system can help organizations attract, motivate and retain highly-valued people.

2.4 COMPENSATION AND BENEFITS IN THE PRIVATE SECTOR

Current Philosophy

The general philosophy underlining compensation and benefits in the private sector is to facilitate employees' reaching their full potential, thereby also maximizing, in a highly competitive environment, their contribution to the profitability and survival of the organization.

Key Features and Principles

In its report to the Task Force on Compensation and Benefits, the Conference Board of Canada noted that, in the private sector, more and more employers center their compensation and benefits approach on seven key features and principles:

- . an organization's compensation and benefits system must complement its overall value system or corporate culture, if it is to be effective and strategically useful;
- . flexibility in an organization's cash compensation is mandatory in a fast changing competitive business environment;
- . a centralized compensation approach (one single compensation package for all employees) is incongruent with the idea of greater employee involvement and the goal of tying compensation and benefits to a business strategy;
- . pay should be related to performance and support high performance levels;

- . maintaining external market equity is important for attracting and retaining employees, but ability to control costs must dominate;
- . internal equity should be promoted by ensuring pay equity between jobs and giving lower level employees opportunities to earn additional compensation;
- . a benefits package should reflect the changing needs of a diverse workforce by offering choices to employees.

2.5 COMPENSATION AND BENEFITS IN THE FEDERAL PUBLIC SERVICE

Current Philosophy

The Public Service has two compensation policies: one for employees represented by a union, the other for employees in the Management Category and other excluded groups. Both policies are essentially based on the premise that compensation and benefits for public servants are to be comparable to, but should not lead, those of employees in the private sector who do similar work.

Key Features and Principles

The compensation policy for collective bargaining (Annex 1) in the Federal Public Service has been based for many years on the following principles:

- . total compensation comparisons with the private sector shall take into consideration factors such as job security, pensions, hours of work and other benefits;
- . federal public service compensation should be sufficient to recruit and retain qualified employees, and be determined so that appropriate compensation relationships are maintained among Public Service occupations;
- . most federal public service employees have the right to participate in the determination of their compensation and particular conditions of employment through responsible collective bargaining; and

- . federal compensation settlements will contribute to reducing inflation and be fiscally responsible.

The compensation policy for the Management Category (Annex 2) is generally based on the concept of aggregate comparability with the average of other sectors of the economy for the first two levels, SM and EX-1. A system of salary differentials is calculated for the remaining executive and Deputy Minister (DM) levels.

This policy was approved by the Governor-in-Council and subsequently authorized by the Treasury Board. The underlying purpose was to ensure that SM and EX-1 managers received compensation comparable to the private sector, and at the same time to put in place a system of salary differentials to increase compensation as responsibility and accountability grew.

Compensation for excluded employees outside the Management Category is determined by granting the same level of compensation awarded through collective bargaining for unionized employees. Excluded employees may also opt for additional insurance, and senior level excluded employees are subject to a performance pay plan.

2.6 CONCLUSIONS

As a result of its deliberations, the Task Force on Compensation and Benefits has reached the following conclusions:

The current Public Service approach to compensation and benefit is highly uniform, centralized and rigidly controlled. Such an approach:

- . tends to treat all employees (exceptional and mediocre) alike, therefore it cannot be utilized in any strategic manner as a management tool to influence the effectiveness of the Public Service. It makes little attempt to recognize or reward exceptional efforts, initiatives or accomplishments, nor does it provide disincentives for poor performance;

- . provides limited flexibility to individual employees in choosing benefits in a manner best-suited to their particular needs; and
- . is not designed to respond to specific departmental needs, values and goals. For example, it does not have the flexibility to adequately cope with difficulties in areas such as recruitment and retention of specialists, special markets (locations), geographical redeployment and, the changing benefit interests of individual employees.

As a result, the current Public Service approach to compensation and benefits fails to instill in employees or in managers a sense of partnership with the goals, objectives and values of a department or of the Government.

The Task Force believes that the modern Public Service should have a flexible and comprehensive approach to basic compensation, benefits and performance-based rewards. This approach should be managed strategically to provide:

- . individual employees or groups of employees with recognition and reward for their special contributions or efforts, and choice over their benefit package.
- . departmental management with some strategic tools designed to enhance performance levels of employees and consequently over the effectiveness of the Public Service;
- . organizations with the flexibility to cope with difficulties in areas such as special recruitment and retention, and geographical redeployment.

Overall, a modern Public Service compensation and benefits system would provide a strategic management tool to: attract the best available recruits, motivate employees to achieve their full potential, and retain competent employees.

3. STRATEGIC REWARDS MANAGEMENT

3.1 THE CHALLENGE

To ensure effective delivery of Government objectives, programs and services in the context of continuing fiscal restraint, the Federal Public Service must meet the needs of a changing workforce, create a motivating work environment, improve employee morale and productivity, and strive to be considered a "competitive employer".

The challenge for the Federal Public Service in the 1990s will be to develop compensation packages that ensure operational effectiveness and meet the divergent needs of the workforce. To accomplish this task and meet the challenge, the Federal Public Service will need to strategically choose, plan and manage remuneration from a gamut of pay plans, benefits, bonuses, incentives, and recognition and reward programs.

The Task Force on Compensation and Benefits thus concludes that the contribution of compensation and benefits to successfully meeting the human resources challenge lies in the introduction of a strategic approach.

RECOMMENDATION I

The Task Force on Compensation and Benefits recommends the adoption of a "strategic rewards management approach" designed to motivate employees to achieve their full potential and a high level of performance through performance-linked awards and rewards.

RECOMMENDATION II

The underpinning principles of the "strategic rewards management approach" are:

- . equal pay for work of equal value;

- . competitive levels of basic compensation and benefits to attract and retain the best and the brightest;
- . performance rewards to assist departmental management in promoting high performance levels among employees;
- . award and reward vehicles to ensure that individual employees are recognized for their contributions to the goals of the organization;
- . flexibility to assist departmental management in meeting needs, values and objectives;
- . flexibility for individual employees to facilitate balancing of work and family responsibilities, and
- . quality of work life conducive to productivity and job satisfaction.

RECOMMENDATION III

The goals of the "strategic rewards management approach" are to:

- . further organizational effectiveness by attracting qualified recruits and retaining competent employees;
- . encourage and promote employee commitment and involvement, and help focus employees on key governmental and departmental objectives; and
- . offer flexibility to departmental management and to individual employees.

RECOMMENDATION IV

The cornerstone of the "strategic reward management approach" is:

a comprehensive and larger "Reward System" structured on three components

- . core remuneration (basic compensation and benefits),
- . flexible benefits, and
- . awards and rewards:
 - . incentive and recognition awards,
 - . productivity gainsharing rewards, and
 - . performance rewards.

3.2 THE REWARD SYSTEM

The three components of the "Reward System" are described in the following sections:

3.2.1 CORE REMUNERATION (basic compensation and benefits)

Discussion

Whether in the Management Category, in excluded groups or in represented groups, employees are entitled to a fair level of basic compensation and benefits for work performed, irrespective of the geographic location of the work performed. Core remuneration would be based on the level of compensation and benefits required to attract and retain the quality of employees required to meet the objectives of the Government.

Determination of the core would be based on comparisons with other organizations (external equity) and on internal comparisons between occupational groups within the Public Service.

Core remuneration would be non-discretionary in that Deputy Heads would play no part in the determination of the core. For excluded employees and those of the Management Category, determination of the core, and economic adjustments to the core, would be by the Government, e.g. Burns Committee. For unionized employees, the core, and economic adjustments to the core, would be determined via collective bargaining.

Core Remuneration should include "Core Compensation" and "Core Benefits".

"Core Compensation" may include: basic rate of pay and basic pay supplements (such as shift premium and call-back pay). Should the Public Service 2000 Initiative lead to fewer occupational groups and levels and to broader pay bands, the Task Force concludes that, for employees outside the Management Category, "Core Compensation" should retain the lock-step system, but with a larger number of smaller annual increments to the maximum of the group and level. In addition to the annual increments provided by the lock-step system, employees would be eligible for a percentage of the annually-earned performance reward being applied to their basic or core compensation (refer to section 4.3).

"Core Benefits" may include: annual leave (2 weeks); statutory holidays; allowances and premiums; basic insured benefits such as medical and hospital coverage; pensions; life insurance; and short-term disability/family-related leave.

The Pay Research Bureau, a component of the Public Service Staff Relations Board would continue to play its impartial compensation research role for obtaining information on rates of pay and conditions of employment prevailing inside and outside the Public Service.

RECOMMENDATION V

The first component of the Reward System is: "Core remuneration" for all employees, i.e. a basic, fair and competitive level of compensation and benefits to compensate for work performed, irrespective of the

geographic or regional location of the work performed.

RECOMMENDATION VI

The Task Force on Compensation and Benefits recommends that:

- . the bargainable aspects of "Core remuneration" and economic adjustments to the core for represented employees be determined via collective bargaining; and
- . "Core remuneration" for unrepresented employees be determined by the government.

RECOMMENDATION VII

The Task Force on Compensation and Benefits recommends for represented employees, should the Public Service 2000 Initiative lead to fewer occupational groups and levels and to broader pay bands, that the current number of lock-steps be reviewed with a view to introducing a larger number of smaller annual increments to the maximum of the group and level.

3.2.2 FLEXIBLE BENEFITS

Discussion

"Menu" or "cafeteria" benefits provide for a flexible system which allows employees to choose certain benefits depending on their individual circumstances.

As part of its research into cafeteria or flexible benefits, the Task Force on Compensation and Benefits commissioned EKOS Research Associates Inc. for a national telephone survey of some 414 full-time indeterminate Federal Public Service employees whose job classification is below SM. Of the 414 employees interviewed, 81% were unionized and 19% were excluded employees. Of those interviewed, 90% indicated a preference for some form of a flexible benefit package; the remaining 10% opted for the status quo. Of the 90%, 74% choose the "core plus" flexible benefits approach.

It is interesting to note that the research indicates only slight differences in opinion between the unionized and non-unionized employees surveyed. Slight differences, also, occur depending on cultural background and age.

Since the Task Force was interested in exploring a range of new benefits, the EKOS survey also provided an opportunity to test public servants' degree of interest in eight new benefits, and their willingness to trade some of their current benefits for the new ones. The new benefits were:

- . additional annual leave,
- . additional insurance,
- . assistance for the care of elderly parents,
- . fitness club,
- . fitness lifestyle,
- . paid parking,
- . day care, and
- . financial counselling.

As highlighted in Exhibit 3.3 of the EKOS report (Annex 3), additional annual leave constitutes the absolute top priority of public service employees among the choices given to them: three in four indicated an interest in this benefit. Furthermore, more than one in two are willing to trade some existing benefit to increase their annual leave. The second most popular new benefit is additional insurance, but the level of interest drops drastically from that associated with additional annual leave (from 74% to 44%). For this benefit, as for assistance for the care of the elderly, about one respondent in three showed a willingness to trade existing benefits.

EKOS Research Associates Inc. also undertook for the Task Force on the Management Category a national telephone survey of some 800 SMs and EXs. It was

found that 81% of interviewed employees moderately or strongly supported a more flexible approach to benefits.

The flexible benefit component will require a phased-in and strategically managed approach. Flexible benefits should be launched initially for excluded employees and those in the Management Category. For unionized employees, flexible benefits should be offered via collective bargaining. Whether for the Management Category, excluded employees or represented employees, flexible benefits might include:

- . annual leave beyond 2 weeks
- . extended health coverage
- . dental care
- . overtime*
- . spousal life insurance
- . financial planning services
- . accidental death coverage
- . RRSP
- . long-term disability coverage
- . child care fees
- . elder care fees
- . subsidized parking
- . fitness assessments
- . membership in a professional association
- . increased post-retirement insurance

In the course of its activities, the Task Force sought the opinion of Revenue Canada-Taxation regarding the taxability of certain benefits under a new "flexible benefit" system. A preliminary opinion indicates that a benefit currently non-taxable would remain non-taxable in the new system, if it remains identical in its characteristics. However, if a flexible benefit system provides for a "cash-option" in lieu of benefits, this option would be taxable. Also, if current non-taxable benefits are significantly modified, or new benefits added, (e.g. elder care fees), they may become taxable items under the flexible benefits system.

* The Management Category would not be eligible for overtime. As a flexible benefit, reimbursement for overtime would be available either in the form of cash or in the equivalent value of one of the other flexible benefits.

The Task Force on Compensation and Benefits has concluded that flexible benefits are a positive element to recruit and retain a changing and diverse workforce.

A flexible benefits approach would facilitate the introduction of benefits and working conditions that permit the balancing of work and family responsibilities. A flexible benefit approach would also be supportive of some of the recommendations contained in "Beneath the Veneer: The Report of the Task Force on Barriers to Women in the Public Service".

RECOMMENDATION VIII

The second component of the Reward System is: a "Core Plus" approach to flexible benefits, i.e. core remuneration plus individually chosen flexible benefits.

RECOMMENDATION IX

For represented employees, the "Core Plus" component will be offered via collective bargaining.

RECOMMENDATION X

The principles for the development of the "Core Plus" component are:

- . no incremental cost to the employee who chooses to remain with his/her current level of benefits over and above the existing benefit costs,

- . any incremental cost to the federal government in moving to a "Core Plus" approach should be absorbed within the existing operating budgets,
- . it should respect the provisions of Income Tax Act,
- . it should be designed to provide maximum achievable flexibility,
- . it should be designed to allow changes over the lifetime of the program,
- . it should be designed to permit employees to reselect as their personal circumstances change, and
- . an effective communication and advisory services program should be established for employees to ensure clear and accurate information as to available benefit choices.

Annex 3 provides the results of the EKOS Research Associates Inc. survey. Annex 4 provides additional information on the flexible benefits component.

3.2.3 AWARDS AND REWARDS

Discussion

Award and reward programs, tailored to an organization's needs, values/culture and objectives, are a strategic management tool to encourage and promote organizational effectiveness and demonstrate that employees are a key resource to achieve mandate and goals.

Organizational research and management experience have shown that effective recognition and reward programs improve employee motivation, commitment to the organization, morale, teamwork and productivity, while at the same time are cost effective.

Surveys done by the Conference Board of Canada indicate that award and reward programs are a very effective mechanism for maximizing human resource excellence; award and reward programs are above average in terms of success in meeting the goals and objectives stated for the programs.

RECOMMENDATION XI

The third component of the Reward System is: an "Award and Rewards program to be structured on three elements:

- . incentive and recognition awards,
- . productivity gainsharing rewards, and
- . performance rewards.

Chapter 4 of this report focuses in greater detail on the recommended Awards and Rewards program and its three elements.

4. MORE ON 'AWARDS AND REWARDS'

Using the Awards and Rewards component strategically means that the three elements:

- . incentive and recognition awards,
- . productivity gainsharing rewards, and
- . performance rewards

should be used in a concerted and directed fashion to help achieve organizational effectiveness while creating a motivating work environment, building teamwork and improving employee morale and productivity.

Award and reward programs, whether to recognize individual or group effort, have a proven track record of success. The Task Force on Compensation and Benefits fully endorses this key component and recommends in this chapter principles for the design and structure of the program.

4.1 INCENTIVE AND RECOGNITION AWARDS

Incentive and recognition awards involve singling-out and recognizing exceptional effort and contribution during a period of time. The period may be an entire career, the time needed to achieve a special result, a regular review period, or a shorter period of a few days or weeks during which an employee or a group of employees make a special contribution.

Discussion

Award programs, if properly used, contribute strategically to:

- . developing commitment to the organization,
- . building teamwork,
- . influencing behaviour, e.g. to get employees to work smarter and better to meet a particular goal,
- . recognizing achievement and merit, and
- . promoting idea generation and innovation.

The award may have a monetary value, or may be non-monetary (e.g. a certificate, a plaque, or a thank you note). The award is anything an employee may value and desire that an employer is able and willing to offer in exchange for above average or exceptional employee contribution. Essentially, the award is prized or valued by the individual or group receiving it.

There are a variety of award programs; a growing number of employers are now focusing attention on programs directed either at individual employees or groups of employees. The following illustrates some of the better-known private sector incentive and recognition award programs. (Corresponding Federal Public Service award programs are described under each heading - refer to indented and italicized paragraphs).

Goal-oriented Incentive

Incentive programs may be targeted to individuals or teams in specific positions or functional areas, and to address specific goals. The award may be monetary or non-monetary, or a combination of both.

For example: a program may be designed to reduce turnover and help combat absenteeism with cash awards tied to individual employee performance, attendance and length of service.

The Federal Public Service does not have a "Special Incentive Award" program.

Employee Suggestion

Promoting idea generation, creativity and employee involvement are some of the objectives behind employee suggestion programs. Employees are encouraged to submit suggestions on ways to improve some aspect of the organization's operations. Improvements can be tangible (cost reduction, productivity or revenue gains) or intangible (aesthetics, quality of work environment). Awards can be monetary, non-monetary, or a combination of both.

The Federal Public Service has a "Suggestion Award" program. Awards consist of cash, a certificate or both. Improvements to the criteria governing eligibility to the "Suggestion Award" program were announced on June 20, 1990 to encourage greater employee participation. Employees may now receive a monetary award for an adopted suggestion which is part of the employee's duties providing the employee does not have the authority to implement the suggestion in question. Suggestion Award "winners" are eligible for the 'Award of Excellence' program.

Recognition and Achievement

Programs that have "recognition and achievement" as their aim, are growing in popularity. Such programs may be monetary, non-monetary or both; they are usually flexible with built-in discretion, i.e. few guidelines regarding the form of the award (monetary or non-monetary), the dollar value of the award, timing or eligible recipients.

The aim of these programs is to recognize individual or group contribution and extra effort in an appropriate and immediate way. For example: an employee who enjoys sports or cultural events and who has spent an entire weekend completing an important project with a stepped-up deadline, may receive from his or her manager, in recognition for the effort, two tickets to a hockey game or to a concert.

As of June 20, 1990 the Public Service of Canada has the flexibility to develop a quick-turnaround recognition and achievement program which now allow departmental managers to immediately, "on-the-spot", recognize with an award. Organizations may now establish their own title, participation and eligibility criteria for these special awards to meet their specific needs. Procedures and process times, along with the type of non-monetary awards to be granted under the new "Special Award" program are at the organization's discretion. However, the maximum value for the award granted may not exceed \$200.00 including income tax which must be deducted.

The Federal Public Service's "Merit Award" program formally recognizes exceptional individual or group achievement. Awards consist of cash, a certificate or both.

The Federal Public Service has a "Long Service Award" program to recognize employees for long and faithful service, and a "Senior Officer Retirement Certificate" program to recognize contribution upon retirement. Both Awards are non-monetary, i.e. plaque, medallion, certificate.

The Federal Public Service has an "Award of Excellence" program to recognize "the best, most exemplary contributions to the public service resulting from employee suggestions or the meritorious performance of duties". The award is non-monetary, i.e. a plaque.

In addition, the Federal Public Service has "The Outstanding Achievement Award" program to extend formal recognition for sustained, outstanding performance. The Award is a citation and a cash award. The Award is restricted to senior management or equivalent levels.

Unique motivational opportunities are offered by the careful and strategic use of incentive and recognition award programs.

However, the Federal Public Service does not have a "celebration" type award program to allow departmental managers and their employees to gather for coffee and donuts or go to lunch in celebration of team efforts and achievements. Generally, managers pay for such celebrations out of their own pockets.

The key to their motivational success, is that managers should never lose sight of the fundamental value of making people feel they are important in contributing to the goals, results and challenges of the organization.

RECOMMENDATION XII

The principles for both departmental and corporate Incentive and Recognition Awards are as follows:

- . flexibility, tailor-made and managed by Deputy Heads to meet organizational goals,
- . implementation delegated, wherever possible, to managerial levels to ensure motivational success, simplicity, timeliness and widespread use,
- . quick turn around between event and award, whenever possible,
- . designed to recognize and reward individual employees and groups,
- . publicize the event to obtain optimum benefits in terms of impact on peers,
- . recognize "un-sung heroes" as well as "high profile employees", and
- . provide for many small awards in addition to a few large awards.

RECOMMENDATION XIII

The Task Force on Compensation and Benefits:

- . commends the Treasury Board for recently announced improvements to the Public Service of Canada award framework, particularly the introduction of the "Special Award";
- . supports the Departmental Award programs:
 - . Suggestion Award,
 - . Merit Award,
 - . Special Award, and
 - . Long Service Award;
- . supports the Corporate Award programs:

- . Senior Officer Retirement Certificates,
 - . Award of Excellence, and
 - . Outstanding Achievement Awards;
- . recommends that Deputy Heads make full use of the new "Special Award" program and develop for their organization "special" incentive awards to respond to specific concerns or goals;
 - . recommends that the Treasury Board Secretariat develop a case-book highlighting successful incentive and recognition awards in large and small organizations; and
 - . recommends that departmental managers be re-imbursed for reasonable out-of-pocket expenses related to special celebrations recognizing group and team contributions.

Annex 5 provides additional information on the concept of recognition and rewards.

4.2 PRODUCTIVITY GAINSHARING REWARDS

Discussion

Under productivity gainsharing, eligible employees share in gains achieved through group productivity improvements. Productivity gainsharing is a "group" incentive plan. Short-term motivation, promotion of an entrepreneurial spirit and productivity improvement are the objectives of productivity gainsharing rewards. Productivity gainsharing programs are usually "custom-designed" to meet organizational needs. The major strength, according to the Conference Board of Canada research, is that productivity gainsharing rewards promote teamwork.

The Task Force on Compensation and Benefits is aware of situations where work can be quantified and measured in terms of outputs. In such cases, a normal standard could be established and a sliding scale of rewards (extra pay, leave, etc.) set for each level of output above the standard.

If collective bargaining so permits and since departments involved in processes and outputs would be the principal interested-parties in establishing productivity gainsharing rewards, the responsibility for designing and implementing such programs should be entirely delegated to Deputy Heads. Productivity gainsharing rewards would thus be tailor-made to the needs of the organization and its employees. As recommended at the end of this Chapter, a pre-requisite to a successful productivity gainsharing program will be the establishment of a good system of performance measurement.

Productivity gainsharing is a new concept for the Federal Public Service. Recent experience with productivity gainsharing in the Federal Public Service has generated negative reaction from unions. The Task Force recognizes that no unilateral productivity gainsharing programs can be implemented by the Employer.

RECOMMENDATION XIV

The following principles for a Productivity Gainsharing Reward program are:

- . no unilateral implementation by the employer;
- . program proposal to be discussed with and agreed to by employee representatives;
- . program objectives, standards, measurement criteria and level of rewards to be developed in consultation with affected employees;
- . employees must be assured that they have the option of transferring to another work unit within the same department with no productivity gainsharing program;

- . employees must be assured that job security will not be affected by the productivity gainsharing savings;
- . productivity gains are measured against the group and not against individual employees; and
- . work standards are not "ratchetted-up" as gains are achieved.

RECOMMENDATION XV

The Task Force on Compensation and Benefits supports the concept of productivity gainsharing and recommends that:

- . the design, implementation and measurement of a productivity gainsharing reward program be delegated to Deputy Heads, and
- . the funding of productivity gainsharing rewards be from within departmental operating budgets.

4.3 PERFORMANCE REWARDS

Discussion

Employees are the Public Service of Canada's most-valued resource. They are key to the effective delivery of the Government's objectives, programs and services. Changes to compensation have generally been awarded through collective bargaining for represented employees and through relative comparisons with the labour market for management levels and unrepresented groups. Only a selected number of groups have or have had merit or performance pay regimes. Annex 6 provides "A History of Performance Pay in the Public Service".

At present, the Management Category, some unrepresented employees including the University Teachers Group, and two represented groups, Foreign Service and Defence Science, have performance pay plans. Performance pay plans for a number of groups have been abandoned because of dissatisfaction with the provisions of the particular plans or their method of application.

While compensation experts have indicated that many organizations are moving to performance pay programs in a search for improved productivity, better fixed-cost control and improved performance standards, behavioural science experts indicate that not all organizations and not all employees are responsive to merit or performance pay programs. Although the concept of performance pay is attractive, it is not all clear that monetary incentives are or can be actually linked to improve job motivation and performance for all organizations or groups of employees. Annex 7 "Pay for Performance: Does it Work?" prepared by the Public Service Commission's Personnel Psychology Centre outlines behavioural scientists' assessments of the complex issues involved in pay for performance.

A recent Conference Board of Canada report: "Strategic Rewards Management: The Variable Approach to Pay" indicates that in the private sector cash-based plans have the greatest incentive value. The report on private sector practices and trends notes that as financial motivators, cash-based incentives and bonus plans are considered by most compensation experts to have higher incentive value than stock plans. At present, these cash-based plans apply mainly to executive, managerial and professional staff. However, their use is growing and eligibility for the cash-based plans is being extended downward to include employees at lower levels, but in most cases, the organizations are not unionized.

Fiscal restraint, downsizing and delayering, and recommendations flowing from the Public Service 2000 Task Forces on the Management Category and on the Classification and Occupational Structure may well imply a classification structure with fewer levels and broader pay bands. Such a system would necessarily reduce the average number of promotions employees can expect to achieve. As such, there will be fewer opportunities to motivate superior employees through promotions. It is all the more important to find other compensation methods to reward performance. Indeed, the Task Force on Compensation and Benefits has concluded that, wherever feasible, linking one-time cash rewards to performance would provide visible recognition of the value and

contribution of public service employees during a review period; we would hope that it will also encourage higher service standards and greater productivity improvements.

The present performance pay system is limited at present to 5% of salary costs. The spread in financial reward between fully satisfactory and outstanding is not sufficiently large to appropriately recognize the difference in contribution of the individuals concerned nor is it large enough to act as an incentive to encourage employees to excel to higher levels of achievement. Higher pay for higher achievement is central to the proposed new performance reward system.

In other words, linking rewards to performance as opposed to linking pay to performance, would provide greater scope and flexibility to meet organizational goals and provide tangible recognition to employees beyond the incentive and recognition award programs outlined in section 4.1.

RECOMMENDATION XVI

The Task Force on Compensation and Benefits recommends:

- . the phasing-out of current performance pay plans, and
- . the phasing-in of performance rewards, i.e. a cash-based approach to support and reward high performance levels.

RECOMMENDATION XVII

The Task Force on Compensation and Benefits recommends:

- . phasing-in of performance rewards be launched initially for the Management Category and for excluded and unrepresented groups;
- . performance rewards for represented groups be offered via collective bargaining.

RECOMMENDATION XVIII

The principles for the design of the Performance Rewards element are:

- . the performance reward may be awarded to individual employees or to a group of employees;
- . performance rewards are to be based on actual performance for that year, i.e. not potential;
- . performance rewards are to recognize strong and consistent performance, in addition to superior and outstanding ratings;
- . generally speaking performance rewards are not to become part of basic compensation;
- . performance rewards are to be re-earned annually, i.e. not a right or an entitlement;
- . the cash value of the performance reward must, if it is to be an effective financial motivator, be of a significant amount;
- . a percentage of the annually-earned performance reward, should the Public Service 2000 Initiative lead to fewer occupational groups and to broader pay bands, may be applied to basic compensation to allow some career progression within the pay range of those occupational groups that have no lock-step increases;
- . the cash value of the performance reward and the percentage to apply to basic compensation is to be discretionary, i.e. at the discretion of the Deputy Head; and

- . the cash value of performance rewards should be limited by performance budgets only and not by quotas or restrictions on performance ratings.

4.4 CONCLUSIONS

Prior to the implementation phase of any Award and Reward component, departments will have to assess and determine the right mix of incentives, awards and rewards to meet their needs and goals, and to match (or change) their corporate culture and climate.

To ensure an effective program, departmental managers will need to understand the purpose and implementation principles, and become active participants and promoters of award and reward programs. In other words,

a pre-requisite for departmental management will be to understand and espouse the goals of award and reward programs, and introduce "award and rewards planning" as part of the strategic corporate planning process.

Also, prior to the implementation phase, to ensure that the Award and Rewards component is effective, a well-defined link between action, results and rewards must be established and accepted by employees. In other words,

a pre-requisite for departments will be the establishment of adequate and accepted performance appraisal and feedback mechanisms.

5. ADDITIONAL CHANGES AND IMPROVEMENTS

The Task Force on Compensation and Benefits received numerous suggestions from employees in all regions, and discussed a variety of issues, outside of compensation and benefits but which are part of the "terms and conditions" of employment in the Public Service of Canada.

By far, the majority of improvements proposed in this Chapter simply require an attitude change and a willingness to modernize "terms and conditions" of employment. The Task Force on Compensation and Benefits concluded that in the area of "terms and conditions" of employment, the Public Service of Canada should not lead the private sector. However, it is paramount that "terms and conditions" of employment be "comparable" and "competitive" to those offered employees in the private sector.

The Task Force on Compensation and Benefits also concluded that in the areas of equal pay for work of equal value and of work and family responsibilities, the Public Service of Canada, as the country's largest employer, must and should play a "social leadership" role. Flexibility and innovation of thought and action, both at the corporate and individual management level are key to attracting, retaining and motivating a Public Service representative of the country as a whole.

5.1 CORPORATE CHANGES AND IMPROVEMENTS

5.1.1. BALANCING WORKLIFE AND FAMILY RESPONSIBILITIES

Discussion

The changing demographic picture of the labour force has been well-documented. We are all aware of the increase in the two-income family, the impact of the less mobile and aging "baby-boomer", the higher level of education of the average worker, as well as the projected shortages in the labour market as a result of a steadily declining birth rate.

The participation rate of women in the labour force has increased dramatically resulting from societal acceptance and the need for a second income. In addition, rising divorce rates have increased the number of lone-parent families.

This has meant that more and more workers have extensive responsibilities outside their work for the care and nurturing of their families. Women are bearing the brunt of the burden of child-bearing demands, full-time jobs and increasingly for the care of elderly parents or grandparents. This trend will remain with us as the elderly population continues to expand into the next century.

Employees' success in balancing home and work responsibilities depends on individual employees themselves. However, if corporate policies and attitudes make it hard for employees to respond when an elder parent or a child is ill, this balance proves to be an impossible goal.

Policies and initiatives to support working families will help eliminate the barriers women face to career building.

By providing flexibility in the workplace, employees are empowered to take charge and be held accountable for their performance.

The Task Force thus re-iterates its support of the "strategic rewards management approach" principles of

- . flexibility for individual employees to facilitate balancing of work and family responsibilities; and
- . quality of work life conducive to productivity and job satisfaction.

RECOMMENDATION XIX

The Task Force on Compensation and Benefits recommends that: future policies, directives and guidelines, whether emanating from Central Agencies or from Deputy Heads, recognize

- . the dual responsibilities of employees to work and to their families, and
- . the necessity for the employer to understand the needs of employees in balancing work and family responsibilities.

RECOMMENDATION XX

Day Care in the Workplace

The Task Force:

- . supports the proposed Treasury Board Secretariat "Workplace Day Care Centre Policy";
- . recommends that the "Workplace Day Care Centre Policy" be reviewed and updated, if necessary, every three years; and
- . recommends the expeditious promulgation by the Treasury Board of the proposed "Workplace Day Care Centre Policy".

RECOMMENDATION XXI

Child and Elder Care Information

The Task Force recommends expanding the base of the existing departmental Employee Assistance Programs (EAP) to include information and counselling on child and elder care resources in the community.

RECOMMENDATION XXIIFamily-Related Leave

The Task Force recommends that the 5-day allowance for family-related responsibilities may be taken consecutively, if required, by the employee to meet a particular family situation.

RECOMMENDATION XXIIIIntegration of Leave

The Task Force recommends integration of existing family-related leave with paid sick leave to allow employees flexibility in using accumulated leave time to meet their unique needs.

RECOMMENDATION XXIVLeave Without Pay for Care and Nurturing of Pre-School-Aged Children

The Task Force recommends the expansion of this entitlement to permit employees to take leave without pay to care for a chronically ill child or parent.

RECOMMENDATION XXVPersonal Leave Without Pay

The Task Force recommends greater flexibility in allowing personal leave. Current regulation allows

for only a one-time use of personal leave under 3 months and a one-time use of personal leave for up to one year.

RECOMMENDATION XXVI

Travel Directive - Child Care Assistance

The Task Force:

- . recommends that the Treasury Board Travel Directive provision regarding Child Care Assistance be reviewed and amended to allow for the reimbursement of legitimate child care expenses; and
- . recommends that the assistance vary with the number of children to be cared for (current assistance provides for a flat fee whether one child or five children).

The Report of the Task Force on Barriers to Women in the Public Service: Beneath the Veneer noted that the Treasury Board Travel Directive reimburses child care expenses only if there is not another capable adult residing with the female employee. If that capable adult is also travelling, working a late or night shift, or otherwise not available, expenses are not reimbursed.

RECOMMENDATION XXVII

Relocation Directive -
Relocation Assistance

The Task Force recommends that the Treasury Board Relocation Directive

be reviewed and amended to

- . recognize "dual-career families";
- . provide payment of employment agency fees for the relocating spouse employed outside* the Public Service,
- . pay for a designated number of trips to look for a job for the spouse in the proposed location, and
- . provide assistance and flexibility for commuter marriages, e.g. increased number of long distance telephone calls, reimbursement for commuting expenses.

The changing demographic picture of the labour force has meant changing lifestyle where physical wellness is important. The Public Service has felt this pressure; as an example, employees now work in a tobacco smoke-free environment. Pressures for physical fitness facilities have also increased and the Task Force is of the view that Deputy Heads should be allowed to introduce such facilities to meet employee needs.

RECOMMENDATION XXVIII

The Task Force on Compensation and Benefits recommends that Deputy Heads be empowered to provide physical fitness facilities and programs within their organizations.

* A relocating spouse employed within the Public Service has the benefit of leave provisions and PSC priority status.

5.1.2. MOBILITY

Discussion

The current Treasury Board Relocation Policy is exclusively based on cost containment and without reference to the fact that it could be a "strategic" instrument to promote staff and management development, and to further operational effectiveness.

The Federal Government is Canada's largest employer with employees in farflung locations yet we lack a comprehensive mobility policy. The current policy is devoted "to relocate employees in the most efficient fashion, that is, at the most reasonable cost to the public."

As to departmental flexibility, the Relocation Policy effectively eliminates this by advising that "the relocation provisions and any limitations thereto are published as directives, not permissive guidelines." Approximately 130 pages constitute the relocation directive. At no point is the value of mobility or field and headquarters experience pointed-out.

The Task force on Compensation and Benefits has concluded a need for a specific mobility policy, tied to departmental requirements and which encourages relocation on the basis of

- . service to the public,
- . management development, and
- . improving the general policy overview and perspective of departments.

Departmental management should be able to choose from a range of options, seeking the most suitable package for an employee and the department. This could include employee requested transfers, surplus employee moves, career development and management relocation. Differential support should be provided for accommodation in higher cost locations (mortgage or rental assistance only).

RECOMMENDATION XXIX

The Task Force on Compensation and Benefits recommends that the Treasury Board Secretariat develop, with the assistance of Deputy Heads, a Mobility Policy to:

- . meet the operational and efficiency needs of departmental management,
- . better develop employees, and to
- . better serve the public.

5.1.3. DEPARTMENTAL FLEXIBILITY - A RESPONSE TO SPECIAL RECRUITMENT AND RETENTION ISSUES

Discussion

The changed nature of work in delayed and more complex organizations has prompted considerable and growing interest in alternatives to traditional forms of compensation.

The Federal Public Service, in view of its size, highly decentralized nature, and scope of programs and services requires its employees to live in, or to relocate to, high-cost areas. The Federal Public Service also has a need for some highly specialized and trained employees. At present, no alternate forms of compensation, such as pay-for-knowledge, skill-based pay, or allowances for special high cost urban areas exists within the Federal Public Service. Exceptions to the latter, however, are the Isolated Posts Allowances and the Foreign Service Directive.

The Task Force on Compensation and Benefits under this sub-heading, investigated how flexibility might be built into the departmental management process to respond to unique and difficult recruitment and retention situations due to

- . extremely competitive market for particular groups,

- . rare combination of skills, and
- . high cost locations (wage and cost of living).

Often the problem is not the system itself; sometimes managers lack knowledge of flexibilities that exist, are timid about using them due to the perception that many approaches were not meant for their situations, and/or are too rigid application of existing tools.

Attitude change both permitting and encouraging managers to manage would encourage them to seek ways to solve their own problems. It is the responsibility of managers to use whatever tools are available, in return for being accountable for their judgement in so doing.

At present, the Federal Public Service does have a variety of instruments to recruit under unique circumstances. The Task Force notes Interchange Canada, Business/Government Exchange and Indian Oil and Gas Canada (IOGC). Please refer to Annex 8 for additional information.

In the Public Service 2000 spirit of increased flexibility to Deputy Heads to strategically meet the needs, values and objectives of their organization and of the government and public they serve:

RECOMMENDATION XXX

The Task Force on Compensation and Benefits recommends that:

- . Deputy Heads be empowered to design special allowances to meet special recruitment, retention, and relocation needs; and
- . Special allowances, whether knowledge or skilled based, or designed to attract to high cost urban areas, would be determined outside of the collective bargaining realm but in consultation with unions (as the Isolated Posts

Allowances and the Foreign Service Directive are determined at the National Joint Council).

RECOMMENDATION XXXI

The Task Force on Compensation and Benefits recommends that:

- . Deputy Heads make greater use of existing assignment programs as a means of responding to unique recruitment situations;
- . Deputy Heads explore use of electronic communications to permit increased working at home to reduce daily commuting; and
- . the Treasury Board increase, for a specific period of time, the allocation of Special Assignment Pay Plan (SAPP) positions for departments with offices in extreme high cost areas.

5.1.4 SICK LEAVE CREDITS

Discussion

Some employees approached Task Force members with proposals or appeals to permit employees to 'cash-out' unused sick leave credits. The reasoning behind these appeals was apparently to provide an incentive for employees to improve attendance by reducing sick leave usage. The conventional wisdom is that there is widespread abuse of sick leave immediately prior to retirement. This was supported primarily by anecdotal evidence although statistics do reveal significant differences in sick leave usage by occupational group.

There is clearly an overlap in income protection benefits in considering the total coverage of sick leave, unemployment insurance and disability insurance coverage

even though only sick leave provides 100% salary protection. On the surface it is clear that there is little incentive, other than internal motivation, for an employee to retain sick leave credits beyond the amount required to qualify for the other income protection benefits. Nevertheless, many long service employees do have extensive banks of sick leave. It was reported to the Task Force that casual sick leave may be used by employees for family related reasons. The recommendations elsewhere in this report that deal with family related responsibilities will address this problem.

Sick leave is currently considered as term insurance, that is to say, if you do not require it you do not use it. The Task Force did consider a number of options to the current sick leave provisions to provide an incentive to reduce sick leave usage. These included a cash out of all credits when leaving the Public Service; an annual cash out inversely proportional to usage; converting unused sick leave credits to pensionable service upon retirement; and also considered recommending a totally new approach to income protection from illness that would clearly differentiate between the requirements for short term and long term protection.

The Task Force could not conclude that any incentive was required. In addition, it could not conclude that any of the above options would provide an effective incentive that would be equitable to all employees and would result in reduced sick leave usage in a cost effective manner without endangering the levels of income protection. The Task Force recognizes that it is a manager's responsibility to monitor and control sick leave usage to ensure that abuse is minimized while respecting the rights of employees to use this benefit as required. The Task Force is of the view that further study of this issue is required.

RECOMMENDATION XXXII

The Treasury Board Secretariat
conduct further studies to
determine if incentives are
required, and conduct pilot
projects as necessary to reduce
sick leave in a cost effective
manner that is equitable to all

employees without endangering the levels of income protection from illness.

5.1.5 SEPARATION PAY (EXTENSION AND DELEGATION)

Discussion

Any large organization, no matter how well it is managed, must accept that a certain percentage of its employees will become dysfunctional. These situations can have many causes: an error in staffing selection, a change over time in the abilities and interests of the employee, conflicts between the employee, his/her peers and management. Occasionally, Separation Pay is an appropriate way to handle the situation.

The central control of Separation Pay makes its application very difficult. Deputy Heads are required to negotiate (through a senior staff officer) between the individual and representatives of the Treasury Board Secretariat. This control, by a third party which is not directly involved in the negotiations can make the process lengthy, labour-intensive and acrimonious.

The Central Agency is understandably concerned with ensuring that settlements can be justified. However, because they are not directly involved in the negotiations they do not have a first-hand understanding of the intricacies of each case. Therefore their decisions on controlling the amounts of separation settlements can be artificial in some cases.

Managers must be encouraged to deal with situations of poor performance at the first indications of unsatisfactory work. Managers must be given better training in techniques for dealing with such situations, such as counselling; coaching; training poor performers; release or demotion; and appropriate transfer on reassignment.

In spite of these approaches, it is inevitable that managers will continue to be faced with poor performance situations which cannot be solved through counselling, training or reassignment. In these cases, a judicious application of a Separation Pay settlement provides the most effective and efficient method of resolving a difficult situation.

RECOMMENDATION XXXIII

The Task Force recommends that:

- . the current Separation Pay Policy be extended to apply to all public servants;
- . the terms of the current Separation Pay Policy be expanded to include a special category of compensation designed specifically to offset some or all of the actuarial pension penalty which could be suffered by the affected employees;
- . authority to negotiate Separation Pay settlements be delegated to Deputy Heads in accordance with established policy guidelines and subject to appropriate accountability mechanisms; and
- . managers be urged to deal with cases of poor performance through proper use of performance review, reassignment and training and to resort to Separation Pay only in situations where all other approaches have been explored and found wanting.

5.1.6 PART-TIME EMPLOYMENT

Discussion

Part-time employment provides flexibility to managers in performing work as and when required thereby helping to minimize costs, and to employees in balancing work and family-related responsibilities. It can also permit employees to ease-out of the workforce into retirement and can permit managers to take advantage

of the experience of retired employees for short-term assignments or peak workloads.

The Treasury Board's part-time employment policy was revised and improved in 1989 following an evaluation of the policy in 1988. Most notable improvements of the policy:

- . a clear statement that Treasury Board encourages this alternative work arrangement, with the caveat that operational requirements be the prime criterion used by management for accommodating or denying an employee's request for part-time status;
- . greater accountability by management when evaluating an employee's request for part-time status, and the requirement that a "memorandum of clarification" be signed with the new part-time employee. This document sets out the terms of the part-time arrangement; and
- . the requirement for departments to communicate to their managers the intent of the employer's policy.

The revised policy has been in place for just over a year. It is too early to make an objective assessment of its impact, but TB's on-going departmental contacts and statistical information suggest the policy is performing reasonably well. It was noted that some Deputy Heads strongly support and facilitate part-time employment within their organizations. In fact, any denial of an employee's request for part-time status is to be co-signed by the Deputy Head. It was found that this requirement for Deputy Head co-signature ensured that departmental management gave full consideration to an employee's request for part-time employment.

The 1988 study showed that almost 95% of part-time employees work 15 or more hours a week and have all of their negotiable terms and conditions of employment established by collective agreement. However, employees who work less than 30 hours per week do not acquire pensionable service. This point is discussed further in the section on part-time employment and the Public Service Superannuation Act.

Part-time employees express a common concern about the poor perception that managers and employees generally have of part-time employment. There is an on-going lack of objective information on part-time employment in the hands of managers and employees.

RECOMMENDATION XXXIV

The Task Force on Compensation and Benefits recommends that:

the Treasury Board Secretariat and departmental personnel embark on an information campaign directed to both management and employees to facilitate part-time employment.

RECOMMENDATION XXXV

The Task Force on Compensation and Benefits recommends that:

the communications initiative should focus on these themes:

- . advantages of part-time employment for managers as a means of efficiently achieving their operational and human resource objectives, e.g., higher productivity, higher quality of work, operational and organizational flexibility (achieve a better balance in resources required to handle peak and slack load situations; adapt or extend services to the hours, extent and frequency of local demand, etc.); improved employee morale; retention of skilled and experienced staff who would otherwise have left the Public Service, or not joined it on a full-time basis in the first place; lessened use of sick and family responsibility leave, etc.

- . advantages of part-time employment for the employee, e.g., flexibility to pursue personal goals (education, social, etc.), resulting self-esteem and job satisfaction, facilitate the demands of equal opportunities for women, provide older individuals with a means for a more gradual transition to final retirement, permit handicapped individuals to meet their needs and aspirations, provide on-the-job training to students to fit them for future careers in the Public Service, to learn skills and to finance their education, etc.
- . rights and obligations of the employees and their managers when entering into a part-time employment arrangement.

RECOMMENDATION XXXVI

The Task Force also recommends that:

- . managers should identify, opportunities within the department which lend themselves to job sharing and part-time work, and then invite employees to consider these jobs,
- . departments should develop career paths for part-time work which would include training and development, and
- . staffing officers should be encouraged to develop an inventory of those desiring job sharing or part-time work.

5.2 LEGISLATIVE CHANGES AND IMPROVEMENTS

The Public Service Superannuation Act (PSSA) provides the majority of Public Service employees with an excellent pension plan that can be considered one of the best in the country. In this respect, it meets the principles defined for a modern and strategic compensation and benefits system.

Nevertheless, a number of areas of concern were identified to the Task Force by outside groups and employees. The report of the Task Force on Barriers to Women in the Public Service identified some of the same concerns. A presentation on possible changes to the PSSA was made to the Task Force by a Treasury Board official and this also raised some concerns.

Possible amendments to the PSSA may improve the vesting and portability provisions. Many of the other concerns expressed relate to age of retirement, actuarial reductions or penalties and the calculation of average salary for pension purposes. The Task Force recognizes that improved benefits are possible in these areas but understands there is a significant cost associated with them. If the superannuation plan is to be actuarially sound, and in view of the quality of the present pension benefits, the Task Force has chosen to not make recommendations for improved benefits.

Nevertheless, concerns still remain in two areas: part-time employment and periods of leave without pay.

5.2.1 PART-TIME EMPLOYMENT AND THE PSSA

Discussion

As noted in section 5.1.6 on Part-time Employment, part-time employment provides flexibility to managers in having work performed as and when required thereby helping to minimize costs, and to employees in balancing work and family-related responsibilities. It can also permit employees to ease-out of the workforce into retirement and can permit managers to take advantage of the experience of retired employees for short-term assignments or peak workloads.

Despite the advantages of part-time employment, the PSSA often acts as a disincentive to part-time employment. Employees who work less than 30 hours per week may not contribute to the PSSA and do not acquire pensionable service. This has a particularly adverse impact on women as the majority of part-time employees are currently women. It could also adversely impact employees wishing to ease into retirement as they could cease to acquire contributory service.

The most obvious answer to this would be to include part-time employees as contributors under the PSSA. However, if contributory status is made mandatory, as it presently is for employees working more than 30 hours per week, this could adversely impact retired employees returning on a part-time basis or for short assignments as, under some circumstances, they would lose their pension.

Because pension entitlements are based upon highest average salary, employees wishing to ease into retirement could be adversely affected, as periods of part-time employment, whether considered contributory or not, could result in a lower average salary for determining pension entitlements.

RECOMMENDATION XXXVII

The Task Force on Compensation and Benefits recommends that the Public Service Superannuation Act (PSSA) be amended:

- . to include as contributors part-time employees who work less than 30 hours per week;
- . to permit employees to ease into retirement through reduced hours of work without adversely affecting future pension benefits; and
- . to permit retired employees to return to work for short periods of time without losing pension benefits.

5.2.2. LEAVE WITHOUT PAY AND THE PSSA**Discussion**

Employees returning from periods of leave without pay are normally required to pay back both the employee and the employer share of superannuation contributions over a period equivalent to the period of leave without pay. This, in addition to current contributions, means that they are paying up to three shares of contributions, up to 22.5% of salary, at the same time. This is a particular concern for employees taking care and nurturing leave, usually female employees, to balance family responsibilities, who have already been placed at a disadvantage by an absence from the career stream. This issue is also a concern for employees proceeding on leave without pay to accompany their spouse on relocation and could serve as a disincentive for spousal relocation within the public service.

The Task Force on Compensation and Benefits notes that, although a provision currently exists to extend the payback period, it requires from the employee a statement of financial hardship. This provision is currently not well-known and utilized by employees, is generally discouraged by the present superannuation system, and is considered humiliating for the employee.

RECOMMENDATION XXXVIII

The Task Force on Compensation and Benefits recommends that the Public Service Superannuation Act (PSSA) be amended to permit payback over extended periods of time, similar to those provided for elective service, at the option of the employee.

RECOMMENDATION XXXIX

The Task Force on Compensation and Benefits recommends that employees proceeding on leave without pay be fully informed of their options prior to proceeding on leave.

6. THE CHALLENGES

The discussions of the last seven months and the numerous letters received from Public Service employees from across the country offered the Task Force on Compensation and Benefits many challenges and many opportunities to re-think the current approach to compensation and benefits. The next seven months promise to be equally challenging for Task Forces and for the whole Public Service 2000 Initiative. Much work and consultation remains to be done before recommendations are made to Ministers and then to Parliament for required legislative reform.

The Task Force on Compensation and Benefits foresees challenges in six particular areas.

6.1 RECOMMENDATIONS OF OTHER TASK FORCES

The ten Task Forces are expected to produce over a hundred recommendations to modernize the Public Service of Canada. The challenge will be to integrate the substantial issues and major recommendations into a logical whole which will take the Public Service of Canada into the twenty-first century.

The "strategic rewards management approach" with its three Reward System components of

- . core remuneration,
- . flexible benefits, and
- . awards and rewards

needs to be meshed with the recommendations of other Task Forces, such as the proposed de-layering of the Management Category, the proposed reduction in the number of occupational groups and classifications, the possible introduction of appointment-to-level instead of appointment-to-position, and the adoption of an "operating budget" system.

6.2 COMMUNICATIONS AND CONSULTATIONS WITH EMPLOYEES

While some ninety Public Service employees have been directly involved in the deliberations of the Task Forces, many more have been indirectly involved in focus groups, in telephone surveys and in workshop or information sessions conducted under the auspices of departments, the Public Policy Forum, the Association of Professional Executives (APEX), and others.

However, the fact remains that Task Force recommendations, when approved by Ministers, will have a direct bearing on all employees of the Public Service of Canada, and will lead to a Public Service renewed by a spirit of professionalism, innovation, high performance, and of improved service to the public.

The challenge over the coming months will thus be to present and to openly discuss with all employees, whether represented or unrepresented, whether at the support level or the management level, whether in the National Capital Region, in the North or in a foreign post, the

- . goals of Public Service 2000,
- . the recommendations of Task Forces, and
- . the development of implementation and transition strategies.

Since the end-result of Public Service 2000 will represent a fundamental change to personal career paths and to the working environment, the participation and commitment of all employees is needed to modernize and to simplify current policies and practices.

Public Service managers will be on the front-lines in the modernization process. They must be ready to assist employees to understand, to contribute and to adapt to a modern Public Service.

6.3 COMMUNICATIONS AND CONSULTATIONS WITH UNIONS

Throughout its deliberations, the Task Force on Compensation and Benefits was conscious of the role and responsibility of Public Service unions. The Task Force met with representatives of ten unions in February, met bilaterally with the Professional Association of Foreign Service Officers and with the Professional Institute of the Public Service; letters were also received from the Public Service Alliance of Canada, the International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, and others.

A basic premise of the Task Force on Compensation and Benefits has been that there will be no unilateral implementation by the Employer of the proposed Reward System in respect of represented employees. In fact, the Task Force has recommended that compensation and benefits for represented employees continue to be determined via collective bargaining.

The Task Force is prepared to meet again with interested unions to present and discuss with them the recommendations and their rationale.

6.4 COST IMPLICATIONS

The Task Force is conscious of the cost implications of its recommendations and of the desire expressed to keep the overall PS 2000 package cost neutral. The Task Force held consultations with officials from the Conference Board of Canada and other private sector organizations where it became evident that compensation and benefit packages are already important strategic management tools in many of the more progressive and successful organizations. The Task Force also concluded that the wise application of a properly structured compensation and benefits package would have a direct and positive impact on operational efficiency and effectiveness. Given the importance of these major findings, the Task Force considered it essential to come forward with a progressive set of recommendations which would enable compensation and benefits to be effectively applied as a strategic management tool.

The Task Force found that it was unable to design a package which it felt it could recommend which would be cost-neutral, if confined to finding offsets from within current expenditures in this area. It is important to note that the private sector in some instances has found this to be the case in terms of trying to develop acceptable packages within dollar-for-dollar constraints. Notwithstanding, the Task Force felt it appropriate to proceed, and in doing so, to give full recognition to the overall advantages of a revised approach in achieving increases in operational efficiency and effectiveness.

The Task Force recognizes that there are two possible sources of funds available to offset incremental cost requirements. The first is as a result of the possible savings expected from the cumulative recommendations of PS 2000 Task Forces, and the second by absorbing the costs from within existing operating budgets through increased effectiveness and efficiency. The use of such offsets would therefore be necessary, for example, in the recommended replacement of the performance pay plan with a new performance reward program, or in implementing the recommended cafeteria concept in offering employee benefits. Offsets required in these instances would have to be relatively small.

6.5 IMPLEMENTATION CHALLENGES

The implementation of the "strategic rewards management approach" and the corollary administration of compensation, benefits and terms of conditions of employment is one of the most basic and fundamental personnel functions and services. As such, the fairness, consistency, flexibility, timeliness and professionalism of the administration of the system is key to employee confidence not only in the proposed Reward System but also in the overall approach to human resource management of an organization. Effective administration of the Reward System can contribute to the use of the system as a strategic management tool.

The Task Force has given thought to the issue of the administration and implementation of the Reward System. Annex 9 provides additional information.

6.6 FUTURE ACTIVITIES OF THE TASK FORCE

The Public Service 2000 Initiative is a complex undertaking with many challenges, some requiring difficult decisions. It recognizes the fundamental changes that have taken place in the workplace and in the labour force, and accepts that change is also required in the Public Service of Canada.

New situations often demand new approaches. The Public Service 2000 Initiative advocated a "fresh look" at the management of people to face the daunting challenges of a new decade and new century. The Task Force on Compensation and Benefits approached its particular task in this spirit.

Now that the Task Force on Compensation and Benefits has completed its review and report, it considers that the report is only phase I of an on-going process. Members unanimously share the view that their work will not be completed with the presentation of the report but rather with the implementation of a "modern" approach to compensation and benefits.

To this end, the Task Force members will be available over the coming months to work with Central Agencies and experts to design a modern system and, more importantly, to meet with employees and with union officials to discuss their conclusions and recommendations.

FOR DISCUSSION

PUBLIC SERVICE 2000: REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE ON
CLASSIFICATION AND OCCUPATIONAL
GROUP STRUCTURES

July 20, 1990

TABLE OF CONTENTS

| | <u>PAGE</u> |
|---|--------------------|
| Executive Summary | |
| Introduction | 1 |
| Need for Reform | 1-3 |
| Guiding Values and Objectives | 3-5 |
| Approach to the New Group and Classification Structure | 6-9 |
| The New Group Structure | 9-16 |
| Job Evaluation Systems 16-17 | |
| Implications of Recommendations | 17-18 |
| Legislative Changes | |
| Staffing System Changes | |
| Staff Relations | |
| Compensation | |
| Conversion to the New Structure | 19-20 |
| Impacts of Recommendations | 20-21 |
| Conclusion | 21 |
| Recommendations | 22-25 |
| Annexes | |

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The mandate of the Task Force on Classification and Occupational Group Structures was to examine the design and administration of the existing classification system within the context of values and objectives for a renewed Public Service.

In its preliminary report of January 31, 1990 the Task Force concluded that there was a need to reform, by means of a pragmatic and reasonable approach, the existing classification system as well as a need for a significant reduction in the number of occupational groups and levels.

The administration of the classification system has become time consuming and costly, and requires an inordinate amount of activity, job data, and documentation for classification decision making. In 1989-90, there were approximately 202,446 actions for some 320,000 established positions. Recent analysis indicates a normal level of classification activity would be between 40 to 50% of the total position establishment for the Public Service. Departmental classification activities because of numerous organizational reviews and reviews of individual positions, existing TB policies on cyclical reviews and classification standard changes result in an average of 150,000 classification actions per year.

The need for change requires that new classification objectives be established to meet the demands of the workplace of the 1990s and beyond.

The new system's basic purpose is to allow for a productive working environment aimed at service to the public, excellence in management practices, efficiency, probity and effectiveness in program management.

The new system must be considerably easier to manage, less complex, easily explainable and understood by human resource specialists, managers, employees and unions.

The new system must allow for the rapid redeployment of staff both within and outside governmental organizations and be responsive to change, technological, social, economic and structural. It should allow for sharing of responsibility, accountability and authority among levels, regions and headquarters and among staff and line groups.

The new system must enhance career/work development and job enrichment.

It must be free of any systemic discrimination and sexual bias.

The new system must be capable of reflecting trends in compensation outside the Public Service.

The system must establish the relative worth of jobs and must recognize the diversity of the many different functions within the Public Service.

The new system must allow broad spans of communication between employees and supervisors and enhance decision-making and more sharing of responsibilities at the working level.

And it must be of such a nature that it can be delegated to front-line managers on the basis of a climate of trust and confidence demonstrated by central agencies and senior managers.

These values and objectives will provide for a classification system that will result in attracting and retaining high quality Public Service employees and provide for logical pay and career progression for these employees. They will result in a much simplified classification system, extensively delegated to managers, and capable of automation. These values and objectives will encourage innovation with the organization of work, leading to management layering, and the giving of greater authority and responsibility to front-line employees.

The Task Force believes that the new group and classification structure must combine existing groups and sub-groups into their broader job families - families which could be Public Service-wide or department-specific. The concept of job family, however, must not be carried to the extreme of failing to recognize that certain groups have a community of interest built up over the years, require specific professional certification, or are very sensitive to outside compensation market forces. A reasonable application of these two realities will significantly improve internal relativities and equal pay for work of equal value objectives. Another major concern of the Task Force is that the levels within the new groups must reflect only significant and discernible differences between work levels. This will lead to a substantial reduction of the number of levels, which, combined with a significant reduction of occupational groups and sub-groups, will greatly simplify the system, make it more transparent, and provide more flexibility.

The Task Force cannot ignore some 20 years of experience under the Public Service Staff Relations Act which have led to the establishment of bargaining units reflecting more specific communities of interests and special needs. The Task Force has accommodated these needs by keeping certain groups separate or providing for sub-groups which could be identified as separate bargaining units in the new classification system.

The system must be consistent with the requirements of human rights legislation that introduced the concept of "equal pay for work of equal value". This concept requires that predominantly male groups and female groups working in the same establishment receive equal pay for work of equal value although the work may be different in nature. This obviously places great emphasis on internal relativity as the underlying principle of compensation. The Task Force feels that its recommendation to combine groups and reduce levels will greatly help the pay equity question. However, the existing classification system does not respond to pay equity issues. Because of the number of classification standards and plans, cross-group comparisons required to deal with pay equity matters cannot be made unless a common classification plan is used.

The answer lies in a new rating plan which would support the concept of equal pay for work of equal value and rely on internal relativity as the underlying principle of compensation in the Public Service.

For each new occupational group four factors will be present in the rating plan and which will be consistent with the requirements of the Canadian Human Rights Act. Within a new occupational group, under each factor the rating scale and its contents will be structured to measure the significant differences that are applicable to the group. The rating scales and their description can therefore vary from group to group.

Renewal of the Public Service provides an opportunity to simplify and improve existing personnel systems to make them more relevant to human resource management in the 90s. Reducing the number of groups and classification levels will result in a more efficient and effective management process for Public Service managers and employees, redesign of jobs, recognition of multiple skills, enhance career development, improvement of morale by allocating increased responsibility and authority to front-line employees, and flatter organizations with better communications between management and front-line workers. Greater energies will be expended on "getting on with the job" rather than "playing the system".

The Task Force recommends the following:

1. Abolish the existing 6 occupational categories.
2. Establish 23 distinct occupational groups and 8 sub-groups by combining the existing 72 groups and 106 sub-groups as follows:

PROPOSED NEW GROUPS

| <u>NEW</u> | <u>SUB-GROUPS</u> | <u>NUMBER OF LEVELS</u> | <u>FORMER</u> |
|-----------------------|--|-----------------------------|---|
| EXECUTIVE | | 3 | Senior Management Executive Group |
| ADMINISTRATION | | 6 | Administrative Services Financial Administration Personnel Administration Information Services Program Administration Organization and Methods Purchasing Welfare Programs Clerical and Regulatory Secretarial Stenographic and Typing Communications Data Processing Office Equipment Social Science Support Library Sciences |
| OPERATIONAL | Firefighters Trades Skilled Lightkeepers Ship Repairs Ships Crews | 7 | Firefighters General Labour and Trades General Services Hospital Services Heating and Power Lightkeepers Ship Repair Ships Crews |
| TECHNICAL | | 5 | Drafting and Illustration Engineering Support General Technical Photography Technical Inspection Primary Products Inspection Radio Operators |

| | | |
|--------------------------------------|---|--|
| CORRECTIONAL | 2 | No change |
| COMPUTER SYSTEMS | 5 | No Change |
| SCIENCES | 5 | Physical Sciences Chemistry Biological Sciences Forestry Meteorology Scientific Regulation Agriculture |
| AUDITING | 5 | No change |
| SOCIAL SCIENCES | 5 | Economics, Sociology and Statistics Mathematics Actuarial Science Social Science Support |
| SHIP OFFICERS | 5 | Ship Officers |
| ARCHITECTURE/ ENGINEERING | 5 | Architecture and Town Planning Engineering and Land Survey |
| RESEARCH | 5 | Scientific Research Defence Scientist Historical Research |
| ELECTRONICS | 5 | No change |
| AIR TRAFFIC SAFETY | 5 | Air Traffic Control Radio Operations |
| HEALTH CARE | 5 | Dentistry Medicine Home Economics Nursing Pharmacy Occupational Therapy Psychology Dentistry Medicine Social Worker |
| EDUCATION | 5 | Education University Teaching Education Support |
| COMMERCE | 4 | No change |
| FOREIGN SERVICE | 4 | Current FS group plus non-managerial SM/EX in External Affairs |

| | | |
|----------------------------|----------|------------------|
| TRANSLATION | 5 | No change |
| PRINTING OPERATIONS | | No change |
| LAW | 3 | No change |
| VETERINARY MEDICINE | 5 | No change |
| AIRCRAFT OPERATIONS | 5 | No change |

3.
 - a) A common job rating plan will apply to all occupational groups except for the Executive, Research, Law, Foreign Service and Printing Operations groups. The plan will be based on the equity principles contained in the Canadian Human Rights Act.
 - b) This rating plan will use 4 factors.
 - c) A 3-page format shall be adopted for all job descriptions.
 - d) The job rating plan shall be automated as much as possible.
4. The PSSRA shall be modified to ensure that the determination of a "bargaining unit" is based on the definition of an occupational group or sub-group.
5. The Public Service Staff Relations Act (PSSRA) should continue to define managers as being excluded from collective bargaining.
6. Conversion to the new structure should be in accordance with these principles:
 - a) employees in positions at current salary ranges which are higher than the maximum of the new range shall be salary protected;
 - b) employees who are not at the maximum of their old salary range would remain in that range until they reach the current maximum;
 - c) employees at the maximum of their range would be placed in the new range at a rate of pay equal to their current rate of pay (the maximum of their old rate) or at the next higher rate in the new range.

FOR DISCUSSION

July 20, 1990

REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE ON CLASSIFICATION AND OCCUPATIONAL GROUP STRUCTURES

INTRODUCTION

The mandate of the Task Force on Classification and Occupational Group Structures was to examine the design and administration of the existing classification system within the context of values and objectives for a renewed Public Service.

In its research, the Task Force considered the Report of the Committee of Deputy Ministers on classification issues; reviewed current classification principles and plans, occupational groupings, and job structures; examined organization of work and levels, compensation and pay lines, Treasury Board and other proposals for simplifying existing classification structures and processes; and studied the implications of potential changes to the classification system for unions and bargaining units. It also reviewed the impact of the current classification system on compensation schemes, staffing, career development and general human resource management, including managerial culture and attitudes. It held a workshop with line and field managers and its members participated in focus groups seeking input and reaction to proposals. It also received numerous proposals from union staff and regional management and personnel groups. Meetings were held with members of the classification community.

NEED FOR REFORM

In its preliminary report of January 31, 1990 the Task Force concluded that there was a need to reform, by means of a pragmatic and reasonable approach, the existing classification system as well as a need for a significant reduction in the number of occupational groups and levels.

The Task Force also questioned the continued relevancy of occupational categories which no longer have any usefulness in the classification system. The Task Force also concluded that the classification decision-making process, including job evaluation plans and job descriptions, needed to be considerably simplified.

There is no doubt that the nature of work in the Public Service is changing. The job differences that existed when the current system was developed are in many instances no longer present or distinguishable. There are fewer discernible differences in job values today. Advancements in the fields of science and information technology, the organizational requirement for many skills and/or multi-skilled type jobs, increased numbers of post-secondary graduates entering the marketplace, compression and lack of career mobility all have contributed to the elimination or reduction of these differences and the need for change.

The current system is cumbersome with its 6 occupational categories, 72 occupational groups and 106 sub-groups. It does not permit managers and employees to understand and thereby accept the salary differentials attributable to different category, group and sub-group allocations. At present, artificial job or organizational differences must be created in order to obtain a classification level which allows a manager the flexibility to redeploy staff. This contributes to the high level of frustration among managers, personnel administrators and employees. The administration of the classification system has become time consuming and costly, and requires an inordinate amount of activity, job data, and documentation for classification decision making. In 1989-90, there were approximately 202,446 actions for some 320,000 established positions. Recent analysis indicates a normal level of classification activity would be between 40 to 50% of the total position establishment for the Public Service. Departmental classification activities because of numerous organizational reviews and reviews of individual positions, existing TB policies on cyclical reviews and classification standard changes result in an average of 150,000 classification actions per year. In 1988, over 1,500 classifications actions, one third of all positions, were made in the Management Category. In 1989, 25% of all promotions in the Public Service were the result of reclassifications.

In addition, the current system is not responsive to pay equity considerations. In fact, the existing group structure with its male/female orientation leads to pay inequity problems. The recently issued report "Beneath the Veneer" sees the current classification system as stereotyping certain types of positions as "female", and recommends an overhaul of the system.

Further, the more complex the classification system, the more it generates staffing actions, particularly for transfers, promotions and reclassifications. In 1989, there were

approximately 100,000 staffing actions made in the Public Service, including recruitment, promotions, lateral transfers, terms and term renewals. This represents close to 47% of the total number of public servants (214,000). In other words, almost one employee in two was involved in a staffing or occupational group and level movement during the past year.

In other words, the current classification system is:

- Too complex
- Too costly and labour intensive
- Too capable of manipulation
- Subject to too many conflicting demands
- Overly restrictive in terms of career progression
- Not responsive to changing work and technologies
- Not responsive to pay equity concerns
- Open to excessive reorganizations and countless reclassifications to compensate or promote employees

GUIDING VALUES AND OBJECTIVES

Throughout its review, the Task Force was inspired by the objectives and values of the renewal exercise of Public Service 2000. Specifically it was inspired by the notion of a Public Service which:

- is professional, competent, non-partisan and imbued with a mission of service to the public;
- recognizes the importance of people in achieving performance and values its human resources;
- places as much authority as possible in the hands of front-line employees and managers; and
- in the context of a single Public Service, provides for diversity in recognition of the many different functions carried out.

The need for change requires that new classification objectives be established to meet the demands of the workplace of the 1990s and beyond. The Task Force considers these to be:

1. Productive working environment

The new system's basic purpose is to allow for a productive working environment aimed at service to the public, excellence in management practices, efficiency, probity and effectiveness in program management. It should not be seen as exclusively a means of rewarding, promoting and compensating employees. This will require a change in managerial attitudes towards classification structures. The new system must not be a hindrance to managers. It must be economical to operate and adaptable to computerization.

2. Simplicity and transparency

The new system must be considerably easier to manage, less complex, easily explainable and understood by human resource specialists, managers, employees and unions. It must reduce significantly the number of occupational groups, sub-groups and levels and be reflective of real differences in work being performed.

3. Flexibility

The new system must allow for the rapid redeployment of staff both within and outside governmental organizations and be responsive to change, technological, social, economic and structural. It must also be flexible enough to deal with exceptional situations, which do not set dangerous precedents for the integrity of the system. It should allow for sharing of responsibility, accountability and authority among levels, regions and headquarters and among staff and line groups.

4. Stimulate career progression

The new system must be reflective of prevailing attitudes and factors impacting on work and employee careers: plateauing, two-career family units, mobility, "knowledge" workers, etc. In order to attract and retain these workers, classification structures must enhance career/work development and job enrichment.

5. Equal pay for work of equal value

The new system must be fair and recognize those female-dominated occupations that have been underpaid yet are of equal value to male-dominated occupations. It must be free of any systemic discrimination and sexual bias.

6. External relativities

The new system must be capable of reflecting trends in compensation outside the Public Service.

7. Internal relativities

The system must establish the relative worth of jobs and must recognize the diversity of the many different functions within the Public Service.

8. Broader span of controls with fewer levels

The new system must allow broad spans of communication between employees and supervisors and enhance decision-making and more sharing of responsibilities at the working level.

9. Ownership by management

Managers must understand, support and feel comfortable with the system. It must not be seen as a system for personnel specialists only. And it must be of such a nature that it can be delegated to front-line managers on the basis of a climate of trust and confidence demonstrated by central agencies and senior managers.

These values and objectives will provide for a classification system that will result in attracting and retaining high quality Public Service employees and provide for logical pay and career progression for these employees. They will result in a much simplified classification system, extensively delegated to managers, and capable of automation. These values and objectives will encourage innovation with the organization of work, leading to management layering, and the giving of greater authority and responsibility to front-line employees.

APPROACH TO THE NEW GROUP AND CLASSIFICATION STRUCTURE

The Task Force believes that the new group and classification structure must combine existing groups and sub-groups into their broader job families - families which could be Public Service-wide or department-specific. The concept of job family, however, must not be carried to the extreme of failing to recognize that certain groups have a community of interest built up over the years, require specific professional certification, or are very sensitive to outside compensation market forces. A reasonable application of these two realities will significantly improve internal relativities and equal pay for work of equal value objectives.

Another major concern of the Task Force is that the levels within the new groups must reflect only significant and discernible differences between work levels. This will lead to a substantial reduction of the number of levels, which, combined with a significant reduction of occupational groups and sub-groups, will greatly simplify the system, make it more transparent, and provide more flexibility.

With the new classification system, management will have the authority to deploy staff within a classification level to meet work requirements and to provide for staff development. This will go a long way towards increasing flexibility in organizing work and will encourage job enrichment and career development. This view is also shared by the Joint Consultation Committee (JCC). In its March 7, 1990 report, the JCC Sub-committee on Mobility concluded that a "reduction in the number of occupational groups coupled with appointment to level with a wide salary band could offer increased opportunities for movement to other positions within the band without the necessity of appeals. This movement could offer employees experiences in different types of jobs where they may require skills and abilities different from those required in their present job." Further, the reduced number of levels should allow for the application of performance pay, which will provide initiatives for high performance, rather than the seeking of reclassification, a frequently chosen alternative under the current system.

The final concern of the Task Force has been the most difficult to approach. Since the classification structure is the foundation for the structuring of bargaining units leading to the certification of bargaining agents, the Task Force wants its proposals to recognize, as much as possible, the existing groups/union affiliation. The Task Force cannot ignore some 20 years of experience under the Public Service Staff Relations Act which have led to the establishment of bargaining units reflecting more specific communities of interests and special needs. The Task Force has accommodated these needs as long as they were not contradictory to the objectives (listed on pages 4 & 5), by keeping certain groups separate or providing for sub-groups which

could be identified as separate bargaining units in the new classification system.

As a result of our approach, occupational categories will disappear. Our concept recognizes that there is a logical career progression as well as a continuum of work between the Administrative Support and the Administrative and Foreign Service categories in particular. In fact, the Task Force's major recommendation is to structure an ADMINISTRATION group to include most groups and sub-groups in these categories. This will go a long way towards meeting the concerns of the Task Force on Barriers to Women in the Public Service.

The application of this approach leads to the following:

a) The integration of current groups into broader families of jobs across departments which could, in some instances, lead to department-specific groups.

The rationale used for integrating or keeping separate existing occupational groups is based on the generic nature of the work performed and on community of interests. Community of interests represents such factors as similarity of the work and duties performed, duration of work performed, conditions of employment, professional and technical qualifications, the required training, compensation and job evaluation schemes, benefits, interdependence of functions, normal career movement within a particular existing group as opposed to lateral transfers to other groups and career development opportunities. The new groupings will keep managers and non-managers together in the same groups but for collective bargaining purposes, managers would be excluded under the PSSRA.

These groupings would enable managers to have more flexibility in human resource management. It will no longer be necessary to create artificial differences to satisfy one particular group allocation versus another within the same category in order to redeploy staff. This new group will enable managers to concentrate on the purpose of the job which is to provide, for example, a certain kind of expertise. Specific knowledge/skills requirements for a particular job will be the selection criteria.

Thus, functions required for the internal management of an organization, i.e. administrative, personnel, financial and clerical support, would be grouped with others engaged in the delivery of a government program or activity. There would no longer be any artificial barriers between employees who provide a service or who administer regulations and those who provide operational, managerial or technical support to the front-line staff. A similar approach has been used for operational, technical, scientific

and health related occupations and professions.

The job family concept is applied essentially across the Public Service. In some instances, it leads to department- specific groups where the job family is department- specific. It must be noted, however, that some departments can argue that all jobs should be in the same classification group even though they are of different job families. For example, Correctional Services Canada could state that all jobs in institutions dealing with inmates should be classified identically, although they are of varying job families (guards, trades, program administration). The same can be said for Revenue Canada, Taxation which wants to evolve to a Tax Officer concept regrouping lawyers, accountants and program administrators. The Task Force recognizes the legitimacy of these situations but cannot support the classification rationale when applied to a single Public Service. The danger would be that each department would have its own distinct classification plan - a situation that prevailed in many departments before 1965 and which was unsatisfactory. We see the legitimate aspirations of these departments as being met with the separate employer concept, whereby, as separate employers, these departments could develop classification plans for their organizations only.

b) Retention of specific groups where professional certification and outside market comparability warrants.

The Task Force recognizes that for certain specific groups such as lawyers, auditors and veterinary scientists, professional qualification is a requirement for appointment and there is a clearly identifiable outside market which must be closely monitored if the Public Service is to attract and retain quality staff. The Task Force believes that in the interest of developing a professional, career-oriented Public Service, such groups need to be retained as specific entities.

c) Classification levels to reflect only significant and discernible differences in work levels.

Under the current system this is not the case. The differences between levels in a particular occupational group generally are so sensitive so as to invite managers to alter their organizations in order to compensate and promote deserving employees. In addition, in most occupational groups, especially those of an administrative nature, these differences are not significant enough to establish and explain the differences in salaries for these jobs. Jobs have become diluted in order to satisfy the requirements of the existing classification plans. Simplifying the system will enable managers to

understand it and assume ownership for it.

- d) **The current and future Public Service requires that managers should be able to deploy staff quickly and easily to meet constantly changing priorities.**

Such a change would reduce paper burden on both classification and staffing specialists, as position documentation would be required only for each unique job, and appointment documentation for initial appointment and promotion. Any transfer from one job to another job would become an accounting procedure.

- e) **Broad pay bands for classification levels to facilitate performance pay.**

The Task Force believes that if managers are to be truly accountable, they have to be truly accountable for compensation. Broader pay bands can allow for the development of performance pay systems, under which managers will be able to reward productive workers. This provision will give managers more ownership of the classification and pay system.

- f) **Retain the existing group/union affiliation whenever possible.**

The Task Force is of the view that, in order to provide for stability in the redesign of the classification system and to acknowledge that certain occupational groups have indeed become clearly identifiable and distinct occupations, to the extent possible and without endangering the principle of families of jobs or natural groupings functions, existing collective bargaining relationships should be retained.

THE NEW GROUP STRUCTURE

EXECUTIVE GROUP

The new EXECUTIVE GROUP will combine the existing Senior Management and Executive Group of the Management Category. The EXECUTIVE GROUP will comprise senior personnel who provide policy development and advising expertise as well as those who exercise managerial functions. The Task Force is also recommending that the Hay Plan be retained as the job evaluation plan, subject to establishing equivalencies for senior professional jobs. There is a strong perception among Public Service managers that inequities persist in the value assigned (as determined by the current classification level): to regional jobs when compared with departmental headquarters and central agency jobs; to operational

management positions when compared to policy/advisory ones and to positions in socially-oriented departments when compared with others in economic/business-oriented departments. The Task Force, therefore, strongly supports the study that Treasury Board is undertaking to analyse these positions to determine if these perceptions are real. The Task Force is recommending a 3-level structure instead of the current 6-level structure, combining SM with EX-1, EX-2 with EX-3 and EX-4 with EX-5. It believes that there are no more than 3 truly discernible levels of responsibility and accountability in executive jobs of the Public Service. The Task Force on the Management Category has addressed this issue and concurs with this recommendation.

ADMINISTRATION GROUP

This new occupational group would be composed of jobs and regulatory activities which a) through a variety of government programs provide services to the public; and b) are involved in the internal management of the Public Service, including office management and support activities, communications, data processing, and information management. This new group would combine the existing Administrative Services, Financial Administration, Personnel Administration, Information Services, Program Administration, Organization and Methods, Purchasing, Welfare Programs, Clerical and Regulatory, Secretarial, Stenographic and Typing, Communications, Data Processing, Office Equipment, Social Science Support, and Library Sciences groups. The Task Force believes that there are no more than 5 or 6 levels of work in this group. It favors a 6-level structure for ease of conversion of existing groups/levels into the new structure.

Combining the existing levels of all of these groups into a 6-level structure with the 3 levels in the new EXECUTIVE group will result in a 9-level structure from the lowest clerical job to an Assistant Deputy Minister position. This reduction of levels will facilitate that responsibility and authority for decision making is delegated to the lowest level possible. This will enable departmental management to effectively delay its decision-making process and will provide front-line employees with greater freedom of action and decision making. It will also remove the artificial distinction that currently exists between "officers" and "clerical workers".

Suggestions were made that regulatory or enforcement functions; (e.g. Custom and Investigation Officers, Fisheries Officers) should be combined into a separate group. The arguments for such a move are not strong enough to justify the benefits of keeping them out of the administration stream.

OPERATIONAL GROUP

This new group would combine the existing Firefighters, General Labour and Trades, General Services, Hospital Services, Heating and Power, Lightkeepers Ship Crews and Ship Repair groups. This new group would have 6 sub-groups: 1. an Operational sub-group, with a 7-level structure to cover those occupations that are not identifiable trades; 2. a Trades sub-group, which would contain all identifiable trades by job titles and treat them as separate classifications; 3. a Firefighter sub-group with the same structure as at present; 4. a Lightkeepers sub-group with the same structure as at present; 5. a Ship Crews sub-group with the same structure as at present, and 6. a Ship Repair sub-group with the same structure as at present. This type of structure would allow utmost flexibility in establishing compensation for this group.

TECHNICAL GROUP

This new group would combine the existing Drafting and Illustration group, Engineering Support group, General Technical, Photography, Technical Inspection and Primary Products Inspection and shore based marine radio operators. The nature of the work environment, working conditions, collective bargaining terms and conditions including benefits, all indicate a community of interests for members of this group. These existing occupational groups are largely engaged in the conduct of analytical, experimental and investigative duties in natural and physical sciences, the preparation, inspection and measurement of biological, chemical and physical substances and materials, the design, construction, inspection and operation of complex equipment, systems and processes in which the knowledge and skills requirements are normally acquired through completion of secondary school and specialized training. The Task Force is recommending that a 5-level structure be studied for this group.

CORRECTIONAL GROUP

The Task Force is of the view that because of the specific nature of positions and the work being performed at correctional institutions across Canada, the Correctional Service could be a separate employer which would allow the combination of occupations, professions and functions performed at these institutions into a new classification group. Existing groups within institutions share commonality of interest, very similar working conditions, including terms of employment and benefits, and similar career advancement and job interests. The new group would be governed by one classification pay plan. This department-specific group would combine all functions and jobs dealing with inmates into one group.

COMPUTER SYSTEMS GROUP

The Task Force is recommending no change to this group. A limited community of interest, its emergence and growth as a new profession and a discernible competitive outside market support this grouping.

SCIENCES GROUP

This new group would combine the existing Physical Sciences, Chemistry, Biological Sciences, Forestry, Meteorology, Scientific Regulation, and Agriculture groups. These groups are largely engaged in the application of a comprehensive body of knowledge acquired through university education. Members of these groups are involved in the application of knowledge and principles and the exercise of skills specific to a comprehensive body of knowledge or profession. For instance, the Chemistry group is largely involved in the analysis, interpretation, classification, measurement and survey of the chemical composition, properties and behaviour of matter while members of the Biological Sciences group analyze, identify, interpret, classify, measure, survey and manage biological resources, organisms or systems. The application of a comprehensive body of knowledge is the most important requirement in achieving the main objectives of the scientist. Similarly, persons in the Agriculture group are involved in the promotion, development and regulation of the agricultural industry and trade and require the application of a comprehensive knowledge of agriculture in the performance of their duties. The Task Force is recommending that a new Science group be created which would have a 5-level group structure.

AUDITING GROUP

The Task Force is recommending no change as this group is essentially department-specific, most employees being located in the Department of National Revenue, either within Customs and Excise or Taxation. In terms of simplifying the existing classification structure the Task Force is recommending that this group be structured along 5 levels.

SOCIAL SCIENCES GROUP

This new group would combine employees involved in the conduct of economic, socio-economic and sociological analyses and studies in support of government programs and policies. It would also include those involved in the development, application and evaluation of statistical and survey methods and measures for data analysis and reporting. To a large

extent the existing Economics, Sociology and Statistics group, the Mathematics group, the Actuarial Science group and the Social Science Support group are involved in these activities. A 5-level structure is recommended for this group. In relation to the Social Sciences Support (SI) group, members can be allocated, on the basis of the duties they are performing, either to the new ADMINISTRATION group or to this group.

SHIP OFFICERS GROUP

The Task Force is recommending no change to this group.

ARCHITECTURE/ENGINEERING GROUP

This new group would combine the existing Architecture and Town Planning and the Engineering and Land Survey groups. Positions in these groups are those that require the application of a comprehensive knowledge of architecture and engineering in the performance of duties normally involved with the planning, and design of new construction and alterations to existing structures, or the planning design, construction, installation or maintenance of buildings, structures, transportation and other systems. Membership in these groups is based on academic qualifications and accreditation by professional groups in which membership in Canada is generally controlled by legally established licensing bodies. The Task Force is recommending a 5-level structure.

RESEARCH GROUP

This new group would combine the existing Scientific Research, Defence Scientist and Historical Research groups. Essentially these 3 groups are involved in the conduct and management of research and development projects in the natural or social sciences. The Task Force is recommending a 5-level structure based on personal qualifications and performance. Appointment-to-level is a standard feature of positions in this group. The members of this group are compensated and recognized for their knowledge and skills rather than for the duties that have to be performed. Also recommended is that the management of these activities remain within the RESEARCH group and not be included in the redefined EXECUTIVE group. This would enable research managers to maintain a closer relationship with their scientific endeavours as opposed to being required to withdraw from their profession for the time that they are performing management functions. Remaining within the group will allow managers to maintain their scientific and professional status.

ELECTRONICS GROUP

The Task Force recommends that this group be retained. A 5-level structure should be considered.

AIR TRAFFIC SAFETY GROUP

The new Air Traffic Safety group would combine the existing Air Traffic Controllers , Radio Operators, Flight Service Specialists and Operational Support Services which are currently GT's and CR's in Transport Canada (that is, those employees involved in the provision of communications to aircraft). These positions are involved in the provision of services to ensure safe and expeditious movement of aircraft and such a grouping would improve career development opportunities and more efficient utilization of resources. The Task Force is recommending a 5-level structure. There is a commonality of interest among these occupational groups as well as similar working conditions.

HEALTH CARE GROUP

This new group would combine the existing Home Economics, Nursing, Pharmacy, Social Worker, Occupational Therapy, Psychology, Dentistry and Medicine groups. These groups are largely involved in the promotion of public and individual health, the prevention and treatment of diseases, the management of illness, and the development and implementation of programs to promote health. The working environments are very similar, the conditions of employment equally similar and the community of interest, including the upgrading and the maintenance of professional skills, equally necessary. The Task Force is recommending that a 5-level structure be established for all except for Dentistry and Medicine. They could be separate sub-groups because of their separate professional licensing and educational requirements and specific compensation needs.

EDUCATION GROUP

This new group would combine the existing Education, University Teaching and Education Support groups. This new group combines employees who are involved in teaching at the primary, secondary or university level. They are all involved in the application of teaching methods and techniques acquired with specialized professional training. Given the nature of duties performed, there is a commonality of interest in terms of maintaining professional

skills within these groups. Compensation for these groups is based on performance and appointment-to-level would be an appropriate staffing process. The Task Force is recommending a 5-level structure based on personal qualifications and performance.

COMMERCE GROUP

The Task Force is recommending no change to this group. Its current 4-level structure should be retained.

FOREIGN SERVICE GROUP

The Task Force is of the view that a new 4-level structure should be created for this group. This would remove non-managerial foreign service jobs currently within the EXECUTIVE group of the Management Category (except for the ADM level), and would provide greater career progression for employees in this group, while recognizing that the foreign service is a distinct, separate occupation.

TRANSLATION GROUP

The Task Force is of the view that because of its department-specific nature there should be no change to this group.

PRINTING OPERATIONS GROUP

The Task Force believes that this group which is department-specific should be retained as a separate and distinct group. It is recommending that there be no classification plan (job titles only) for operations and non-supervisory jobs within this group.

LAW GROUP

The Task Force is of the opinion that there should be no change to this group (department-specific).

VETERINARY MEDICINE GROUP

The Task Force is of the view that there should be no change to this group because of its department-specific nature.

AIRCRAFT OPERATIONS GROUP

The Task Force is recommending no change to this group.

JOB EVALUATION SYSTEMS

The Task Force studied many options in relation to a job evaluation system. Uppermost in the minds of Task Force members was the need to simplify and standardize the rating system. The current system uses 1960s methodology and technology and as a result is heavily resource intensive. Further, the system must be consistent with the requirements of human rights legislation that introduced the concept of "equal pay for work of equal value". This concept requires that predominantly male groups and female groups working in the same establishment receive equal pay for work of equal value although the work may be different in nature. This obviously places great emphasis on internal relativity as the underlying principle of compensation. The Task Force feels that its recommendation to combine groups and reduce levels will greatly help the pay equity question. However, the existing classification system does not respond to pay equity issues. Because of the number of classification standards and plans, cross-group comparisons required to deal with pay equity matters cannot be made unless a common classification plan is used.

The answer lies in a new rating plan which would support the concept of equal pay for work of equal value and rely on internal relativity as the underlying principle of compensation in the Public Service. It must be realistic and responsive to the needs of the 1990s. In reference to the Canadian Human Rights Act, the rating plan must contain 4 factors that make up the composite and the measurement of value of relative jobs: "skill", which refers to the intellectual and physical qualifications acquired by experience, training, education or natural ability; "effort", which is intellectual and physical effort; "responsibility", which is the extent of responsibility of the employee for technical, financial and human resources; and "working conditions", which include the physical and psychological work environments including noise, temperature, isolation, physical danger, health hazard and stress.

For each new occupational group these factors will be present in the rating plan. Within a new occupational group, under each factor the rating scale and its contents will be structured to measure the significant differences that are applicable to the group. The rating scales and their description can therefore vary from group to group. We recommend the introduction of a plan based on these four factors for all the groups except for the new EXECUTIVE group; RESEARCH

group; LAW group, FOREIGN SERVICE group; PRINTING OPERATIONS group; and the Trades, and Ship Repairs sub-groups of the new OPERATIONAL Group. We expect, however, that with the work that has taken place in a number of jurisdictions in recent years, a plan can be put in place within 24 months. The actual design of this new job rating plan will need to be left to the experts.

The efficiency of this new system will be greatly enhanced if it is automated. The use of specific forms not exceeding 3 pages will provide for most job descriptions and facilitate automation. This is essential for the sake of simplicity, capturing the essential requirement of jobs, reducing time and effort and discouraging the reclassification game. This is an attitudinal requirement as much as a system requirement.

IMPLICATIONS

Legislative Changes

The Public Service Staff Relations Act will have to be amended to remove all references to occupational categories, and retain only references to occupational groups. It will be critical, in order to simplify not only the classification process but also the process of collective bargaining, that bargaining units be determined by occupational group and sub-group definition. The Public Service Staff Relations Act should also continue to contain a provision to allow for a council of unions to represent a bargaining unit.

Staffing System Changes

A simplified occupational group structure with a reduced number of levels and with the authority to deploy staff within a level will significantly reduce the number of staffing actions involved in promotions and intergroup transfers or lateral appointments. It is estimated that staffing activity will be reduced by up to two-thirds.

Staff Relations

Regrouping the existing 72 occupational groups into 23 will have an impact on some bargaining agents. For instance, the following bargaining units would all be affected by the regrouping: AI, FI, ES, LS, MA, SI, EDS, ED, RO. A large number of bargaining units would also have to be combined; for example, in the ADMINISTRATION group, 13 existing units would be integrated into one. In addition, the Task Force recognizes that

certain groups proposed for inclusion in this new group (UT, PE, OM) have been excluded from collective bargaining since the inception of the PSSRA. The appropriateness of continuing this exclusion will need to be reviewed. If this exclusion (whole or in part) is to remain, then the exclusion status should be similar to "managerial exclusions" currently found in the PSSRA.

The restructuring of occupational groups will streamline the bargaining process. There will be fewer bargaining units for which negotiations will be required, and there will be fewer rates of pay to negotiate and less protracted negotiations for other groups.

It is difficult to assess the impact of large bargaining units on government operations. Currently, negotiations take place for a number of bargaining units at the same time. While it is believed that it will be more difficult for a particular bargaining agent to encourage a large unit of employees to strike, nonetheless, such a large unit would pose problems if its members chose the strike route. On the other hand, the government would be more vulnerable to strikes if certain key bargaining units (CR, PM) were left intact since these have the potential effect of crippling operations because of the strategic function they perform within the operations of government.

All unions have stated that classification should be bargainable. The unions recognized that it is the responsibility of management to assign duties to positions and set out the organization of work. The Task Force believes that with a common job evaluation system, it would be an overwhelming task to negotiate its content and application with some 15 bargaining agents. It is to management's advantage to develop a fair and effective classification plan. Therefore, the job evaluation system and the number of levels for each group should not be bargainable. Management should also define which positions go into which occupational group - subject to review by the Public Service Staff Relations Board - for collective bargaining purposes. However, from that point on, management and the union could jointly agree on the evaluation of a position to a level and the handling of grievances against such decisions could become adjudicable. Such a move would strengthen the ownership of the classification process by unions and employees and make it more transparent.

Compensation

Reducing the number of occupational groups and the number of levels within a particular group is linked with the introduction of broader pay bands and should be conducive to the potential application of performance rewards or pay.

CONSULTATIONS THAT HAVE TAKEN PLACE

The Task Force met at least once with all bargaining agents and in some cases, several times. It also received a number of written representations. While bargaining agents agree in principle that there is a need for simplification and restructuring of occupational groups, they do not want it to be at the expense of their bargaining units. Bargaining agents such as APSFA and CAPRO are strongly opposed to the proposed regrouping affecting them. If there is to be an amalgamation of a bargaining unit with bargaining units that belong to another bargaining agent, the unions so affected do not want this amalgamation to be a forced one. They support a free certification vote. Most unions do not want to be left out in the cold when it comes to the final restructuring. All have stated that they want the new structure to be a negotiated one.

CONVERSION TO THE NEW STRUCTURE

The conversion of 72 occupational groups into 23 will require time and effort. The Task Force recommends, on conversion,

- a) Employees in positions at current salary ranges which are higher than the maximum of the new range shall be salary protected;
- b) Employees who are not at the maximum of their old salary range would remain in that range until they reach the current maximum;
- c) Employees at the maximum of their range would be placed in the new range at a rate of pay equal to their current rate of pay (the maximum of their old rate) or at the next higher rate in the new range.

The Task Force sees the conversion as moving existing classifications to the new levels (the Task Force has recommended the number of levels for the new groups it has formed) on a date which takes into account the renewal of the existing collective agreements.

Once conversion has taken place, the job evaluation rating plan can be applied, using benchmarks representative of each of the levels in a group.

Over time, each position description would be rewritten (3 pages) and rated to confirm its level or to change the level if conversion resulted in a wrong placement.

The Task Force feels strongly that this approach is faster, more economical and more certain for staff than the traditional BCR (1965-1970) type of exercise which would require developing the rating plan, evaluating all jobs (with new job descriptions) and then converting them to the new plan, a process which could take up to 5 years to complete.

IMPACT ON THE SIZE OF THE PUBLIC SERVICE

The Task Force sees some of its recommendations as potentially having an impact on the organization of work in the Public Service and reducing the volume and nature of work involved in human resource management as currently done by managers and personnel staff. This may result in shifting resources to provide better service to the public. Resources will be released as a result of delayering (reduction in managerial and supervisory positions) and the reduction of classification and staffing activity.

OPERATIONAL IMPACT

The reduction in levels in virtually all groups will require a rethinking of the organizational structures in many departments. Managerial and supervisory levels will be reduced, and more authority will be shifted to the working levels. We see this as positive, as a way to provide job enrichment for staff and a more effective delivery of work. The reduction of classification and staffing activity will remove a large number of bureaucratic constraints and delays, reduce costs and liberate resources that can be oriented toward better service to the public.

The introduction of performance rewards or pay at levels below the Executive group will create more work in the management of the appraisal process, and could lead to more grievances. However, it will strengthen the human resources process, make managers more accountable for their staff and result in better human resource management.

PARLIAMENTARY IMPACT

Changes to the Public Service Staff Relations Act will be required.

UNION IMPACT

The major union impact will be for those bargaining units affected by the regrouping, if the occupational group structures remain the prime criteria for the certification of bargaining agents. Particularly affected are the Association of Public Service Financial Administrators representing the FI group, which is to be combined with new Administration group, and the Canadian Association of Radio Operators, representing the RO group, which according to the recommendation will be split between the Air Traffic Safety and Technical groups.

IMPACT ON EMPLOYEE MORALE

The Task Force feels that its recommendations will open up more possibilities of job enrichment, staff development, performance pay, delayering, greater authority and accountability to the working level and the substantial reduction in the frustration involved in the classification and staffing systems.

As a result of combining groups and reducing the number of levels, many managers and employees will have to rethink their approach to their jobs and careers. Some may be demoralized because they have been combined with other groups or assigned a "lower level", even though their compensation has not been affected. Because of the reduction in classification and staffing activity, the work load in the human resources field will be reduced, leading to a potential reduction of person years and reallocation of these resources.

CONCLUSION

Renewal of the Public Service provides an opportunity to simplify and improve existing personnel systems to make them more relevant to human resource management in the 90s. Reducing the number of groups and classification levels will result in a more efficient and effective management process for Public Service managers and employees, redesign of jobs, recognition of multiple skills, enhance career development, improvement of morale by allocating increased responsibility and authority to front-line employees, and flatter organizations with better communications between management and front-line workers. Greater energies will be expended on "getting on with the job" rather than "playing the system".

RECOMMENDATIONS

The Task Force recommends the following:

1. Abolish the existing 6 occupational categories.
2. Establish 23 distinct occupational groups and 8 sub-groups by combining the existing 72 groups and 106 sub-groups as follows:

PROPOSED NEW GROUPS

| <u>NEW</u> | <u>SUB-GROUPS</u> | <u>NUMBER OF LEVELS</u> | <u>FORMER</u> |
|-----------------------|--|------------------------------------|---|
| EXECUTIVE | | 3 | Senior Management Executive Group |
| ADMINISTRATION | | 6 | Administrative Services Financial Administration Personnel Administration Information Services Program Administration Organization and Methods Purchasing Welfare Programs Clerical and Regulatory Secretarial Stenographic and Typing Communications Data Processing Office Equipment Social Science Support Library Sciences |
| OPERATIONAL | Firefighters Trades Skilled Lightkeepers Ship Repairs Ships Crews | 7 | Firefighters General Labour and Trades General Services Hospital Services Heating and Power Lightkeepers Ship Repair Ships Crews |

| | | |
|--------------------------------------|---|--|
| TECHNICAL | 5 | Drafting and Illustration Engineering Support General Technical Photography Technical Inspection Primary Products Inspection Radio Operators |
| CORRECTIONAL | 2 | No change |
| COMPUTER SYSTEMS | 5 | No Change |
| SCIENCES | 5 | Physical Sciences Chemistry Biological Sciences Forestry Meteorology Scientific Regulation Agriculture |
| AUDITING | 5 | No change |
| SOCIAL SCIENCES | 5 | Economics, Sociology and Statistics Mathematics Actuarial Science Social Science Support |
| SHIP OFFICERS | 5 | Ship Officers |
| ARCHITECTURE/ ENGINEERING | 5 | Architecture and Town Planning Engineering and Land Survey |
| RESEARCH | 5 | Scientific Research Defence Scientist Historical Research |
| ELECTRONICS | 5 | No change |
| AIR TRAFFIC SAFETY | 5 | Air Traffic Control Radio Operations |
| HEALTH CARE | 5 | Dentistry Medicine Home Economics Nursing Pharmacy Occupational Therapy Psychology Dentistry Medicine Social Worker |

| | | |
|----------------------------|---|--|
| EDUCATION | 5 | Education University Teaching Education Support |
| COMMERCE | 4 | No change |
| FOREIGN SERVICE | 4 | Current FS group plus non-managerial SM/EX in External Affairs |
| TRANSLATION | 5 | No change |
| PRINTING OPERATIONS | | No change |
| LAW | 3 | No change |
| VETERINARY MEDICINE | 5 | No change |
| AIRCRAFT OPERATIONS | 5 | No change |

3.
 - a) A common job rating plan will apply to all occupational groups except for the Executive, Research, Law, Foreign Service and Printing Operations groups. The plan will be based on the equity principles contained in the Canadian Human Rights Act.
 - b) This rating plan will use 4 factors.
 - c) A 3-page format shall be adopted for all job descriptions.
 - d) The job rating plan shall be automated as much as possible.
4. The PSSRA shall be modified to ensure that the determination of a "bargaining unit" is based on the definition of an occupational group or sub-group.
5. The Public Service Staff Relations Act (PSSRA) should continue to define managers as being excluded from collective bargaining.
6. Conversion to the new structure should be in accordance with these principles:
 - a) Employees in positions at current salary ranges which are higher than the maximum of the new range shall be salary protected;

- b) employees who are not at the maximum of their old salary range would remain in that range until they reach the current maximum;
- c) employees at the maximum of their range would be placed in the new range at a rate of pay equal to their current rate of pay (the maximum of their old rate) or at the next higher rate in the new range.

ANNEXES

- | | | |
|------|---|------------|
| I. | List of Members | |
| II. | Current Occupational groups and Sub-groups | |
| III. | Current Bargaining Agents and Bargaining Units | March 1990 |
| IV. | Proposed new Occupational groupings | July 1990 |

LIST OF MEMBERS

| | |
|------------------|---|
| Robert Giroux | Public Works Canada |
| Jean Fournier | Secretary of State of Canada |
| Ole Ingstrup | Correctional Service Canada |
| Michel Cardinal | Public Service Commission |
| Treffle Lacombe | Employment and Immigration Canada |
| Don Goodwin | Indian and Northern Affairs |
| Mike Binder | Communications Canada |
| Francois Pouliot | Fisheries and Oceans |
| Lise Ouimet | Treasury Board (Resource Person) |
| Joe Landriault | Canadian Center for Management Development |
| Terry Kelleher | Public Works Canada |

OCCUPATIONAL GROUPS AND SUB-GROUPS

ANNEX II

| <u>GROUPS</u> | <u>SUB-GROUPS</u> |
|---|---|
| OE - Office Equipment Group | BEO Bookkeeping Equipment Operator CEO Calculating Equipment Operator DEO Duplicating Equipment Operator MSE Mailing Service Equipment Operator MEO Microphotography Equipment Operator |
| ST - Secretarial, Stenographic and Typing Group | TYP Typist Sub-Group STN Stenographic Sub-Group OCE Office Composing Equipment Operator COR Court Reporter SCY Secretary |
| CR - Clerical and Regulatory Group | |
| CM - Communications Group | |
| DA - Data Processing Group | CON Data Conversion PRO Data Production |
| AS - Administrative Services | |
| AT - Administrative Trainee | |
| CO - Commerce | |
| CS - Computer Systems Administration | |
| FI - Financial Administration | |
| FS - Foreign Service Group | |
| IS - Information Services | |
| PE - Personnel Administration | |
| OM - Organization and Methods | |
| TR - Translation | |
| WP - Welfare Programme | |
| PG - Purchasing and Supply | |
| PM - Programme Administration Group | MCO Mediation/Conciliation Officer |
| MT - Meteorology | |
| AG - Agriculture | |
| NU - Nursing Group | HOS Hospital Nursing CHN Community Health Nursing |
| FO - Forestry | |
| HR - Historical Research | |
| HE - Home Economics | ADV Advisory DIT Dietitian HME Home Economist |
| LS - Library Science | |

GROUPS

SUB-GROUPS

MA - Mathematics

MD - Medicine

MOF Medical Officer
MSP Medical Specialist

OP - Occupational and
Physical Therapy

PC - Physical Science

SG - Scientific Regulation

SRE Scientific Regulation
PEM Patent Examination

PS - Psychology

DE - Dentistry

ES - Economics, Sociology and
Statistics

ED - Education Group

LAT Language Teaching
EST Elementary and Secondary Teaching
EDS Education Services

DS - Defence Scientific Services

EN - Engineering and Land
Survey Group

ENG Engineering
SUR Land Survey

LA - Law

SE - Scientific Research

RES Research Scientist
REM Research Manager

SW - Social Work

CHA Chaplain
SCW Social Welfare

UT - University Teaching

VM - Veterinary Medicine

AC - Actuarial Science

AR - Architecture and Town Planning

AU - Auditing

BI - Biological Science

CH - Chemistry

PH - Pharmacy

ADR Advisory
DIS Dispensing

DD - Drafting

GROUPS

SUB-GROUPS

| | |
|---|---|
| EU - Educational Support | LAL Language Instructor PEL Physical Education Instructor TEA Teacher's Aid |
| EL - Electronics | |
| EG - Engineering and Scientific Support | |
| GT - General Technical | |
| TI - Technical Inspection | |
| AO - Aircraft Operations | CIA Civil Aviation Inspector HPS Helicopter Pilots and Supervisors ETP Engineering Test Pilots |
| AI - Air Traffic Control | |
| PY - Photography | |
| SI - Social Science Support | |
| PI - Primary Products Inspectors | GGC Grain Inspection |
| RO - Radio Operations | |
| SO - Ships Officers | MAO Marine Operations FLP Floating Plant RAD Radio INS Instructor |
| CX - Correctional Group | STI Staff Inspector COF Custodial LUF Living Unit |
| GL - General Labour & Trades | ELT Elemental MAN Manipulating MDO Machine Driving/Operating MOC Machine Operating/Controlling PRW Precision Working PCI Painting & Construction Finishing AMD Ammunition Working AIM Aircraft Maintaining INM Instrument Maintaining MAM Machinery Maintaining VHE Vehicle & Heavy Equipment Maintaining BOB Boiler Making/Blacksmithing EIM Electrical Installing & Maintaining PIP Pipefitting SMW Sheet Metal Working WOW Woodworking MET Metal Machining GHW Grain Handling and Weighing COI Construction Inspection |

GROUPS

SUB-GROUPS

PR - Printing Operations

BIN Bindery
COM Composition
OFE Pre-Press Preparation
OFO Press Operation
MAI Maintenance
PRC Job Planning and Control
SES Senior Supervisor

FR - Firefighters

GS - General Services

HP - Heating Power and
Stationary Plant Operations

HS - Hospital Services

LI - Lightkeepers

SC - Ships Crews

PED Deck Department
ERD Engine Room Department
EQO Equipment Operating Department
SPT Specialist Trades Department
STD Supply Department

SR - Ship Repair

ELE Elemental
MAT Machine Tending
MAN Manipulating
MDO Machine Driving/Operating
MOC Machine Operating/Controlling
SPS Ship Painting and Surface Protecting
PRW Precision Working
INM Instrument Maintaining
MAM Machinery Maintaining
EME Engine & Mechanical Equipment Maintaining
BOB Boiler Making/Blacksmithing
EEW Electrical & Electronic Working
PIP Pipe Fitting
SNW Sheet-Metal Working
WOW Woodworking
MAC Machine and Tool Making
QCW Quality Control & Weapons Examining
PLE Planning and Estimating
MGT Management

SM - Senior Management

EX - Executive Group

BARGAINING AGENTS AS OF DECEMBER 31, 1989

| BUD CODE | BARGAINING UNIT | NO. OF EMPLOYEES B. UNIT | EXCLU. | EXPIRY DATES |
|--|---------------------------------------|-----------------------------|--------|-----------------|
| 1. <u>PUBLIC SERVICE ALLIANCE OF CANADA (PSAC)</u> | | | | |
| 209 | Education | 1,661 | 94 | 30.11.89 |
| 215 | Library Science | 480 | 44 | 31.03.91 |
| 301 | Administrative Services | 9,008 | 3,247 | 20.06.91 |
| 305 | Information Services | 1,348 | 126 | 23.06.91 |
| 308 | Programme Administration | 25,536 | 2,796 | 20.06.91 |
| 309 | Purchasing and Supply | 2,182 | 185 | 21.06.91 |
| 310 | Welfare Programmes | 1,493 | 136 | 23.11.91 |
| 403 | Drafting & Illustration | 1,531 | 16 | 13.03.91 |
| 405 | Engineering & Scientific Support | 6,980 | 92 | 21.06.91 |
| 406 | General Technical | 3,155 | 128 | 21.06.91 |
| 407 | Photography | 130 | 0 | 15.03.91 |
| 408 | Primary Products Inspection | 2,691 | 41 | 26.04.91 |
| 412 | Social Science Support | 2,175 | 106 | 21.06.91 |
| 413 | Technical Inspection | 1,392 | 94 | 21.06.91 |
| 414 | Educational Support | 21 | 0 | 28.02.91 |
| 501 | Communications | 572 | 13 | 21.06.91 |
| 502 | Data Processing | 2,535 | 52 | 28.08.91 |
| 503 | Clerical & Regulatory | 49,970 | 1,597 | 11.06.91 |
| 504 | Office Equipment | 326 | 18 | 08.05.91 |
| 505 | Secretarial, Stenographic & Typing | 11,311 | 2,210 | 21.07.91 |
| 651 | Correctional (S) | 473 | 5 | 31.05.91 |
| 601 | Correctional (NS) | 4,382 | 0 | 31.05.91 |
| 652 | Firefighters (S) | 218 | 26 | 30.06.91 |
| 602 | Firefighters (NS) | 1,065 | 13 | 30.06.91 |
| 653 | General Labour & Trades (S) | 1,636 | 39 | 04.05.91 |
| 603 | General Labour & Trades (NS) | 13,006 | 33 | 04.05.91 |
| 654 | General Services (S) | 1,316 | 6 | 04.08.91 |
| 604 | General Services (NS) | 7,995 | 34 | 04.08.91 |
| 655 | Heating Power & Stat. Pl., Oper. (S) | 181 | 1 | 06.04.91 |
| 605 | Heating Power & Stat. Pl., Oper. (NS) | 1,475 | 4 | 06.04.91 |
| 656 | Hospital Services (S) | 71 | 0 | 21.12.87 |
| 606 | Hospital Services (NS) | 1,205 | 1 | 21.12.87 |
| 657 | Lightkeepers (S) | 83 | 0 | 19.06.91 |
| 607 | Lightkeepers (NS) | 158 | 0 | 19.06.91 |
| 659 | Printing Operations (S) | 76 | 13 | 31.08.90 |
| 662 | Ships' Crews (S) | 39 | 0 | 31.12.87 |
| 612 | Ships' Cres (NS) | 2,167 | 5 | 31.12.87 |
| TOTAL | | 159,863 | 11,175 | |

March 7, 1990

| BUD CODE | BARGAINING UNIT | NO. OF EMPLOYEES B. UNIT | EXCLU. | EXPIRY DATES |
|---|-------------------------------------|-----------------------------|----------|-----------------|
| 2. <u>PROFESSIONAL INSTITUTE OF THE PUBLIC SERVICE OF CANADA (PIPSC)</u> | | | | |
| 201 | Actuarial Science | 3 | 0 | 30.09.90 |
| 202 | Agriculture | 261 | 39 | 30.09.90 |
| 203 | Architecture & Town Plan. | 306 | 17 | 31.12.90 |
| 204 | Auditing | 3,541 | 325 | 04.05.90 |
| 205 | Biological Science | 1,151 | 42 | 30.09.90 |
| 206 | Chemistry | 420 | 16 | 21.12.89 |
| 207 | Dentistry | 30 | 1 | 30.09.90 |
| 210 | Engineering & Land Survey | 2,717 | 216 | 31.08.90 |
| 211 | Forestry | 148 | 2 | 30.09.90 |
| 212 | Historical Research | 308 | 7 | 30.09.90 |
| 213 | Home Economics | 32 | 1 | 30.09.90 |
| 214 | Law | 35 | 978 | 28.02.91 |
| 216 | Mathematics | 213 | 6 | 30.09.90 |
| 217 | Medicine | 221 | 66 | 17.03.91 |
| 218 | Meteorology | 602 | 32 | 31.12.89 |
| 219 | Nursing | 1,542 | 80 | 30.09.90 |
| 220 | Occupational & Physical Therapy | 35 | 2 | 30.09.90 |
| 221 | Pharmacy | 64 | 1 | 30.09.90 |
| 222 | Physical Science | 886 | 32 | 15.06.90 |
| 223 | Psychology | 145 | 3 | 30.09.90 |
| 224 | Scientific Regulation | 392 | 30 | 30.09.90 |
| 225 | Scientific Research | 2,078 | 104 | 30.09.90 |
| 226 | Social Work | 104 | 4 | 30.09.90 |
| 228 | Veterinary Medicine | 590 | 37 | 30.09.90 |
| 229 | Defence Scientific Service | 529 | 54 | 30.09.90 |
| 230 | Patent Examination | 119 | 7 | 01.02.90 |
| 303 | Computer Systems Administration | 4,439 | 146 | 30.04.90 |
| 311 | Commerce | <u>1,934</u> | <u>5</u> | 21.06.90 |
| TOTAL | | 22,845 | 2,304 | |
| 3. <u>INTERNATIONAL BROTHERHOOD OF ELECTRICAL WORKERS (IBEW)</u> | | | | |
| 404 | Electronics | 2,842 | 108 | 31.08.91 |
| 4. <u>ECONOMISTS', SOCIOLOGISTS' AND STATISTICIANS' ASSOCIATIONS (ESSA)</u> | | | | |
| 208 | Economics, Sociology and Statistics | 2,484 | 71 | 15.02.90 |
| 5. <u>CANADIAN AIR TRAFFIC CONTROL ASSOCIATION (CATCA)</u> | | | | |
| 402 | Air Traffic Control | 1,881 | 158 | 31.12.90 |

March 7, 1990

| | BUD CODE BARGAINING UNIT | NO. OF EMPLOYEES | | EXPIRY DATES |
|-----|---|------------------|--------|-----------------|
| | | B. UNIT | EXCLU. | |
| 6. | <u>CANADIAN MERCHANT SERVICE GUILD (CMSG)</u> | | | |
| | 410 Ship Officers | 1,363 | 116 | 31.08.90 |
| 7. | <u>FEDERAL GOVERNMENT DOCKYARD, TRADES, AND LABOUR COUNCIL EAST (DTLC)</u> | | | |
| | 611 Ship Repair | 1,220 | 58 | 31.12.90 |
| 8. | <u>CANADIAN ASSOCIATION OF PROFESSIONAL RADIO OPERATIONS (CAPRO)</u> | | | |
| | 409 Radio Operations | 1,111 | 144 | 30.04.92 |
| 9. | <u>CANADIAN UNION OF PROFESSIONAL AND TECHNICAL EMPLOYEES (CUPTÉ)</u> | | | |
| | 313 Translation | 990 | 96 | 18.04.90 |
| 10. | <u>COUNCIL OF GRAPHIC ARTS UNION (CGAU)</u> | | | |
| | 609 Printing Operations (NS) | 932 | 5 | 31.08.90 |
| 11. | <u>FOREIGN SERVICE OFFICER (PAFSO)</u> | | | |
| | 312 Foreign Service | 1,080 | 72 | 30.04.91 |
| 12. | <u>FEDERAL GOVERNMENT DOCKYARD, TRADES AND LABOUR COUNCIL ESQUIMALT (WEST) (DTLC)</u> | | | |
| | 614 Ship Repair | 858 | 36 | 31.05.90 |
| 13. | <u>AIRCRAFT OPERATIONS GROUP ASSOCIATION (AOGA)</u> | | | |
| | 401 Aircraft Operations | 555 | 55 | 25.10.92 |
| 14. | <u>FEDERAL GOVERNMENT DOCKYARDS CHARGEHANDS ASSOCIATION (FGDCA)</u> | | | |
| | 663 Ship Repair (Chargehands) | 112 | 0 | 31.03.91 |
| 15. | <u>ASSOCIATION OF PUBLIC SERVICE FINANCIAL ADMINISTRATORS (APSFA)</u> | | | |
| | 304 Financial Administration | 2,209 | 424 | 06.11.91 |

March 7, 1990

PROPOSED NEW GROUPS

| <u>New Group</u> | <u>Former Groups</u> | <u>Employees as of Dec. 31, 1989</u> |
|----------------------------|--|--------------------------------------|
| EXECUTIVE | EX, SM | 4,632 |
| ADMINISTRATIVE | AS, FI, PE, IS, PM, OM, PG, WP, CR, ST, CM, DA, OE, SI, LS | 116,843 |
| OPERATIONAL | FR, GL, GS, HS, HP, LI, SR, SC | 30,688 |
| TECHNICAL | DD, EG, GT, PY, TI, PI, RO | 16,230 |
| CORRECTIONAL | CX | 4,689 |
| COMPUTER SYSTEMS | CS | 4,552 |
| SCIENCES | PC, CH, BI, FO, MT, SG, AG | 4,070 |
| AUDITING | AU | 3,782 |
| SOCIAL SCIENCES | ES, MA, AC, SI | 3,760 |
| SHIPS OFFICERS | SO | 1,394 |
| ARCHITECTURE / ENGINEERING | AR, EN | 3,179 |
| RESEARCH | SE, DS, HR | 3,045 |
| ELECTRONICS | EL | 2,939 |
| AIR TRAFFIC SAFETY | AI, RO | 2,639 |
| HEALTH CARE | HE, NU, OP, PS, DE, MD, SW, PH | 2,167 |
| EDUCATION | ED, UT, EU | 2,099 |
| COMMERCE | CO | 1,931 |
| FOREIGN SERVICE | FS | 1,126 |
| TRANSLATION | TR | 1,036 |
| PRINTING OPERATIONS | PR, PR-SUP | 1,025 |
| LAW | LA | 988 |
| VETERINARY MEDICINE | VM | 615 |
| AIRCRAFT OPERATIONS | AO | 607 |

FOR DISCUSSION

PUBLIC SERVICE 2000: REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE ON
STAFFING

August 8, 1990

TABLE OF CONTENTS

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

| | |
|--|----|
| INTRODUCTION | 1 |
| THE STAFFING SYSTEM: AN OVERVIEW | 3 |
| GUIDING PRINCIPLES | 9 |
| INDIVIDUAL COMPONENTS OF THE STAFFING SYSTEM | 12 |
| RECRUITMENT TO THE PUBLIC SERVICE | 12 |
| EMPLOYMENT OPTIONS | 16 |
| DEPLOYMENT..... | 22 |
| PROMOTIONS | 25 |
| PROBATION..... | 28 |
| THE INCLUSION OF MILITARY, RCMP AND CSIS | |
| PERSONNEL IN CLOSED COMPETITIONS | 29 |
| RECOURSE | 31 |
| EMPLOYMENT EQUITY | 33 |
| APPOINTMENT TO LEVEL | 34 |
| LEGISLATIVE PROVISIONS | 38 |
| CONCLUSION | 41 |
| IMPLEMENTATION..... | 43 |

Executive Summary

The objective of the Task Force on Staffing was to determine how the staffing system could be made more consistent with the vision of the public service that was described in the Prime Minister's announcement of PS 2000. The primary approach of the Task Force was consultative. It met with employees and managers at all levels of the public service and staffing specialists to discuss what is wrong with the staffing system and how it could be improved. In addition, it invited all unions to meet informally with the Task Force to discuss difficulties they are experiencing with the current system and to react to the statement of principles on which the Task Force would be basing its recommendations.

The Task Force began by examining the staffing system as a whole. The picture that emerged was that of a system that has failed to earn the support of the people who use it. Managers feel little ownership of the system and they generally do not understand its specific provisions. Employees are suspicious of its integrity. While this lack of support is in part a result of the various flaws in the individual components of the system, it is far more the result of the administrative culture in which the system is embedded: a culture characterised by an over-reliance on rules rather than a common sense and judgement; a culture in which managers rely too much on specialists to interpret the rules and therefore feel little sense of direct responsibility for the staffing process.

The rigidity of the staffing system was traced to the current legislation which prescribes specific administrative procedures, to previous attempts to improve the system by prescribing rules to guide public servants in situations where there are competing objectives for human resource management and to the selection and training of staffing specialists which in the past has emphasized the rule-based nature of the system.

The Task Force concluded that the staffing system needs to be transformed into one in which managers have the responsibility to use their judgment within a framework of general policies and guidelines and are subsequently held accountable for the staffing process and their

staffing decisions. It recognized that to do so will require **legislative amendment**. It believes, however, that the process of change can begin immediately even though the really fundamental changes envisaged in the system must await a new statute.

Six principles for the overall staffing system were identified by the Task Force. These are:

- It has sufficient flexibility to respond to the human resource needs of departments to support them in fulfilling their responsibilities to the Canadian public.
- It contributes to a highly competent public service.
- It presents no systemic barriers to a representative public service and can respond to policies regarding the correction of representation imbalances.
- It meets the requirements of fairness and administrative due process.
- It requires that the recruitment and promotion of public servants be free from political, bureaucratic or personal patronage.
- It is simple and efficient to operate.

The Task Force then addressed the individual elements of the staffing system:

The Task Force concluded that the decision of when to recruit should be departmental, but that above the entry-level, promotion from within should continue to be the norm. The **process of recruitment** should continue to be the responsibility of the parliamentary agency. Recruitment should become faster and more responsive to the particular circumstances of individual recruitment actions or campaigns. In keeping with the Task Force's commitment to the concept of a career public service, it concluded that the selection of recruits should reflect the long term needs of the public service rather than just the immediate needs of the initial job to which a recruit is appointed.

It was felt that with these changes, the staffing system would become fairer, more equitable and more responsive and therefore more able to supply the public service the quality of employees needed to meet our responsibilities in serving the public and the government of the day.

INTRODUCTION

The Task Force recommended that managers receive more support and information on the use of **probation** following recruitment and that rejection on probation be more often used in those circumstances where it is clearly warranted.

It was clear that the current uses of **term employment** go well beyond the initial intention of meeting short term labour requirements. The Task Force concluded that difficulties with the recruitment and probation process accounted in part for the unforeseen use of terms, and that these difficulties should be addressed directly as described above. It also concluded that managers needed a wider variety of options under which to appoint recruits, and suggested four options: indeterminate appointments which is the preferred option, redefined part-time appointments, term employment for work that is continuous but of fixed duration, and casual appointments for work that is of short duration and unlikely to be extended. All of these categories of appointees except casuals would be recruited through the normal process and would be employed under comparable terms and conditions.

The Task Force concluded that treating **deployments** in the same way as recruitment and promotions is an obstacle to operational efficiency and inhibits the implementation of developmental plans for employees. It concluded that in most circumstances deployment to temporary or permanent jobs should be a responsibility of management which would be exercised in the context of the normal consensual relationship between employees and management. Only in the minority of situations where deployability is a precondition to operational effectiveness will deployability be a condition of employment to be exercised entirely at management discretion. To fully capitalise on the developmental opportunities that this new ease of deployment will bring to employees it was recommended that departments and the centre set up assignment offices that would help match employees seeking assignments with managers seeking employees and that departments ensure that all employees have fair access to appropriate developmental opportunities.

The Task Force explored in depth the concept of **appointment to level**. It is recommended that new legislation should permit promotion to be based on either job requirements (appointment to position) or service-wide level standards (appointment to level). The Task Force's

recommendations in respect to deployment of employees described above will, when adopted, **implement the assignment to job aspect of appointment to level.**

For **promotions**, the Task Force concluded that the competitive process should continue to be the norm and that the process be conducted in a manner that is fair and transparent to employees. A wider variety of instruments for assessing candidates should be employed to increase confidence in the assessment process. The basis of selection should go beyond the specific requirements of the job being staffed to include the requirements of the occupational group at that level and the more general human resource needs of the organization.

The continued need for **recourse** was affirmed. The Task Force recommended that employees be able to appeal promotions and that their access to this right not be restricted from what it is in the current system. It believed that more openness in the form of post-competition feedback could help departments avoid appeals. In addition, it recommended that the parliamentary agency have the responsibility of prescribing corrective action as it relates to the selection process following an upheld appeal but that this not extend to the authority to determine who the successful candidate should be.

The need for more direct and more effective means to achieve **representative public service** was also affirmed and it was recommended that new legislation reflect section 15 of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The implementation is the most important phase of any change process. To succeed, it needs continuing senior level commitment and, in the case of this Task Force's recommendations, it involves two major thrusts. The first thrust is the changing of the administrative culture in which the staffing system is embedded. The second thrust is the actual changing of the system of rules that have given rise to these attitudes, beliefs and roles. The system must be characterised by integrity, be principles-driven and based on a minimum set of policies and guidelines rather than by rules. Managers must know the policies and guidelines and be held accountable for using their judgement in a manner that applies these general policies to individual circumstances. Personnel specialists must support managers in this role.

INTRODUCTION

The objective of Public Service 2000, as announced by the Prime Minister is, to foster a public service that:

- is professional, highly-qualified, non-partisan and imbued with a mission of service to the public;
- recognizes its employees as assets to be valued and developed;
- places as much authority as possible in the hands of front-line employees and managers; and
- provides scope for different organizational forms to meet differing needs, but in the context of a single Public Service.

This report presents the final recommendations of the PS 2000 Task Force on Staffing, which conducted its work over an eight month time period which started in December 1989. The mandate of the Task Force was to examine the design and administration of staffing and to suggest changes which would give effect to the objectives of PS 2000.

The public service is an organization that conducts its work through people. The capacity of the public service to serve the government and the public is dependent on the ability of the staffing system to resource the public service with the right people. It was from this perspective of the importance of our employees and of the staffing system that the Task Force undertook its work.

Although the Task Force examined statistics, policies and legislation, its approach to its mandate has been largely consultative. Individual public servants, groups of public servants, staffing specialists, and organizations directly affected by particular provisions of the staffing act were all consulted for their advice as to what is wrong with the staffing system and how it could be improved. All union leaders were invited to meet informally with the Task Force to discuss not only difficulties they are experiencing with the current system but, as well,

obtain their reaction to the principles on which the Task Force would be basing its recommendations.

Twenty-three focus groups were conducted nationally, with randomly selected public servants at all organizational levels from a wide range of departments. In these focus groups all of the Task Force's proposals were discussed in detail. In addition to the focus groups, members of the Task Force on Staffing frequently consulted with managers and employees in their departments, and special focus groups were conducted on particular topics such as term employment and appointment to level.

These groups had many useful ideas and suggestions which are reflected in the report that follows. However, what was most striking in the focus groups was the dedication, commitment and good faith of employees at all levels. One inevitably left these focus groups across the country with a sense of pride for being the colleague of these public servants.

Meeting with the focus groups also helped the task force develop a strong sense of the possibility of change. There was little doubt that these public servants were ready to rise to the challenge of PS 2000 and were willing and able to take on the responsibility that it will bring.

The Task Force addressed the staffing system at two levels, both specific problems and overall problems that transcend any individual component of the staffing system.

In what follows we will first explore the staffing system as a whole and then examine its constituent elements.

THE STAFFING SYSTEM:

AN OVERVIEW

THE STAFFING SYSTEM: AN OVERVIEW

The Problem:

There are many criteria by which we could measure the success of a system, but perhaps the most revealing is the extent to which its users understand it and turn to it willingly to help them achieve their objectives. This is the most important test that the Task Force on Staffing applied to the staffing system and it is the test that the system most clearly failed.

Managers do not feel ownership of the staffing system. They talk about it as an imposed burden. They either tolerate it with ill-disguised impatience or apply their ingenuity to circumvent it.

Many managers are not aware of the specific rules of the system or of much of the thinking behind those rules. It is seen as the domain of staffing specialists and central agencies and not as the instrument of the people responsible for managing personnel: the line managers.

Many public servants at all levels of the organization share similar views. Their perception of the staffing system is that it is unduly complex, rules driven and, particularly in the area of competition, applied in an unfair fashion.

A second critical test of the success of the staffing system is the extent to which staff believe it is administered with integrity. Again, the system is often found wanting. Because managers see the system as a maze of red tape to be circumvented, employees, who see the system being circumvented, have become suspicious of its capacity to ensure fairness and, suspicious of the good faith of the managers.

The Cause:

This situation is not primarily the result of the unreasonableness of the various components of the staffing system. The Task Force examined all of the components in detail and discovered that while some are flawed, many of them do work reasonably well. Their

imperfections do not explain the failure of the system to earn the support of either management or staff.

The Task Force recognizes that today's staffing system is the product of 75 years of effort to ensure integrity by means of rules. Its underlying assumption is that fair and impartial access to public service employment will be guaranteed not by holding managers accountable but by a system of rules and procedures administered by specialists.

It is the Task Force's view that the primary source of the problem is the management philosophy that underlies the current staffing system - a philosophy that favours the exercise of external control rather than the exercise of individual responsibility, a philosophy that favours error prevention rather than accountability, a philosophy that relies on rules rather than judgement.

This approach is in part a reflection of the current legislation and regulations which are prescriptive regarding administrative process and in part a reflection of the selection, training and supervision of staffing specialists which in the past have emphasized the rule-based nature of the staffing system. It has created an administrative culture that is resistant to change.

The Task Force believes that the various individual flaws in the staffing system must be addressed and this report contains many recommendations to this end. However, flaws in the system have been intelligently addressed before with only limited success in creating overall change. The staffing system is more than the sum of its parts and it is the entire approach to managing staffing that must be changed. There must be a major shift in the administrative culture in which the staffing system is embedded. Without it, individual changes to the staffing system are unlikely to have the necessary effect. The Task Force is of the opinion that this sort of change is possible and that there is a readiness throughout the system to make it work.

In summary, the Task Force recommends that the overriding objectives for changes to the staffing system must be to create a system in which managers feel personal responsibility for selecting, developing and promoting their employees and which is seen by employees as possessing integrity. This change requires a shift in administrative culture away from an over-reliance on rules.

The Context:

The staffing system succeeds when it helps achieve the overall objectives of public sector human resource management. It is by understanding the objectives of the staffing system in the context of the overall human resource management objectives that the direction for improvement can be determined. In what follows, some of the objectives of human resource management are described in the context of the role that staffing plays in them.

The first objective is to **provide the best possible service to the public and to the government of the day** - it is the *raison d'être* of the Public Service. It is also the *raison d'être* of the staffing system. The type of people we recruit, the type of behaviour we reward with promotion, and the ease with which we deploy staff to respond to client needs will have a very large impact on our performance as a service organization.

The second objective is to **provide our employees with a positive human environment in which to work**. It includes several overlapping elements. A positive environment is one in which employees feel they are treated fairly. It is one in which employees are treated with respect. It is an environment in which employees are not bullied or threatened. It is a workplace where employees have room to learn and develop. It is a workplace in which the meaning and importance of work being performed is made apparent to the worker. It is a workplace where the employee feels a sense of community and belonging. Clearly the manner in which decisions regarding promotions are made and explained, the extent to which deployments are used for staff development, the extent to which recourse is treated with good faith and the manner in which all other elements of the staffing system operate will have a profound impact on the extent to which the workplace is experienced as a positive human environment in which to work.

Another objective relates to the **requirements of managing in a large organization**. Appointments must be made, not just to meet operational needs of the immediate organization in which staffing is occurring, but also to respond to the requirements of the larger corporate entity. These corporate requirements can include the need to reassign staff from elsewhere in the organization, the need to provide a diversity of opportunity for staff in smaller units, and the need to invest in the development of staff with long term potential to contribute to the corporation as a whole.

In addition to these three categories of objectives for human resource management, there are obligations that come with the special nature of managing in the public service in that Public Service managers are judged publicly on their effectiveness. This also must be understood as part of the context within which the staffing system operates.

One of these obligations is in the area of **accountability**. The staffing system is not simply an administrative tool of convenience. It is based on legislation, and activities within it are subject to review by the courts. Managers in the public service must be able to report on and explain their human resource management.

Another obligation relates to **fairness of access**. The staffing system is the means by which the public has access to employment in the federal public service. It therefore must be administered in a manner that reflects the fairness and the administrative due process expected in a system that manages a public program.

A third obligation is **representativeness**. The staffing system is the means by which we determine the composition of the workforce that gives effect to much of our national public agenda. The system is therefore expected to produce a workforce that reflects the regional, linguistic, cultural and human diversity of the country.

While the list of objectives and obligations to which the staffing system must respond is long, they are generally complementary. Employees who are working in a positive environment, who feel good about themselves and feel they are valued and well treated are more likely to provide the type of responsive sensitive service required by their jobs. Similarly, employees who are providing a meaningful service in a professional manner are more likely to feel positive about their work life.

The overall organizational health of the larger corporate entity will be reflected in the effectiveness of each unit. Fairness in recruitment supports recruiting the best talent. A workforce that reflects the people it serves is better able to serve them well. And, the need for accountability encourages sound management practice.

The Solution:

The complementarity of the objectives and obligations is relatively straightforward when one considers the organization as a whole. However, the multiple objectives do lead to some difficult choices at the level of individual transactions. Service and staff development can be competing demands when you are deciding whether to use a position for developmental purposes or whether to staff it with someone who is already fully trained. Similarly, transparent fairness to employees and service to the public can be competing values when you are deciding how expeditiously to conduct an individual staffing action.

Thus, the staffing system must inevitably respond to a hierarchy of demands which at the overall level, are complementary, but at the transactional level, are often in conflict.

Responding to these demands fairly, expeditiously and in a publicly accountable fashion is the essence of the public service manager's problem and is made more difficult by a rules-oriented staffing system.

The pivotal question then in addressing the staffing system is how should we resolve these competing demands? Should there be policies, rules and regulations to guide managers when they are faced with these competing demands or should their resolution be left to individual judgement?

The temptation to write rules is strong but experience points to the problems that come with that approach. Rules cannot anticipate the enormous diversity of situations to which staffing in the public sector must apply. While the best of rules may strike the ideal balance overall, they will inevitably be off the mark in many individual circumstances. The response to situations in which the rules don't work is often to write more and more detailed rules to guide behaviour in all possible circumstances. The result is a rigid system in which specialists take over responsibility because they are the only ones who claim authority to interpret the many volumes of rules. A system in which a mark of sophisticated management is the ability to finesse around the rules. In short, the result is our current system.

What then is the alternative? It is not to give managers unfettered authority but rather to give them more responsibility. Responsibility that must be exercised in the context of a framework of general principles and policies. Responsibility to use judgement in deciding what course of action makes sense given the nature of the situation being addressed. Responsibility includes accountability for the reasonable exercise of judgement. The Implementation Section proposes an approach that will provide a framework within which this responsibility and accountability can be elaborated on and exercised.

The Task Force's recommendations on individual elements of the staffing system have been developed in the light of this approach. The recommendations for legislative change and the overall approach to implementation also reflect this approach.

In what follows, the general principles that should underlie the staffing system are first presented. Next, recommendations for changes to individual elements of the staffing system are reported and then specific recommendations for legislative change and the general proposal for an implementation strategy are presented.

GUIDING PRINCIPLES

GUIDING PRINCIPLES

The approach of the Task Force in addressing each particular element of the staffing system was to formulate the broad principles and policies within which managers would be expected to exercise their judgement when conducting staffing actions. Prior to addressing each individual element the Task Force formulated a set of principles to which the entire system should conform and which constitutes a framework within which the individual recommendations must fit.

The Task Force believes that to be successful, a staffing system must sustain the following principles:

- It has sufficient flexibility to respond to the human resource needs of departments to support them in fulfilling their responsibilities to the Canadian public and to the government of the day.
 - It contributes to a highly competent public service.
 - It presents no systemic barriers to a representative public service and it can respond to policies regarding the correction of representation imbalances.
 - It meets the requirements of fairness and administrative due process.
 - It requires that the recruitment and promotion of public servants be free from political, bureaucratic or personal patronage.
 - It is simple and efficient to operate.
-

Matters of Balance:

Having accepted the above six principles the Task Force recognizes that within these principles any system will have to accommodate the following competing values:

- The discretion given to managers versus the requirements to be fair and open in staffing.
- Responding to immediate needs of a position versus responding to longer term needs of the organization.
- Treating staff as employees of the government as a whole versus treating them as employees only of their department.
- Maintaining a career public service versus opening the public service to new recruits at all levels.

The Task Force does not think it is possible or desirable to resolve the tension between these values but rather seeks to point to an optimal balance. It believes that:

- While the system must be fair and be seen to be fair, this should not be at the expense of the managerial discretion necessary to ensure that departmental responsibilities to the Canadian public and the government are met.
 - While the candidate selected for a job will normally be capable of competently performing its duties, a key principle in selection must be the extent to which a candidate will meet the longer term needs of the public service.
 - Although it is natural that managers may look first to their own organization when staffing positions, the staffing system must ensure that employees have reasonable access to government wide opportunities.
-

- Jobs above the entry level will normally be filled by public servants, but the system must allow for external recruitment at all levels. The decision by a manager to recruit from outside the public service at other than the entrance level must be made in the context of an appropriate balance between the immediate needs of the individual manager and the long-term needs of the public service.

In the sections that follow we examine how these principles apply to the various elements of the staffing system.

**INDIVIDUAL COMPONENTS OF THE
STAFFING SYSTEM**

RECRUITMENT TO THE PUBLIC SERVICE

In this report, the term "recruitment" refers to those activities associated with hiring of individuals from outside the public service. In this context, there are several considerations: when to recruit, who should recruit, the basis of recruiting candidates and the whole area of speed and responsiveness. With the exception of employees at the support and junior levels, public servants perceive the current recruitment process to be too slow, cumbersome and rule-burdened. While the need for institutionalized fairness is recognized, it is felt that many procedures and levels of approval seriously hamper departments' ability to recruit competent staff. At the junior and support levels where individuals have relatively little input into recruitment decisions, the concern focuses on the impact of recruitment on individual promotional and developmental opportunities. For this reason, people at these levels place considerable emphasis on the control of the Public Service Commission in ensuring that fairness has been observed. The Task Force recommendations in this area have attempted to capture these competing concerns in a balanced reasonable way.

When to recruit

While there are occasions when operational requirements or the effectiveness of an organization requires that we recruit externally for jobs above the entry level, providing our employees with the opportunity to progress in their careers within the public service continues to be an important value and should be recognized as such in policy.

At present the legislation requires that departments seek PSC approval before recruiting above the entry level; however, management is in the best position to know when they need to recruit externally and therefore should have that responsibility.

Recommendations

1. *Limiting recruitment to the Public Service to the entry level should be recognized in policy as the norm.*
-

2. *The responsibility for deciding when to recruit from outside the public service above the entrance level should rest with the departments. The current legislative requirement to seek PSC approval should be removed and in the context of overall human resource management policies the employer should develop guidelines that will guide departments' decisions to initiate recruitment.*

Who should recruit?

The maintenance of a politically neutral public service continues to be an important value. The experience of other jurisdictions is that when the institutional arrangements for supporting this tradition are removed the neutrality of the public service is often eroded. One of the critical institutional arrangements for ensuring the neutrality of the public service is giving responsibility for recruitment to an agency that reports to parliament rather than to the government of the day.

Recommendation

3. *Recruitment from outside the public service at all levels should continue to be the responsibility of a parliamentary agency which is required in law to conduct recruitment in a manner that supports the political neutrality of the public service. (The possibility of delegating recruitment should however, not be precluded in the new act.)*

The Basis of Selecting Recruits

Our current Act is based on the premise that one hires into jobs not into organizations. This has led us to recruit to individual positions rather than to a public service career and to select recruits on the basis of the abilities required for the initial position rather than on the longer term requirements for public service. Most recruits do remain to pursue public service careers and are likely to hold several different positions after the initial position for which they were recruited. Recruitment decisions are investments, they should be taken on the basis of long term return rather than only immediate needs.

Recommendation

4. *Recruits should be selected not just on their ability to perform the duties of the first position to which they are recruited but also on the extent to which they respond to the long term human resource needs of the public service.*

This will sometimes entail putting greater emphasis, than has been done in the past, on candidates with long term potential. It will also sometimes entail recruitment strategies that are more rigorous and therefore less expeditious in the short run.

Speed and Responsiveness

Managers and public servants in general see the recruitment process as slow and burdened with unnecessary procedures. Employees at the more junior levels tend to focus on the impact that recruitment from outside the public service has on their promotional and developmental possibilities. Under the current system, the emphasis has tended to be on considerations as expressed by employees without an appropriate balancing concern for the needs of managers. The recommendations that follow are based on a philosophy of less rules and more judgement. While this caters to managers' needs, the trade-off is that managers will be judged on their performance in the area of fairness to their employees.

Recommendations

5. *Recruitment from outside the public service should be managerially driven, not appealable and not burdened with procedural detail. Recruitment strategies that enhance speed and efficiency and that are conducted in a manner that is responsive to the individual circumstances of each recruitment action or campaign should be the norm. Where appropriate, the successful techniques of the private sector should be adopted.*
 6. *The Task Force made a number of recommendations in its interim report on actions that could be taken immediately to improve the staffing system. Some of these relate to the area of recruitment; specifically the recommendation that the Public Service Commission specify those situations in which a named referral will be considered, that the means and cost of improving the effectiveness of recruitment through more automation and direct departmental*
-

access be determined, that the efficiency of security screening be improved, and that the use of pools for recruiting generalists be explored. In addition to these recommendations, and in the context of paragraph 5 above, the Task Force believes that the speed and responsiveness of the recruitment process could be improved measurably if the following steps are also implemented:

- Recruitment officers should have direct contact with hiring managers. Currently in many departments this relationship is carried on through the mediation of departmental staffing officers. In addition to weakening communication, this arrangement dilutes accountability for timely service.*
- Resource needs can be predicted more often and recruits hired in anticipation of those needs.*
- The use of inventories of pre-screened candidates should be increased at both the parliamentary agency and departmental level.*
- Block priority clearance numbers could be given for terms of less than six months.*
- Simultaneous open and closed competitions can be held where appropriate.*
- Response times in advertisements could be shortened provided that candidates have reasonable opportunity to respond.*
- generic statements of qualifications can be used more often.*
- Documentation can be reduced to the minimum.*
- Various steps in assessing candidates can be conducted simultaneously.*
- Eligibility lists can be used more extensively.*

EMPLOYMENT OPTIONS

One of the areas in which managers have made the most imaginative use of the current provisions of the staffing system is term employment.

The structure of employment in the public service is largely predicated on the concept of a career public service. It is assumed that the majority of public servants will spend the better part of their career with the public service. The conditions of employment and the protection against layoff offered to public servants are in large part a reflection of this assumption.

The reality of work in the public service is in many cases at odds with the principle of a career public service. Many public service tasks are of limited duration, intermittent in nature or part-time. Also, while permanent employment is the desirable option for many individuals, they are now less likely to seek a single uninterrupted career from entry into the workforce to retirement.

While the current provision for term employment has provided some of the flexibility necessary to adapt to changing circumstances, the realities of work in the public service are far more complex than is captured in the distinction between term and indeterminate employees. This has led to some uses of term employment that go well beyond its original intention. Some of these are described below.

Generally, managers' experience of the normal staffing process is that it is often rigid and impractical, and they have turned to the creative use of term employment to ensure that they can meet their operational requirements.

Because term employees are ineligible for benefits under the work force adjustment policies, managers have sometimes used them as an adjustable labour force that can be decreased or increased in response to uncertain budgets.

Because term employees can be released by simply letting their term run out, they are often used as probationary employees and the actual provisions for rejection on probation on recruitment are rarely used.

Also, because of the perception (unsubstantiated) that short-term employees can be hired with little need to consider priority candidates, with less attention to security requirements and with less rigorous scrutiny from the Public Service Commission, they are often hired in lieu of recruiting indeterminate employees. This has progressed to the point where the majority of new indeterminate employees are hired through the term route rather than directly as indeterminate recruits.

In summary, we currently have a situation in which term employment is often used to avoid the more restrictive elements of the staffing system rather than for its intended purpose of filling labour requirements for a specified period.

The Task Force concluded that the difficulties with external recruitment and the use of probation that have led to the extended use of terms should be addressed directly. (These are addressed in previous sections of the report.) And, that while a career public service should continue to be the norm, it is clear that managers need more flexibility in hiring to meet operational requirements. With this in mind, the Task Force is recommending an expansion of the modes of employment available to managers which reflects the diversity of requirements in the public service.

Recommendation

1. *The menu of options available to managers for hiring into the Public Service should be expanded and modified within the following broad headings:*
 - *Indeterminate employment*
 - a) *Full-time*
 - b) *Part-time (redefined)*
 - *Term Employment*
 - *Casual Employment (redefined)*

Indeterminate Employment

a) **Full-time**

This usually implies a commitment to offer a career and employment of unspecified duration. It is the preferred option for most circumstances. Our capacity to attract the best talent is at its greatest when we are able to offer full-time employment. The best young graduates and highly valued employees from other organizations are unlikely to accept offers of limited duration. Every attempt should be made to use full-time appointments as the primary vehicle for recruiting into the public service.

Even in situations where the duration of work is uncertain the first choice should be to use full-time recruitment. When work requirements change, employees who have been well selected will not be difficult to redeploy.

b) **Part-Time (redefined)**

Where the available work occurs sporadically or at regular intervals, the employment agreement should reflect this fact. The existing options of seasonal and part-time are useful but not flexible enough. "Seasonal" is usually associated with a season of the year and "part-time" is limited to part of a week. The capacity should exist for employees, who otherwise enjoy all the benefits of indeterminate status, to work at any regular or irregular intervals during a week, a month or a year.

Many people, usually women, prefer to integrate their work hours with obligations to home and family. These more flexible arrangements should enable the government to attract a number of additional candidates who would not otherwise apply. In addition, it should allow some current employees who wish to lapse into part-time status at certain times of their lives to do so without leaving the public service. Similarly, on the employer's side, the workload in some situations can fluctuate widely. To accommodate this, managers should have the flexibility to enter into agreements with interested people to hire them on an intermittent basis,

i.e. to call them in when there is work and to put them in off-duty status when there isn't or to put them in off-duty status at their own request.

In any of the situations described above, the employees should be able to accumulate service, as if it were continuous, for purposes of pensions and other benefits linked to years of service.

Recommendations

2. *Policy should require that recruitment be done on an **indeterminate** basis unless it can be clearly shown to be of limited duration.*
3. *The definition of indeterminate part-time employment should encompass the existing provisions of seasonal and part-time with the following additions and elaborations:*

*SEASONAL: to include **any** regular period during the year;*

*PART-TIME: to include **any** portion or portions of a day, week, month or year, regular or irregular;*

INTERMITTENT: to provide, by mutual agreement of the employer and employee, for call-back and off-duty status corresponding to the fluctuations in workload or the employee's availability.

4. *Part-time employees should have benefits pro-rated to their hours of work and should be allowed to count all service during a year as continuous service.*
 5. *Part-time employees should be selected in accordance with normal recruitment processes and standards and they should be eligible for deployment and to enter closed competitions.*
 6. *The definitions of the above employment options should be standardized in all policies and employment-related legislation in addition to the Public Service Employment Act.*
-

Term Appointments

Term employment should be limited to term work. Because term employees often become permanent public servants they must be recruited and selected with rigour. They should not be treated as second class employees.

Recommendations

7. *Policy should limit the hiring of term employees to situations in which work is of limited duration. In hiring term employees managers will be expected to describe the specific task for which a term employee is required. Term employment should normally be for periods of less than two years.*
8. *Term employees should be selected in accordance with the normal recruitment processes and standards. They should be eligible to compete in internal public service competitions and be considered for appointment without competition.*
9. *Term employees should be employed under the same conditions and receive comparable benefits to those enjoyed by indeterminate employees except that their appointment is for a specified period.*

Casual Employment

The hiring of casual labour should not be subject to the same requirements as the hiring of permanent or potentially permanent employees. However, employees who are hired without formality should not become permanent except through the normal process.

Managers who foresee the possibility of work extending beyond the initial period or who are anticipating vacancies for which the casual employees may be candidates should use one of the other options for recruitment.

Recommendations

10. *Departments should be able to recruit casual employees without the necessity of conforming to the normal processes and standards for recruitment.*
-

11. *Casual employees should not be eligible for indeterminate employment except as external candidates through the normal recruitment process.*
 12. *To prevent them from becoming a parallel permanent labour force hired under different conditions casual employees should only be eligible to work in a particular department for six months in any twelve month period.*
 13. *Casual employees should receive comparable benefits and work under comparable terms and conditions to term employees under six months in the current system.*
 14. *Casual employees may be hired on an hourly basis or for continuous periods up to six months.*
-

DEPLOYMENT

Under the current Public Service Employment Act, deployment of personnel from one job to another is considered to be an appointment and thus is subject to the same considerations as the other two components of the staffing system, i.e. recruitment to the public service and promotion within the public service. In the area of recruitment and promotion, the major considerations relate to the need to carry out these functions in a way that is demonstrably free from political, bureaucratic and personal patronage. As such, the whole area of fairness, equitable access and selection of the "best qualified" is of primary importance. In relation to deployment, however, bringing the same considerations to bear works against the capacity of managers to meet operational needs quickly and efficiently, and develop their employees through the provision of varied experience.

The Task Force has concluded that deployment should be removed from the consideration of "best qualified" and should be the result of a consensual arrangement between the manager and his or her employees. The question of fairness in the determination of which employees should be identified for developmental exposure or meeting operational needs must still be a major consideration on the part of the individual manager. The Task Force's view, is that providing significant flexibility in this area will be a counter-balance to the more restrictive regime associated with promotions. It does not believe that the interests of the public service are served by expressing distrust of managers' capacity to use such flexibility through the continued use of rules, regulations and burdensome procedures to protect the integrity of the system. Rather, it believes that public service managers are quite capable of exercising their responsibilities in the area of deployment in an open and fair manner with no need for central controls.

For some positions in the public service, the operational requirement for deployability is such that it should be a condition of employment. The example of Canada's rotational foreign service springs to mind. However, in most situations, it is expected that the normal consensual relationship between management and employees should suffice to provide managers with the flexibility necessary to exercise their responsibilities for deployment.

The developmental and operational advantages of increased flexibility for deployment would be far greater if this flexibility were not limited to jobs whose levels are coincident with the levels of the person being deployed. However, the situation where an individual is deployed

to a higher level job (as an underfill) poses special problems. On the one hand, it can be viewed as a developmental benefit received by the individual in preference to others and thus should not be accompanied by the added benefit of acting pay. On the other hand, employees and their unions would not readily give up their protection associated with acting assignments and acting pay provisions, especially when such underfills can be seen as conferring an unfair advantage in subsequent competitions. For this reason, the Task Force concluded that this increased flexibility should not extend to underfill deployments other than through the normal provisions for acting assignments and acting pay. This conclusion does not extend to the proposed Executive Category and takes account also of the greater room for lateral deployment being recommended in the Task Force on Occupational and Classification Structures.

To maximize the potential that deployment has for personnel enrichment it is important that deployment opportunities be as broad as possible and that departments actively promote the development of employees through deployment by devoting time and resources to coordinate this activity.

Access to the experience that deployments bring is valuable to all employees. It must be managed fairly and openly so that it does not become, or be seen as, a means for managers to practice favouritism.

Recommendations

1. *In order to ensure the flexibility necessary for service to the public and for the development of staff, the permanent or temporary deployment of staff should be (subject to the other considerations described below) a responsibility of management.*
 2. *Managers will be expected to exercise their responsibility in this area fairly and to take the initiative in being open and explaining their deployment decisions to their staff.*
 3. *Managers will be expected to continue to respect the relevant employer policies such as those dealing with the language and security requirements.*
 4. *In those jobs where the freedom to deploy staff is necessary for operational efficiency, the employer should have the authority to deem deployability a condition of employment.*
-

5. *In all situations where deployability is not a condition of employment the deployment decision should be through the normal consensual relationship between management and employees.*
6. *With the exception of those situations where acting assignment and acting pay provisions apply, deployment of individuals whose personal classification is lower than the level of the job should not be included in the increased flexibility to managers.*
7. *To facilitate lateral movement, departments should establish assignment offices which will facilitate deployment across organizational units and the central agency should establish an office to facilitate interdepartmental lateral movement.*

PROMOTIONS

It is in the area of promotions that public servants express their greatest scepticism as to the fairness of the staffing system. In the focus groups conducted on behalf of the Task Force, there was a sense, at all levels, that in many cases promotions are predetermined. Many employees viewed it as an exercise to legitimate a predetermined outcome.

There are a number of factors that contribute to this general feeling of unfairness. Employees cite the fact that large proportions of promotions result from appointments without competition, many successful candidates in competitions have been acting in the job for lengthy periods of time, and statements of qualifications are often very specialized giving the impression that they were designed either to eliminate candidates or favour specific candidates. At a more fundamental level, there is an increasing gap between the perception of managers and employees of the basis upon which promotions should be made. Over the last few years, a view has grown among some public service managers that private sector managers are able to promote employees as part of an incentive and reward system rather than only to meet corporate needs at a given level. This view has influenced public service managers to move away from the traditional merit based (best qualified) approach to promotion to one more in line with their perception of what is happening in the private sector. At the same time, public servants continue to see the public service as an institution where employees should have equal opportunities to be promoted on the basis on their competence.

The Task Force members believe that it is imperative that actions be taken to change this perception of unfairness among our employees. They believe that the significantly increased flexibility inherent in the recommendations surrounding deployment provide an opportunity for taking the necessary steps to get back to basics in relation to how individuals are selected for promotions. The Task Force believes while the norm should be by competition, there will always be situations where the best qualified candidate will be obvious, and going through the proforma of a competition will be counter productive. It is this recognition that resulted in the Task Force recommending the continuation of the provision for promotion without competition.

One particular concern regarding the validity of assessment of candidates in the current system is the over-reliance on interviews as the exclusive instrument for rating candidates. Research indicates that, of all the various instruments available (in-basket tests, assessment

centres, interviews, etc.), the least reliable is the interview. Considering this concern with the fact that if employees are to be deployed after being promoted, they must fit not only the needs of their specific job but the more general needs of the organization and the public service at large, the selection instrument should be designed to provide assessment of future potential as well as on-the-job skills. It is with these needs in mind that the Task Force makes the following recommendations.

Recommendations

1. *The basis for promotion should be the determination of the "best qualified" through the relative assessment of candidates against other candidates and against a statement of qualifications that reflects the specific requirements of the job, the requirements of the group and level of the job and the needs of the organization.*
2. *Managers should make use of the variety of assessment instruments available when conducting promotional competitions. Their choice of instrument should be made reflecting a reduced reliance on interviews and a concentration on those instruments that will assist them in determining future potential.*
3. *The promotional process should be competitive except in those circumstances where it can be demonstrated that the candidate who best meets the statement of qualifications can be identified without a competition.*
4. *In developmental programs the relative assessment of candidates (i.e. the competition) should occur at entry. Promotion within a program should be on the basis of meeting a selection standard for the level.*
5. *The promotional process should be the responsibility of the parliamentary agency but should continue to be delegated to departments to the maximum extent possible.*

6. *The parliamentary agency should monitor and, as required, audit departmental promotional practices.*
 7. *The use of lengthy acting appointments is seen by employees as a major source of unfairness in the system and should be avoided.*
 8. *In keeping with the commitment to a career public service, the area of competition for promotion should be as wide as practical circumstances permit.*
 9. *Promotions should be appealable up to and including entrance to the management category.*
 10. *The employer should set policies which define what constitutes a promotion.*
 11. *The employer should prepare selection standards for each level of each occupational group.*
-

PROBATION

The use of probation is the final step in both the recruitment and the promotion process. The intent is to provide a period of time for a manager to assess the validity of the selection decision through performance on the job, provide feedback and counselling to the individual, and generally draw a conclusion as to whether selection has been appropriate or not.

In respect to recruitment from outside the organization, it is a well established labour relations principle that rejection on probation should result in release from the organization with no recourse. In respect to promotion, however, while the purpose of the probationary period is the same, the Task Force believes that the result of rejection should be different, i.e. that a conclusion that the selection was not the correct one should result in either deployment to another job at the individual's new level or reinstatement at his or her previous level. It should NOT result in release from the public service.

The Task Force believes that the exceptionally low rate of rejection on probation reflects the fact that most managers do not understand and/or are reluctant to deal face to face with an employee to explain the reason behind the rejection. While it is recognized that rejection on probation should be a rare event, it should be used in those cases where the selection process has failed.

Recommendations

1. *Managers should be trained and supported in the use of rejection on probation following recruitment and promotion.*
 2. *There should continue to be no appeal rights for rejection on probation nor should the parliamentary agency investigate rejection on probation.*
 3. *Unsuccessful completion of probation following a promotion should not result in release but rather should involve either deployment to another job at the same level or reinstatement at the individual's previous level.*
-

THE INCLUSION OF MILITARY, RCMP AND CSIS PERSONNEL IN CLOSED COMPETITIONS

Section 2(2) *a, b and c* of the current Public Service Employment Act (PSEA) allows members of the Armed Forces, RCMP and CSIS to compete in closed competitions on an equal basis with public servants. It does so by enabling departments to define the area of competition. For example, a competition could be opened to employees appointed under the PSEA from a select area of the public service, a select geographic location, and to members of the Canadian Armed Forces across Canada.

Section 2(2) *d* allows departments to extend areas of competition to other public servants not under the PSEA providing they are designated by the Governor in Council to be included in these staffing actions. These organizations apply to the PSC, which recommends to the Governor in Council whether or not the organization should be included. The PSC bases its recommendation on the hiring practices of the organization. If the practices followed are viewed as meritorious, fair and impartial, organizations may be included in closed competitions through Section 2(2)*d*.

The *Task Force on Barriers to Women in the Public Service* has identified the inclusion of military personnel in closed competitions as a barrier which prevents the advancement of civilian women and men, particularly in certain groups and in certain departments. The Task Force on Barriers to Women therefore recommends that Section 2(2) be removed from the PSEA.

Military representatives agree that most of the positions now attained by military personnel through this preference could be obtained through the normal channels. However, they feel that removal of this preference may send a negative signal to the military regarding how much they are valued as "public servants".

For some separate employers and for some departments the movement of employees between organizations that results from section 2(2)d represents a significant advantage in human resource management. For example, it allows departments to benefit from the expertise of employees of small specialized agencies who are separate employers and it gives employees of those agencies a source of career possibilities beyond the agency.

After considering this issue from a variety of perspectives the Task Force has concluded that the appropriate vehicle for the recruitment of staff from organizations not under the PSEA is the recruitment process. With departments being given the responsibility for deciding when to recruit above the entry level they will have sufficient access to this vehicle when they cannot obtain the staff they need through closed competition. There is thus little continued need for Section 2(2).

Recommendation

1. *Section 2(2) be removed from the Act.*

RECOURSE

The discussions with employees have revealed that the existence of appeal rights as a counterbalance to managerial discretion continues to be a feature of the system which they consider useful. The importance of appeal rights will increase as the staffing system evolves from one that is tightly regulated to one in which managers are expected to use their judgement within the framework of a general set of guiding policies and principles. The Task Force believes strongly in an atmosphere of openness and encourages managers to use all possible informal mechanisms to increase this atmosphere.

Many managers expressed concern about the number of vexatious appeals and with the need to practice defensive staffing because of the threat of appeals.

Research reveals that the actual number of vexatious appeals is low but they are well remembered and frequently discussed.

The tendency to practice defensive staffing is far more the result of the overall administrative culture of the staffing system than it is the result of the requirements of being able to withstand a possible appeal. Staffing officers admitted that they often used the threat of appeal to get managers to comply with what the staffing officers felt were the minimum requirements for a sound staffing action.

Several options for reducing the number of vexatious appeals have been examined but none could be found that did not also significantly reduce overall access to recourse.

The methods which have been found to reduce the number of appeals without reducing legitimate access to recourse involve increasing the transparency of the staffing system. Two of these are:

- Current staffing policies encourage managers to provide all interested candidates with detailed post-board feedback. In cases where there has been post-board feedback, appeals are rare. However, few managers appear to be aware of this policy.
-

- When an employee launches an appeal, the department is encouraged to provide the appellant with documentation and information about the staffing action (disclosure). Since the implementation of disclosure withdrawals have increased from 14% to 40%. Of these, 90% are attributable to disclosure.

Recommendations

1. *Recourse should continue to be available to unsuccessful candidates competing for promotion or, in non-competitive processes, to those persons who believe that they should have been considered for promotion to that position.*
2. *The basis for review should be the extent to which the process followed reflects the policies and principles that are supposed to guide the promotional process.*
3. *Managers should offer post-board feedback in all staffing actions.*
4. *Appellants and their representatives should be required to seek post-board feedback before launching an appeal.*
5. *Disclosure should be required in all cases where an appeal has been launched.*
6. *The provision of recourse and decisions regarding individual corrective actions should be the responsibility of the independent parliamentary agency.*
7. *The role of any review body appointed by the parliamentary agency for this purpose should be to operate within the framework of the parliamentary agency policies and include making recommendations to the parliamentary agency for corrective action.*
8. *The parliamentary agency should be empowered to direct the appropriate corrective action as it relates to the selection process. This power would not include directing the actual choice of the successful candidate.*

EMPLOYMENT EQUITY

The staffing system must not simply be consistent with the goals of employment equity it must be one of the instruments by which these goals can be actively pursued.

The current act does not contemplate the redress of representational imbalances except through the normal staffing process, expressly forbidding discrimination in a way which is contradictory to the rights expressed in Section 15 of the **Charter of Rights and Freedoms**. This has been insufficient to achieve the representational goals that the government has set for the public service. As a result there is some tension in the staffing system regarding the frankness with which employment equity strategies are being described. Legislation which recognizes more proactive approaches to employment equity would help resolve the difficulty.

Recommendations

1. *The legislation should reflect the provisions of Section 15 of the **Charter of Rights and Freedoms** and permit recruitment and promotion processes to redress representational imbalances.*
 2. *The employer should define the needs of the Public Service in terms of representation and set objectives for the redress of particular imbalances.*
 3. *The parliamentary agency should develop, in consultation with departments and the employer, recruitment strategies that respond to these needs.*
 4. *The increased ease of deployment recommended in this report should be actively used to promote the development of the public servants who are members of employment equity target groups.*
-

APPOINTMENT-TO-LEVEL

For the purposes of analysis there are two elements of the "appointment-to-level" concept that must be considered independently. First is the assignment to job aspect and second is promotion on the basis of a service-wide level standard as opposed to on the basis of an individual job requirement.

Assignment to Job

The Task Force recognizes the advantages associated with the capacity to assign an individual to a job independent of consideration respecting promotion, personal classification and the classification of the job.

The recommendations for deployment of employees contained earlier in this report will when adopted implement the assignment to job aspect of appointment to level.

Promotion

The Task Force believes that promotion on the basis of a service-wide level standard is a concept that has application to certain occupational groups and/or in certain organizational instances. It works well in the rotational foreign service; it has been used successfully for scientists and lawyers; it appears to be a possibility for some functional groups (financial officers and personnel officers) and is being considered actively for all or part of the Management Category.

Recommendations

1. *The legislation be amended to permit promotion to be based on **either** individual job requirements (appointment to position) or service-wide level standards (appointment-to-level).*
-

-
2. *The conversion of any group or part of a group to a promotion to level system would require substantial adjustment and the decision on the conversion of promotion to level should not be taken until the implications of such change have been fully studied and discussed with those who would be affected.*

The Task Force studied the appropriate application of promotion to level and has concluded that its adoption should be guided by the criteria set out below:

The desirability of adopting it for any particular occupational group or part of a group depends on two factors:

- Are the advantages of promotion to level relevant to the occupational group?
- Is the nature of the occupational group such that it can be meaningfully managed under a promotion to level system?

For any occupational group, the answers to these two questions must be known before the cost benefit balance of adopting promotion to level can be assessed.

Are the advantages of promotion to level relevant to the occupational group?

Three factors will determine the relevance of the advantages of promotion to level:

- **The extent to which there is a need for deployability of staff:** Promotion to level creates an ease of deployment. If deployment will be frequently used, then promotion to level will be advantageous. This may be the case in occupations where changing environmental demands require frequent redeployment staff. It may also be the case in occupations where exposing staff to a variety of job assignments increases their overall usefulness to the organization.
 - **The extent to which there is a requirement to reward employees who have grown in their job without requiring that they be promoted out of their job:** In promotion to position, promotion means a new position. In promotion to level, there is no need to remove employees from their position when they are promoted. This means that excellent scientists can stay in the laboratory, excellent litigators can stay in the
-

courtroom, and excellent teachers can stay in the classroom while still receiving the promotions they deserve.

3. **The extent to which equality of access to promotional opportunity is an important value:** The more specialized statements of qualification of promotion to position inevitably eliminate many candidates from competing for promotion. Access to promotional opportunity is much wider and, is seen as much fairer in the collective promotion process that characterizes promotion to level. If this type of equity of access is important in an organization then promotion to level is advantageous.

How easily can the occupational group be managed under a promotion to level system?

While promotion to level may hold many benefits for a particular occupational group the costs of trying to manage the group under promotion to level may outweigh the benefits. Five factors determined what those costs would be:

- **The extent to which the commonality of what is required at a level outweighs the differences of what is required in each individual position at that level:** Appointment to level uses a level standard rather than a job standard in deciding who should be promoted. It works best when the level standard realistically reflects the requirements of most jobs at that level. If jobs at a level are very heterogenous then a level standard cannot adequately reflect job requirements. In these cases a promotion to position is a more realistic option.
- **The extent to which the differences in capabilities of individuals at different levels can be distinguished:** In appointment to level people are classified as belonging at one level or another. If the capabilities that characterise one level cannot be clearly distinguished from those at another level the classification of individuals will lack credibility. Usually the fewer the number of levels in an occupational group the more likely it is that promotion to level can be realistically implemented.

- **The extent to which staff are seen as belonging to the organization rather than a job:** If staff are considered corporate resources rather than incumbents of positions then promoting to level is appropriate because in it promotions are on the basis of organizational requirements for the level rather than requirements of the position. If staff are really seen as working in jobs more than in the organization then appointment to position is more appropriate.
 - **The extent to which the size of the group is such that it can be managed as an entity:** The promotion to level process requires that all eligible candidates in a group be compared to each other to decide who best meets the criteria for promotion. The larger the group the more difficult it is to realistically undertake this task.
 - **The extent to which there is a corporate commitment to disciplined collective human resource management:** In promotion to level there is a need for a disciplined collective commitment to human resource planning and performance evaluation. Promotions must reflect the overall needs of the organization rather than the individual interest of a particular manager. When this collective approach runs contrary to corporate culture, promotion to level is difficult to implement.
-

LEGISLATIVE PROVISIONS

LEGISLATIVE PROVISIONS

General Approach:

- The current Act is highly prescriptive and leaves little room for administrative adjustment to changing policies. Accordingly, the Task Force believes that new legislation should allow maximum flexibility to respond to evolving administrative realities.

Preamble:

- There should be a preamble to the Act which includes the following:
 - the principle that the recruitment and promotion of public servants be free from political, bureaucratic or personal patronage;
 - the importance of a highly competent and representative public service;
 - the need for a staffing system that has sufficient flexibility to respond to the human resource needs of departments to support them in fulfilling their responsibilities to the Canadian public and to the government of the day;
 - the importance of a staffing system that treats employees fairly.

Legislative Provisions:

- The Act should specify that the recruitment process is the responsibility of the parliamentary agency and must be conducted in a manner that supports the political neutrality of the public service
 - The Act should specify that describing recruitment needs and the decision when to recruit will be the responsibility of departments.
 - The Act should permit selection based on the requirements of a job or group of jobs, an occupational group, a level, the needs of the organization or the long term human resource needs of the public service, as appropriate.
-

- The Act should permit indeterminate (full-time and redefined part-time), term and casual appointments.
 - The Act should specify that term employees may be terminated for cause or because the task for which they were hired has been completed or is no longer required.
 - The Act should specify that casual employees may be hired by departments, and that they are not eligible for indeterminate employment except as external candidates through the normal recruitment process and that they are eligible to work in a particular department for no more than six months in any twelve month period.
 - The Act should specify that the permanent or temporary deployment of staff should be the responsibility of the deputy head within the policy framework of the employer.
 - The Act should specify that with the exception of the proposed executive category, a requirement that underfill deployment is not allowed in circumstances other than where the provisions of acting assignments and acting pay apply.
 - The Act should specify that regulations defining promotion will be the responsibility of the employer
 - The Act should specify that the promotion process is the responsibility of the parliamentary agency and would be conducted in accordance with the policies established by the agency.
 - The current legislative provision permitting members of the Armed Forces, RCMP, CSIS and other public servants not under the Act to compete in closed competitions on an equal basis with public servants should be deleted.
 - The Act should specify that promotions would be subject to appeal.
 - The Act should specify that the parliamentary agency may monitor and audit delegated departmental recruitment and promotion practices.
-

- The Act should specify that appeals would be the responsibility of the parliamentary agency and would be conducted in accordance with the regulations, policies and procedures established by the agency.
 - The Act should specify that the parliamentary agency should be empowered to direct the appropriate corrective action following an upheld appeal, but that this power would not include directing the choice of the successful candidate.
 - The Act should specify that the role of any review body appointed by the agency for the purpose of hearing an appeal would be to operate within the framework of the agency's policies and should include making recommendations to the parliamentary agency.
 - The Act should reflect the provisions of section 15 of the **Charter of Rights and Freedoms** and permit recruitment and promotion processes to redress representational imbalance.
 - The Act should allow the parliamentary agency, in consultation with the employer, to require the appointment of, or the consideration for appointment of, persons or classes of person in priority to other candidates in accordance with the policies established by the agency.
 - The Act should allow for appointment to position or appointment to level.
 - Any specific prescriptions in the current Act regarding how the staffing process should be conducted, other than those described above, should be deleted from legislation and to the extent needed should be replaced with regulation.
-

CONCLUSION

CONCLUSION

In carrying out its work, the Task Force found a staffing system that had a number of problems not least of which is the conflict between the need for speed and flexibility and the need for fairness. The Task Force concluded early in the discussions that devising a staffing system that would contribute to the achievement of the **objectives of Public Service 2000** would necessitate a delicate balancing act between recommendations that would contribute to increased flexibility on the part of managers while at the same time building the trust of our employees in the fairness of the staffing system. The result is a set of recommendations that the Task Force believes provides a **reasonable balance** and, as well, will contribute to the achievement of all **four objectives** established by Public Service 2000.

The proposed **deployment** process and the provision for **appointment to level** will broaden developmental opportunities for employees and at the same time enable managers to deploy people quickly to ensure continuity of **service to the public**. The Public Service Commission, departmental staffing officers and managers will be freed of much of the administrative burden associated with lateral movement of employees. This will have the effect of freeing time and resources to put the emphasis on those components of the staffing system, i.e. **recruitment to the public service** and **promotion within the public service**, which contribute most to the maintenance of a **highly competent public service** while at the same time emphasizing **fairness** to its employees.

The proposed emphasis on **recruiting for long-term needs** of the Public Service and proper use of the **probation period** will contribute to **excellence in the Public Service**. These measures will help ensure that those recruited can adapt to the changing needs of the Public Service and that those who, despite coaching and counselling, cannot reach or maintain required standards, are rejected early from the Public Service. The result will be a dynamic, effective and dedicated career Public Service.

The recommendations with respect to **job security, recourse, disclosure** and the removal of the power to reject an employee from the Public Service during a **probation period** following a promotion, recognize our employees as **assets to be valued and developed** and deserving of fair treatment and due process.

The emphasis on wide **areas of competition**, the recognition that the norm is to **promote from within the Public Service** and the recommendations with respect to the exclusion of military

personnel and others from closed competitions are important elements of a **single career Public Service**. On the other hand, the recommendation that departments, rather than the Public Service Commission, decide when it is necessary to **recruit from outside the Public Service**, places authority in the hands of **the managers who are responsible for the performance of their units**.

Expanding the menu of **employment options** will enable management to tailor the workforce to meet fluctuating workloads, thereby improving **service to the public**. At the same time, this will enable employees to balance their **work and family responsibilities**. Managers will also be able to **hire casual employees** more easily in order to handle short-term peaks in workload, thereby reducing undue pressure on the regular workforce.

The recommendations regarding **authority and responsibility** will give managers a greater sense of ownership of the Staffing process which, in turn, will require them to demonstrate a profound commitment to the **principles** set out at the beginning of this report.

With the rule books being replaced with statements of principle and, with more responsibility being put on the individual players, accountability will become more direct. Managers will no longer be accountable for simply following the rules, they will be accountable for acting within the spirit of the principles. It will no longer be acceptable to artfully manipulate the system so as to comply with the letter of the rules rather than their intent. We will have to be prepared to say "I did it because in my judgement it was the right thing to do" and be willing to explain our decisions on that basis to our staff and superiors.

It will also no longer be necessary to find increasingly clever ways of finessing around the system in order to do what makes sense. Creative energy can be reserved for finding the best way of managing human resources. The criterion against which actions will be judged will be whether they made sense given the situation and the framework of principles.

These changes should make the system more human. It will be people making decisions that affect people. It will be more interpersonal because we will be more personally responsible for the decisions that come out of it and this, combined with direct accountability for the principle of fair treatment, will increase fairness of the system.

Finally the overall result of the many changes will be such that it can be characterized by one word: **INTEGRITY**.

IMPLEMENTATION

IMPLEMENTATION

General

Implementation is the most important phase of any change process. To succeed, it needs continuing senior level commitment and, in the case of this Task Force's recommendations, it involves two major thrusts.

The first thrust is the **changing of the administrative culture** in which the staffing system is embedded. This means changing the attitudes, the beliefs and the roles of the key actors in the system, i.e. the managers and the personnel officers.

The second thrust is the actual **changing of the system of rules** that have given rise to these attitudes, beliefs and roles.

The process of reducing the number of rules is already well advanced and it is critical that the recommendations of this report do not get translated into new detailed rules. However, the necessary changes in attitudes, beliefs and roles that must accompany the change from a rules-oriented system to a principle driven system has barely begun.

In respect to the first thrust, the changing of the administrative culture, **managers must be the primary target** of the change process. **They must be aware of the accountability regime they will be working under.** Communications to managers must emphasize the fundamental simplicity of what is now required of the staffing system and the key role that judgement will play in making these policies work in a sensitive and efficient manner. Managers must know and understand the framework of policies within which they will be operating.

They must appreciate the degree of responsibility given to them to use their judgement and they must be clearly informed of what is expected and how they will be held to account. Managers must have incentives to perform in the manner expected and the most important incentive of all is the example set by the most senior levels of the public service.

The second target of the change process must be the staffing specialists. Many members of this community have expressed strong support for a new approach to staffing that would

involve greater ownership on the part of managers. They will have to be seen as key players in assisting managers to take on this ownership role.

The second thrust in implementation, the changing of the system of rules, is an activity that is focused mainly in the Public Service Commission and the Treasury Board Secretariat and should be guided by the principles and recommendations of this report.

Specific

The process of reform can begin well before the legislation is amended. While a great deal of progress is possible under the current legislation, the full implementation of the fundamental changes envisaged in the system must await Parliament's approval of a new statute.

The Task Force proposes an implementation approach that would consist of a number of **dedicated teams**. Concentrating on the two main thrusts identified above, the first would be a team that should be made up of members of both central agencies and departments. It should be led by a senior personnel specialist who has high credibility both among staffing specialists and departmental line managers. It should take guidance from either the Staffing Task Force or a committee of Deputy Ministers sitting as a steering committee to ensure that the spirit and intent of the Staffing Task Force recommendations are followed as implementation progresses. This central team would be responsible for both the changing of the system of rules and the overall management of the process of changing the administrative culture, including articulating the chain of accountabilities which would inform the new culture.

In respect to the second thrust, the changing of the administrative culture, the Task Force envisages the establishment of **an implementation team in each department** with special attention being paid to implementation in the regions where almost 70% of public servants work. These teams should be multi-disciplinary. Members should bring expertise in training, communications, management and staffing. To ensure the penetration of the changes across the service, a **"training the trainer"** strategy should be adopted. This will allow the cascading of the training from the centre to departments and then within departments **to the lowest level**. It is absolutely essential that the communication themes and intent of the Staffing Task Force recommendations be the same not only across the public service but externally in respect to parliamentarians, unions and the media.

A gradual evolution of management culture is always in danger of sliding back to its original state. Adherence to the process for change, the sense of urgency and importance and to a realistic timeframe must be unrelenting during the initial transition period. The change process must be monitored throughout the transition period and adjusted as necessary.

The Task Force members believe that an approach such as described above has the best chance of making the **fundamental changes** necessary to move from our current system to a system of staffing that is **FAIR, EQUITABLE AND RESPONSIVE**.

STAFFING TASK FORCE

Mr. Jean-Jacques Norneau
Task Force Chairman
Deputy Minister
Agriculture Canada

Mr. Raymond A. J. Chretien
Associate Under-Secretary of State for
External Affairs
External Affairs

Mr. Nick Mulder
Associate Deputy Minister
Employment and Immigration

Mr. David J. Nicholson
Assistant Deputy Minister, Programs Branch
Veterans Affairs

Dr. Victor Robinovitch
Assistant Deputy Minister, International
Fisheries and Oceans

Mr. Ercel Baker
Executive Director
Staffing Programs Branch
Public Service Commission

Mr. Frederic R. Drummie
Associate Deputy Minister
Indian Affairs and Northern
Development

Mr. Arthur Silverman
Senior Assistant Deputy Minister
Western Economic Diversification

Mr. Larry J. O'Toole
Executive Director
Bureau of Real Property Management
Treasury Board Secretariat

Mr. Murdock Reteff
Assistant Deputy Minister,
Personnel Administration
Customs and Excise

Mr. Rod Grainger
Director, Policies and
Procedures Group
Treasury Board Secretariat

RESOURCE PERSONS

Ms. Michelle Comeau
Director General
Personnel Branch
Agriculture Canada

Ms. Lucie Goyette
Chief
Management Category Services
Agriculture Canada

Mr. Avrim Lazar
Director General
Review Directorate
Public Service Commission

FOR DISCUSSION

**REPORT OF THE
TASK FORCE ON THE MANAGEMENT CATEGORY**

ALAIN GOURD, CHAIRMAN

RAY LAFRAMBOISE, SECRETARY

MEMBERS/PARTICIPANTS

**ERCEL BAKER
MICHAEL BINDER
MEL CAPPE
ROBERT FOWLER
AIMÉE LEFEBVRE-ANGLIN
DOUG LINDORES
JEAN-CLAUDE MERCIER
MADELEINE OUELLON
BRUCE PETRIE
GLORIA REID
RICHARD RITTENBERG
HARRY ROGERS
MICHEL SÉGUIN
JEAN THIVIERGE**

7 AUGUST 1990

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The Task Force on the Management Category was established to review issues concerned with the structure and management of the Management Category and to recommend changes that would enhance the effectiveness of service delivery, the efficiency of management processes and the accountability of departments and individual managers for results.

A highly qualified, well motivated and appropriately structured management cadre is essential if first-rate service to the public is to be maintained or improved, particularly in an era of continued cost constraint. A number of problems, however, threaten the quality of this service. Our review of past task force and commission reports, the findings of attitudinal surveys of managers, and an extensive series of focused discussions with Management Category members, consistently point to the same set of inter-related problems. These include the multiplicity of layers within the executive cadre which slows decision-making and blurs lines of accountability; the lack of clearly articulated and shared values to guide behaviour; the lack of cohesiveness within the management cadre and falling levels of morale and job satisfaction as one goes down the management hierarchy; inadequate delegation to employees of the powers they need to achieve the results for which they are being held responsible; the increasing difficulty of attracting and retaining high achievers in the executive ranks; the lack of representation of certain groups within the Canadian population; and the welter of rules and regulations governing how we recruit, select, develop, promote, reward and discipline managers which impose a heavy administrative cost and inhibit creativity and initiative.

The report of the Task Force on the Management Category contains a series of inter-related recommendations aimed at resolving these problems and preparing the public service for the challenges it will face in the future.

To begin with, we recommend changes in the definition and structure of the Category. We believe that it should be renamed the Executive Group, to better reflect its composition of both senior level managers and staff advisors and its function as the executive cadre within the public service. This change will improve cohesiveness and morale within Category members -- an important prerequisite for high quality service to the public.

We believe that the structure needs to be simplified by reducing the six classification levels currently within the Category to three, and reorganizing management hierarchies to reflect a structure of Director, Director General and Assistant Deputy Minister. This streamlining will substantially reduce administrative costs, improve communication between all levels, clarify accountability for results, and speed decision-making.

These new levels would be defined on the basis of the existing salary maxima. The precise nature of the transition is left up to departments in consultation with the Treasury Board, however, deputies would be responsible for ensuring that their operating budgets do not increase as a result of this restructuring. The reduction in the

number of levels and the creation of fewer but wider salary bands will encourage managers to stay at each level longer than in the past. It will also reduce the pressure on the system to reclassify positions upwards for the sole aim of increasing compensation. Since promotional opportunities would be less frequent, lateral movement will become increasingly important as a source of challenging assignments which motivate and develop employees.

Historical controls on the number of staff within the Management Category (complement control) should be gradually eliminated. Departments should be allowed to manage their responsibilities within an operating budget and within an appropriate accountability regime. This will increase their operational effectiveness and enhance accountability for results.

Given that the new definition of the Executive Group continues to exclude a significant portion of the management team of departments, we recommend the development and implementation of initiatives directed at improving the quality of managers who are outside the Executive Group. For example, management potential should be identified at an earlier stage, management training enhanced, and managers outside the Group adequately recompensed for management risks and responsibilities. We also recommend the establishment of a management trainee program to recruit the managers of tomorrow from the best of our university graduates. Such initiatives are essential if the public service is to have the supply and calibre of managers it will need in the year 2000.

Another set of recommendations is focused on assuring that individual managers and front-line staff have the powers they need to fulfil their responsibilities. Most of the necessary authorities have already been delegated by the central agencies to departments. The stumbling block is often the lack of sub-delegation of these powers to lower levels of management, or the lack of sufficient decentralization of these powers to regional managers. We therefore recommend that departments review their practices to ensure that authority is placed where decisions have the most impact, and that employees have the authority they need to perform their jobs effectively.

Another set of recommendations is aimed at simplifying and revitalizing personnel practices. For example, we are proposing that an appointment to level staffing process be implemented for the Executive Group. The appointment of executives to classification levels, rather than to specific positions, will mean that executives will no longer "own" their specific positions. Rather, executives would have a broader corporate view of their roles and responsibilities. It will also reduce the pressure for "empire-building", which is encouraged under the current system in order to justify position levels. Such a system will also increase the flexibility to use lateral movement as a developmental tool, and the ability to rapidly respond to operational exigencies.

We also believe that each department should be able to promote executives to the Group from within the department or from other departments, and to recruit candidates from outside the public service. Executives must have authority over who performs what function in their organization if they are to held accountable for results. We therefore recommend that deputies be delegated the authority to staff executive

positions in their departments up to and including the Director and Director General levels. As Assistant Deputy Ministers are primarily service-wide rather than departmental resources, staffing at this level should remain with the central agencies.

It is important that the public service is representative of the Canadian population and able to benefit from the diversity of views and talents of Canadians. Initiatives are required to improve the representation of women, natives, people with disabilities and visible minorities. We are recommending a number of steps that could be taken to improve the balance of men and women within the executive ranks and feeder groups, and we urge central agencies and individual departments to devise meaningful strategies that will alter attitudes that inhibit the participation of other target group members.

Other human resources management practices need improvement. We believe that the skills, attributes and other requirements for all three levels of the Executive Group should be clearly articulated and that such criteria should control entrance into and advancement within the Group. Career planning will become more critical with the compression of the classification levels (fewer promotions) and should be improved. The training and development needs of managers should be reviewed frequently, management training provided as early as possible, and greater use made of situational training and rotational assignments.

We believe that mobility should be increased within the public service and between the public service and private sector. Work experience in other regional centres and in other job environments should be seen as valuable in the development of seasoned executives; two-way mobility will also increase mutual understanding and appreciation of other values, needs and operating environments, and improve the flow of information about successful management practices. We therefore recommend that barriers to inter-regional, regional/headquarters and private/public sector mobility be identified and removed.

The processes by which we reward good behaviour and penalize poor performance have also been subject to considerable criticism over the years. Although it has become easier to deal with serious performance problems, we make several recommendations to improve the ability of senior management to deal with consistently below par performers. On the other side, we urge that departments be given greater authority to implement customized plans to reward performance.

To better respond to the diversity of needs of the labour force, and therefore render the public service more attractive to employment equity groups, we recommend that a flexible benefits approach be implemented: Executive Group members would be permitted to select among a menu of optional benefits over and above a basic core package. The total package should remain cost-neutral.

We also echo the recommendation of the Advisory Group on Executive Compensation (the Burns Committee), that a separate and distinctive pension plan should be developed and implemented for the Executive Group. This pension plan should be

designed so as to meet the needs of a wide variety of employees and should encourage mobility between the public and private sectors.

Simply eliminating outdated and cumbersome rules and regulations will be insufficient to achieve the goals of Public Service 2000. A fundamental change in corporate culture and management attitudes is also required if we wish to promote the kinds of behaviours which will achieve the desired results. For this reason, we encourage efforts to define a set of values and operating principles to guide the actions of public service managers, both within departments and at the service-wide level. These should encourage creativity and initiative, trust and teamwork, and excellence in the delivery of government services.

We urge rapid implementation so that managers will have concrete evidence of progress and the momentum generated by the Public Service 2000 initiative is not lost.

Sufficient resources must be made available by departments and at the service-wide level for the communication and implementation of these recommendations. In particular, senior levels of management must be committed to the reforms and should be prepared to invest considerable time and effort into communicating and consulting with staff, preparing for the transition period and overseeing the implementation of the reforms. This is an essential prerequisite for successful cultural change.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

| | |
|--|----|
| EXECUTIVE SUMMARY | i |
| PURPOSE | 1 |
| BACKGROUND | 1 |
| SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS | 2 |
| REDEFINING AND RESTRUCTURING THE MANAGEMENT | |
| CATEGORY | 7 |
| Redefining the Category | 7 |
| Reducing the Number of Levels | 9 |
| Conversion | 10 |
| Classification Authority | 10 |
| Complement Control | 11 |
| BUILDING A COHESIVE AND EFFECTIVE MANAGEMENT CADRE | 11 |
| Shaping Common Values | 11 |
| Recognizing Managers Outside the Executive Group | 12 |
| Empowering Managers | 13 |
| Improving Communication Among Managers | 13 |
| STAFFING THE EXECUTIVE GROUP | 14 |
| Modification of the Staffing Process | 14 |
| Staffing Authority | 16 |
| Recruitment Mix | 17 |
| TRAINING AND DEVELOPMENT | 19 |
| Training and Career Development | 19 |
| Counselling and Placement Services | 20 |
| Mobility Within the Public Service | 20 |
| Mobility Between the Public and Private Sectors | 20 |
| Performance Appraisal | 21 |
| Separation | 22 |
| COMPENSATION AND BENEFITS | 23 |
| Compensation Policy | 23 |
| Performance Rewards and Incentives | 24 |
| Benefits and Perquisites | 25 |
| Pension Reform | 25 |
| IMPACT ASSESSMENT | 26 |
| CONCLUSIONS | 29 |

PURPOSE

1. This paper presents the final recommendations of the Task Force on the Management Category for actions aimed at restructuring and revitalising the management of the public service. A well motivated and structured management cadre is necessary to maintain and improve high quality service to the public.

BACKGROUND

2. The Task Force on the Management Category was established in December 1989 to review all issues associated with the Category and make recommendations for change that would facilitate the management of the Category and enhance the efficiency, effectiveness and accountability of the management of the public service.

3. The members of the Task Force met regularly over a six month period to discuss the values and principles which should govern public service managers, to identify the problems and irritants which hamper managers in the performance of their work, and to examine possible solutions that would allow the public service to better serve Canadians.

4. Deliberations rapidly focused on both the structure and management of the Category. The key areas of concern were seen as the need to streamline the structure of the Management Category to remove unnecessary levels of reporting relationships; the lack of common values and cohesiveness within the management cadre; inconsistencies between the responsibilities and authorities delegated to departments and managers; weaknesses in how we recruit, select, develop, promote, reward and discipline managers; and inadequate communication among public service managers.

5. Ten recommendations for immediate implementation were made to the Committee of Senior Officials (COSO) in our February 15, 1990 interim report. At the same time, a number of recommendations were made for actions to be started or for issues which required further study and consideration. This work has been completed, and this report summarizes our conclusions and recommendations.

6. Included as well is an assessment of the likely impacts of these recommendations on the size and cost of the public service, program effectiveness and delivery efficiency, legislative reform, operational practices, staff relations, and employee morale. More detailed explorations of underlying problems, alternatives considered, and the nature and implications of some of the solutions recommended are available in a number of background reports and discussion documents. These are listed at the end of this report and are available under separate cover from the Public Service 2000 Secretariat.

SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS

7. The following are the key recommendations from our Task Force:
8. *Redefining and Restructuring the Management Category*
 - a. The Management Category should be renamed the Executive Group, to better reflect its composition of both senior level managers and staff advisors, and to emphasize that Senior Managers (SMs) are clearly part of the executive cadre within the public service.
 - b. Other professionals or technical specialists, such as doctors, lawyers, scientists and engineers, should progress in separate but parallel career streams, even if the pay bands at the senior levels overlap with those of the Executive Group. As a result, in some situations, these professionals or specialists will be paid more than their manager-supervisors. This inversion of the traditional salary relationship will not be common, but it should be recognized as acceptable in certain circumstances.
 - c. To simplify and streamline the structure of the Executive Group, the six classification levels currently within the Category should be collapsed into three by combining the EX-4 and 5 levels into a new EXEC-3 level, the EX-2 and 3 levels into a new EXEC-2 level, and the SM and EX-1 levels into a new EXEC-1 level.
 - d. To facilitate rapid implementation and minimize transition costs, the new classification levels should be defined by existing Hay System point boundaries and current SM and EX employees should be "grandfathered" from the present structure to the new one. Each department should be permitted to determine its own transition approach and timetable, in consultation with the Treasury Board.
 - e. The reduction of the number of levels should be implemented in a manner that does not increase aggregate department operating costs. Deputies should be held accountable for ensuring that any rise in salary costs resulting from collapsing the levels is absorbed within their operating budgets.
 - f. Complement control should be gradually eliminated; deputies should be responsible for managing the number of executives within an operating budget, which would cover salaries and wages, other operating costs, and minor capital expenditures.

- g. We endorse the recent Treasury Board decision to delegate to deputies the authority to classify and organize their departments up to and including the new EXEC-2 level, subject to an appropriate accountability regime.

9. *Building a Cohesive and Effective Management Cadre*

- a. Efforts to define a management philosophy or set of values and operating principles to guide the actions of public service managers should be continued, within departments and, under the leadership of the Clerk of the Privy Council Office, at the service-wide level. These values should encourage managers to empower their employees and to foster work environments in which creativity and initiative, trust and teamwork, and excellence in the delivery of government services will flourish.
- b. A distinctive regime to identify, develop and recognize managers outside the Executive Group should be developed and implemented. The term "manager" should be reserved for those with managerial responsibilities and managerial positions should be reserved for those selected on the basis of a competitive process which emphasizes human resource management aptitudes and abilities. A separate performance pay plan and process for annual salary adjustments should be established for these managers, as well as a flexible approach to benefits.
- c. Departments should review their internal sub-delegation patterns to ensure that authority is placed where decisions have the most impact, and that the authorities granted to managers and front-line staff are commensurate with their responsibilities.
- d. Efforts to improve communication among managers should be continued, including the extension of the Senior Executive Network to Executive Group members below the Assistant Deputy Minister level and managers outside the Executive Group.

10. *Staffing the Executive Group*

- a. An appointment to level staffing process should be implemented for the Executive Group. The Public Service Employment Act should be amended to clearly state that all lateral movement is the prerogative of management and that deployments from one job to another where no promotion is involved will not constitute an appointment in law.

-
- b. Deployment should be used to develop and motivate employees, as well as to meet operational needs. We believe that in the Executive Group, deployment should be the sole responsibility of management if the deployment is within the same commuting region. If the executive would have to move to another city or region as a result of the deployment, his or her consent would be required, unless the department had previously specified deployability as a condition of employment.
 - c. Deputies should be delegated the authority to staff their departments up to and including the new EXEC-2 level, subject to an appropriate accountability regime. The Public Service Commission should continue to monitor the process and ensure that the merit principle continues to be respected in staffing decisions.
 - d. We endorse the Treasury Board proposal to create a management trainee program with dedicated funding. Such a recruitment and career development program will help to ensure that the public service has the supply and calibre of executives it will need in the year 2000 and beyond.
 - e. We support the recommendations of the Task Force on Barriers to Women. In addition, we recommend that departments review their selection processes to ensure that they are not biased against women, capture the views of women in focus groups and surveys to help ensure that policies and practices are sensitive to their needs, and increase their efforts to identify qualified women in the private sector who would be suitable for appointment to all executive levels and to the feeder group level. We concur with the Task Force on Workforce Adaptiveness that women should be over-represented in developmental programs and assignments, and that recruitment and promotion boards, and developmental assignment committees should include women. Likewise, women should be fairly represented on assessment centre evaluation teams.
 - f. Meaningful strategies should be developed to ensure that the public service is representative of the Canadian population and able to benefit from the diversity of views and talents of Canadians. We believe that fundamentally the issue is one of changing corporate culture and management values. We recommend that statistics on representation by natives, persons with disabilities and visible minorities be improved. We concur with the Task Force on Workforce Adaptiveness that minorities, and other target groups, should be fairly represented on selection

boards and over-represented in developmental programs. In addition, they should be fairly represented on assessment centre evaluation teams.

11. *Training and Development*

- a. The training and development needs of managers should be reviewed at least annually. Departments should clearly specify the skills and attributes, and training and developmental requirements for all three levels of the Executive Group. We look forward to the guidance of the Task Force on Staff Training and Development on this and other training issues.
- b. We concur with the Advisory Group on Executive Compensation that relocation policies are too restrictive and rigid. Corrective action is needed to allow departments to adequately compensate executives for moving. This is essential if we are to encourage regional/headquarters and inter-regional movement.
- c. The various government programs that affect the capacity of senior public servants to move easily between the public and private sectors should be examined with a view to removing barriers to mobility and, where appropriate, facilitating this movement when it is in the best interest of the public service to do so.
- d. Performance appraisal should be separated from career development review, although it is recognized that there is a relationship between the two. Performance pay would be determined based on an appraisal of the manager's contribution to the organization over the past 12 months and his or her management skills. A separate document would focus on the individual's career development needs, preferences and options.
- e. Given that some of the overall performance ratings are rarely if ever used, the five current ratings should be revised so as to combine Satisfactory and Unsatisfactory into a new rating that would indicate that performance is not meeting management's expectations. The other ratings could also be modified in order to provide finer but clear-cut distinctions between levels of performance. The 30% rule for performance pay should continue to be applied so that Superior and Outstanding ratings (or any new equivalents) continue to be meaningful and valued.

- f. The separation process for the Executive Group should be simplified, and deputies allowed to negotiate settlement packages directly with the individual.

12. *Compensation and Benefits*

- a. The maximum salaries for the three new classification levels should be set at the salary maxima for the EX-1, EX-3 and EX-5 levels. As in the past, the salary ranges should be adjusted each year based on comparisons with the private sector and consideration of collectively bargained settlements for the new EXEC-1 level, and through a system of appropriate internal relativities for the new EXEC-2 and EXEC-3 levels.
- b. Salaries would be permitted to rise within these new pay bands to levels commensurate with level of responsibilities, performance and experience, but aggregate operating costs should not rise. The normal rate of progress from the bottom to the top of these wider pay bands would be slower than in the past.
- c. Annual economic adjustments to the salary ranges should continue to be integrated into basic pay unless an individual's performance has been very unsatisfactory and salary regression is warranted. Performance pay should be re-earned each year, although some portion could be added to the basic salary of those below the maximum salary at the discretion of senior management (and subject to the operating budget at the departmental level). Normally, some part of the performance reward would be incorporated into the salary base; to maintain some degree of comparability among departments, there should be a consensus each year on the portions to be incorporated.
- d. Deputies should be given greater authority to design and administer customized performance reward plans as part of a strategic reward management approach. Appropriate safeguards will be required, and any alterations to the plans must be funded through the internal reallocation of management resources.
- e. We also concur with the Task Force on Compensation and Benefits that greater use should be made of the ability to make spontaneous one-time bonuses to reward particular achievements.
- f. A flexible benefits approach should be designed and implemented for members of the Executive Group. These employees should be permitted to select among a menu of optional benefits over and

above a basic core package. Additional optional benefits should be offered, although the total package should remain cost-neutral.

- g. As recommended by the Advisory Group on Executive Compensation, a separate and distinctive pension plan should be developed and implemented for the Executive Group. This pension plan should be designed so as to meet the needs of a wide variety of employees, and encourage mobility between the public and private sectors. It should be managed by a board with representation from the Executive Group. The level of benefits should at least equal those currently available.

13. *Implementation and Communications*

- a. As our recommendations have been put forward as an integrated package, they should be viewed, publicized and implemented as such, as too partial an implementation may fail to achieve the desired cultural changes. We also urge rapid implementation so that managers will have concrete evidence of progress and the momentum generated by the Public Service 2000 initiative is not lost.
- b. Sufficient resources should be made available by departments and at the service-wide level for the communication and implementation of these recommendations. In particular, senior levels of management must be committed to the reforms and prepared to invest considerable time and effort into communicating and consulting with their staff, planning the transition, and overseeing the implementation phase.

REDEFINING AND RESTRUCTURING THE MANAGEMENT CATEGORY

Redefining the Category

14. Our first set of recommendations is aimed at clarifying and simplifying the structure and control of the Management Category. To begin with we recommend that the name of the Category be changed to the Executive Group to explicitly recognize that it is composed of more than just managers. It also includes senior policy and other corporate advisors who may be without significant human or budgetary resources and who therefore do not "manage" in the strictest sense of the word. Management Category is also a misnomer because the Category excludes a large portion of the management cadre, or those public servants who can be defined as managers on the basis of their responsibilities for human, material and financial resources in connection with the delivery of a program or activity.

Renaming the Category would also emphasize that all members are executives, including current Senior Managers (SMs).

15. Employees whose interests and opportunities for advancement lie with a profession or technical specialty, and whose value to the organization lies in attributes other than those associated with either the management or staff advisor streams of the Executive Group, should progress within separate professional and specialist streams, even if the pay bands at the senior levels run parallel to those for the Executive Group. In essence, we are endorsing the proposals of the Task Force on Classification and Occupational Structures, and recommending that the approach used today for medical officers, lawyers and defence scientists be applied to other professions. Thus, for example, engineers, economists and natural scientists could pursue their professions at senior levels without having to join the Executive Group.

16. The overlapping of the pay scales will mean that in some situations, professionals and specialists will earn more than their managers/superiors, by virtue of the scarcity of and market demand for their skills. This inversion of the traditional salary relationship will not be common, but it should be explicitly recognized as acceptable within the public service, in certain circumstances.

17. The establishment of relatively broadly based parallel career streams could remove some employees from the Executive Group, such as the management levels of the Research and Foreign Service Groups. The reduction to three levels within the Executive Group, however, will set the salary maximum for the EXEC-1 level above that of the senior levels of most other classification groups. This could make entrance into the Executive Group relatively more attractive and thereby generate pressure for the reclassification of senior level positions. The delegation of classification authority must be accompanied by an appropriate accountability mechanism and an aggregate expenditure ceiling (operating budget), to ensure that managers will withstand reclassification pressures solely aimed at increasing salaries.

18. Members of parallel classification groups would be eligible for appointment to executive positions only if they formally met the more generalist managerial or staff specialist/corporate advisor criteria of the Executive Group.

19. At the Assistant Deputy Minister level, all employees should be within the Executive Group. ADMs are primarily service-wide rather than departmental resources, and should all be included within one classification group to maximize deployment flexibility. The one exception would be for the Law Group -- the maximum salary at the senior level of this group is equivalent to that of an EX-5 ADM, and the work is so specialised that deployment flexibility is not a requirement.

Reducing the Number of Levels

20. There are currently six classification levels within the Management Category. This has, in some cases, encouraged the addition of layers to the management hierarchy. Although a two step difference between reporting levels is prescribed, it is not easy to enforce. As a result, there is often relatively little difference between adjoining levels in terms of duties and responsibilities. The differentials between salary ranges are sometimes considered insufficient to encourage managers to accept more responsibility.

21. The multiplicity of layers can blur lines of communication and accountability. In addition, the two level gap between employee and supervisor has created barriers to career progression.

22. The six level classification system has also proved an onerous administrative burden on departments and central agencies. There are now six "cut points" at which there is pressure to upgrade jobs and use the classification system to reward and retain valued employees. Treasury Board Secretariat figures reveal that 1,200 to 1,500 evaluation decisions are completed annually, as well as 500 to 700 administrative actions such as deletions, position number changes and title changes, with respect to 4,600 Management Category jobs. As a result, personnel processes are cumbersome and slow. This view was echoed by the Nielsen task force which found that the cost of personnel administration within the federal system was considerably higher than in the private sector, even allowing for major differences between the sectors.

23. With fewer management levels, decision making should be quicker, and it should be easier for staff and managers to communicate with each other. A simplified management structure should be easier to administer and less costly. Reducing the number of levels within the Management Category will also support delayering efforts already under way in departments, and perhaps more importantly, serve as a stepping stone towards other goals. One of these is the introduction of an appointment to level staffing system.

24. We therefore recommend that the current six classification levels be collapsed into three by combining the EX-4 and 5 levels into a new EXEC-3 level, the EX-2 and 3 levels into a new EXEC-2 level, and the SM and EX-1 levels into a new EXEC-1 level.

25. Three levels are recommended, rather than a four level structure which distinguishes SMs from EX-1s, on pragmatic grounds. Three levels at the executive level have been identified as operationally sound and effective by such diverse agencies as the Public Service Commission ("Profiles of Public Service Leaders and Managers"), the Task Force on Classification and Occupational Group Structures, the Ontario provincial government and the Australian federal government.

Secondly, the three recommended levels would also reflect a hierarchical structure of Assistant Deputy Minister, Director General and Director, levels which are widely used throughout the public service and well understood. Thirdly, the advantages sought through the reduction of management levels, such as quicker decision-making, clearer lines of accountability, greater deployment flexibility, ease of communications between all levels, reduced classification and staffing action, a continuous career development pyramid, would be more pronounced with three rather than four levels. Finally, continuing to distinguish between SM and EX directors (a likely scenario with four levels) would be seen by SM managers as inequitable and would further depress an already low morale.

Conversion

26. To facilitate rapid implementation and minimize transition costs, the new classification levels should be defined by existing Hay System point boundaries, and current SM and EX employees should be "grandfathered" from the present structure to the new one. The implementation of the three level classification system will undoubtedly create pressures on, and in some cases should facilitate, delayering efforts currently under way in many departments. Departments should review opportunities for organizational change in advance of the conversion process in order to identify the most effective and least disruptive approach to introduce the new classification system.

27. As the reduction to the proposed three levels will cause some departments problems, flexibility will be required during the transition period. Each department should be permitted to determine its own transition approach and timetable, in consultation with the Treasury Board.

Classification Authority

28. Our preliminary report recommended the immediate delegation of classification authority to deputy ministers for up to and including the current EX-3 (proposed EXEC-2) level, with an appropriate accountability mechanism. Delegation was subsequently approved. The accountability mechanism proposed by the Treasury Board is still under discussion. Any mechanism adopted should be based on the principle that departments can be trusted with authority. Treasury Board would monitor and report on performance.

29. Our preliminary report also recommended that the application of the Hay Plan be studied in order to determine if it leads to inequities in the classification of regional and headquarters, and line and staff positions. The Treasury Board Secretariat has agreed to conduct such a study. Modifications which could ease the administrative burden of the system, and make it easier for managers to exercise the delegated classification authorities, should also be explored.

Complement Control

30. The Management Category Complement Control was introduced in the early 1970's in an attempt to control a rapidly expanding executive group. This control is no longer as necessary or appropriate. The size of the Category has been relatively stable over the past decade and could decline in size under the combined impact of delayering and collapsing the number of classification levels. In addition, the continued application of the Hay job evaluation system will be sufficient to ensure that any alterations to the Complement can be justified; the establishment of operating budgets will set limits on changes in staff size; and the creation of assistant deputy ministers remains a central agency function under our proposals. Complement Control is not fully consistent with the Public Service 2000 and Increased Ministerial Authority and Accountability (IMAA) philosophies which argue for the replacement of controls and regulations by after the fact accountability for results, moreover, pilot projects have demonstrated that the removal of person-year controls do not necessarily result in unwarranted increases in staff size.

31. We therefore recommend that Complement Control be gradually replaced with an operating budget, which would cover salaries and benefits, other operating costs, and minor capital expenditures. We agree with the Task Force on Resource Management that this approach would maximize the latitude of departments to vary the mix of these items in order to meet unique operational requirements. The approach will also permit better costing of program delivery and assessment of delivery efficiency. An appropriate accountability scheme which holds departments (and individual managers) accountable for results obtained will be required; at the departmental level, this might take the form of an IMAA agreement.

BUILDING A COHESIVE AND EFFECTIVE MANAGEMENT CADRE

Shaping Common Values

32. Over the past decade, a number of attempts have been made to sketch the dimensions of a management philosophy which clearly identifies the values, principles and objectives which should be shared by public service managers in the pursuit of their responsibilities. The high degree of consensus as to the basic elements encourages us to believe that such a goal is achievable. We also believe it to be highly desirable.

33. We therefore recommend that initiatives to define a "management ethos", based on the *raison d'être* of the public service -- nation building, service to the public and efficient management of the resources entrusted to us -- should be vigorously pursued within departments and at the corporate level. The sharing of a common set of clearly articulated values and operating principles would help to

create a vital and cohesive management cadre and influence the manner in which policies, structures and processes are developed and implemented. In particular, we believe that these values should encourage managers to foster an environment in which creativity, risk-taking and excellence in the delivery of government programs can flourish and be rewarded. These values and principles should also encourage respect for others, trust, teamwork, adaptiveness, responsiveness, and high quality service to the public. Once defined, these values must be instilled in all managers.

34. Defining management values is a longer term project, and one which should be lead at the corporate level by the Clerk of the Privy Council, with the assistance of a specially constituted Public Service 2000 task force, the Canadian Centre for Management Development, and APEX. This corporate exercise should build on the work done to date by task forces and departments.

Recognizing Managers Outside the Executive Group

35. The new definition of the Executive Group continues to exclude significant portions of the management team necessary to manage departments and government programs. Managers outside the Executive Group cannot easily identify with a common managerial cadre at the departmental or service-wide level and therefore may not necessarily understand their managerial roles and responsibilities, or share common values and principles.

36. The lack of a "pure" management classification group also prevents a uniform approach from being applied to the selection, training and career development, job evaluation and compensation of managers and prospective managers. Employees with significant managerial tasks, but who are outside the Executive Group, are not always given suitable management training and development or adequately compensated for management risks and responsibilities.

37. To offset these disadvantages, we recommend that managers be clearly distinguished from other employees, both within the specialized parallel occupational streams and at the SM-1 and SM-2 levels. The term "manager" should be reserved for those with managerial responsibilities. These managers need not be excluded from collective bargaining, although when appropriate, for example when the employee serves as a step in the grievance process, they should be excluded.

38. Managerial positions should be reserved for those selected on the basis of a competitive process which emphasizes human resource management aptitudes and abilities. Employees with management potential should be identified at an early stage, through expanded use of the assessment centre approach, and systematically developed to ensure that the public service has the supply and calibre of managers it will need in the future. Women and other employment equity groups should be

well represented in the executive feeder groups and over-represented in developmental programs.

39. To further distinguish managers, a separate performance pay plan should be established, as well as a separate process for annual salary adjustments, and a flexible approach to benefits. As the extension of these benefits to managers who are under collective bargaining would alter the terms and conditions of employment, these recommendations should be discussed with unions at the earliest opportunity.

40. We believe that the implementation of a distinctive regime for excluded managers, and the inculcation of a common set of core values, will help to create a cohesive management cadre at both the departmental and corporate levels. The introduction of a distinctive regime for all managers, whether within a parallel stream or at the SM-1 and SM-2 levels, will also accentuate the value placed on managerial responsibilities and improve the ability of deputy heads to form, deploy and manage their management resources.

Empowering Managers

41. Managers must be provided with authorities commensurate with their responsibilities. We have proposed a number of additional delegations to departments (classification, staffing, etc.) which should be appropriately sub-delegated. In some instances, however, the stumbling block is with the department. We therefore recommend that all departments review their internal systems and practices to ensure that authorities are sub-delegated to the appropriate level below the deputy head and decentralised to regional managers and front-line staff. Authority should be placed where decisions have the most impact.

42. Managers must also be encouraged to use these delegated powers fully and to be innovative in their efforts to improve effectiveness and efficiency. This cannot happen without some changes in the traditional rules of the game -- the occasional error or failure must be accepted by senior management and the political level as an inherent cost of doing business under the new management philosophy. Reward and recognition systems must likewise be reoriented to encourage creativity and the full exercise of the powers available to managers.

Improving Communication Among Managers

43. We also believe that communication among managers and members of the Executive Group should be improved. For example, many managers do not consider that adequate effort is made to ensure that they are aware of new government initiatives and priorities, that they understand resourcing practices

used within the Management Category, or that they are properly informed about opportunities for advancement at the departmental and service-wide levels.

44. Task Force members strongly support improvements to the circulation of information about vacancies, deployments and appointments in particular, and improvements to the circulation of timely information of interest to managers in general. In our preliminary report we recommended the implementation of the Senior Executive Network (SEN). Subsequently approved, this service will initially connect DMs and ADMs, but should be extended downwards to connect all Executive Group members. Extension to connect particular subgroups outside the Executive Group may also be possible. This electronic network is an obvious carrier for up to date information on vacancies, appointments, and other staffing information. With the addition of strategic, financial, and other information, it should become a primary communications network for the Executive Group and the management cadre of the public service. This network could provide a unique opportunity for the public service to reduce its dependency on paper-based information exchange. It could profoundly alter the way in which we collect, store and disseminate information.

45. Our other recommendations for further efforts which could be undertaken to improve the circulation of information of interest to managers include more frequent publication of the Manager's Magazine/*La Revue des Gestionnaires*, the establishment of a "best practices" exchange and updates for Executive Group members and managers modelled on the ADM Updates.

STAFFING THE EXECUTIVE GROUP

Modification of the Staffing Process

46. Under the Public Service Employment Act (PSEA), selection of an individual to perform the duties of a particular "job" is made on the basis of the specific requirements of that job and results in the "appointment" of the individual to a specific position. Any subsequent move or "deployment" to another job legally constitutes an appointment. In the Management Category, intra-departmental moves (or deployments), where there is no change in an individual's classification, are delegated to deputy heads from the Public Service Commission. The authority for all other appointments (inter-departmental deployments and promotions) is retained by the Public Service Commission.

47. The Task Force developed a set of principles that should guide any changes to the current promotion system. These principles are:

- the basis of promotion should include the relative assessment of candidates against a level standard

- there should be no systemic barriers to a representative public service and the system of promotion should be responsive to policies regarding the correction of representational imbalances
- it should be and be seen to be fair. It should provide all members of the Executive Group with a fair opportunity to be considered for promotion at reasonable points in their career
- it should give executives authority over who performs what function in their organization
- it should be flexible enough to respond to operational needs
- within such a system, executives should be considered both a departmental and corporate resource
- it should be capable of developing executives by facilitating their obtaining a wide breadth of experience.

48. In examining the current approach to staffing the Management Category, we were conscious of the recommendation coming from the Task Force on Staffing respecting the concept of appointment to level. Specifically, that Task Force drew the distinction between the capacity to assign an individual to a job independent of his or her classification level and promoting that individual. The Task Force is recommending that the "deployment" aspect of appointment to level be introduced for all occupational groups by amending the legislation to state clearly that all lateral movement is the prerogative of management and that deployments from one job to another where no promotion is involved will not constitute an appointment in law. We endorse this recommendation. Acceptance of it will change the current situation within the Management Category as it will remove the "ownership" aspect of appointment to position.

49. The question of whether an individual can be redeployed without his or her agreement was also discussed. It is the view of our Task Force members that the Executive Group should be designated as one of those occupational groups where deployment should be the responsibility of management if the deployment is within the same commuting region. If the executive would have to move to another city or region as a result of the deployment, his or her consent would be required, unless the department had previously specified deployability as a condition of employment.

50. In considering the promotion to level component of the appointment to level concept, the Task Force began by discussing at length the problems with the current system which must be addressed. Of particular concern is the widespread perception among members of the Management Category that promotions are

predetermined. As a basis for this sense of unfairness, employees point to the fact that many promotions are not competitive, those that are competitive are often won by someone who has been occupying the job on an acting basis, and vacancy notices often include highly specialized statements of qualifications which give the impression that they were designed to eliminate candidates or to favour specific candidates. It is also believed that entrance to the Category and promotion within it are based more on specialist capabilities than on an assessment of management skills. There is a general consensus that, as a result, the system does not ensure that those promoted to management have the necessary skills to manage.

51. Considerable time was spent debating the pros and cons of various models of promotion to level that could be applied to the Executive Group. In its purest form, promotion to level is a centrally driven annual exercise that assesses those who are considered ready for promotion against a service-wide standard that applies to all jobs classified at a particular level (thus appointment to level). We concluded that this pure form of appointment to level could be applied to the ADM level but that, for the entrance level (Director) and the intermediate level (Director General), it would be appropriate to consider not only the service-wide requirements of the level but also the technical requirements of individual jobs.

52. Accordingly, we are proposing a model which is based on the concept of promotion to level but which would be implemented differently at the entrance and Director General level than at the ADM level. In effect, entrance to the Executive Group and promotion to the Director General level would be based on both the particular requirements of individual jobs and a service-wide standard for the particular level. This would result in a departmentally constituted competitive process on an individual job basis as vacancies would occur and where intra- or inter-departmental deployment was not an option. However, following selection, the individual would be appointed to the appropriate level rather than to the particular position. At the ADM level, the Task Force concluded that a centrally driven promotion to level process would be appropriate and should be implemented. A more detailed description of the model we are recommending is available as part of a package of background reports.

53. In order to address the question of fairness discussed above, the Task Force recommends that the advertising of promotional opportunities be the rule rather than the exception and that the Public Service Commission play a prominent role in those promotional processes run by departments at the Director and Director General level.

Staffing Authority

54. Staffing authority for the Executive Group should be delegated to deputy heads for up to and including the current EX-3 (proposed EXEC-2) level. Each department should be able to promote managers within and to the Group from

within the department or from other departments, and to recruit candidates from outside the public service. This delegation would be accompanied by appropriate accountability mechanisms. The Public Service Commission will play a shared role in promotional processes run by departments under its mandate to ensure that the merit principle continues to be respected in staffing decisions. Rates of inter-departmental movement should be monitored subsequent to delegation, as other jurisdictions making a similar change have noted a decline. Additional initiatives may be required to counter any substantial decline, for example, through better circulation of information about managers in all parts of Canada and through appropriate inter-departmental movement objectives and accountability, keeping in mind targets for hiring from specific groups.

Recruitment Mix

55. The public service is vitally dependent on the recruitment done today for its managers of tomorrow. It is therefore imperative that there be a program aimed specifically at attracting the best and brightest from our universities into the public service. Specifically, the Task Force recommends a management trainee program with dedicated funding. With greater departmental attention to human resources management, and judicious use of developmental programs such as the Career Assignment Program (CAP), this intake from the universities will give the public service the supply and the calibre of managers it will need in the year 2000 and beyond. It is our understanding that Treasury Board approval is being sought for the resources needed to establish a management trainee program and to enhance post-secondary recruitment.

56. Managers have experienced difficulties in not only recruiting but retaining target group members. Barriers to the advancement of women, aboriginals, visible minorities and persons with disabilities into and through the managerial ranks exist at both the corporate and departmental levels.

57. With respect to barriers to women, we have carefully reviewed the report of the Task Force on Barriers to Women and strongly support the directions proposed therein. We endorse their recommendations, including holding deputies and managers accountable for progress towards gender balance in all groups and levels; allowing part-time employees to contribute to the pension plan; lengthening the pay-back period; encouraging job-sharing, part-time work, working at home, and more flexible working hours to help employees trying to balance work and family responsibilities; and conducting exit interviews in order to identify departmental and corporate barriers and irritations.

58. In addition, we recommend the following measures to help rectify the gender imbalance in the Executive Group:

- outside consultants could be used to identify inadvertent discriminatory factors which operate within a department. This could help provide a basis for an action plan
- job descriptions and selection processes should be scrutinized to ensure that they are not biased against women candidates
- recruitment and promotion boards, evaluation teams in assessment centres used to evaluate management potential, and departmental developmental assignment committees, should include women
- the views of women should be adequately captured in attitudinal surveys of managers and focus groups. For example, their needs and preferences should be captured as part of the planning of a flexible benefits approach and pension reform. Input of this nature is essential to help ensure that policies and practices suit the variety of employee needs
- more pro-active efforts should be instituted to attract women outside the public service into the Executive Group feeder levels and to identify qualified women for appointment to the executive cadre
- developmental programs and assignments should over-represent women, and should be aggressively used to ensure that an adequate pool of qualified women exist as candidates for entry and advancement
- job-sharing and part-time work should be fully considered as time at level for the purposes of management advancement.

59. According to the Public Service Commission, representation from other employment equity groups falls well short of their levels within the Canadian population at large. The lack of reliable figures for their representation within the public service, as members of these groups are self-identified, is troubling. Without greater precision as to the extent of the problem, it is difficult to set appropriate goals or to measure progress. Further effort is required to redress this shortcoming.

60. Meaningful strategies must be developed if we are to ensure that the public service is representative of the Canadian population, and able to benefit from a rich diversity of views and talents. We believe that fundamentally the issue is one of changing corporate culture and management values.

61. We also concur with the Task Force on Workforce Adaptiveness that selection boards should include minority members and that natives, minorities and persons with disabilities should be over-represented in developmental programs. In addition, they should be fairly represented on evaluation teams in assessment centres.

TRAINING AND DEVELOPMENT

Training and Career Development

62. We believe that a planned and pro-active approach to the development of managers at all levels from supervisor to ADM is necessary to guarantee an adequate supply of well qualified managers. The primary responsibility for the provision of training and development lies with departments. We concur with the proposed new policy framework developed by the Staff Training Council that departments should establish clear statements of the kinds of skills, experiences and competencies required of managers at all levels. Such statements should be based on the "Profile of Public Service Leaders and Managers" and must reflect service-wide as well as departmental requirements. We believe that such requirements or criteria should control entrance into and advancement within the Executive Group.

63. We also concur that the training and development needs for each manager be reviewed at least annually; in a later section, we propose changes to the appraisal process that we believe will increase the attention paid to these considerations. Career planning will become increasingly critical with the compression of the executive classification levels. As promotions will happen less frequently, lateral movement will become a more important source of challenging assignments which develop and motivate employees. Career planning should also be improved for management candidates in feeder groups, to ensure that they understand and can meet the prerequisites for entry and advancement.

64. Management development normally takes place through job experience, interpersonal relationships, and formal education and training. It is generally agreed that most learning takes place on the job and that this is the most effective form of career development. We recommend more mandatory situational training and rotational assignments be provided at all levels to develop and refine managerial skills.

65. The mandatory orientation training necessary to give managers the knowledge base they need to operate within the public service, and to help them identify their operational and structural role, should continue to be made available as early as possible to new entrants to the Executive Group. We also believe that management training should be provided to future Executive Group members. Beyond ensuring a steady source of competent public service managers, training

should also introduce would-be managers to the public service management ethos or values intended to influence behaviour and corporate culture. We support all efforts under way to review the adequacy of management training and orientation courses and agree that these should be tailored to the needs of managers irrespective of their classification level. We look forward to the guidance of the new Task Force on Staff Training and Development on this and other training matters.

Counselling and Placement Services

66. In our preliminary report we argued that enhanced counselling and placement services should be made available to members of the Executive Group. The introduction of the Public Service Commission's proposed diagnostic and career counselling service for the Management Category will meet the needs identified by the Task Force.

Mobility Within the Public Service

67. It is important that future deputy ministers and assistant deputy ministers have work experience in regional centres. In order to encourage executives to seek and accept assignments in other regions, flexibility with respect to setting compensation levels will be required. This and other strategic tools should be used to encourage greater headquarters/regional movement and inter-regional movement.

68. Another impediment to inter-regional and inter-departmental mobility is the relocation policy. We agree with the 1988 Report of the Advisory Group on Executive Compensation that relocation policies in the public service are more rigid and less realistic than those found in the private sector. Further effort is required to identify and implement corrective actions which would encourage regional/headquarters and inter-regional mobility. Major concerns in this respect are the negative impacts on the career progression of spouses and variations in the cost of living between regions.

Mobility Between the Public and Private Sectors

69. The Task Force believes that increased two-way flow of executives between the public service and the private sector is desirable. Such exchanges enhance mutual understanding and respect, and sensitize executives to the goals, problems, needs and attitudes of the other sector. In addition, this kind of interchange enhances the circulation of information about good management practices. We believe that barriers which prevent such movement should be reduced or removed. We do not consider that such an action will deplete the public service of its best and brightest.

70. Instances arise regularly where it is both in the interest of a senior public servant and the public service at large to facilitate the movement from the public service to the private sector. Usually, this occurs when an individual has identified a possible position in the private sector, but there is some uncertainty on the part of the individual and the potential private sector employer that the move would be successful. We believe it is in the interest of the public service to examine the various programs and policies that relate to this kind of mobility with a view to removing any barriers that might exist and, when appropriate, facilitating a "trial period" that would help both parties decide on the permanency of such a move.

71. The sort of changes that we would envisage include using the provisions of Interchange Canada and Business/Government Executive Exchange programs as vehicles for providing this kind of "proof period". This would involve, in those instances described above, the use of the standard agreement but removing certain provisions for these cases. Specifically, the agreement would not include the condition that an offer of employment could not be made at the end of the assignment. Similarly, a lower scale salary could be permitted in recognition of a learning curve that would be present in a number of cases -- the department would make up the difference to the individual. It would be understood that in these particular cases, individuals would be permitted to negotiate arrangements that would not exceed the normal public service salary and benefits.

Performance Appraisal

72. The appraisal system was scrutinized to determine if it is appropriately structured. It serves a number of different aims (performance review, determination of compensation, career review, identification of training needs, and reporting to central agencies) and we questioned its ability to serve all well.

73. Based on this review, we recommend that a distinct performance appraisal policy be developed and issued for members of the Executive Group which would separate the process into two -- performance appraisal and career development review -- although recognizing that the two are related.

74. The performance report should evaluate a manager's contribution to the organization during the past 12 months and his or her managerial skills and attributes. This should summarize the dialogue that should have been ongoing between an employee and his or her manager during the previous 12 months. Central agency policy on performance appraisal should encourage self-evaluation, so as to better ensure that this dialogue is as constructive as possible. A self-evaluation document would constitute the basis for discussion, but would not replace the supervisor's right to change or modify the wording therein.

75. We concur with the recommendation of the Task Force on Workforce Adaptiveness that the views of subordinates on the quality of management

supplied over the appraisal period should be taken into account by those responsible for the evaluation. While this should not be the dominant input into the appraisal, feedback of this nature should be sought (for example, through a survey of employees) in order to help identify and correct problems.

76. Given that some of the overall performance ratings are rarely if ever used (in particular, the Unsatisfactory rating), the five current overall ratings should be revised so as to combine Satisfactory and Unsatisfactory into a new rating that would indicate that performance is not meeting management's expectations. The other ratings could also be modified in order to provide finer distinctions between levels of performance. Any new ratings should be clearly defined and distinguishable. The overall performance rating would only be used for determining performance pay, and not the longer term career potential. With the flexibility now available for performance pay, the 30% rule should continue to be applied to ensure that Superior and Outstanding ratings (or any new equivalents) are meaningful and valued, and its purpose clarified.

77. A separate career development report would identify training needs and recommendations, developmental options, and the manager's own aspirations and preferences. Again, this report would not comment on the individual's potential.

78. The performance appraisal should not be used for staffing purposes when appointment to level is introduced for the Executive Group or a portion thereof. Instead, an overall multi-year summary evaluation by a senior executive, endorsed by the department's senior management committee or the deputy minister, might constitute an effective mechanism. Such a document should address a "master list" of skills and abilities; this list would be developed by the central agencies to ensure a reasonable discipline and consistency in the process.

Separation

79. While it has become easier for senior management to address serious performance problems, further effort is required to simplify the process of dealing with consistently below par performers. To increase the flexibility of the deputy, a separation process should be applicable not only to those who are surplus to departmental requirements (as a result of downsizing, delayering or restructuring), or those whose performance has clearly deteriorated, but also to those whose commitment and contribution to the department is so marginal that their departure would benefit the organization.

80. Deputies should continue to consult with the Public Service Commission prior to initiating a separation process, to determine if a manager's skills and experience might be productively utilized elsewhere in the public service. The Treasury Board Secretariat should continue to play a key role in the process, providing front-end expert advice on the strengths and weaknesses of each case,

settlement trends in the public service and private sector, recent court decisions, inter-departmental relativity, and a recommended settlement for each situation. Departments should also have the flexibility to negotiate the settlement package directly with the individual.

COMPENSATION AND BENEFITS

Compensation Policy

81. Two major and related concerns raised by the recommendation to collapse the levels of the Executive Group are (i) that the new broader pay bands could mean that executives might get paid the same amount despite marked differences in their responsibilities, and, (ii) that overall salary costs will increase as employees' salaries rise to the new pay maxima through annual increases.

82. A number of options were explored to address these issues. We believe that a single salary maximum should be applied to each of the new levels, despite the wide range of duties and responsibilities which these can contain. Multiple pay bands within each classification level would be a mistake, as they would serve as *de facto* sub-classifications. They would be complex to administer, and would perpetuate the upward reclassification pressure that causes so much work and friction with the present system. In addition, pay barriers would undermine all attempts to delay and would be inappropriate within a system in which executives are promoted to level as salaries cannot fluctuate with each deployment.

83. We therefore recommend that a single compensation maximum be set for each of the three new classification levels at the salary maxima for the EX-1, EX-3 and EX-5 levels. Compensation levels would continue to be set based on external comparisons, using the new midpoint, and internal relativities for the new EXEC-1 level, and through a system of internal relativities for the new EXEC-2 and EXEC-3 levels.

84. Within the new pay bands, salaries would be permitted to rise to levels commensurate with level of responsibilities, performance and experience, but the departmental operating budget should not rise. Deputies should be held accountable for remaining within an operating cost ceiling. This could be accomplished by limiting the number of managers who could progress into the upper portion of the range to those whose responsibilities clearly merit higher pay levels; reducing the number of executives; and/or reducing the speed at which individuals progress through the scale by eliminating or reducing the proportion of performance pay which is permanently captured as a salary increase.

85. We considered the argument that all adjustments to salary should not be automatic but subject to managerial discretion. While this may be consistent with

private sector practice, and allows salaries to fall in real terms for consistently poor performance, we believe that the radical application of such an approach would be ill-advised. The public service has come to expect that fully satisfactory performance will be rewarded in some incremental fashion each year, to offset at least in part the impact of inflation, and to recognize, at least in some token fashion, merit and increased experience. Disappointing these expectations could reduce the motivation to perform well, increase mistrust and dissatisfaction, and reduce the attractiveness of entry into the executive ranks.

86. On the other hand, we believe that the rate of progress through the new pay bands may be slowed relative to historical levels. The rate of progress of executives from the bottom to the top of each of the new wider salary ranges could be slower than the rate of progress in the past through the narrower pay bands.

87. Annual economic adjustments to the salary ranges should continue to be integrated into basic pay unless performance has been very unsatisfactory and salary regression is warranted. Performance pay should be re-earned each year, although some portion could be added to the basic salary of those below the maximum salary at the discretion of senior management (and subject to the operating budget control at the departmental level). Normally, some part of the performance reward would be incorporated into the salary base; to maintain some degree of comparability among departments, a consensus should be sought each year on the portions to be incorporated.

Performance Rewards and Incentives

88. We support the recommendations of the Task Force on Resource Management that compensation, benefits and performance rewards should be more explicitly directed towards encouraging and rewarding desirable behaviours (including teamwork and sound human resources management practices) and we believe that the authority to make spontaneous one-time bonuses to reward particular achievements should be increased and sub-delegated. We also recognize that non-monetary rewards and recognition are critical motivators that should not be neglected.

89. We agree with the principles recommended by the Task Force for the design of performance rewards, as a replacement for performance pay, and we believe that deputies should be given greater authority to develop and administer customized performance reward plans suited to their operational needs and departmental culture. Appropriate safeguards will be required in return for this added discretion. Alterations to performance pay plans must be funded through the internal reallocation of management resources so as to be cost-neutral.

Benefits and Perquisites

90. Allowing employees to select among benefit options and variable coverage levels is becoming more popular in the private sector. With respect to the public sector, such an approach offers significant advantages, as it would better meet the diversity of needs of the labour force, and therefore render the public service more attractive to employment equity groups. It maintains the ability to control costs, but at the same time, increases employee satisfaction with the same dollar outlay. A recent survey of public sector managers confirmed high levels of interest in a flexible approach.

91. We therefore recommend that a flexible benefits approach be implemented for the Executive Group, on a cost-neutral basis for departments and the public service as a whole. Employees would be permitted to select a set of benefits equal in cost to those provided under the current plan. A basic or core package should be offered to ensure that all employees have certain basic protections. New types of benefits and higher benefit levels should be included in the menu of options, and employees permitted to select cash in lieu of benefits from the optional menu.

92. Employees should be provided the opportunity to reaffirm or alter their selection annually. Counselling services should be provided to assist employees in this annual selection process.

93. Members of the Executive Group should be consulted to ensure that their wishes and preferences are considered during the design phase. This consultation process should include a sample survey of executives, similar to that conducted in 1982. This survey should be replicated on a periodic basis and the results disseminated to all Executive Group members.

94. While the benefits package itself would remain cost-neutral, existing departmental compensation organizations may need to be expanded to administer the more complex system we propose. These additional resources, however, could be offset by the savings which will be realized from the proposed simplification of the classification and staffing systems for the executive levels.

Pension Reform

95. The last three reports of the Advisory Group on Executive Compensation have argued that a distinctive pension plan should be developed for the Management Category in order to provide adequate flexibility for its management. In light of the proposed changes to the Income Tax Act, a separate pension plan for the Executive Group is even more imperative.

96. We believe that this should consist of a basic registered plan (separate from the public service superannuation plan) and a supplementary plan to at least

maintain the current levels of benefits. The Executive Group pension plan should be managed by a board which includes representation from the Executive Group.

97. Some of the preparatory work is under way to reform the Pension Act. We recommend that the following features be considered in these pension reform efforts and in the development of a distinct pension plan for the Executive Group:

- the portability of pension accruals should be enhanced in order to encourage mobility within the public service and between the public service and other sectors of the economy
- some of the age and years of service penalties on early retirement should be waived, at least in certain circumstances, in order to encourage movement of senior managers out of the public service
- trade-offs between compensation and improved pension provisions should be investigated, and implemented where appropriate
- pension coverage should be extended to part-time workers in order to increase the attractiveness of the public service to employment equity target group members
- the pay-back period for women returning from care and nurturing leave should be lengthened.

IMPACT ASSESSMENT

98. We believe that the majority of our recommendations can be implemented without increasing overall costs. For example, we have proposed that the reduction of the classification levels and enhancement of performance rewards be cost-neutral with respect to the aggregate operating costs.

99. Several recommendations will require additional resources -- the extension of the Senior Executive Network below the ADM level, proposed pension reforms, the introduction of a management trainee program, increased use of assessment centres for managers and executives, and increased training for managers. In addition, costs would increase if executive benefits or perquisites were extended to excluded managers. More proactive recruitment of women and the administration of a flexible benefits approach will be more time-consuming. The layering and restructuring processes subsequent to the transition to three classification levels will also demand considerable senior level time and effort.

100. On the other hand, a number of our recommendations will reduce administrative overhead and improve productivity. The reduction in classification

and promotion activities as a result of simplifying the classification structure are two obvious examples. It is difficult to quantify the cost savings that would be generated by these initiatives, or to put a dollar value on faster decision making, better communications, improved morale and better service to the public. It is likely, however, that the productivity gains to be realised would outweigh any cost increases, judging from the calculations made by the Task Force on Classification and Occupational Group Structures of the cost savings which would be generated from the restructuring of the classification system.

101. The size of the Executive Group may decline marginally over time as a result of our recommendations. Since we are recommending that deputies be responsible for remaining within operating budgets subsequent to the reduction in classification levels and introduction of other initiatives, the trade-offs made between staff size and compensation could reduce the size of the Group. The net result of ongoing delayering efforts, and further sub-delegations of authorities, will also encourage deputies to pare down their executive ranks.

102. Our recommendations, if successfully implemented, will alter operational processes. Managers below the Executive Group, and regional and front-line staff will have greater authority and responsibility. All delegations of authority (and sub-delegations) will require sound accountability mechanisms. The introduction of appointment to level staffing will require the development of level standards, and a corporate promotional process for the ADM level. Our proposals will alter the performance appraisal process and require alteration of the definitions of the overall performance ratings. The introduction of a flexible benefits approach will require an initial selection and annual reselection process, and employee counselling services. We are also proposing that the assessment centre approach be used to identify the management potential of Executive Group members and would-be managers at the SM-1 and SM-2 levels. This would expand the use of assessment centres.

103. Only two recommendations will require legislative change: the establishment of a separate Executive Group pension plan (and pension reform) and the amendment of the PSEA to permit the appointment of individuals to levels in addition to the current ability to appoint to positions.

104. As can be expected, few of our proposals have any implications for staff relations, given that all members of the Executive Group are excluded from collective bargaining, and we make no recommendation to increase the number of managerial exclusions. We are, however, recommending the introduction of a special regime to distinguish and recognize managers outside the Executive Group. As the extension of this regime to unionized managers would alter the terms and conditions of employment, we recommend that discussions be held with union representatives with respect to this regime.

105. On balance, we anticipate that our recommendations will improve employee morale. For example, on the basis of the sample survey we had conducted of 400 public service managers, we feel that the majority will approve of our proposals to increase training opportunities and attention to career planning, to introduce flexible benefits, and to separate performance appraisals from career planning. It would also be logical to assume that our proposals to create a distinctive and revised pension plan, enhance mobility, and clarify criteria for advancement will be favourably received by Executive Group members. We also believe that the creation of a distinctive regime for managers outside the Group will be positively viewed by managers, so long as it can be equitably applied to those within and excluded from collective bargaining.

106. Renaming the Category will also be favourably received, as it will improve the status of current members, and help end the isolation of SM level employees. Reducing the number of classification levels will please some and upset others. EX-1s, 3s and 5s might feel that their promotion opportunities have declined. Attitudes of SMs, EX-2s and 4s will be more positive, but will depend on how each department determines salary progression within the wider pay bands. Our survey revealed a slim margin in favour of reducing the number of levels (54%), one quarter against, and a high degree of uncertainty (21% neutral). Special communications efforts will be required to dissipate this uncertainty and persuade managers of the benefits of streamlining and modernizing the structure of the Group.

107. We anticipate generally positive attitudes towards appointment to level staffing, based on our survey findings -- 73% of managers surveyed favoured its introduction. Opinions will vary, of course, depending on whether the person is seeking a promotion, or staffing a position, and the strategies to explain the new system to executives must be sensitive to both these perspectives. From the employer's point of view, the new system will have a beneficial impact on motivation, as employees will no longer "own" positions. From the employee's perspective, this loss of job "ownership" could be threatening, although the increased opportunities for growth and development through lateral assignments should be attractive. Any improvements perceived in the role of merit in promotion decisions will be very favourably received.

108. The increase in authorities delegated to managers could also be seen as attractive or threatening. Some managers will be reluctant to accept greater responsibility, whereas others will find increased authority attractive. We anticipate the latter reaction will predominate, based on our survey of managers (95% report that they favour more classification and staffing authority) and the Zussman and Jabes studies which show that control over work increases job satisfaction.

CONCLUSIONS

109. This report has recommended an integrated package of solutions to address the major problems and irritations which trouble public service managers and reduce their effectiveness and efficiency. The vast majority of these problems have been consistently cited by every royal commission, task force and government agency that has considered the health of the public service over the past twenty years. The numerous letters and submissions that we have received, and focus groups, discussions and surveys that we have engaged in during the last six months have convinced us of their currency.

110. The recommendations contained in this report have not gone through an equally rigorous validation process, although we are confident that our solutions are germane, workable and will be supported by the majority of managers today. Our deliberations over the nature and implications of the solutions have been lengthy and painstaking, and we are encouraged by the consistency with which some of the solutions have been proposed over time, as well as the positive reactions from the managers whom we have polled, consulted, or who have written to us.

111. We believe that the benefits to be gained from the recommended changes clearly outweigh the costs. These benefits will take the form of improved efficiency as a result of streamlined structures and simplified processes, and higher levels of job satisfaction and employee morale. Operational effectiveness should improve as a result of clarifying lines of accountability and communication, and increased delegation and subdelegation of the authorities required to meet responsibilities. Recommended improvements in recruitment, staffing and rewards management processes, and the encouragement of creativity should also enhance program delivery.

112. Some of our recommendations need further refinement and development, through discussions and consultation with members of the Management Category, managers outside the Category and unions. This consultation process should also aid in the development of implementation strategies and communications plans. A more rigorous cost/benefit analysis is also advisable to clarify the net cost or cost savings from the combination of recommendations contained in this report and other Task Force reports. The members of the Task Force on the Management Category are available to function as a "sounding board" for this subsequent review and refinement process, and with respect to any subsequent recommendations affecting the Management Category stemming from this process.

113. We believe that simply amending legislation and eliminating inappropriate rules and regulations will be insufficient in themselves to achieve the goals of Public Service 2000. We believe that a fundamental change in the corporate culture is required if we are to change the way we operate. Without the inculcation of a

new set of values which stress innovation, initiative, trust and empowerment of employees, the reforms will be hollow, and central controls replaced with departmental controls. The quality of service to the public, and the success of the Public Service 2000 reforms, is dependent upon the commitment of managers to such values, and upon their morale and motivation.

114. Values are the key to animate and inform the changes we recommend. It is imperative that public servants share a common set of values and operating principles which promote ethical behaviour and the kinds of attitudes and actions most likely to achieve the desired results. We urge the Clerk of the Privy Council to set in motion a process to determine and promote the values which should be shared by all managers.

115. The successful implementation of these recommendations, and in particular, the proposed changes in the corporate culture, will require the visible commitment of senior levels of management to these reforms. Moreover, senior managers must be willing to spend substantial amounts of time participating in and overseeing the implementation and communication processes.

116. The problems which we have identified are linked, as are our recommended solutions. They should be viewed, publicized and implemented as an integrated package. Implementation of only a few may fail to achieve the desired effects as each problem needs to be attacked on multiple fronts. We also urge rapid implementation so that managers will have concrete evidence of progress. Otherwise, the momentum generated by the Public Service 2000 initiative will dissipate and latent cynicism will surface to overwhelm the reform process.

117. Finally, we recommend that implementation strategies and communications plans be developed for the recommendations of this Task Force at the corporate and departmental levels, and sufficient resources devoted to these important tasks. The recommendations reflect an evolution of the values and culture of the public service management cadre, and thus the implementation strategy must simultaneously safeguard worthy but traditional values, structures and practices, and nurture the emerging values which we believe are required for the public service over the next 20 years. The implementation and communications strategies must involve and engage all levels of the management cadre, in both the National Capital Region and the regions, in order to build the necessary levels of understanding, commitment and cohesion. At the same time, plans should be prepared to monitor the pace of implementation and the success of these recommendations in producing the desired effects.

BACKGROUND REPORTS AND DISCUSSION PAPERS

DISCUSSION PAPERS

Regime for Excluded Managers/*Régime des gestionnaires exclus*

Appointment to Level in the Management Category/*Catégorie de la gestion :
Nomination au niveau*

Delegation and Public Service 2000/*Délégation et Fonction publique 2000*

COMMISSIONED REPORTS

Ekos Research Associates: Management Category Task Force: Summary of Survey Findings

H. L. Laframboise: Restructuring the Management Category: Defining the Category, and Reducing the Number of Levels/*Restructuration de la catégorie de la gestion : La définition de la catégorie, et Dénivellement*

Martineau Provencher et associés : *Document de discussion relatif aux avantages sociaux et autres éléments non-monétaires de rémunération*

Karl Snider: Management Compensation: Implications of Restructuring the Management Category/*Rémunération de la catégorie de la gestion : Répercussions de la restructuration de la catégorie de la gestion*

FOR DISCUSSION

PUBLIC SERVICE 2000: REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE
ON TRAINING AND DEVELOPMENT

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

August 8, 1990

Scope and Context

The Public Service Task Force on Training and Development plans to achieve its objectives in three stages. This Phase I report reviews the existing policies and objectives for training and development and the institutional support for achieving them in the public service. It identifies major initiatives and problems, outlines guiding principles for decision-making, and formulates recommendations for immediate action. Phase II, to be tabled at the end of September, will review the training and development implications of other PS 2000 Task Forces. Phase III will consider longer term issues and will be completed by the end of December.

The Task Force met seven times between May 28 and July 13, 1990 to review available studies and documents relevant to training and development. The Task Force also met with representatives of public sector unions, departmental heads of training, heads of large federal training centres, and received many briefs from directors of personnel and other public servants.

Initiatives and Problem Areas

In its review, the Task Force found that many of the present efforts of departments and central agencies offer an excellent base on which to build for the future. Despite these strong initiatives, the Task Force has identified some specific areas for improvement, including:

- assessment of training and development needs, both corporate and individual
- planning of training and development, at corporate, departmental and individual levels
- training and development of scientists and professionals
- role of management and individual managers in training and development is unclear
- inequitable distribution of training and development of individuals
- departments and agencies require central support services, sharing of information, materials, technology, facilities; particular problems for small agencies
- better coordination needed at centre
- training policies over-emphasize immediate job skill training needs and neglect future needs and personal developmental needs
- training and development not used as instrument of employment equity strategies
- developmental programs not well used
- workforce adjustment training policy under-utilized
- serious concerns about resource constraints and inability to meet priorities

Guiding Principles and Concepts

The Task Force has also formulated a set of guiding principles and concepts which we feel can be used to orient future policies and priorities for training and development. These eight principles offer a sense of fundamental values from which complex problems can be addressed and decisions undertaken.

- . Training and development is an investment in better government and better service to the public
- . PS 2000 will put more emphasis on individual responsibility and professionalism, requiring more knowledge and skills by individuals
- . Good human resource management and development policies will be necessary to attract and retain good people in the public service in the future
- . Training and development of staff is an integral part of management at all levels, embracing a broad range of activities and priorities of which classroom training is but one
- . There is a hierarchy of responsibility for training and development:
 - the individual is responsible for his/her own career development, for demonstrating a willingness to grow and learn on the job, and for taking full advantage of training and development opportunities provided
 - **supervisors** are guides, mentors and counsellors and are responsible to ensure the worker has the skills and tools to do the job
 - the **department** is responsible to provide an enabling framework for productive work now and in the future through effective training and development; and, to assess needs and set priorities
 - **central control and service agencies** provide an enabling framework at the corporate level
- . There is a hierarchy of needs and priorities which must be dealt with from the perspectives of the individual, the department, and the government as a whole, both in the immediate and longer term
- . Resources must be needs and priorities-related and protected in the same fashion as capital investment funds
- . Equity in training and development means responding adequately to needs of the individual, as well as corporate needs, including the need to redress previous inequities.

Summary Recommendations

In light of the identified problems and these principles, the Task Force forwards the following recommendations:

1. A new emphasis on personal planning of training and career needs, separate from the performance appraisal system.
2. A new emphasis on the role of supervisors and managers in determination of needs and priorities and the management of training and development.
3. Continued delegation of primary responsibility for training to departments within the new context recommended herein.
4. Strengthened training and development needs assessment at all levels.
5. More rigorous assessment of the appropriateness and cost-effectiveness of various means of training and development.
6. More careful monitoring of training and development to ensure equitable access, and the use of training and development to meet employment equity objectives; members of employment equity groups should have a more than proportionate share of places in training and development programs identified as suitable for this purpose.
7. Treasury Board's role to be re-shaped to emphasize leadership, resource allocation, policy direction, evaluation and accountability but recognizing that delivery of program rests with departments, PSC and CCMD.
8. Treasury Board policies to be recast to reflect the guiding principles and concepts with specific provisions relating to:
 - . re-balancing emphasis on immediate job skills, future requirements and career development requirements
 - . revision of workforce adjustment training policy providing training for anticipated as well as current job vacancies.
9. The cost-effectiveness and management of existing corporate developmental programs be reviewed.
10. Consideration be given to new developmental experiences for public servants who demonstrate high performance, high potential or special need.

11. Treasury Board policies and corporate systems and programs be described in layperson's language in brochures/guides for individuals, supervisors, managers, etc.
12. The Staff Training Council should be replaced by a new Human Resources Council with a broader mandate recognizing the integral role of training and development of human resources management and with linkages to existing and potential groups dealing with training and development on a functional basis.
13. Existing Training Boards of the Staff Training Council should be retained but their mandates broadened to include developmental activities and programs.
14. The informal training coordination group of TBS, PSC and CCMD should be formalized as the primary work group of the Human Resource Council.
15. The functions of central support and sharing of information, materials, facilities and technology should be performed on a collaborative basis by the Committee of Heads of Training, on behalf of the Government as a whole. Resources may have to be provided for some of the more operational of these functions.
16. The CCMD and PSC should work out a cooperative arrangement to ensure that managers at all levels receive a continuum of consistent knowledge and skill development.

Implementation Plan

The Task Force urges the Treasury Board to respond by taking immediate action to develop coordinating and support mechanisms outlined in its recommendations and then using these mechanisms to pursue more substantive areas. This includes the formation of a special team to review TB policies toward the view of a tighter policy offering clear leeway to departments in developing training and development programs. It is also necessary to quickly establish task groups to address some of the immediate training implications of the other PS 2000 Task Forces, including assessing the generic training necessary in key areas like Service to the Public and Human Resource management.

12. Remplacement du Conseil de la formation du personnel par un nouveau Conseil des ressources humaines muni d'un mandat plus large qui reconnaîtrait que la formation et le perfectionnement font partie intégrante de la gestion des ressources humaines, et doté de liens avec les groupes actuels et éventuels qui s'occupent de formation et de perfectionnement sur le plan fonctionnel.

13. Maintien des comités de formation du Conseil de la formation du personnel mais avec un mandat étendu aux activités et programmes de perfectionnement.

14. Reconnaissance officielle du groupe officieux de coordination de la formation composé du SCT, de la CFP et du CCG comme groupe de travail principal du conseil des ressources humaines.

15. Exercice des fonctions de soutien central et de partage de l'information, du matériel, des installations et de la technologie en collaboration par le Comité des directeurs de la formation, au nom du gouvernement dans son ensemble. Il faudra peut-être prévoir des ressources pour certaines de ces fonctions qui ont des exigences plus opérationnelles.

16. Mise au point par le CCG et la CFP d'une formule de coopération pour faire en sorte que les gestionnaires de tous les niveaux reçoivent en séquence continue des connaissances formant un tout cohérent et qu'ils puissent perfectionner leurs compétences.

Plan de réalisation

Le Groupe de travail recommande vivement au Conseil du Trésor de donner suite immédiatement à ses recommandations en développant la coordination et les mécanismes de soutien proposés dans ses rapports et, ensuite, en utilisant ces mécanismes pour poursuivre des objectifs plus substantiels. Cela inclut la création d'une équipe spéciale pour passer en revue les politiques du Conseil du Trésor dans le but d'en arriver à avec une politique plus concise offrant une plus grande liberté d'action aux ministères pour qu'ils puissent développer des programmes de formation et de perfectionnement. Il est aussi nécessaire de créer rapidement des groupes de travail pour faire face aux répétitions des recommandations des autres groupes de travail de FP 2000 pour la formation, y compris l'évaluation de la formation de base nécessaire dans des aspects clés tels le service au public et la gestion des ressources humaines.

première en matière de formation dans le nouveau cadre recommandé dans le présent rapport.

4. Renforcement à tous les niveaux de l'évaluation des besoins de formation et de perfectionnement.

5. Evaluation plus rigoureuse de l'opportunité et de la rentabilité des diverses méthodes de formation et de perfectionnement.

6. Surveillance plus attentive de la formation et du perfectionnement pour qu'ils soient d'un accès plus équitable et qu'ils servent à atteindre les objectifs de l'équité en matière d'emploi. Les membres des groupes visés par la politique d'équité en matière d'emploi devraient avoir plus qu'une part proportionnelle des places dans les programmes de formation et de perfectionnement reconnus pour être adaptés à cette fin.

7. Redéfinition du rôle du Conseil du Trésor de manière à mettre l'accent sur le leadership, l'affectation des ressources, l'orientation des politiques, l'évaluation et l'imputabilité, mais en reconnaissant que la prestation des programmes relève des ministères, de la CFP et du CCG.

8. Remaniement des politiques du CT pour refléter les principes et les concepts directeurs en incluant des dispositions précises concernant

- la mise au point d'un nouvel équilibre entre les compétences immédiatement nécessaires à un emploi, les exigences futures et les exigences du déroulement de la carrière

- la révision de la politique de formation relative au réaménagement des effectifs de manière à offrir de la formation en fonction des postes dont on prévoit qu'ils seront à pourvoir ainsi que des postes actuellement à pourvoir.

9. Examen de la rentabilité et de la gestion des programmes de perfectionnement généraux qui existent à l'heure actuelle.

10. Attention donnée aux nouvelles expériences de perfectionnement à l'intention des fonctionnaires dont le rendement et le potentiel sont supérieurs ou qui manifestent des besoins spéciaux.

11. Description des politiques et des systèmes et programmes généraux du Conseil du Trésor en un langage courant et leur publication dans des brochures ou guides à l'intention des individus, des superviseurs, gestionnaires, etc.

Il y a une hiérarchie des responsabilités en matière de formation et de perfectionnement

1. L'individu est responsable du déroulement de sa carrière, il doit se montrer disposé à croître et à apprendre en cours d'emploi et profiter pleinement des occasions de formation et de perfectionnement qui lui sont offertes

2. Les superviseurs sont des guides, des mentors et des conseillers et ils sont chargés de veiller à ce que les employés, hommes ou femmes, aient les compétences et les instruments voulus pour faire leur travail

3. Le ministère a la responsabilité de fournir un cadre favorable à un travail productif maintenant et dans l'avenir grâce à un régime efficace de formation et de perfectionnement; il a aussi la responsabilité d'évaluer les besoins et d'établir les priorités

4. Les organismes centraux de contrôle et de service fournissent un cadre favorable à l'échelle de toute la fonction publique

5. Il y a une hiérarchie des besoins et des priorités dont il faut tenir compte du triple point de vue de l'individu, du ministère et du gouvernement dans son ensemble, tant dans l'immédiate qu'à plus long terme

6. Les ressources doivent être liées aux besoins et aux priorités et protégées de la même manière que les capitaux d'investissement

7. L'équité en matière de formation et de perfectionnement signifie que l'on répond adéquatement aux besoins de l'individu ainsi qu'aux besoins de l'ensemble, y compris le besoin de corriger les injustices passées.

Recommandations

Tenant compte des problèmes qu'il y a identifiés et des principes qu'il a énoncés, le Groupe de travail propose les recommandations suivantes:

1. Un accent nouveau sur la planification personnelle de la formation et des exigences de sa carrière, une planification qui soit séparée du régime de l'apprentissage du rendement.
2. Un accent nouveau sur le rôle des superviseurs et des gestionnaires dans la définition des besoins et des priorités et dans la gestion de la formation et du perfectionnement.

3. Maintien de la délégation aux ministères de la responsabilité

matériel, de la technologie et des installations; ce qui représente des problèmes particuliers pour les petits organismes

- le centre a besoin d'une meilleure coordination
 - les politiques de formation attachent trop d'importance aux besoins des compétences liées à l'emploi et négligent les besoins à venir et les besoins de perfectionnement personnel

- la formation et le perfectionnement ne sont pas utilisés comme instrument des stratégies d'équité en matière d'emploi
 - les programmes de perfectionnement ne sont pas bien utilisés

- sous-utilisation de la politique de formation relative au réaménagement des effectifs
 - graves préoccupations au sujet de la compression des ressources et de l'incapacité d'atteindre les objectifs prioritaires.

Principes directeurs et concepts

Le Groupe de travail a aussi formulé une série de principes directeurs qui, selon nous, pourraient servir à orienter les politiques et les priorités à venir dans le domaine de la formation et du perfectionnement. Ces huit principes proposent un ensemble de valeurs fondamentales pouvant servir à faire face à des problèmes complexes et à prendre des décisions.

• Mettre en oeuvre des programmes de formation et de perfectionnement, c'est investir dans un meilleur gouvernement et dans de meilleurs services au public
 • Fonction publique 2000 accordera plus d'importance à la responsabilité individuelle et au professionnalisme en exigeant des individus qu'ils aient des connaissances et des compétences plus nombreuses

• Une gestion compétente des ressources humaines et de bonnes politiques de perfectionnement seront nécessaires pour attirer et retenir désormais d'excellentes personnes dans la fonction publique
 • La formation et le perfectionnement du personnel font partie intégrante de la gestion à tous les niveaux et ils englobent un large éventail d'activités et de priorités dont la formation en salle de classe n'est qu'un exemple

Le Groupe de travail de la fonction publique sur la formation et le perfectionnement projette d'atteindre ses objectifs en trois temps. Le présent rapport de la phase I passe en revue les politiques et les objectifs existants dans le domaine de la formation et du perfectionnement et les appuie institutionnels dans la fonction publique permettant d'atteindre ces objectifs. Il identifie les efforts et les problèmes majeurs, il brosse un tableau des principes directeurs de prise de décision et il formule des recommandations d'actions immédiates. Le rapport de la phase II, qui sera présenté à la fin de septembre, examinera les répercussions des travaux des autres groupes de travail de RP 2000 sur la formation et le perfectionnement des travaux. Quant à la phase III, elle prendra en considération les questions à long terme et le rapport sera présenté vers la fin de décembre.

Il y a eu sept rencontres du Groupe de travail entre le 28 mai et le 13 juillet 1990. On y a passé en revue les études et les autres documents disponibles portant sur la formation et le perfectionnement. Le Groupe de travail a aussi rencontré des représentants des syndicats du secteur public, des chefs de la formation dans les ministères et les personnes dirigeantes des principaux centres de formation fédéraux. Il a de plus reçu plusieurs dossiers de la part de directeurs du personnel et d'autres fonctionnaires.

Domaines d'initiatives et de problèmes

Dans son étude, le Groupe de travail a constaté que plusieurs efforts actuels des ministères et des agences centrales formaient une excellente base sur laquelle bâtir l'avenir. Malgré ces domaines précis qui pourraient être améliorés, par exemple :

- l'évaluation des besoins de formation et de perfectionnement tant des institutions que des individus
- la planification de la formation et du perfectionnement au niveau de l'ensemble de la fonction publique, des ministères et des individus
- la formation et le perfectionnement des scientifiques et des professionnels
- le rôle de la gestion et des gestionnaires individuels dans la formation et le perfectionnement n'est pas clairement défini
- le manque d'équité dans la distribution aux individus des ressources en formation et en perfectionnement
- les ministères et les organismes ont besoin de services centraux de soutien, du partage de l'information, du

Le 8 août 1990

SOMMAIRE

FONCTION PUBLIQUE 2000 :
LA FORMATION ET LE
PERFECTIONNEMENT

POUR DISCUSSION

RAPPORTS DOCUMENTAIRES ET DOCUMENTS DE RÉFLEXION

DOCUMENTS DE RÉFLEXION

Régime des gestionnaires exclus/*Regime for Excluded Managers*

Catégorie de la gestion : Nomination au niveau/*Appointment to Level in the Management Category*

Délégation et Fonction publique 2000/*Delegation and Public Service 2000*

RAPPORTS D'EXPERTS-CONSEILS

Ekos Research Associates: *Management Category Task Force: Summary of Survey Findings*

H. L. Laframboise: Restructuration de la catégorie de la gestion : La définition de la catégorie, et Dénivèlement/*Restructuring the Management Category: Defining the Category, and Reducing the Number of Levels*

Martineau Provencher et associés : Document de discussion relatif aux avantages sociaux et autres éléments non-monétaires de rémunération

Karl Snider: Rémunération de la catégorie de la gestion : Répercussions de la restructuration de la catégorie de la gestion/*Management Compensation: Implications of Restructuring the Management Category*

115. La mise en oeuvre réussie de ces recommandations et, en particulier, les changements proposés à la culture de l'organisation exigeront l'engagement visible envers ces réformes de la part des niveaux supérieurs de la gestion. De plus, les gestionnaires supérieurs doivent être disposés à consacrer une portion substantiel de leur temps à participer aux processus de mise en oeuvre et de communication et d'en surveiller le déroulement.

116. Tout comme les problèmes que nous avons cernés, les solutions que nous recommandons sont reliées entre elles. Elles devraient être considérées, présentées et mises en oeuvre comme un ensemble. Leur mise en oeuvre de quelques-unes seulement pourrait ne pas produire les effets souhaités, étant donné qu'il faut attaquer chaque problème sur plusieurs fronts à la fois. Nous souhaitons ardemment que ces recommandations soient mises en oeuvre rapidement pour que les gestionnaires aient des signes évidents des progrès réalisés. Autrement, l'élan créé par Fonction publique 2000 se dissipera et le cynisme latent se manifestera pour anéantir le processus de réforme.

117. Enfin, nous recommandons que des stratégies de mise en oeuvre et des plans de communication portant sur les recommandations de notre groupe de travail soient élaborés pour l'ensemble de l'administration fédérale et pour chacun des ministères et que des ressources suffisantes soient affectées à ces tâches importantes. Les recommandations reflètent une évolution des valeurs et de la culture du milieu de la gestion dans la fonction publique. Par conséquent, les stratégies de mise en oeuvre doivent sauvegarder les valeurs, les structures et les pratiques traditionnelles qui le méritent et favoriser en même temps les nouvelles valeurs dont la fonction publique aura besoin, croyons-nous, pendant les 20 prochaines années. Les stratégies de mise en oeuvre et de communication doivent bénéficier de la participation et de l'engagement de tous les niveaux du milieu de la gestion dans la région de la Capitale nationale et dans les autres régions afin d'obtenir la compréhension, l'engagement et la cohérence nécessaires. En même temps, des plans devraient être établis pour suivre le rythme de mise en oeuvre des recommandations et leur degré d'efficacité pour la réalisation des effets souhaités.

111. Nous croyons que les avantages à retirer des changements recommandés dépassent largement les coûts de ces changements. Ces avantages prendront la forme d'une efficacité accrue par suite de structures rationalisées et de processus simplifiés ainsi que d'une plus grande satisfaction professionnelle et d'un meilleur moral chez les employés. L'efficacité opérationnelle devrait augmenter par suite de la clarification des rapports hiérarchiques et des voies de communication, de la délégation et de la subdélégation plus large des pouvoirs nécessaires pour s'acquitter de responsabilités. Les améliorations que nous recommandons en matière de processus de gestion du recrutement, de la dotation et des récompenses ainsi que de l'encouragement à la créativité devraient également renforcer l'exécution des programmes.

112. Certaines de nos recommandations ont besoin d'être précisées et développées au moyen de discussions et de consultations avec les membres de la catégorie de la gestion, les gestionnaires qui ne font pas partie de cette catégorie et les syndicats. Le processus consultatif devrait également contribuer à l'élaboration de stratégies de mise en oeuvre et de plans de communication. Une analyse plus rigoureuse des coûts et des avantages est également souhaitable pour préciser le coût net ou les économies nettes qui pourraient découler de la combinaison des recommandations contenues dans ce rapport et dans ceux d'autres groupes de travail. Les membres du Groupe de travail sur la catégorie de la gestion sont disposés à opérer comme un "groupe-témoin" lors de cet examen et cette mise au point ultérieurs, de même que pour toute recommandation découlant de ce processus et susceptible d'avoir une incidence sur la catégorie de la gestion.

113. Nous croyons que les amendements législatifs et la suppression des règles et règlements ne suffiront pas par eux-mêmes à ce que les objectifs visés par Fonction publique 2000 soient atteints. Il nous semble qu'un changement fondamental de la mentalité de toute l'administration fédérale est nécessaire pour que nous puissions modifier notre façon de faire. Sans l'implantation d'un nouvel ensemble de valeurs qui met l'accent sur la confiance, l'innovation et le respect individuel des employés, les réformes seront vaines et les contrôles centraux seront remplacés par des contrôles ministériels. La qualité du service au public et le succès des réformes de Fonction publique 2000 dépendent de l'engagement des gestionnaires envers ces valeurs et de leur morale et de leur motivation.

114. Les valeurs sont les éléments clés qui permettront de donner vie et forme aux changements que nous recommandons. Il est impératif que les fonctionnaires partagent un ensemble de valeurs et de principes directeurs favorisant un comportement professionnel ainsi que les attitudes et les actions les plus propres à mener aux résultats souhaités. Nous prions le greffier du Conseil privé de mettre en marche un processus de détermination et de promotion des valeurs qui devraient être communes à tous les gestionnaires.

107. Nous prévoyons que les attitudes face à la nomination au niveau seront de manière générale positive si l'on s'en tient aux résultats du sondage alors que 73 % des gestionnaires participants en favorise l'établissement. Les opinions varieront évidemment selon qu'une personne sera à la recherche d'une promotion ou aura à doter un poste. Les stratégies utilisées pour expliquer le nouveau système aux membres du Groupe de la direction devront tenir compte de ces deux perspectives. Du point de vue de l'employeur, le nouveau système aura des répercussions bénéfiques sur la motivation puisque les employés ne seront plus les détenteurs d'un poste. Aux yeux des employés, le fait de ne plus être détenteurs d'un poste pourrait être menaçant, mais les possibilités accrues d'enrichissement et de perfectionnement par le truchement d'affectations latérales devraient se révéler attrayantes. Tout accroissement que l'on percevra dans l'importance accordée au mérite pour les décisions concernant les promotions sera accueilli très favorablement.

108. L'augmentation des pouvoirs délégués aux gestionnaires pourrait également être jugée intéressante ou menaçante. Certains gestionnaires hésiteront à accepter des responsabilités plus larges, tandis que d'autres trouveront agréable de détenir des pouvoirs accrues. En nous fondant sur notre sondage auprès des gestionnaires (95 % se sont dit en faveur de plus de pouvoirs en matière de classification et de dotation) et sur les études réalisées par Zussman et Jakes, qui démontrent que le contrôle sur le travail à effectuer augmente la satisfaction retirée d'un emploi, nous prévoyons que la dernière réaction sera plus fréquente.

CONCLUSIONS

109. Ce rapport recommande un ensemble intégré de solutions aux principaux problèmes et causes d'irritation qui affectent les gestionnaires de la fonction publique et réduisent leur efficacité et leur efficacité. La grande majorité de ces problèmes ont été cités constamment par les commissions royales d'enquête, les groupes de travail et les organismes gouvernementaux qui ont pris le pouls de la fonction publique depuis 20 ans. Les lettres et les mémoires nombreux que nous avons reçus ainsi que les discussions et les enquêtes auxquelles nous avons participé pendant les six derniers mois nous ont convaincus que ces problèmes sont encore d'actualité.

110. Les recommandations contenues dans le présent rapport n'ont pas toutes été soumises à un processus de validation aussi rigoureux, mais nous avons bon espoir que les solutions que nous proposons sont appropriées et applicables et qu'elles seront appuyées par la majorité des gestionnaires actuels. Nos délibérations sur la nature et les répercussions des solutions ont été longues et ardues. Nous sommes encouragés par la constance avec laquelle certaines des solutions ont été proposées ainsi que par les réactions positives des gestionnaires que nous avons interrogés, consultés ou qui nous ont écrit.

103. Deux recommandations seulement exigent des modifications législatives: l'établissement d'un régime distinct de pension pour le Groupe de la direction (et la réforme des pensions) et la modification de la LPFP de façon à permettre la nomination de personnes à des niveaux en plus de la possibilité actuelle de les nommer à des postes.

104. Comme on peut s'y attendre, peu de nos propositions ont des répercussions sur les relations de travail, vu que tous les membres du Groupe de la direction sont exclus des négociations collectives et que nous ne recommandons aucune augmentation du nombre des exclusions pour cause de gestion. Nous recommandons cependant la mise en place d'un régime spécial qui permettra de distinguer et de reconnaître les gestionnaires n'appartenant pas au Groupe de la direction. Vu que l'élargissement de ce régime aux gestionnaires syndiqués modifierait les conditions d'emploi, nous recommandons de tenir des discussions avec les représentants syndicaux relativement à ce régime.

105. Dans l'ensemble, nous croyons que nos recommandations amélioreront le moral des employés. Par exemple, nous fondant sur un sondage sélectif de 400 gestionnaires de la fonction publique, nous avons le sentiment que la plupart approuveront nos propositions visant l'augmentation des possibilités de formation et l'attention portée à la planification de carrière, la mise en place d'avantages souples et la séparation des évaluations du rendement de la planification de carrière. Il serait également dans la logique des choses de croire que nos propositions portant sur la création d'un régime distinct et réformé de pension, l'accroissement de la mobilité et la clarification des critères d'avancement seront accueillies favorablement par les membres du Groupe de la direction. Nous croyons également que la création d'un régime distinct pour les gestionnaires n'appartenant pas à ce groupe sera perçue positivement par les gestionnaires, pourvu qu'il puisse s'appliquer également à ceux qui sont syndiqués comme à ceux qui sont exclus des négociations collectives.

106. L'attribution d'un nouveau nom à la catégorie sera également accueillie favorablement puisqu'elle rehaussera le statut des membres actuels et contribuera à mettre fin à l'isolement des employés de niveau SM. La réduction du nombre de niveaux plaira à certains, mais déplaîtra à d'autres. Les EX-1, 3 et 5 penseront peut-être que leurs chances de promotion ont diminué. L'attitude des SM, des EX-2 et des EX-4, en revanche, sera plus positive, mais dépendra de la façon dont chaque ministère déterminera l'augmentation de la rémunération à l'intérieur d'échelles salariales plus larges. Notre sondage révèle que ceux qui favorisent la réduction du nombre des niveaux dominent avec une faible marge (54 %), alors que le quart des participants au sondage sont contre et qu'il y a un haut niveau d'incertitude (21 % n'ont pas d'opinion). Des efforts particuliers en matière de communication devront être consentis pour dissiper cette incertitude et persuader les gestionnaires du bien-fondé de la rationalisation et de la modernisation de la structure du Groupe.

Le recrutement plus dynamique de femmes et l'administration d'avantages sociaux souples exigeront plus de temps. Les processus de réduction des échelons et de restructuration ultérieurs à l'adoption de trois niveaux demanderont également du temps et des efforts considérables de la part des niveaux supérieurs.

100. D'autre part, un certain nombre de nos recommandations réduiront les charges administratives et accroîtront la productivité. La diminution des activités de classification et de promotion qui résultera de la simplification de la structure de classification est un exemple frappant. Il est difficile de quantifier les économies qui découleraient de ces initiatives ou d'attribuer une valeur monétaire précise à l'accélération de la prise de décisions, l'amélioration des communications, au relèvement du moral et à l'amélioration du service au public. Il se pourrait fort bien que les gains de productivité excèdent les augmentations de coûts, si l'on en juge par les résultats des calculs effectués par le Groupe de travail sur la structure des professions et de la classification quant aux économies que l'on pourrait faire par la restructuration du système de classification.

101. La taille du Groupe de la direction pourrait diminuer quelque peu avec le temps par suite de l'application de nos recommandations. Puisque nous recommandons que les administrateurs généraux soient tenus de s'en tenir aux budgets de fonctionnement après la réduction du nombre de niveaux de classification et la mise en oeuvre d'autres initiatives, les compromis effectués entre le volume de l'effectif et la rémunération pourraient entraîner une réduction de la taille du groupe. Le résultat net des efforts visant à réduire le nombre de niveaux et les nouvelles sous-délégations de pouvoirs inciteront également les administrateurs généraux à éclaircir les rangs des membres du Groupe de la direction.

102. Si elles sont mises en oeuvre avec succès, nos recommandations modifieront les processus de fonctionnement. Les gestionnaires sous le Groupe de la direction, le personnel des régions et ceux qui sont en première ligne auront de plus grands pouvoirs et responsabilités. Toutes les délégations (et sous-délégations) de pouvoirs auront besoin de bons mécanismes d'imputabilité. La mise en application des nominations à un niveau exigera l'élaboration de normes applicables aux niveaux et un processus général de promotion pour le niveau de SMA. Nos propositions changeront le processus d'évaluation du rendement et exigeront de modifier les définitions des cotes globales de rendement. L'instauration d'une approche souple des avantages sociaux exigera un processus de sélection initiale et annuelle, de même que des services de consultation pour les employés. Nous proposons également de recourir à des centres d'évaluation pour déterminer les capacités de gestion des membres du Groupe de la direction et des gestionnaires éventuels des niveaux SM-1 et SM-2. Cela élargirait l'utilisation des centres d'évaluation.

97. Certains travaux préparatoires à la réforme de la Loi sur les pensions sont en cours. Nous recommandons que les caractéristiques suivantes soient envisagées dans le cadre de ces efforts de réforme et dans l'élaboration d'un régime de retraite distinct pour le Groupe de la direction:

- il faudrait améliorer la transférabilité des contributions au régime de pension afin d'encourager la mobilité au sein de la fonction publique d'une part, et entre la fonction publique et d'autres secteurs de l'économie d'autre part.
- Il faudrait examiner les compromis qui pourraient être faits entre la rémunération et des dispositions améliorées du régime de retraite et les mettre en oeuvre lorsque c'est approprié.
- Il faudrait éliminer certaines pénalités liées à l'âge ou au nombre d'années de service au moment de la retraite anticipée, du moins dans certains cas, afin d'encourager les membres du groupe de la gestion supérieure à quitter la fonction publique.
- Il faudrait élargir la protection de la pension de façon à englober les travailleurs à temps partiel afin d'attirer dans la fonction publique des membres des groupes de l'équité en matière d'emploi.
- Il faudrait prolonger la période de remboursement des contributions dans le cas des femmes qui rentrent d'un congé parental.

EVALUATION DES RÉPERCUSSIONS

98. Nous croyons que la plupart de nos recommandations peuvent être mises en oeuvre sans augmentation des coûts globaux. Par exemple, nous avons proposé que la réduction des niveaux de classification et le renforcement des primes de rendement n'aient pas d'influence sur l'ensemble des coûts de fonctionnement des ministères.

99. Plusieurs recommandations exigeront des ressources additionnelles comme celles de l'élargissement du Réseau d'information des cadres supérieurs au-dessous du niveau des SMA, la réforme des pensions, l'instauration d'un programme à l'intention des stagiaires en gestion, l'utilisation accrue des centres d'évaluation pour les gestionnaires et les cadres supérieurs et la formation accordée aux gestionnaires. De plus, les coûts augmenteraient si les avantages ou les

en matière d'emploi. Elle permet de contrôler les coûts tout en accroissant la satisfaction des employés. Un sondage récent mené auprès des gestionnaires du secteur public a confirmé l'intérêt marqué envers une telle approche.

91. Nous recommandons donc de mettre au point une approche souple en matière d'avantages sociaux pour le Groupe de la direction sans pour autant en augmenter les coûts pour les ministères et l'ensemble de la fonction publique. Les employés pourraient choisir un ensemble d'avantages correspondant au même coût que ceux qui leur sont offerts en vertu du régime actuel. Une couverture de base devrait être offerte pour que tous les employés aient une certaine protection élémentaire. De nouveaux types et plusieurs niveaux d'avantages devraient être inscrits au menu et les employés devraient avoir le droit de choisir leur équivalent en argent.

92. Les employés devraient avoir annuellement l'occasion de confirmer ou de modifier leurs choix. La prestation de conseils aux employés faciliterait cette sélection annuelle.

93. Les membres du Groupe de la direction devraient être consultés de façon que la conception du régime tienne compte de leurs souhaits et préférences. Ce processus de consultation devrait inclure un sondage auprès d'un échantillon de cadres supérieurs, comme celui qui a été mené en 1982. Le sondage pourrait être repris à intervalles réguliers et les résultats communiqués à tous les membres du Groupe de la direction.

94. Bien que l'ensemble lui-même des avantages n'ait pas d'effet sur les coûts, il se peut que les services de la paye des ministères soient obligés de renforcer leurs effectifs pour gérer le système plus complexe que nous proposons. Ces ressources supplémentaires pourraient toutefois n'avoir aucun effet sur les coûts compte tenu des économies faites dans le cadre de nos propositions de simplification des systèmes de classification et de dotation.

Réforme du régime de retraite

95. Les trois derniers rapports du Groupe consultatif de la rémunération du personnel de direction dans la Fonction publique affirmaient qu'il fallait mettre au point un régime de pension distinct à l'intention de la catégorie de la gestion afin de pouvoir le gérer avec une souplesse adéquate. Compte tenu des changements proposés à la Loi de l'impôt sur le revenu, un régime de retraite distinct pour les membres du Groupe de la direction s'impose de plus en plus.

96. Nous croyons que ce régime devrait être composé d'un régime enregistré de base (distinct du régime de pension de retraite de la Fonction publique) et d'un régime supplémentaire qui offrirait au moins le même niveau d'avantages que le

86. Par contre, nous croyons que le rythme d'avancement d'une plage de rémunération à l'autre pourrait être ralenti par rapport à ce qu'il était historiquement. La vitesse de la progression des cadres du bas jusqu'en haut de chacune des échelles de traitement plus larges pourrait être plus lente qu'elle ne l'était dans le passé avec des échelles plus étroites.

87. Il faudrait continuer à intégrer les ajustements annuels des échelles de traitement au salaire de base, à moins que le rendement devrait être méritée chaque année, même si une partie de cette rémunération peut être ajoutée au salaire de base des employés qui ne sont pas encore au dernier échelon de l'échelle des traitements, si la haute direction en décide ainsi (et sous réserve du contrôle du budget de fonctionnement au niveau du ministère). En règle générale, une partie du montant versé au titre du rendement serait intégrée au salaire, pour maintenir une certaine uniformité entre les ministères, les administrateurs généraux devraient chercher à s'entendre à ce sujet chaque année.

Primes au rendement et encouragements

88. Nous appuyons les recommandations du Groupe de travail sur la gestion des ressources à l'effet que la rémunération, les avantages sociaux et les primes au rendement soient plus explicitement destinés à encourager et à récompenser les comportements désirés (dont le travail d'équipe et les saines pratiques de gestion des ressources humaines). Nous croyons que le pouvoir d'accorder des primes uniques et spontanées pour récompenser des réalisations particulières devrait être accru et subdélégué. Nous reconnaissons en outre que les récompenses non monétaires et la reconnaissance sont des outils essentiels de motivation qu'il ne faudrait pas négliger.

89. Nous adoptons les principes recommandés par le Groupe de travail visant la conception de primes au rendement en remplacement de la rémunération au rendement. Nous croyons que les administrateurs généraux devraient avoir plus de pouvoirs pour élaborer et administrer des régimes de récompenses du rendement qui conviennent à leurs besoins de fonctionnement et à leur culture ministérielle. Il faudra prévoir des garanties appropriées à l'égard de ces pouvoirs accrus. Les modifications des régimes de rémunération au rendement devront être financées par réaffectation interne des ressources de la gestion afin de ne pas avoir d'effet.

Avantages sociaux et gratifications

90. Dans le secteur privé, il est de plus en plus fréquent d'accorder aux employés le privilège de sélectionner les avantages sociaux et le niveau de protection. Dans la fonction publique, cette approche présente beaucoup d'intérêt car elle répond mieux aux besoins variés de la main-d'œuvre et rend l'emploi au sein de la fonction publique plus attrayant aux yeux des groupes cibles de l'équité

82. On a envisagé un certain nombre de solutions pour donner suite à ces préoccupations. Nous sommes d'avis qu'il y aurait lieu d'appliquer un plan d'unique de rémunération à chacun des nouveaux niveaux de classification, peu importe la gamme des fonctions et responsabilités qui y sont affectées. Ce serait une erreur d'établir des plages de rémunération multiples à l'intérieur de chaque niveau de classification, car ces plages multiples tendraient à lier de fait de sous-classifications. Ces dernières risquent d'être complexes à administrer et de perpétuer les pressions en faveur d'une reclassification à la hausse, ce qui est à l'origine de tout ce travail et des frictions que l'on connaît en ce moment. En outre, des barrières salariales risquent de miner toutes les tentatives de déstratification et d'être contre-indiquées dans le contexte d'un régime où les cadres sont promus au niveau, alors que le traitement ne peut pas varier à chaque réaffectation.

83. Nous recommandons donc d'établir pour chacun des trois nouveaux niveaux de classification un plan d'unique de rémunération correspondant au dernier échelon des niveaux EX-1, EX-3 et EX-5. Les niveaux de rémunération continueraient d'être fondés sur des comparaisons avec l'extérieur et sur un système de relativités internes dans le cas du niveau EXHC-1 en se servant du nouveau point médian et en utilisant un système de relativités internes au regard des niveaux EXHC-2 et EXHC-3.

84. À l'intérieur des nouvelles plages de rémunération, les augmentations salariales pourraient être autorisées suivant les responsabilités, le rendement et l'expérience, mais le budget de fonctionnement du ministère ne devrait pas augmenter. Les administrateurs généraux devraient être tenus de respecter au plus profond de frais de fonctionnement. À cette fin, on pourrait veiller à ce que seuls les gestionnaires qui ont des responsabilités justifiant nettement un traitement plus élevé atteignent les échelons supérieurs de l'échelle salariale, réduire le nombre des cadres supérieurs et/ou ralentir leur progression d'un échelon à l'autre, en éliminant ou en réduisant la proportion de la rémunération au rendement qui constitue une majoration salariale.

85. Nous avons étudié l'argument selon lequel les rajustements économiques ne devraient pas être automatiques, mais laissés à la discrétion des gestionnaires. Même si cette pratique a cours dans le secteur privé et permet des réductions nettes de salaires dans les cas de rendement habituellement insatisfaisant, nous sommes d'avis que l'application rigoureuse d'un principe de ce genre ne serait pas judicieuse. Dans la fonction publique, on a fini par considérer qu'un rendement entièrement satisfaisant doit être récompensé par une quelconque augmentation annuelle afin d'atténuer les effets de l'inflation et de reconnaître au moins formellement le mérite et l'expérience acquise. Décevoir ces attentes pourrait nuire au rendement, accroître la méfiance et décourager l'entrée dans les rangs des cadres supérieurs.

de ses parties. La dotation pourrait reposer plutôt sur un mécanisme comme les évaluations pluriannuelles globales préparées par des hauts fonctionnaires et endossées par le comité de la haute direction du ministère ou le sous-ministre. Un tel document devrait comporter la "liste maîtresse" des capacités et des aptitudes, liste élaborée par les organismes centraux afin d'assurer au processus une certaine mesure de discipline et de cohérence.

Cessation d'emploi

79. Bien que la haute direction puisse maintenant régler plus facilement les graves problèmes de rendement, il faut encore simplifier le processus utilisé pour traiter les employés dont le rendement est systématiquement inférieur à la moyenne. Pour donner plus de latitude à l'administrateur général, la politique actuelle concernant la cessation d'emploi devrait s'appliquer non seulement aux employés excédentaires suite à un dégraisage, une déstructuration ou une réorganisation, ou à ceux dont le rendement s'est nettement détérioré, mais également à ceux dont l'engagement et la contribution sont si minimes que leur départ profiterait à l'organisme.

80. Les administrateurs généraux devraient continuer de consulter la Commission de la Fonction publique avant d'entamer le processus menant à la cessation d'emploi afin de vérifier si les capacités et l'expérience du gestionnaire ne peuvent pas être mises à profit ailleurs dans la fonction publique. Le Secrétaire du Conseil du Trésor devrait continuer à intervenir de façon déterminante dans le processus en fournissant des conseils précieux quant aux points forts et aux points faibles de chaque cas, à la tendance des règlements dans la fonction publique et dans le secteur privé, aux dernières décisions des tribunaux et à la relative interministérielle, de même qu'une recommandation de règlement de la situation. Les ministères devraient également avoir la souplesse nécessaire pour négocier directement avec l'intéressé.

RÉMUNÉRATION ET AVANTAGES SOCIAUX

Politique en matière de rémunération

81. La recommandation visant à fusionner les niveaux du Groupe de la direction soulève deux grandes préoccupations apparentes : (i) en raison des nouvelles plages élargies de rémunération, certains cadres supérieurs pourraient toucher la même rémunération que leurs collègues en dépit de différences marquées du point de vue de leurs responsabilités; (ii) les coûts salariaux d'ensemble pourraient s'enfler à mesure que les employés atteindront le dernier échelon de leur échelle de traitement, au fil des ans.

définition des besoins en formation et rapports aux organismes centraux. Nous nous interrogeons sur sa capacité de toutes les remplir adéquatement.

73. Suite à cet examen, nous recommandons qu'une politique distincte soit élaborée et appliquée à l'évaluation des membres du Groupe de la direction. Le processus serait divisé en deux volets, l'évaluation du rendement et l'examen des carrières, bien qu'il faille reconnaître que les deux sont reliés.

74. Le rapport sur le rendement devrait évaluer la contribution du gestionnaire à l'organisme au cours des 12 derniers mois et ses aptitudes et qualités de gestion. Ce serait le résumé du dialogue de l'employé avec son supérieur au cours des 12 mois visés. La politique des organismes centraux en matière d'évaluation du rendement devrait encourager l'autoévaluation afin de s'assurer que ce dialogue est aussi constructif que possible. Un document d'autoévaluation servirait de point de départ à la discussion sans brimer le droit du supérieur de changer ou modifier la formulation.

75. Nous appuyons les recommandations du Groupe de travail sur l'adaptation de la main-d'œuvre qui considère que, pour tous les membres du Groupe de la direction, les responsables de l'évaluation tiennent compte des opinions des subordonnés quant à la qualité de la gestion pendant la période visée. Bien qu'il ne s'agisse pas là des principales données de l'évaluation, on devrait rechercher cette rétroaction (sous la forme d'un sondage auprès des employés par exemple) afin d'aider à identifier et corriger les problèmes.

76. Compte tenu du fait que les cotes générales de rendement sont rarement sinon jamais utilisées (la cote "insatisfaisant" par exemple), les cinq cotes actuellement utilisées devraient être révisées de façon à fusionner le satisfaisant et l'insatisfaisant en une nouvelle cote qui indiquerait un rendement ne répondant pas aux attentes de la direction. Les autres pourraient être modifiées afin de mieux distinguer les niveaux de rendement. Il faudrait que toute nouvelle cote soit bien définie et clairement identifiable. La cote de rendement global servirait à déterminer la rémunération au rendement et non les possibilités de carrière à long terme. Compte tenu de la souplesse appliquée en matière de rémunération au rendement, la règle des 30 % devrait continuer de s'appliquer, afin que les cotes "supérieur" et "exceptionnel" (ou tout nouvel équivalent) aient une signification et une valeur et que son objet soit précisé.

77. Un rapport distinct sur le cheminement de la carrière préciserait les besoins et les recommandations en matière de formation, les options de cheminement et les aspirations et préférences du gestionnaire. Ce rapport n'aborderait pas lui non plus la question du potentiel de l'employé.

78. L'évaluation du rendement ne devrait pas servir aux fins de dotation si le système de nomination au niveau est appliqué au Groupe de la direction ou à une

de la fonction publique comme plus rigides et moins réalistes que celles du secteur privé. Il faudra redoubler d'efforts pour définir et mettre en oeuvre des mesures correctrices encourageant la mobilité entre les régions et l'administration centrale et entre les régions elles-mêmes. À cet égard, on craint surtout les conséquences négatives de cette politique sur l'avancement des carrières des conjoints et les variations du coût de la vie entre les régions.

Mobilité entre les secteurs public et privé

69. Les membres du Groupe de travail croient qu'une augmentation du flot des échanges de cadres supérieurs entre la fonction publique et le secteur privé est souhaitable. De tels échanges accroissent la compréhension et le respect mutuels et sensibilisent les cadres supérieurs aux objectifs, problèmes, besoins et attitudes de l'autre secteur. En plus, ce type d'échanges augmentent le flot d'information quant aux bonnes pratiques de gestion. Nous croyons qu'il faudrait réduire ou enlever les obstacles qui nuisent à ce mouvement. Nous ne croyons pas que la fonction publique perdra ses cadres supérieurs les plus talentueux.

70. Il arrive régulièrement que le transfert d'un haut fonctionnaire au secteur privé puisse être facilité dans l'intérêt aussi bien du fonctionnaire que de la fonction publique en général. Cela se produit habituellement lorsqu'un fonctionnaire envisage un poste dans le secteur privé mais que ni lui ni son employeur éventuel du secteur privé ne sont sûrs du succès du transfert projeté. Nous croyons qu'il est dans l'intérêt de la fonction publique d'examiner nos divers programmes et politiques concernant ce type de mobilité en vue d'éliminer tout obstacle éventuel et, au besoin, de faciliter une "période d'essai" qui aiderait les deux parties à prendre une décision.

71. On utiliserait, entre autres, Échanges Canada et le Programme d'échanges de cadres de direction entre les milieux d'affaires et l'administration fédérale pour offrir ce genre de "période d'essai". En l'occurrence, toutefois, on supprimerait certaines dispositions de l'accord de principe, notamment la disposition interdisant d'offrir au fonctionnaire un emploi au terme de son affectation. De même, les salaires inférieurs pourraient être autorisés lorsque la situation d'apprentissage le justifie - le ministère verserait la différence au fonctionnaire. En outre, il serait entendu que les intéressés pourraient négocier des salaires et des avantages sociaux qui ne seraient pas supérieurs à ceux qui sont habituellement offerts dans la fonction publique.

Évaluation du rendement

72. Le système d'évaluation du rendement a été examiné afin de déterminer s'il est adéquatement structuré. Ce système remplit de nombreuses fonctions: examen du rendement, établissement de la rémunération, révision des carrières,

64. Le perfectionnement en gestion se fait normalement par l'expérience de travail, les relations interpersonnelles et des cours structurés. Il est en général admis que la plus grande partie de l'apprentissage a lieu au travail, ce qui est la formule de développement de carrière la plus efficace. Nous recommandons d'augmenter, à tous les niveaux, la formation obligatoire en cours d'emploi et les affectations par rotation, afin de développer et d'affiner les capacités de gestion.

65. Il faudrait continuer d'offrir le plus tôt possible aux nouveaux-venus dans le Groupe de la direction et à ceux qui s'y destinent, la formation obligatoire qui leur donne les connaissances de base nécessaires pour fonctionner au sein de la fonction publique et mieux cerner leur rôle opérationnel et structurel. Nous croyons également qu'il faudrait offrir de la formation en gestion aux membres du nouveau Groupe de la direction. La formation assure une source constante de gestionnaires compétents dans la fonction publique et elle familiarise en outre les gestionnaires potentiels avec la philosophie ou les valeurs qui influent sur le comportement et la culture de la fonction publique. Nous appuyons tous les efforts qui visent actuellement à évaluer la pertinence des cours de formation et d'initiation en gestion. Nous convenons que ces cours devraient répondre aux besoins des gestionnaires, quel que soit leur niveau. Nous attendons l'avis du nouveau Groupe de travail sur la formation et le perfectionnement du personnel à cet égard et au sujet d'autres questions de formation.

Services d'orientation professionnelle et de placement

66. Dans notre rapport préliminaire, nous avons soutenu qu'il faudrait offrir des services d'orientation professionnelle et de placement aux membres du Groupe de la direction. La proposition de la Commission de la Fonction publique de mettre sur pied le service de diagnostic et d'orientation professionnelle à l'intention des membres de la catégorie de la gestion comblerait les besoins définis par le Groupe de travail.

Mobilité au sein de la fonction publique

67. Il est important que les prochains sous-ministres et sous-ministres adjoints aient eu des expériences de travail dans les centres régionaux. Dans le but d'encourager les cadres supérieurs à rechercher et accepter des affectations dans d'autres régions, il faudra que le régime d'avantages soit souple. Allié à d'autres instruments stratégiques, ce régime devrait être utilisé pour encourager une plus grande mobilité entre les régions et l'administration centrale et entre les régions elles-mêmes.

68. La politique de réinstallation constitue une entrave supplémentaire à la mobilité inter-régionale et interministérielle. Nous sommes d'accord avec le Groupe consultatif de la rémunération du personnel de direction dans la Fonction publique, qui, dans son rapport de 1988, considère les politiques de réinstallation

60. Il faut élaborer des stratégies valables pour s'assurer que la fonction publique reflète bien la composition de la population canadienne et soit en mesure de tirer le meilleur parti de la diversité des opinions et des talents des Canadiens. Nous croyons que la question réside essentiellement dans le changement dans la culture de l'organisation et des valeurs de gestion.

61. Nous sommes également d'accord avec le Groupe de travail sur l'adaptation de la main-d'œuvre sur la présence aux comités de sélection de membres des minorités et la surreprésentation des autochtones, minorités et handicapés au sein des programmes de perfectionnement. En outre, ces groupes devraient être représentés équitablement au sein des équipes des centres d'évaluation.

FORMATION ET PERFECTIONNEMENT

Formation et perfectionnement professionnels

62. Nous jugeons essentiel d'aborder de façon planifiée et proactive le perfectionnement de tous les gestionnaires, du superviseur au SMA, pour constituer une réserve adéquate de gestionnaires compétents. La responsabilité première de la formation et du perfectionnement revient aux ministères. Nous sommes d'accord le nouveau cadre stratégique élaboré par le Conseil de formation du personnel qui souhaite que les ministères se dotent d'énoncés précis quant aux genres de capacités, d'expérience et de compétences exigées des gestionnaires de tous les niveaux. De tels énoncés devraient s'inspirer du "Profil des leaders et des gestionnaires", et refléter les exigences de la fonction publique en général aussi bien que celles du ministère concerné. Nous croyons que ces critères et exigences permettront de régler l'entrée et l'avancement au sein du Groupe de la direction.

63. Nous convenons également que les besoins de chaque gestionnaire en matière de formation et de perfectionnement soient réexaminés au moins une fois l'an et nous proposons plus loin des modifications au processus d'évaluation qui, à notre avis, permettront d'accorder plus d'attention à ces considérations. La planification de carrière est une activité d'importance croissante, compte tenu de la compression des niveaux de classification de la direction. Comme les promotions se feront plus rares, les mutations latérales constitueront de plus en plus le moyen privilégié de distribuer les affectations stimulantes qui vont perfectionner et motiver les employés. La planification de carrière devrait également être améliorée dans le cas des candidats des groupes de relève afin de veiller à ce que ces candidats comprennent bien et remplissent les exigences préalables à l'entrée et à l'avancement.

58. En plus, dans le but d'aider à corriger le déséquilibre entre les sexes au sein du Groupe de la direction, nous recommandons les mesures suivantes :

- Il faudrait utiliser des consultants de l'extérieur pour repérer les facteurs de discrimination fortuite au sein d'un ministère; les données faciliteraient la mise au point d'un plan d'action.

- Il faudrait étudier attentivement les descriptions de poste et les processus de sélection pour vérifier s'ils ne portent pas préjudice aux candidates.

- Il faudrait que des femmes fassent partie des comités de recrutement, promotion et affectation de perfectionnement de même que des équipes des centres d'évaluation du potentiel en gestion.

- Il faudrait cerner adéquatement les opinions des femmes dans les sondages sur les attitudes des gestionnaires et dans les groupes de discussion. Par exemple, les besoins et les préférences des femmes devraient être partie intégrante de la planification d'une approche souple d'avantages sociaux et d'une réforme du régime de retraite. De telles données sont indispensables à des politiques et pratiques adaptées aux divers besoins des employés.

- Il faudrait faire des efforts plus proactifs afin d'inciter les femmes à entrer au niveau de la relève du Groupe de la direction de la fonction publique et d'identifier des candidates qualifiées pour leur nomination au sein de la structure de direction.

- Il faudrait que les programmes et affectations de perfectionnement aient des femmes en surnombre et soient utilisés avec dynamisme afin de créer une réserve suffisante de candidates compétentes.

- Il faudrait que le partage du travail et le temps partiel soient pleinement considérés aux fins de l'avancement au niveau de la gestion.

59. D'après la Commission de la Fonction publique, les autres groupes du programme d'équité en matière d'emploi ne sont pas représentés en proportion de leur importance numérique dans l'ensemble de la population canadienne. L'absence de données fiables quant à la proportion des membres de ces groupes au sein de la fonction publique, calculée à la suite d'études d'auto-identification, est troublante. Comme on ignore l'ampleur du problème, il est difficile de fixer des buts appropriés ou de mesurer les progrès réalisés. Il faut continuer de travailler en vue de corriger cette lacune.

dans les processus de promotion administrés par les ministères afin de veiller à ce que le principe du mérite continue d'être respecté dans les décisions de dotation. La mobilité interministérielle devrait être surveillée après la délégation puisque de tels changements dans d'autres paliers de gouvernement en ont entraîné le déclin marqué. Afin de l'empêcher, des initiatives supplémentaires seront peut-être nécessaires, telles que, par exemple, une meilleure diffusion de l'information sur les gestionnaires dans toutes les régions du pays de même que des objectifs et l'imputabilité appropriés en matière de mobilité interministérielle, tout en gardant à l'esprit les buts quant à l'embauche des groupes particuliers.

Recrutement

55. Pour se maintenir, la fonction publique doit recruter aujourd'hui les gestionnaires de demain. Il lui faut donc absolument disposer d'un programme précis destiné à attirer dans la fonction publique les meilleurs éléments que produisent nos universités. Le Groupe de travail a précisément recommandé un programme de stagiaires en gestion doté d'un budget propre. Si les ministères accordent l'attention voulue à la gestion des ressources humaines et utilisent judicieusement les programmes de perfectionnement comme le programme Cours et affectations de perfectionnement (CAP), cet apport des universités fournira les gestionnaires de calibre dont la fonction publique aura besoin à partir de l'an 2000. Nous croyons savoir qu'on cherche à obtenir du Conseil du Trésor les ressources qui permettraient d'établir un programme de stagiaires en gestion et d'intensifier le recrutement postsecondaire.

56. Les gestionnaires ont eu de la difficulté à recruter des membres des groupes cibles et à les retenir. Il y a encore des obstacles à l'entrée et à l'avancement des femmes, des autochtones, des membres des minorités visibles et des handicapés dans la catégorie de la gestion, au sein des ministères et dans l'ensemble de la fonction publique.

57. Pour ce qui est des obstacles à l'avancement des femmes, nous avons étudié attentivement le rapport du Groupe de travail sur les obstacles rencontrés par les femmes dans la fonction publique et nous appuyons sans réserve les orientations qui y sont proposées. Nous endossons ses recommandations, et notamment les suivantes: l'imputabilité des administrateurs généraux et gestionnaires quant aux progrès en vue de l'équilibre entre les sexes dans tous les groupes et niveaux; la possibilité pour les employés à temps partiel de contribuer au régime de pension; le prolongement de la période de remboursement; l'encouragement au partage du travail, au temps partiel, au travail à domicile et aux horaires de travail plus souples, afin d'aider les employés à concilier obligations familiales et professionnelles; les entrevues de fin d'emploi, afin de définir les obstacles et les facteurs de frustration au sein des ministères et dans l'ensemble de la fonction publique.

catégorie dépendent plus de compétences spécialisées que des aptitudes à la gestion. Tout le monde croit donc que le système n'arrive pas à garantir que ceux qui sont promus au rang de gestionnaire ont les capacités nécessaires en gestion.

51. Les avantages et inconvénients de divers modèles de promotion au niveau applicables au Groupe de la direction ont donné lieu à un long débat. Sous sa forme la plus rigoureuse, la promotion au niveau constitue un exercice annuel centralisé qui vise à évaluer les candidats jugés aptes à une promotion par rapport à une norme commune de la fonction publique visant tous les postes classés à un niveau donné, d'où l'expression nomination au niveau. Nous avons conclu que cette forme extrême de la nomination au niveau conviendrait au niveau de SMA, mais qu'au niveau d'entrée (directeur) et au niveau intermédiaire (directeur général), il serait utile de considérer non seulement les exigences reconnues dans l'ensemble de la fonction publique, mais également les exigences de nature technique que comporte chaque poste.

52. Nous proposons donc un modèle fondé sur le concept de promotion au niveau qui, pour les niveaux d'entrée et de directeur général, serait distinction du modèle appliqué aux SMA. En effet, l'entrée dans le Groupe de la direction et la promotion au niveau de directeur général seraient fondées sur les exigences propres aux postes visés et sur la norme adoptée dans l'ensemble de la fonction publique pour le niveau donné. De cette façon, les ministères mettraient sur pied des processus de concours adaptés à chaque poste à mesure que des vacances se créeraient et lorsque le déploiement intra ou interministériel n'est pas envisagé. Toutefois, après la sélection, le candidat serait nommé au niveau approprié plutôt qu'à un poste précis. Au niveau des SMA, le Groupe de travail a conclu qu'un processus de promotion centralisé conviendrait aux besoins et devrait être mis en oeuvre. Une description plus détaillée du modèle que nous recommandons figure parmi les rapports documentaires disponibles.

53. Afin de donner suite à la question susmentionnée concernant l'équité, le Groupe de travail recommande que l'annonce des occasions de promotion soient la règle plutôt que l'exception et que la Commission de la fonction publique assume un rôle de premier plan dans ces processus de promotion administrés par les ministères aux niveaux de directeur et de directeur général.

Pouvoirs de dotation

54. Les pouvoirs de dotation pour le Groupe de la direction jusqu'au niveau EX-3 (EXBC-2 proposé) inclusivement devraient être délégués aux administrateurs généraux. Chaque ministre devrait être en mesure de promouvoir des gestionnaires au niveau d'entrée et à l'intérieur de la catégorie en provenance du ministère ou d'autres ministères et de recruter des candidats à l'extérieur de la fonction publique. Cette délégation s'accompagnerait de mécanismes appropriés d'imputabilité. La Commission de la fonction publique jouerait un rôle partagé

- Il devrait donner aux cadres supérieurs le pouvoir de décider qui doit remplir telles fonctions au sein de l'organisation.
- Il devrait être assez souple pour répondre aux besoins opérationnels.
- Au sein d'un tel système, les cadres supérieurs devraient être considérés à la fois comme des ressources ministérielles et comme des ressources d'ensemble.
- Le système devrait pouvoir veiller au perfectionnement des cadres supérieurs en facilitant l'acquisition d'une vaste expérience.

48. En examinant la façon actuelle d'envisager la dotation de la catégorie de la gestion, nous étions conscients de la recommandation du Groupe de travail sur la dotation au sujet du concept de nomination au niveau. Le Groupe de travail distingue en effet la capacité d'affecter un employé à un poste, quelle que soit sa classification, et celle de lui donner une promotion. Il recommande de modifier la loi pour y inclure, pour tous les groupes professionnels, l'aspect "déplacement" de la nomination au niveau pour expliquer clairement que toute mutation latérale est une prérogative de la direction et que les déplacements sans promotion d'un poste à un autre ne constituent pas une nomination aux termes de la loi. Nous appuyons cette recommandation. Son acceptation modifiera la situation actuelle de la catégorie de la gestion, puisqu'elle éliminera l'aspect "propriété" des nominations à un poste.

49. Les discussions ont également porté sur la question du consentement de l'employé visé par un déplacement. Les membres du Groupe de travail croient que le Groupe de la direction devrait faire partie des groupes professionnels où le déplacement est la responsabilité de la gestion s'il s'agit d'un déplacement dans la même zone de transport quotidien. Si le cadre doit s'installer dans une autre ville ou une autre région suite au déplacement, on demanderait son consentement à moins que le ministère n'ait précisé le déplacement comme condition d'emploi.

50. Lorsque le Groupe de travail a abordé l'élément promotion au niveau du concept de nomination au niveau, il a amplement discuté des problèmes à corriger dans le système actuel. Nous sommes particulièrement préoccupés du fait que les membres de la catégorie de la gestion croient de manière générale que les promotions sont déterminées à l'avance. Comme fondement de ce sentiment d'injustice, les employés ont pointé du doigt le fait que plusieurs promotions sont accordées sans concours, que celles qui le sont sont souvent obtenues par quelqu'un qui a occupé le poste à titre intérimaire et que les avis de vacance s'accompagnent souvent d'énoncés de qualités très spécialisées qui donnent l'impression d'avoir été préparés dans le but d'éliminer des candidats ou d'en favoriser certains. On croit également que l'entrée et la promotion au sein de la

information à jour sur les postes vacants, les nominations et toute autre mesure de dotation. L'addition de renseignements de nature stratégique, financière et autre, devrait permettre d'en faire un réseau de communication de première valeur pour le Groupe de la direction et pour la structure de gestion de la fonction publique. Avec ce réseau d'échanges d'information, la fonction publique pourrait posséder l'instrument idéal pour réduire sa dépendance envers le papier. Il pourrait avoir une influence considérable sur nos méthodes pour recueillir, conserver et diffuser les renseignements.

45. Nous formulons également des recommandations concernant d'autres efforts qui pourraient être faits pour améliorer la circulation des renseignements susceptibles d'intéresser les gestionnaires, notamment la publication plus fréquente de La Revue des gestionnaires/The Manager's Magazine, la mise au point d'échanges des "meilleures méthodes" et les mises à jour calquées sur celles des SMA pour les membres du Groupe de la Direction et des gestionnaires.

DOTATION DU GROUPE DE LA DIRECTION

Modification du processus de dotation

46. En vertu de la Loi sur l'emploi dans la Fonction publique (LEFP), la sélection d'une personne en vue de remplir les fonctions liées à un poste donné se fait suivant les exigences précises de ce poste et aboutit à la «nomination» de la personne à un poste donné. Toute mutation ou "déplacement" à un autre poste constitue une nomination légale. La Commission de la Fonction publique délègue aux administrateurs généraux les pouvoirs en matière de mutation intraministérielle ou d'ajout de membres de la catégorie de la gestion lorsque l'on ne reclasse pas les cadres concernés. La Commission conserve tous les pouvoirs sur les autres nominations (déplacements interministériels et promotions).

47. Le Groupe de travail a élaboré un ensemble de principes qui devraient guider tous les changements apportés au système de promotion actuel et ce sont:

- La promotion devrait se fonder sur les évaluations des candidats par rapport à une norme de niveau.
- Il ne devrait exister aucun obstacle systémique à la représentativité de la fonction publique et le système de promotion devrait respecter les politiques visant à corriger les déséquilibres de représentation.
- Le système devrait être et sembler juste. Il devrait donner à tous les membres du Groupe de la direction des chances équitables de promotion à certains moments de leur carrière.

Habilitation des gestionnaires

ressources en gestion.

généralistes de meilleures possibilités de former, déployer et administrer leurs

41. Il faut garantir aux gestionnaires des pouvoirs correspondant à leurs responsabilités. Nous avons proposé de déléguer un certain nombre de pouvoirs supplémentaires aux ministères (classification, dotation et autres) qui devraient être dûment subdélégués. Cependant, dans certains cas, c'est le ministère qui sert de pierre d'achoppement. Par conséquent, nous recommandons que tous les ministères revolent leurs systèmes et pratiques internes afin que les pouvoirs soient subdélégués au niveau approprié au-dessous de celui d'administrateur général et qu'ils rejoignent les gestionnaires régionaux et employés de première ligne. Les pouvoirs doivent être conférés aux personnes dont le poste a la plus forte incidence.

42. Les gestionnaires doivent également être incités à utiliser pleinement les pouvoirs qui leur sont délégués et à faire preuve d'innovation pour accroître l'efficacité et la rentabilité. Pour ce faire, les règles du jeu doivent être modifiées: avec la nouvelle philosophie de la gestion, l'erreur ou l'échec occasionnels doivent être acceptés par la haute direction et les pouvoirs politiques comme le prix normal à payer lorsqu'on fait des affaires. On doit vraisemblablement réorienter les systèmes de récompense et de reconnaissance afin d'encourager la créativité et le plein exercice des pouvoirs dévolus aux gestionnaires.

Amélioration de la communication entre les gestionnaires

43. Nous croyons également que la communication entre les gestionnaires et les membres du Groupe de la direction devrait être améliorée. Par exemple, un grand nombre de gestionnaires sont d'avis qu'on ne fait pas les efforts suffisants pour les mettre au courant des nouvelles initiatives et priorités du gouvernement, leur faire comprendre les pratiques de ressourcement utilisées au sein de la catégorie de la gestion ou les informer des possibilités d'avancement à l'échelle ministérielle et de la Fonction publique.

44. Les membres du Groupe de travail sont fortement en faveur d'améliorer la circulation opportune de renseignements qui intéressent les gestionnaires en général et, en particulier, ceux qui ont trait aux postes vacants, aux déploiements et aux nominations. Dans notre rapport préliminaire, nous avons recommandé la mise en oeuvre du réseau d'information des cadres supérieurs (RICS). Ce service qui a été approuvé par la suite assurera d'abord l'interconnexion entre les sous-ministres et les sous-ministres adjoints. Il conviendrait cependant qu'il soit étendu pour permettre l'interconnexion de tous les membres du Groupe de la direction. Son extension à des sous-groupes particuliers ne faisant pas partie du Groupe de la direction est envisageable. Ce réseau électronique est un véhicule idéal d'une

leurs rôles et responsabilités de direction ni ne partagent de valeurs et principes communs.

36. L'absence d'un groupe dont la classification porte «exclusivement» sur la gestion empêche également d'utiliser une approche uniforme à la sélection, la formation, l'avancement professionnel, l'évaluation des postes et à la rémunération des gestionnaires et des candidats à la gestion. Les employés qui exercent des tâches importantes de gestion qui n'appartiennent pas au Groupe de la direction ne bénéficient pas toujours d'une formation ni d'un perfectionnement suffisant en matière de gestion et ne reçoivent pas une rémunération suffisante pour les risques et responsabilités qu'ils prennent en matière de gestion.

37. Afin de compenser ces inconvénients, nous recommandons que les gestionnaires soient nettement démarqués des autres employés, tant à l'intérieur des filières professionnelles parallèles qu'aux niveaux SM-1 et SM-2. Le terme "gestionnaire" devrait être réservé à ceux qui ont des responsabilités de gestion. Ces gestionnaires n'ont pas besoin d'être exclus des conventions collectives, mais ils le devraient, notamment lorsqu'ils font fonction de premier palier de règlement des griefs.

38. Les postes de gestion devraient être réservés aux employés dont la sélection est faite par voie de concours mettant l'accent sur les aptitudes à gérer des ressources humaines. Il y aurait lieu de déceler des les premiers stades, en faisant plus largement appel aux centres d'évaluation, les employés qui possèdent les capacités de gestion et de leur assurer un perfectionnement systématique pour faire en sorte que la Fonction publique puisse compter sur des gestionnaires de grande qualité dont elle aura besoin dans l'avenir. Les femmes et les autres groupes visés par le programme d'égalité d'accès à l'emploi devraient être bien représentés au sein des groupes de relève pour la direction et surreprésentés dans les programmes de perfectionnement.

39. Pour distinguer encore davantage les gestionnaires, il faudrait établir un régime distinct de rémunération au rendement, un processus particulier de rajustement salarial annuel et une approche souple en matière d'avantages sociaux. Étant donné que la prestation de ces avantages aux gestionnaires visés par les conventions collectives risque de modifier les conditions d'emploi, il faudrait discuter ces recommandations avec les syndicats dans les meilleurs délais.

40. Nous croyons que la mise en oeuvre d'un régime distinct pour les gestionnaires exclus et l'inculcation d'un ensemble commun de valeurs fondamentales vont aider à créer un cadre homogène de gestion tant à l'échelle des ministères qu'à l'échelle de la fonction publique toute entière. L'instauration d'un régime distinct pour tous les gestionnaires, peu importe qu'ils fassent partie des groupes parallèles ou qu'ils appartiennent aux niveaux SM-1 et SM-2, va accentuer la valeur accordée aux responsabilités de gestion et donner aux administrateurs

ministères (et chacun des gestionnaires) imputables des résultats obtenus, ce qui, à l'échelle ministérielle, pourra prendre la forme d'une entente d'APRM.

CRÉATION D'UN CADRE DE GESTION HOMOGÈNE ET EFFICACE

Développer des valeurs communes

32. Tout au long de la dernière décennie, on fait un certain nombre de tentatives pour articuler une philosophie de la gestion de manière à définir nettement les valeurs, principes et objectifs qui devraient être partagés par les gestionnaires de la fonction publique dans l'accomplissement de leurs responsabilités. La très large acceptation des éléments fondamentaux nous incite à croire qu'il est possible de réaliser un tel objectif que nous croyons hautement souhaitable.

33. Nous recommandons donc de mettre de l'avant avec ardeur, au sein des ministères et dans l'ensemble de la fonction publique, les mesures pour définir une "philosophie de la gestion" fondée sur la raison d'être de la fonction publique -- nous sont confiées. Le partage d'un ensemble commun de valeurs et de principes directeurs clairement énoncés est de nature à favoriser la création d'un cadre de gestion indispensable et homogène et à exercer une influence sur la façon dont les politiques, structures et processus sont élaborés et mis en œuvre. En particulier, nous croyons que ces valeurs devraient encourager les gestionnaires à favoriser la création d'un milieu où la créativité, l'audace et l'excellence dans l'exécution des programmes gouvernementaux puissent s'épanouir et être valorisées. Ces valeurs et principes devraient en outre encourager le respect mutuel, la confiance, l'esprit d'équipe, l'adaptation, la pertinence et l'excellence du service au public. Une fois définies, ces valeurs devront être assimilées par tous les gestionnaires.

34. La définition des valeurs de la gestion est un projet à plus long terme qui devrait être confié au greffier du Conseil privé pour l'ensemble de la fonction publique avec l'aide d'un groupe de travail spécial de Fonction publique 2000, du Centre canadien de gestion et de l'APFEX. Cette action collective devrait s'inspirer du travail déjà accompli par les divers groupes de travail et ministères.

Reconnaissance des gestionnaires à l'extérieur du Groupe de la direction

35. La nouvelle définition du Groupe de la direction exclut encore d'importantes fractions de l'équipe de la gestion qu'exige l'administration des ministères et programmes gouvernementaux. Les gestionnaires qui ne font pas partie du Groupe de la direction ne peuvent pas facilement s'identifier à un cadre commun de direction, que ce soit à l'échelle d'un ministère ou à l'échelle de l'administration fédérale. Par conséquent, il se peut qu'ils ne comprennent pas

Cette délégation a été approuvée par la suite. Le mécanisme d'imputabilité proposé par le Conseil du Trésor est encore l'objet de discussions. Il faudrait fonder le mécanisme adopté sur le principe de la confiance envers les ministères qui ont les pouvoirs. Le Conseil du Trésor contrôlerait et ferait rapport sur le rendement.

29. Notre rapport préliminaire recommandait également d'étudier l'application du plan Hay afin de déterminer s'il donne lieu à des injustices de classification en ce qui a trait aux postes des bureaux régionaux et des administrations centrales, et aux postes organiques et fonctionnels. Le Secrétaire du Conseil du Trésor a convenu de mener une telle étude. Il faudrait également songer à des modifications de nature à alléger le fardeau de l'administration du système et à faciliter aux gestionnaires l'exercice des pouvoirs de classification qui leur sont délégués.

Contrôle de la collectivité

30. Le contrôle de la collectivité de la catégorie de la gestion a été instauré au début des années 1970 afin de contrôler le mouvement d'expansion accélérée du groupe des cadres. Ce contrôle n'est plus aujourd'hui aussi nécessaire et justifié. La dimension de la catégorie a été relativement stable au cours de la dernière décennie et tout laisse croire que sa dimension va diminuer en raison de l'incidence de la déstratification et de la fusion des niveaux de classification. En outre, le maintien de l'utilisation du système Hay d'évaluation des tâches sera suffisant pour garantir que toute modification à la collectivité peut être justifiée. L'établissement de budgets de fonctionnement fixera des limites au changement dans le nombre des employés. Enfin, la création de sous-ministres adjoints demeure une fonction des organismes centraux en vertu de nos propositions. Le contrôle de la collectivité n'est pas tout à fait conforme aux principes qui sous-tendent l'Accroissement des pouvoirs et des responsabilités des ministères (APRM) qui favorisent le remplacement des contrôles et des règlements par une obligation de rendre compte après le fait. Des projets pilotes ont montré que la suppression du contrôle des années-personnes n'entraîne pas nécessairement d'augmentations injustifiées des effectifs.

31. Par conséquent, nous recommandons que le contrôle de la collectivité soit remplacé progressivement par un budget de fonctionnement qui engloberait les salaires et avantages sociaux, d'autres frais de fonctionnement et des dépenses mineures en immobilisation. Nous convenons avec le Groupe de travail sur la gestion des ressources que cette solution est de nature à donner aux ministères la plus grande latitude possible pour modifier l'équilibre de ces articles de dépenses afin de répondre à des besoins particuliers de fonctionnement. Cette solution permettra en outre de mieux évaluer les coûts et l'efficacité de l'exécution des programmes. Il faudra concevoir un schéma approprié d'imputabilité rendant les

28. Notre rapport préliminaire recommandait dans l'immédiat la délégation des pouvoirs de classification au sous-ministre jusqu'à l'actuel niveau EX-3 (EXEC-2 projeté) inclusivement, accompagnés d'un mécanisme approprié d'imputabilité.

Pouvoirs de classification

27. Comme la fusion qui permettra de ramener à trois le nombre des niveaux va occasionner des problèmes à certains ministères, ces derniers devront jouir d'une certaine latitude pendant la période de transition. Chaque ministère devrait être autorisé à établir sa propre méthode et son propre calendrier de transition, de concert avec le Conseil du Trésor.

26. Dans l'intérêt d'une mise en oeuvre rapide et pour réduire les coûts de transition, les nouveaux niveaux de classification devraient être délimités par la fourchette de points du système Hay et les employés qui font actuellement partie des groupes SM et EX devraient bénéficier d'une clause de droits acquis au moment du passage de la structure actuelle à la nouvelle structure. La mise en oeuvre d'un système de classification à trois niveaux constituera certainement un facteur encourageant et parfois même facilitant les efforts de déstructuration actuellement déployés par de nombreux ministères. Les ministères devraient examiner les possibilités de changement dans leur organisation avant que soit entamé le processus de conversion afin de définir la méthode la plus efficace et la plus harmonieuse de mettre en place le nouveau système.

Conversion

et les EX-1, pour des raisons de pragmatisme. Le bien-fondé et l'efficacité du fonctionnement de cette structure à trois niveaux ont été reconnus par des organismes aussi diversifiés que la Commission de la Fonction publique (Profil des leaders et des gestionnaires de la fonction publique), le Groupe de travail sur les structures d'occupations et de classification, le gouvernement provincial de l'Ontario et le gouvernement fédéral de l'Australie. En second lieu, les trois niveaux recommandés sont de nature à refléter la structure hiérarchique que sont les niveaux de sous-ministres adjoints, directeurs généraux et directeurs, que l'on utilise largement à l'échelle de la fonction publique et que l'on connaît bien. En troisième lieu, les avantages attendus de la réduction du nombre des niveaux de gestion, notamment l'accélération du processus de prise de décisions, une facilité plus nette d'imputabilité, une plus grande souplesse de redéploiement, une facilité de communication accrue entre tous les niveaux, une réduction des mesures de classification et de dotation en personnel, une pyramide non interrompue d'avancement de la carrière, seront plus marqués dans le cadre d'une structure à trois niveaux que dans le cadre d'une structure à quatre niveaux. Enfin, poursuivre la distinction entre les directeurs SM et EX (scénario probable avec quatre niveaux) serait perçu comme inéquitable par les gestionnaires SM et nuirait davantage au moral qui est déjà passablement bas.

20. La catégorie de la gestion compte actuellement six niveaux de classification, ce qui, dans certains cas, a entraîné l'ajout d'échelons hiérarchiques. Bien qu'il soit prescrit d'assurer un écart de deux niveaux entre l'employé et son superviseur, cette exigence n'est pas facile à respecter. En conséquence, il y a souvent une différence relativement faible entre niveaux voisins du point de vue des fonctions et responsabilités. La différence entre les niveaux de rémunération est, dans bien des cas, jugée insuffisante pour encourager les gestionnaires à accepter des responsabilités accrues.

21. La multiplicité des échelons risque de brouiller les filières de communication et d'imputabilité. En outre, l'écart de deux niveaux prescrit entre l'employé et son superviseur a occasionné des obstacles à l'avancement professionnel.

22. Le régime comportant six niveaux de classification s'est également révélé un fardeau administratif onéreux pour les ministères et les organismes centraux. On compte aujourd'hui six "points de démarcation" où s'exercent des pressions pour rehausser le niveau des postes et se servir du régime de classification pour récompenser et conserver les employés que l'on estime. Selon les statistiques du Secrétariat du Conseil du Trésor, il se prend chaque année de 1200 à 1500 décisions d'évaluation et de 500 à 700 mesures administratives, notamment des suppressions de poste ainsi que des changements de numéro et de titre de poste, au regard des 4600 postes de la catégorie de la gestion. Ainsi, les processus d'administration du personnel sont lourds et lents. Ce point de vue a été repris par le Groupe de travail Nielsen qui a constaté que le coût de l'administration du personnel dans l'administration fédérale est beaucoup plus élevé que dans le secteur privé, même en tenant compte des différences qui caractérisent les deux secteurs.

23. Si les niveaux de gestion étaient moins nombreux, la prise de décisions se ferait plus rapidement et les employés, de même que les gestionnaires, auraient plus de facilité à communiquer entre eux. Une structure simplifiée de gestion devrait être plus facile et moins coûteuse à administrer. La réduction du nombre des niveaux de la catégorie de la gestion secondera en outre les efforts de déstructuration qui ont déjà été entrepris dans les ministères et, aspect peut-être plus important, pourra servir de tremplin pour la réalisation d'autres objectifs, notamment l'instauration d'un régime de nomination au niveau.

24. Nous recommandons donc que les six niveaux actuels de classification soient fusionnés, les niveaux EX-4 et 5 devenant le nouveau niveau EXBC-3, les niveaux EX-2 et 3 le niveau EXBC-2, et les niveaux SM et EX-1 le niveau EXEC-1.

25. Il est recommandé d'adopter une structure comportant trois niveaux de préférence à une structure à quatre niveaux qui établit une distinction entre les SM

vaieur qui est fondée sur des "compétences" autres que celles qui sont propres aux filières « gestion » ou « conseil » du Groupe de la direction, devraient évoluer au sein de structures professionnelles et de spécialisations différentes, même si les plages de rémunération des niveaux supérieurs de ces structures se comparent à celles du Groupe de la direction. Dans l'ensemble, nous appuyons les propositions du Groupe de travail sur la classification et les structures professionnelles et nous recommandons d'étendre à d'autres professions l'approche appliquée aujourd'hui aux médecins fonctionnaires, aux avocats et aux scientifiques de la défense. De cette façon, par exemple, les ingénieurs, les économistes et les spécialistes des sciences naturelles pourraient poursuivre leur carrière aux niveaux supérieurs sans avoir à faire partie du Groupe de la direction.

16. En conséquence du recoupement des échelles salariales, dans certains cas, les professionnels et les spécialistes vont toucher un salaire supérieur à celui du gestionnaire qui les supervise, en raison de leur rareté et de la demande du marché pour de telles compétences. Cette inversion des relations salariales ne sera pas courante, mais elle devrait être explicitement reconnue comme acceptable dans la fonction publique, dans certaines circonstances.

17. En raison de la création de cadres professionnels parallèles relativement vastes, certains employés pourraient être exclus du Groupe de la direction, notamment les employés des niveaux de gestion des groupes de la recherche et du service extérieur. En ramenant à trois le nombre de niveaux du Groupe de la direction, on élève le traitement maximal du niveau EXBC-1 au-dessus des niveaux supérieurs de la plupart des autres groupes de classification. Le Groupe de la direction pourrait donc devenir un peu plus attrayant, ce qui entraînerait des pressions concernant la reclassement de postes de niveau supérieur. La délégation des pouvoirs de classification doit s'accompagner d'un mécanisme approprié d'imputabilité et d'un plafond des dépenses totales (budget de fonctionnement) pour que les gestionnaires puissent résister aux pressions de reclassement visant uniquement les hausses salariales.

18. Les membres des groupes professionnels parallèles ne pourront être nommés à des postes de direction que s'ils répondent dûment aux critères plus généraux applicables à la gestion ou aux exigences du poste de spécialiste fonctionnel ou de conseiller général du Groupe de la direction.

19. Au niveau de sous-ministre adjoint, tous les employés feront partie du Groupe de la direction. Les sous-ministres adjoints sont avant tout des ressources appartenant à la fonction publique toute entière plutôt qu'à un ministère en particulier, et il conviendrait qu'ils fassent partie d'un même groupe de classification pour assurer une souplesse de redéploiement maximale. Le groupe des services juridiques ferait toutefois exception - le traitement le plus élevé au niveau supérieur de ce groupe équivaut au traitement d'un SMA EX-5 et le travail est à ce point spécialisé que la capacité de redéploiement n'est pas pertinente.

encourager la mobilité entre les secteurs public et privé. Il devrait être administré par un conseil comprenant des représentants du Groupe de la direction. Le niveau des avantages devrait être au moins égal au niveau actuel.

13. *Mise en oeuvre et diffusion*

a. Puisque nos recommandations ont été présentées comme un tout intégré, elles devraient être examinées, diffusées et mises en oeuvre de même. En effet, une mise en oeuvre trop partielle risque de ne pas produire les changements désirés de la culture. Nous jugeons en outre important de procéder rapidement afin que les gestionnaires puissent constater les progrès réalisés et qu'ainsi nous conservions l'élan donné par Fonction publique 2000.

b. Il faudrait que des ressources suffisantes soient fournies par les ministères et à l'échelle de la fonction publique pour la diffusion et la mise en oeuvre de ces recommandations. En particulier, il faut que les niveaux supérieurs de la gestion s'engagent dans les réformes et se préparent à investir du temps et des efforts considérables pour communiquer avec leur personnel, les consulter, planifier la transition et surveiller la phase de mise en oeuvre.

REDEFINITION ET RESTRUCTURATION DE LA CATEGORIE DE LA GESTION

Redéfinition de la catégorie

14. Notre première série de recommandations vise à clarifier et à simplifier la structure et le contrôle de la catégorie de la gestion. Nous recommandons d'abord que la Catégorie soit rebaptisée Groupe de la direction afin d'indiquer de façon explicite qu'elle n'est pas constituée uniquement de gestionnaires. Elle comprend également des conseillers principaux en politiques et d'autres conseillers généraux qui n'ont peut-être pas à gérer d'importantes ressources humaines ou budgétaires et qui, par conséquent, ne "gèrent" pas au sens rigoureux du terme. La catégorie de la gestion est également mal nommée, puisqu'elle exclut une grande partie des cadres de gestion, soit les fonctionnaires qui assument des responsabilités de gestionnaire au regard des ressources humaines, matérielles et financières nécessaires à l'exécution d'un programme ou à une activité. La nouvelle appellation de la catégorie ferait également ressortir que tous les membres sont des cadres, y compris les SM actuels.

15. Les employés dont les intérêts et les possibilités d'avancement sont liés à une profession ou à une spécialisation technique et qui ont pour l'organisation une

- b. À l'intérieur des nouvelles plages de rémunération, les augmentations salariales seraient autorisées en fonction du niveau de responsabilité, de rendement et d'expérience, mais l'ensemble des coûts de fonctionnement ne devrait pas augmenter. La progression normale du premier au dernier échelon de ces plages de rémunération élargies devrait prendre plus de temps que dans le passé.
- c. Les rajustements annuels de traitement devraient demeurer intégrés au traitement de base, à moins que le rendement ne soit insuffisant à justifier une baisse de salaire. La rémunération au rendement devrait être méritée chaque année, même si une partie de celle-ci peut être ajoutée au salaire de base des employés qui ne sont pas encore au dernier échelon de l'échelle des traitements et si la haute direction en décide ainsi (sous réserve du budget de fonctionnement du ministère). En règle générale, une partie du montant versé au titre du rendement serait intégrée au salaire, pour maintenir une certaine uniformité entre les ministères, les administrateurs généraux devraient s'entendre à ce sujet chaque année.
- d. Les administrateurs généraux devraient avoir le pouvoir de concevoir et d'administrer des régimes modifiés de primes au rendement dans le cadre d'une approche stratégique de la gestion des primes. Des garanties adéquates seront nécessaires et les régimes devront être financés par réaffectation des ressources de gestion à l'intérieur.
- e. Nous appuyons également le Groupe de travail sur la rémunération et les avantages sociaux qui croit qu'il faut utiliser davantage le pouvoir d'accorder des primes uniques et spontanées pour souligner les réalisations notables.
- f. Il faudrait concevoir et mettre en œuvre un régime souple d'avantages sociaux à l'intention des membres du Groupe de la direction. Ces employés pourraient choisir sur un menu les avantages facultatifs qui s'ajouteraient au régime de base. Il faudrait offrir des avantages facultatifs supplémentaires, sans qu'il en coûte plus.
- g. Comme l'a recommandé le Groupe consultatif de la rémunération du personnel de direction, il faudrait élaborer et mettre en œuvre un régime de pension distinct à l'intention des membres du Groupe de la direction. Ce régime de pension devrait être conçu pour répondre aux besoins de toute une gamme d'employés et

essentielle pour encourager la mobilité entre les régions et l'administration centrale et entre les régions.

c. Il faudrait examiner les divers programmes du gouvernement qui touchent la capacité des hauts fonctionnaires de passer facilement du secteur public au secteur privé en vue d'éliminer les obstacles à la mobilité et, au besoin, de la faciliter lorsque c'est dans le meilleur intérêt de la fonction publique.

d. Il faudrait établir une distinction entre l'évaluation du rendement et l'examen de l'avancement professionnel. La rémunération au rendement serait déterminée en fonction d'une évaluation de la contribution du gestionnaire pendant les douze derniers mois et de ses compétences en gestion. Nous approuvons la position du Groupe de travail sur l'adaptation de la main-d'oeuvre suivant laquelle cette évaluation devrait aussi tenir compte des opinions des subalternes quant à la qualité du leadership exercé au cours de la période visée.

e. Compte tenu du fait que les cotes générales de rendement sont à toute fin pratique inutilisées, il faudrait réviser les cinq cotes en vigueur et fusionner "satisfaisant" et "insatisfaisant" en une nouvelle cote qui indiquerait que le rendement ne répond pas aux attentes de la gestion. Les autres cotes pourraient aussi être modifiées afin de mieux distinguer les niveaux de rendement. La règle des 30 % applicable à la rémunération au rendement devrait être maintenue afin que les cotes "supérieur" et "exceptionnel" ou leurs équivalents conservent tout leur sens et leur valeur.

f. Dans le cas du Groupe de la direction, le processus de cessation d'emploi devrait être simplifié et les administrateurs généraux devraient avoir la latitude voulue pour négocier des règlements directement avec les intéressés.

12. Rémunération et avantages sociaux

a. Il faudrait établir pour chacun des trois nouveaux niveaux de classification un plafond unique de rémunération correspondant au dernier échelon des niveaux EX-1, EX-3 et EX-5. Comme par le passé, il faudrait que les niveaux de rémunération soient ajustés annuellement à partir des comparaisons avec le secteur privé et des règlements obtenus par négociations collectives pour le nouveau niveau EXEC-1 et en utilisant un système de relativités internes appropriées pour les nouveaux niveaux EXEC-2 et EXEC-3.

Nous convenons avec le Groupe de travail sur la rémunération du personnel de direction que les politiques de réinstallation sont trop rigides et restrictives. Il est nécessaire de prendre des mesures correctrices permettant aux ministères de compenser adéquatement les cadres qui doivent déménager. Cette réorientation est

Il faudrait passer en revue les besoins de formation et perfectionnement des gestionnaires au moins tous les ans. Les ministères devraient préciser clairement les exigences quant à la compétence, à la formation et au perfectionnement correspondant aux trois niveaux du Groupe de la direction. Nous attendons à ce sujet et en ce qui concerne d'autres questions de formation les conseils du Groupe de travail sur la formation et le perfectionnement du personnel.

11. *Formation et perfectionnement*

Il faudrait élaborer des stratégies valables pour viller à ce que la fonction publique reflète bien la composition de la population canadienne et soit en mesure de tirer le meilleur parti de la diversité des opinions et des talents des Canadiens. Nous croyons que la question réside essentiellement dans le changement dans la culture de l'organisation et des valeurs de gestion. Nous recommandons que les statistiques concernant la représentation des autochtones, handicapés et minorités visibles soient améliorées. Nous convenons avec le Groupe de travail sur l'adaptation de la main-d'œuvre que les minorités et autres groupes cibles devraient être représentées équitablement au sein des comités de sélection, être représentées dans les programmes de perfectionnement et représentées avec équité au sein des équipes des centres d'évaluation.

opinions dans les sondages et les groupes de discussions pour vérifier si les politiques et pratiques en vigueur tiennent compte des besoins de ce groupe et d'accroître les efforts visant à repérer dans le secteur privé les femmes compétentes qui pourraient être nommées à tous les niveaux supérieurs et au niveau de relève. Nous sommes d'accord avec le Groupe de travail sur l'adaptation de la main-d'œuvre sur le fait que les femmes soient surreprésentées dans les programmes et affectations de perfectionnement et que les comités de recrutement, promotion et affectation de perfectionnement comprennent des femmes. De même, les femmes devraient être représentées équitablement au sein des équipes des centres d'évaluation.

aux personnes dont les décisions ont la plus forte incidence et qu'ils correspondent aux responsabilités des gestionnaires et du personnel de première ligne qui en sont investis.

d. Il faudrait poursuivre les efforts pour améliorer la communication entre les gestionnaires dont l'extension du Réseau d'information des cadres supérieurs aux membres du Groupe de la direction sous le niveau de sous-ministre adjoint et aux gestionnaires qui ne font pas partie du Groupe.

10. *Dotation du Groupe de la direction*

a. Il faudrait mettre en oeuvre un régime de nomination au niveau pour le Groupe de la direction. Il faudrait modifier la Loi sur l'emploi dans la Fonction publique afin d'indiquer clairement que les mutations latérales relèvent exclusivement de la gestion et que le déploiement d'un poste à un autre ne représente pas une nomination aux termes de la loi s'il ne constitue pas une promotion.

b. Les déploiements devraient servir à perfectionner et à motiver les employés ainsi qu'à satisfaire aux besoins de fonctionnement. Nous croyons qu'au sein du Groupe de la direction, le déploiement devrait être de la responsabilité exclusive de la gestion s'il est effectué dans la même zone de transport quotidien. Si le cadre supérieur doit s'installer dans une autre ville ou une autre région suite à un déploiement, il devrait pouvoir donner son consentement, à moins que le ministère n'ait précisé la possibilité de déploiements parmi les conditions d'emploi.

c. Il faudrait déléguer aux administrateurs généraux le pouvoir de doter les postes de leur ministère jusqu'au nouveau niveau EXBC-2 inclusivement sous réserve d'un régime approprié d'imputabilité.

d. Nous appuyons la proposition du Conseil du Trésor sur la création d'un programme de stagiaires en gestion doté d'un budget propre. Un tel programme de recrutement et d'avancement professionnel permettra à la fonction publique de pouvoir compter des cadres supérieurs en nombre et de calibre suffisants à partir de l'an 2000.

e. Nous appuyons les recommandations du Groupe de travail sur les obstacles rencontrés par les femmes dans la Fonction publique. Nous recommandons en outre aux ministères de revoir les processus de sélection afin de vérifier l'absence de toute mesure discriminatoire envers les femmes, de cerner adéquatement leurs

9. *Edifier une structure de gestion unie et efficace*
- a. Il faudrait poursuivre les efforts entrepris pour définir une philosophie de la gestion ou un ensemble de valeurs et de principes directeurs dont pourraient s'inspirer les gestionnaires de la fonction publique au sein des ministères et, sous la direction du greffier du Conseil privé, à l'échelle de l'administration fédérale. Ces valeurs devraient encourager les gestionnaires à donner l'autorité nécessaire à leurs employés et à favoriser un milieu de travail où régnerait la créativité et l'initiative, la confiance et l'esprit d'équipe et où la prestation des services gouvernementaux est faite sous le signe de l'excellence.
 - b. Il faudrait définir et mettre en oeuvre un régime distinct permettant de sélectionner, former et reconnaître les gestionnaires qui ne font pas partie du Groupe de la direction. Le terme "gestionnaire" devrait être réservé aux personnes assumant des responsabilités de gestion. Les postes de gestionnaires devraient être attribués à des personnes qui ont réussi des concours axés sur les aptitudes et capacités de gestion des ressources humaines. Un régime distinct de rémunération au rendement, un processus annuel de rajustement salarial et une approche souple quant aux avantages sociaux devraient être établis pour ces gestionnaires.
 - c. Les ministères devraient passer en revue leurs modèles de subdélégation interne pour s'assurer que les pouvoirs sont dévolus
- e. La réduction du nombre de niveaux devrait être effectuée sans accroître le total des frais de fonctionnement du ministère. Les administrateurs généraux devraient avoir la responsabilité de veiller à ce que toute hausse des frais salariaux découlant de la compression des niveaux soit absorbée à même les budgets de fonctionnement.
 - f. Le contrôle de la collectivité devrait être supprimé
 - g. Nous soucrivons à la récente décision du Conseil du Trésor de déléguer aux administrateurs généraux le pouvoir de classifier et d'organiser leur ministère jusqu'au nouveau niveau EXEC-2 inclusivement sous réserve d'un régime approprié d'imputabilité.

distribués séparément par le secrétariat de Fonction publique 2000 figure à la fin du présent document.

RÉSUMÉ DES RECOMMANDATIONS

7. Les principales recommandations de notre Groupe de travail sont exposées dans les paragraphes qui suivent.

8. *Redéfinition et restructuration de la catégorie*

a. La Catégorie de la gestion devrait être rebaptisée Groupe de la direction afin de mieux refléter le fait qu'elle se compose à la fois de gestionnaires de niveau supérieur et de conseillers et faire ressortir que les SM font partie de la structure de direction de la fonction publique.

b. D'autres employés dont les intérêts, perspectives de carrière et valeur pour l'organisation sont liés à une profession ou une spécialité technique, comme les médecins, avocats et ingénieurs, devraient évoluer au sein de filières distinctes mais parallèles, même si les plages de rémunération correspondant aux niveaux supérieurs recoupent celles du Groupe de la direction. Dans certains cas, ces professionnels et spécialistes seront mieux rémunérés que les gestionnaires qui les supervisent. Cette inversion des rapports salariaux traditionnels ne sera pas fréquente, mais sa validité sera reconnue dans certains cas.

c. Dans le but de simplifier et rationaliser la structure du Groupe de la direction, les six niveaux actuels de classification de la catégorie EXBC-3 par la fusion des niveaux EX-4 et EX-5, ensuite le niveau EXBC-2 avec les niveaux EX-2 et EX-3 et enfin, le niveau EXEC-1 avec les niveaux SM et EX-1.

d. Pour faciliter une mise en oeuvre rapide et réduire les coûts de transition, les nouveaux niveaux de classification devraient être délimités par la fourchette de points du système Hay. Les employés qui font actuellement partie des groupes SM et EX devraient bénéficier d'une clause de droits acquis au moment du passage de la structure actuelle à la nouvelle structure. Chaque ministère devrait être libre de déterminer, de concert avec le Conseil du Trésor, son approche et le calendrier de la transition.

OBJET

1. Le présent document expose les dernières recommandations du Groupe de travail sur la catégorie de la gestion quant aux mesures à prendre pour restructurer la fonction publique et insuffler un nouveau dynamisme à sa gestion. Il est nécessaire de pouvoir compter sur une structure de gestion bien motivée et organisée si l'on veut maintenir et améliorer la haute qualité du service au public.

CONTEXTE

2. Le Groupe de travail sur la catégorie de la gestion a été créé en décembre 1989 et chargé d'étudier toutes les questions liées à la catégorie et de recommander des modifications de nature à faciliter sa gestion et assurer dans la fonction publique une gestion plus efficace et plus responsable.

3. Les membres du Groupe de travail se sont rencontrés à intervalles réguliers pendant six mois pour discuter des valeurs et des principes qui devraient inspirer les gestionnaires de la fonction publique, cerner les problèmes et sources d'insatisfaction qui touchent et inquiètent les gestionnaires et examiner les solutions éventuelles pouvant permettre à la fonction publique de mieux servir les Canadiens.

4. Les discussions n'ont pas tardé à se fixer sur la structure et la gestion de la catégorie. Les principaux aspects qui ont retenu l'attention du Groupe de travail sont les suivants: la nécessité de rationaliser la structure de la catégorie de la gestion afin de faire disparaître tous les niveaux de supervision qui ne sont pas nécessaires; l'absence de valeurs communes et de cohésion à l'intérieur de la structure de gestion; les écarts entre les responsabilités et les pouvoirs délégués aux ministères et aux gestionnaires; les lacunes dans nos façons de recruter, sélectionner, former, promouvoir, récompenser et réprimander les gestionnaires; la piètre qualité de la communication entre les gestionnaires de la fonction publique.

5. Dans le rapport provisoire du 15 février 1990, nous formions au Comité des hautes fonctionnaires (CHF) dix recommandations quant aux mesures à mettre en oeuvre dans l'immédiat. Nous recommandons également un certain nombre de mesures à mettre en route ou de poursuivre les études et les l'analyses d'un certain nombre d'autres questions. Ces dernières sont maintenant terminées et le présent rapport résume nos conclusions et recommandations.

6. Il comprend également une évaluation des répercussions que ces recommandations auront vraisemblablement sur les dimensions et le coût de la fonction publique, l'efficacité et l'économie des programmes, la réforme législative, les pratiques de fonctionnement, les relations de travail et le moral des employés. Une série de rapports documentaires et de réflexion présentent une analyse plus détaillée des problèmes sous-jacents, des solutions envisagées et de la nature et des répercussions de certaines des solutions recommandées. La liste de ces rapports

| | |
|------------------------------------|----|
| ÉVALUATION DES RÉPÉRCUSSIONS | 29 |
| CONCLUSIONS | 32 |

TABLE DES MATIÈRES

| | |
|--|----|
| RÉSUMÉ | 1 |
| OBJET | 1 |
| CONTEXTE | 1 |
| RÉSUMÉ DES RECOMMANDATIONS | 2 |
| REDÉFINITION ET RESTRUCTURATION DE LA CATÉGORIE DE LA | |
| GESTION | 8 |
| Redéfinition de la catégorie | 8 |
| Réduction du nombre des niveaux | 10 |
| Conversion | 11 |
| Pouvoirs de classification | 11 |
| Contrôle de la collectivité | 12 |
| CRÉATION D'UN CADRE DE GESTION HOMOGENE ET EFFICACE | 13 |
| Développer des valeurs communes | 13 |
| Reconnaissance des gestionnaires à l'extérieur du Groupe de la | |
| direction | 13 |
| Habilitation des gestionnaires | 15 |
| Amélioration de la communication entre les gestionnaires | 15 |
| DOTATION DU GROUPE DE LA DIRECTION | 16 |
| Modification du processus de dotation | 16 |
| Pouvoirs de dotation | 18 |
| Recrutement | 19 |
| FORMATION ET PERFECTIONNEMENT | 21 |
| Formation et perfectionnement professionnels | 21 |
| Services d'orientation professionnelle et de placement | 22 |
| Mobilité au sein de la fonction publique | 22 |
| Mobilité entre les secteurs public et privé | 23 |
| Évaluation du rendement | 23 |
| Cessation d'emploi | 25 |
| RÉMUNÉRATION ET AVANTAGES SOCIAUX | 25 |
| Politique en matière de rémunération | 25 |
| Primes au rendement et encouragements | 27 |
| Avantages sociaux et gratifications | 27 |
| Réforme du régime de retraite | 28 |

normale. D'autre part, nous insistons pour que les ministères aient plus de pouvoirs pour mettre en oeuvre des régimes appropriés de récompenses pour le rendement. Afin de mieux répondre aux divers besoins des effectifs et rendre ainsi la fonction publique plus attrayante pour les groupes visés par le programme d'équité en matière d'emploi, nous recommandons qu'un régime souple d'avantages sociaux soit mis en oeuvre: les membres du Groupe de la direction pourraient choisir dans une liste d'avantages optionnels s'ajoutant à l'ensemble déjà offert. Cet ensemble n'aurait pas d'effet sur les coûts.

Nous réitérons aussi la recommandation du Groupe consultatif de la rémunération du personnel de direction dans la Fonction publique (le Comité Burns) selon laquelle il faudrait élaborer et mettre en oeuvre un régime de retraite séparé et distinct pour le Groupe de la direction. Ce régime devrait être conçu de manière à répondre aux besoins d'un large éventail d'employés et devrait favoriser la mobilité entre le secteur public et le secteur privé.

Le seul fait d'éliminer les règles et règlements désuets et encombrants sera insuffisant pour atteindre les buts visés par Fonction publique 2000. Un changement fondamental dans la "culture organisationnelle" et dans les attitudes de gestion est également nécessaire si nous voulons promouvoir le genre de comportements qui nous permettront d'obtenir les résultats désirés. Pour cette raison, nous favorisons les efforts pour définir un ensemble de valeurs et de principes directeurs pour guider les actions des gestionnaires de la fonction publique tant au sein des ministères qu'à l'échelle de toute l'administration fédérale. Ils devraient favoriser la créativité et l'initiative, la confiance et le travail d'équipe ainsi que l'excellence dans la prestation des services gouvernementaux.

Nous insistons sur une mise en oeuvre rapide pour que les gestionnaires puissent avoir des preuves concrètes des progrès accomplis et pour que l'élan généré par Fonction publique 2000 ne se perde pas.

Des ressources suffisantes doivent être consacrées par les ministères et l'ensemble de l'administration fédérale à la communication et la mise en oeuvre de ces recommandations. À cet égard, les gestionnaires de haut niveau doivent s'engager à appliquer les réformes et devraient être disposés à investir beaucoup de temps et d'efforts pour communiquer et consulter le personnel, préparer la période de transition et surveiller la mise en oeuvre des réformes. Il s'agit là d'une condition essentielle au succès d'un changement de la "culture organisationnelle".

comme moyen de perfectionnement et permettra de répondre rapidement aux exigences des opérations.

Nous croyons aussi que chaque ministre devrait être capable de promouvoir au Groupe de la direction des gestionnaires en provenance de son organisation ou d'autres ministères et de recruter des candidats à l'extérieur de la fonction publique. Les cadres supérieurs doivent pouvoir de déterminer les attributions des employés de leur organisation s'ils doivent être imputables des résultats. Pour cette raison, nous recommandons que soit délégué aux administrateurs généraux le pouvoir de doter les postes de leur ministère jusqu'aux niveaux de directeur et de directeur général inclusivement. Pour les sous-ministres adjoints, ressources de l'ensemble de l'administration fédérale plutôt que d'un ministère, la dotation de ces postes devrait rester la responsabilité des organismes centraux.

Il est important que la fonction publique soit représentative de la population du Canada et qu'elle puisse profiter de la diversité des vues et des talents des Canadiens. Il est nécessaire d'accroître la représentation des femmes, des autochtones, des handicapés et des minorités visibles. Nous recommandons une série de mesures qui pourraient être prises pour améliorer l'équilibre entre les hommes et les femmes au niveau des postes de direction et dans les groupes de relève et prions les organismes centraux et ministères de concevoir des stratégies valables qui changeront les attitudes nuisant à la participation des membres d'autres groupes cibles.

D'autres pratiques de gestion des ressources humaines nécessitent des améliorations. Nous croyons que les capacités, caractéristiques et autres exigences envers les trois niveaux du Groupe de la direction devraient être clairement formulés et que de tels critères devraient régir l'entrée et les déplacements à l'intérieur du groupe. La planification de carrière sera plus nécessaire par suite de la compression des niveaux de classification (moins de promotions) et devrait être améliorée. Il faudrait revoir fréquemment les besoins des gestionnaires en perfectionnement et en formation. Il faudrait offrir la formation en gestion le plus tôt possible et faire un plus grand usage de la formation par simulation et affectations par rotation.

Nous croyons que la mobilité devrait être accrue au sein de la fonction publique et entre la fonction publique et le secteur privé. L'expérience de travail dans d'autres centres régionaux et dans d'autres milieux devrait être vue comme un atout pour le perfectionnement des cadres expérimentés. La mobilité à double sens accroîtra aussi la compréhension mutuelle et l'appréciation sur les pratiques de gestion efficaces. Pour cette raison, nous recommandons que les barrières à la mobilité entre les régions, entre l'administration centrale et les régions et entre la fonction publique et le secteur privé soient repérées et supprimées.

Les processus utilisés pour récompenser la bonne conduite et pénaliser le piètre rendement ont aussi été l'objet de beaucoup de critiques au cours des ans. Bien qu'il nous recommandons plusieurs mesures propres à accroître la capacité de la haute gestion de traiter les cas des employés dont le rendement est régulièrement sous la

Ces nouveaux niveaux seraient définis selon le maximum actuel des salaires. Les détails de la transition sont laissés aux ministères, en consultation avec le Conseil du Trésor. Toutefois, les administrateurs généraux auraient la responsabilité de voir à ce que le budget de fonctionnement n'augmente pas suite à la restructuration. La réduction du nombre de niveaux de classification et la création de nouvelles plages salariales moins nombreuses mais plus larges inciteront les gestionnaires à demeurer plus longtemps que par le passé à chaque niveau. Cela permettra aussi de réduire la pression sur le système pour la reclassification à la hausse des postes dans le seul but d'augmenter la rémunération. Etant donné que les possibilités de promotions seraient moins fréquentes, les mutations latérales deviendraient une source importante d'affectations stimulantes permettant de motiver et de perfectionner les employés.

Il faudrait supprimer graduellement les contrôles traditionnels du nombre d'employés de la catégorie de la gestion (contrôle de la collectivité). Les ministères devraient pouvoir gérer leurs responsabilités avec un budget de fonctionnement sous un régime approprié d'imputabilité. Cette solution permettrait d'augmenter leur efficacité de fonctionnellement et de renforcer leur imputabilité envers les résultats.

Etant donné que la nouvelle définition du Groupe de la direction continue à exclure une partie importante de l'équipe de gestion des ministères, nous recommandons l'élaboration et la mise en oeuvre d'initiatives visant à améliorer la qualité des gestionnaires qui ne font pas partie du Groupe de la direction. Il faudrait déterminer plus tôt, par exemple, le potentiel de gestion, renforcer la formation en gestion et récompenser adéquatement les gestionnaires à l'extérieur du Groupe pour les risques et responsabilités de gestion qu'ils prennent. Nous recommandons aussi la création d'un programme de stagiaires en gestion afin de recruter les gestionnaires de demain parmi les meilleurs finissants de nos universités. De telles mesures sont essentielles si la fonction publique veut s'assurer d'une relève suffisante et de haut calibre pour l'an 2000.

Une autre série de recommandations vise à faire conférer aux gestionnaires et aux employés de première ligne les pouvoirs dont ils ont besoin pour assumer leurs responsabilités. La plupart des pouvoirs nécessaires ont déjà été délégués aux ministères par les organismes centraux. La pierre d'achoppement est souvent le manque de subdélégation de ces pouvoirs aux niveaux inférieurs de la gestion ou le manque de décentralisation de ces pouvoirs aux gestionnaires régionaux. C'est pourquoi nous recommandons que les ministères étudient leurs pratiques pour s'assurer que les pouvoirs sont accordés là où les décisions produisent le plus d'effets et que les employés détiennent les pouvoirs dont ils ont besoin pour faire leur travail efficacement.

D'autres recommandations visent à simplifier et à revitaliser les pratiques relatives au personnel. Par exemple, nous proposons qu'un processus de nomination au niveau soit mis en oeuvre pour les employés du Groupe de la direction. La nomination des cadres supérieurs à des niveaux de classification plutôt qu'à des postes précis signifiera que ces cadres ne seront plus "propriétaires" de leurs postes respectifs et auront une vision plus large de leurs rôles et responsabilités. Elle réduira la tentation de se constituer un domaine, chose que le système actuel favorise pour justifier les niveaux des postes. Le nouveau système donnera plus de souplesse pour se servir des mutations latérales

RÉSUMÉ

Le Groupe de travail sur la catégorie de la gestion a été créé pour examiner les questions liées à la structure et à la gestion de la catégorie des services, des changements qui permettraient d'augmenter l'efficacité de la prestation des services, l'efficacité des processus de gestion et l'imputabilité des ministères et gestionnaires individuels envers les résultats.

Une structure de gestion hautement qualifiée, bien motivée et organisée de manière adéquate est essentielle si l'on veut poursuivre ou améliorer la prestation de services de première qualité au public à une époque de restrictions financières constantes. Toutefois, plusieurs problèmes menacent la qualité de ce service. Notre examen des rapports des commissions et des groupes de travail précédents, les conclusions des sondages d'attitudes des gestionnaires et de nombreuses discussions à ce sujet avec des membres de la catégorie de la gestion reviennent inmanquablement aux problèmes suivants qui sont liés entre eux: la multiplicité des paliers dans la structure de direction qui ralentit la prise de décision et brouille les filières d'imputabilité; le manque de valeurs clairement formulées et partagées pour guider le comportement; le manque de cohésion à l'intérieur de la gestion et la diminution du moral et de la satisfaction professionnelle à mesure que l'on descend les échelons de la gestion; la délégation insuffisante des pouvoirs nécessaires pour atteindre les résultats dont les employés tenus responsables; la difficulté croissante à attirer et à retenir des employés exceptionnels dans les rangs de la direction; la faible participation de certains groupes de la population canadienne; le fatras de règles et règlements dictant la manière de recruter, sélectionner, perfectionner, promouvoir, récompenser et réprimander les gestionnaires, ce qui représente d'importants coûts administratifs et entrave la créativité et l'initiative.

Le rapport du Groupe de travail sur la catégorie de la gestion contient une série de recommandations interpellées pour résoudre ces problèmes et préparer la fonction publique à affronter les défis de l'avenir.

Tout d'abord, nous recommandons des changements dans la définition et la structure de la catégorie. Nous croyons qu'il faudrait la rebaptiser Groupe de la direction de manière à mieux refléter sa composition de gestionnaires et conseillers supérieurs et sa fonction de direction au sein de la fonction publique. Ce changement améliorera la cohésion et le moral des membres de la catégorie, ce qui constitue une condition préalable à la prestation d'un service de haute qualité au public.

Nous croyons que la structure a besoin d'être simplifiée par la réduction à trois des six niveaux de classification actuels de la catégorie et par la réorganisation de la hiérarchie de la gestion afin de refléter une structure de directeur, directeur général et sous-ministre adjoint. Cette rationalisation réduira beaucoup les coûts d'administration, améliorera la communication entre tous les niveaux, clarifiera l'imputabilité envers les résultats et accélérera le processus décisionnel.

POUR DISCUSSION

**RAPPORT DU GROUPE DE TRAVAIL SUR
LA CATÉGORIE DE GESTION**

ALAIN GOURD, PRÉSIDENT

RAY LAFRAMBOISE, SECRÉTAIRE

MEMBRES/PARTICIPANTS

**ERCEL BAKER
MICHAEL BINDER
MEL CAPPE
ROBERT FOWLER
AIMEE LEFEBVRE-ANGLIN
DOUG LINDORES
JEAN-CLAUDE MERCIER
MADELEINE OUELLO
BRUCE PETRIE
GLORIA REID
RICHARD RITTENBERG
HARRY ROGERS
MICHEL SÉGUIN
JEAN THIVIERGE**

LE 7 AOÛT 1990

GROUPE DE TRAVAIL SUR LA DOTATION

M. Jean-Jacques Noreau
Président du Groupe de travail
Sous-ministre
Agriculture Canada

M. Frédéric R. Drumme
Sous-ministre adjoint
Affaires indiennes et du Nord
Canada
M. Arthur Silverman
Sous-ministre adjoint en chef
Diversification de l'économie
de l'Ouest

M. Larry J. O'Toole
Directeur exécutif
Bureau de la gestion
immobilière
Secrétariat du Conseil du
Trésor

M. Murdoch Retief
Sous-ministre adjoint
Douanes et Accise
M. Rod Grainger
Directeur, Groupe des
politiques et des méthodes
Secrétariat du Conseil du
Trésor

M. Raymond A.J. Chrétien
Sous-secrétaire d'État
associé aux Affaires
extérieures
Affaires extérieures

M. Nick Mulder
Sous-ministre associé
Emploi et Immigration

M. David J. Nicholson
Sous-ministre adjoint
Affaires des anciens
combattants

M. Victor Robnovitch
Sous-ministre adjoint
Pêches et Océans

M. Ercel Baker
Directeur exécutif
Direction générale des
programmes de dotation
Commission de la fonction
publique

Mlle Michelle Comeau
Directrice générale,

Personnel

Agriculture Canada

Mlle Lucie Goyette

Services à la catégorie de la
Chef
gestion

Agriculture Canada

PERSONNES-RESSOURCES

M. Avrim Lazar
Directeur général
Direction de la revue
Commission de la fonction
publique

SC - Équipages de navires

SR - Réparation des navires

SM - Gestion supérieure

EX - Directeurs

DED Équipage de pont
ERD Équipage de la chambre des machines
EGO Équipage d'exploitation
SPT équipage spécialisé
STD Équipe des commis aux vivres

ELE Fonctions élémentaires
MAT Surveillance des machines
MAN Manipulation
MDO Conduite et actionnement des machines
MOC Conduite et surveillance des machines
SPS Peinture et application de matières de protection
PRW Travail de précision
INM Entretien des instruments
MAM Entretien des machines
EME Entretien de moteurs et d'équipement mécanique
BOB Chaudronnerie - Forge
EEW Installations électriques et électroniques
PIP Tuyauterie
SMW Tôlerie
WOW Menuiserie
MAC Usinage et outillage
QCW Contrôle de la qualité et inspection du matériel de guerre
PLE Planification et évaluation
MGT Direction

AGENTS NÉGOCIATEURS AU 31 DÉCEMBRE 1989

| CODE | | NOMBRE D'EMPLOYÉS | DATE | |
|---|---------------------------------------|-------------------|--------------|----------|
| IUN | UNITÉ DE NÉGOCIATION | UNITÉ (EXCLU.) | D'EXPIRATION | |
| 1. <u>ALLIANCE DE LA FONCTION PUBLIQUE DU CANADA (AFPC)</u> | | | | |
| 209 | Enseignement | 1,661 | 94 | 30.11.89 |
| 215 | Bibliothéconomie | 480 | 44 | 31.03.91 |
| 301 | Services administratifs | 9,008 | 3,247 | 20.06.91 |
| 305 | Services d'information | 1,348 | 126 | 23.06.91 |
| 308 | Administration des programmes | 25,536 | 2,796 | 20.06.91 |
| 309 | Achat et approvisionnement | 2,182 | 185 | 21.06.91 |
| 310 | programmes de bien-être | 1,493 | 136 | 23.11.91 |
| 403 | Dessin et illustrations | 1,531 | 16 | 13.03.91 |
| 405 | Soutien technique et scientifique | 6,980 | 92 | 21.06.91 |
| 406 | Techniciens divers | 3,155 | 128 | 21.06.91 |
| 407 | Photographie | 130 | 0 | 15.03.91 |
| 408 | Inspection des produits primaires | 2,691 | 41 | 26.04.91 |
| 412 | Soutien des sciences sociales | 2,175 | 106 | 21.06.91 |
| 413 | Inspection technique | 1,392 | 94 | 21.06.91 |
| 414 | Soutien de l'enseignement | 21 | 0 | 28.02.91 |
| 501 | Communications | 572 | 13 | 21.06.91 |
| 502 | Traitement mécanique des données | 2,535 | 52 | 28.08.91 |
| 503 | Commis aux écritures et aux régle. | 49,970 | 1,597 | 11.06.91 |
| 504 | Mécanographie | 326 | 18 | 08.05.91 |
| 505 | Secrétariat, sténo. et dactlo. | 11,311 | 2,210 | 21.07.91 |
| 651 | Services correctionnels (S) | 473 | 5 | 31.05.91 |
| 601 | Services correctionnels (NS) | 4,382 | 0 | 31.05.91 |
| 652 | Pompiers (S) | 218 | 26 | 30.06.91 |
| 602 | Pompiers (NS) | 1,065 | 13 | 30.06.91 |
| 653 | Manoeuvres et hommes de métier (S) | 1,636 | 39 | 04.05.91 |
| 603 | Manoeuvres et hommes de métier (NS) | 13,006 | 33 | 04.05.91 |
| 654 | Services divers (S) | 1,316 | 6 | 04.08.91 |
| 604 | Services divers (NS) | 7,995 | 34 | 04.08.91 |
| 655 | Ch. for. mot. & opér. mach. fixes (S) | 181 | 1 | 06.04.91 |
| 605 | Ch. for. mot. & opér. mach. fix. (NS) | 1,475 | 4 | 06.04.91 |
| 656 | Services hospitaliers (S) | 71 | 0 | 21.12.87 |
| 606 | Services hospitaliers (NS) | 1,205 | 1 | 21.12.87 |
| 657 | Gardiens de phares (S) | 83 | 0 | 19.06.91 |
| 607 | Gardiens de phares (NS) | 158 | 0 | 19.06.91 |
| 659 | Services d'imprimerie (S) | 76 | 13 | 31.08.90 |
| 662 | Équipages de navires (S) | 39 | 0 | 31.12.87 |
| 612 | Équipages de navires (NS) | 2,167 | 5 | 31.12.87 |
| TOTAL | | 159,863 | 11,175 | |

le 7 mars 1990

| CODE IUN | UNITÉ DE NÉGOCIATION | NOMBRE D'EMPLOYÉS UNITÉ (EXCLU.) | DATE D'EXPIRATION |
|-------------|---|-------------------------------------|----------------------|
| 2. | <u>L'INSTITUT PROFESSIONNEL DE LA FONCTION PUBLIQUE DU CANADA (IPFPC)</u> | | |
| 201 | Actuariat | 3 | 0 30.09.90 |
| 202 | Agriculture | 261 | 39 30.09.90 |
| 203 | Architecture et urbanisme | 306 | 17 31.12.90 |
| 204 | Vérification | 3,541 | 325 04.05.90 |
| 205 | Sciences biologiques | 1,151 | 42 30.09.90 |
| 206 | Chimie | 420 | 16 21.12.89 |
| 207 | Art dentaire | 30 | 1 30.09.90 |
| 210 | Génie et arpentage | 2,717 | 216 31.08.90 |
| 211 | Sciences forestières | 148 | 2 30.09.90 |
| 212 | Recherche historique | 308 | 7 30.09.90 |
| 213 | Sciences domestiques | 32 | 1 30.09.90 |
| 214 | Droit | 35 | 978 28.02.91 |
| 216 | Mathématiques | 213 | 6 30.09.90 |
| 217 | Médecine | 221 | 66 17.03.91 |
| 218 | Météorologie | 602 | 32 31.12.89 |
| 219 | Sciences infirmières | 1,542 | 80 30.09.90 |
| 220 | Ergothérapie et physiothérapie | 35 | 2 30.09.90 |
| 221 | Pharmacie | 64 | 1 30.09.90 |
| 222 | Sciences physiques | 886 | 32 15.06.90 |
| 223 | Psychologie | 145 | 3 30.09.90 |
| 224 | Réglementation scientifique | 392 | 30 30.09.90 |
| 225 | Recherche scientifique | 2,078 | 104 30.09.90 |
| 226 | Service social | 104 | 4 30.09.90 |
| 228 | Médecine vétérinaire | 590 | 37 30.09.90 |
| 229 | Service scientifique de la défense | 529 | 54 30.09.90 |
| 230 | Examineurs de brevets | 119 | 7 01.02.90 |
| 303 | Gestion des systèmes d'ordinateur | 4,439 | 146 30.04.90 |
| 311 | Commerce | 1,934 | 5 21.06.90 |
| | TOTAL | 22,845 | 2,304 |
| 3. | <u>FRATERNITÉ INTERNATIONALE DES OUVRIERS EN ÉLECTRICITÉ (FIOE)</u> | | |
| 404 | Électronique | 2,842 | 108 31.08.91 |
| 4. | <u>ASSOCIATION DES ÉCONOMISTES, SOCIOLOGUES ET STATISTICIEN(NE)S (AEES)</u> | | |
| 208 | Économie, sociologie et statistique | 2,484 | 71 15.02.90 |
| 5. | <u>ASSOCIATION CANADIENNE DU CONTRÔLE DU TRAFIC AÉRIEN (ACCTA)</u> | | |
| 402 | Contrôle de la circulation aérienne | 1,881 | 158 31.12.90 |

le 7 mars 1990

| | CODE | NOMBRE D'EMPLOYÉS | DATE |
|-----|--|-------------------|--------------|
| | IUN UNITÉ DE NÉGOCIATION | UNITÉ (EXCLU.) | D'EXPIRATION |
| 6. | <u>LA GUILDE DE LA MARINE MARCHANDE DU CANADA (GMMC)</u> | | |
| | 410 Officiers de navires | 1,363 | 116 31.08.90 |
| 7. | <u>CONSEIL DES MÉTIERS ET DU TRAVAIL DU CHANTIER MARITIME DU GOUVERNEMENT FÉDÉRAL EST (CMTCM)</u> | | |
| | 611 Réparation des navires | 1,220 | 58 31.12.90 |
| 8. | <u>ASSOCIATION CANADIENNE DES PROFESSIONNELS DE L'EXPLOITATION RADIO (ACPER)</u> | | |
| | 409 Radiotélégraphie | 1,111 | 144 30.04.92 |
| 9. | <u>SYNDICAT CANADIEN DES EMPLOYÉS PROFESSIONNELS ET TECHNIQUES (SCEPT)</u> | | |
| | 313 Traduction | 990 | 96 18.04.90 |
| 10. | <u>CONSEIL DES UNIONS DES ARTS GRAPHIQUES (UAGC)</u> | | |
| | 609 Services d'imprimerie (NS) | 932 | 5 31.08.90 |
| 11. | <u>ASSOCIATION PROFESSIONNELLE DES AGENTS DU SERVICE EXTÉRIEUR (APASE)</u> | | |
| | 312 Service extérieur | 1,080 | 72 30.04.91 |
| 12. | <u>CONSEIL DES MÉTIERS ET DU TRAVAIL DES CHANTIERS MARITIMES DU GOUVERNEMENT FÉDÉRAL ESQUIMALT (CMTCM)</u> | | |
| | 614 Réparation des navires | 858 | 36 31.05.90 |
| 13. | <u>L'ASSOCIATION DU GROUPE DE LA NAVIGATION AÉRIENNE (AGNA)</u> | | |
| | 401 Navigation aérienne | 555 | 55 25.10.92 |
| 14. | <u>L'ASSOCIATION DES CHEFS D'ÉQUIPES DES CHANTIERS MARITIMES DU GOUVERNEMENT FÉDÉRAL (ACECMGF)</u> | | |
| | 663 Réparation des navires (chef d'équipe) | 112 | 0 31.03.91 |
| 15. | <u>L'ASSOCIATION DES GESTIONNAIRES FINANCIERS DE LA FONCTION PUBLIQUE (AGFP)</u> | | |
| | 304 Gestion des finances | 2,209 | 424 06.11.91 |

le 7 mars 1990

NOUVEAUX GROUPES PROPOSÉS

| <u>Nouveau Groupe</u> | <u>Groupes Actuels</u> | <u>Effectifs au 31 déc. 1989</u> |
|-------------------------|--|----------------------------------|
| DIRECTION | EX, SM | 4,632 |
| ADMINISTRATION | AS, FI, PE, IS, PM, OM, PG, WP, CR, ST, CM, DA, OE, SI, LS | 116,843 |
| OPÉRATIONNEL | FR, GL, GS, HS, HP, LI, SR, SC | 30,688 |
| TECHNIQUE | DD, EG, GT, PY, TI, PI, RO | 16,230 |
| SERVICES CORRECTIONNELS | CX | 4,689 |
| INFORMATIQUE | CS | 4,552 |
| SCIENCE | PC, CH, BI, FO, MT, SG, AG | 4,070 |
| VÉRIFICATION | AU | 3,782 |
| SCIENCES SOCIALES | ES, MA, AC, SI | 3,760 |
| OFFICIERS DE NAVIRE | SO | 1,394 |
| ARCHITECTURE ET GÉNIE | AR, EN | 3,179 |
| RECHERCHE | SE, DS, HR | 3,045 |
| ÉLECTRONIQUE | EL | 2,939 |
| SÉCURITÉ AÉRIENNE | AI, RO | 2,639 |
| SERVICE DE SANTÉ | HE, NU, OP, PS, DE, MD, SW, PH | 2,167 |
| ENSEIGNEMENT | ED, UT, EU | 2,099 |
| COMMERCE | CO | 1,931 |
| SERVICE EXTÉRIEUR | FS | 1,126 |
| TRADUCTION | TR | 1,036 |
| SERVICES D'IMPRIMERIE | PR, PR-SUP | 1,025 |
| DROIT | LA | 988 |
| MEDECINE VÉTÉRINAIRE | VM | 615 |
| NAVIGATION AÉRIENNE | AO | 607 |

POUR DISCUSSION

FONCTION PUBLIQUE 2000 : RAPPORT DU GROUPE DE TRAVAIL
SUR LA DOTATION

Le 8 août 1990

TABLE DES MATIÈRES

Sommaire

| | |
|--|----|
| Introduction | 1 |
| Aperçu du système de dotation | 3 |
| Principes directeurs | 13 |
| Éléments du système de dotation | 17 |
| Recrutement à la fonction publique | 17 |
| Options d'emploi | 42 |
| Déploiement | 33 |
| Promotions | 73 |
| Stage probatoire | 14 |
| Admission du personnel militaire, de la GRC et du SCRS dans les concours internes | 34 |
| Recours | 54 |
| Équité en matière d'emploi | 05 |
| Nomination au niveau | 25 |
| Dispositions législatives | 95 |
| Conclusion | 46 |
| Mise en oeuvre | 86 |

Sommaire du rapport

Le groupe de travail sur la dotation avait pour objectif de déterminer de quelle façon le système de dotation pourrait être rendu plus conforme au portrait de la fonction publique tracé dans le discours prononcé par le Premier ministre lors de l'annonce officielle du projet FP 2000. L'approche choisie était axée sur la consultation. Le groupe de travail a rencontré des employés et gestionnaires de tous les niveaux dans l'ensemble de la fonction publique ainsi que des spécialistes de la dotation pour circonscrire les lacunes de l'actuel système de dotation et déterminer les améliorations à y apporter. Les syndicats ont également été invités à des rencontres informelles avec les membres du groupe de travail pour exprimer leurs doléances à l'égard du système actuel et faire part de leurs réactions face à l'énoncé de principes qui servirait de base pour les recommandations du groupe de travail.

L'ensemble du système de dotation a d'abord été passé en revue. Cette étude globale a permis de constater le manque de soutien à l'égard du système actuel. Les gestionnaires ne considèrent pas que ce dernier leur appartient véritablement et semblent, en règle générale, mal comprendre sa raison d'être. Les employés mettent son équité en doute. Même si ce manque de soutien résulte en partie de certaines lacunes dans les diverses composantes du système, il s'explique toutefois bien davantage par les valeurs véhiculées par la culture administrative dans laquelle s'insère ce système: une culture qui repose beaucoup trop sur les réglementations que sur le bon sens et le jugement; une culture où les gestionnaires dépendent d'un trop grand nombre de

spécialistes pour interpréter la réglementation, ce qui réduit considérablement leur sens de responsabilité immédiate à l'égard du processus de dotation.

Divers facteurs ont contribué à la lourdeur du système en place: les procédures administratives prescrites par la législation en vigueur; les tentatives antérieures visant à améliorer le système en formulant diverses lignes directrices pour guider les fonctionnaires dans les situations où certains objectifs en matière de gestion des ressources humaines étaient en conflit; la sélection et la formation des spécialistes de la dotation les quelles ont renforcé la tendance du système à reposer sur une réglementation méticuleuse.

Le groupe de travail en est arrivé à la conclusion que le système de dotation doit être transformé de façon à permettre aux gestionnaires de faire preuve de jugement dans le contexte général des politiques et lignes de directrices en matière de dotation, pour ainsi assumer l'entière responsabilité du processus de dotation et des décisions connexes. Pour y arriver, il est convenu qu'il sera nécessaire de **modifier la législation** en vigueur. Le groupe de travail pense cependant que le processus de changement peut déjà être mis en branle, même si les modifications vraiment fondamentales devront peut-être encore attendre.

Le groupe de travail a formulé six principes devant orienter la conception d'un système de dotation renouvelé. Ce système:

- doit être suffisamment souple pour répondre aux besoins en ressources humaines des ministères, tout en leur

permettant de s'acquitter de leurs reponsabilités à l'égard du public canadien.

- doit contribuer à maintenir une fonction publique hautement compétente.
- ne doit comporter aucun obstacle systémique en ce qui concerne la représentativité de la fonction publique tout en permettant de respecter les politiques visant à corriger les déséquilibres relevés à cet égard.
- doit satisfaire aux exigences relatives à l'équité et à la régularité administrative.
- doit garantir que le recrutement et la promotion des fonctionnaires soient soustraits à tout favoritisme politique, bureaucratique ou personnel.
- soit simple à administrer et efficace.

Le groupe de travail a ensuite examiné en particulier chaque élément du système de dotation.

Il a été convenu qu'il faudrait laisser aux ministères le soin de décider dans quel cas il y a lieu de recruter des candidats à l'extérieur. Par contre, pour ce qui est des postes autres que ceux de niveau d'entrée, les promotions internes devraient demeurer la norme. Un organisme parlementaire devrait toutefois conserver la responsabilité du **processus de recrutement**. Ce dernier devrait être plus expéditif et s'adapter davantage aux circonstances particulières liées aux diverses activités ou campagnes de

recrutement. Le groupe de travail est acquis à la notion de carrière dans la fonction publique et considère que la sélection des nouveaux fonctionnaires devrait tenir compte des besoins à long terme de la fonction publique et non pas seulement des besoins immédiats de tel poste à combler.

Le groupe de travail a recommandé que les gestionnaires reçoivent davantage de soutien et d'informations au sujet du recours aux **stages probatoires** à la suite du recrutement. Il recommande aussi que les renvois en cours de stage soient utilisés plus souvent, lorsque les circonstances le justifient.

Il est pleinement évident que les nominations **pour une période déterminée** servent présentement beaucoup plus qu'à répondre aux seuls besoins de main-d'oeuvre à court terme. Le groupe de travail a constaté que les difficultés relatives au processus de recrutement et de probation étaient en partie responsables de ce fréquent recours aux nominations pour une période déterminée. Il a également constaté qu'il fallait offrir aux gestionnaires un plus grand nombre d'options en ce qui concerne le recrutement de nouveaux employés. Quatre options ont été suggérées: nominations pour une période indéterminée (de préférence); redéfinition du travail à temps partiel; nominations pour une période déterminée pour les tâches à exécuter de façon continue mais pendant une durée fixe; nominations temporaires, pour les emplois occasionnels de courte durée et peu susceptible d'être prolongés. Exception faite du personnel occasionnel, toutes les personnes retenues pour ces diverses catégories d'emploi seraient sélectionnées conformément au processus de recrutement habituel et seraient soumises à des conditions d'emploi comparables.

Le groupe de travail reconnaît que **le déploiement** des effectifs ne peut être traité de la même façon que le processus de recrutement ou de promotion sans compromettre l'efficacité opérationnelle ou la mise en application des plans de perfectionnement pour le personnel. Il est convenu que, dans la plupart des cas, le déploiement à postes temporaires ou permanents devrait faire partie des responsabilités administratives confiées aux gestionnaires, dans la mesure où ces derniers exercent ces responsabilités dans le contexte général des relations entre employés et gestionnaires, sur la base de leur consentement mutuel. Le consentement à être redéployé peut être considéré comme une condition d'emploi laissée à la discrétion des gestionnaires, mais uniquement dans les cas où un tel consentement est un préalable indispensable du point de vue de l'efficacité opérationnelle. Pour mettre pleinement à profit les possibilités de perfectionnement offertes grâce à un processus simplifié de déploiement, le groupe de travail recommande aux ministères de constituer des services d'affectations qui seraient chargés d'apparier les offres et demandes d'affectation. Les ministères devraient aussi prendre les dispositions nécessaires pour que tous les employés puissent avoir des chances égales de bénéficier de ces possibilités de perfectionnement.

Le groupe de travail a étudié en profondeur le concept de **nomination au niveau**. Il recommande que la nouvelle législation permette d'effectuer des promotions soit en fonction des exigences des postes à pourvoir (nomination au poste), soit en fonction des normes applicables à l'ensemble de la fonction publique (nomination au niveau). Les recommandations du groupe de travail portant sur le déploiement des effectifs permettront, après leur adoption, de

mettre en application les dispositions du régime de nomination au niveau portant sur les affectations à un poste.

Le groupe de travail pense que le processus de concours doit demeurer la norme pour ce qui est des **promotions**. Ce processus doit se dérouler de façon équitable et transparente. Il est recommandé d'accroître le nombre des instruments d'évaluation pour augmenter la crédibilité du processus d'évaluation. La sélection des candidats devrait reposer non seulement sur les exigences particulières du poste à pourvoir mais aussi sur les exigences du groupe et niveau professionnel de même que sur les besoins en ressources humaines de chaque organisme.

La nécessité des voies de **recours** a été confirmée. Le groupe de travail a recommandé de maintenir intégralement le droit d'appel que le système actuel accorde aux employés par rapport aux promotions. On pense qu'il serait possible de réduire le nombre de pourvois en appel, en faisant preuve d'une plus grande ouverture dans la communication des renseignements postérieurs aux concours. Le groupe de travail a en outre recommandé qu'un organisme parlementaire conserve la responsabilité de prescrire les mesures correctives à la suite d'un appel accueilli à l'encontre d'un processus de sélection, sans toutefois étendre cette responsabilité de façon à lui accorder le pouvoir de déterminer quel candidat devrait être retenu.

Le groupe de travail a confirmé la nécessité de trouver des moyens plus directs et plus efficaces pour accroître la **représentativité de la fonction publique** et recommandé que la nouvelle législation

se conforme aux dispositions de l'article 15 de la Charte canadienne des droits et libertés.

La phase de mise en application constitue l'étape la plus critique dans tout processus de changement. Le succès du processus dépend de la participation active des niveaux supérieurs de gestion. Deux autres facteurs peuvent avoir une influence majeure sur les recommandations du groupe de travail: le changement de mentalité nécessaire pour transformer la culture collective dans laquelle s'insère le système de dotation et la réforme des systèmes et réglementations qui ont jusqu'ici favorisé ces attitudes, présupposés et conceptions des responsabilités. Le nouveau système devra être axé sur l'équité, reposer sur des principes clairs ainsi que sur un ensemble restreint de politiques et lignes directrices plutôt que sur une prolifération excessive de règlements. Les gestionnaires devront bien connaître ces politiques et lignes directrices, faire preuve de jugement et assumer la responsabilité des décisions qu'ils prendront quant à la manière de les adapter aux circonstances particulières. Les spécialistes de la gestion du personnel auront pour responsabilité de soutenir les gestionnaires dans cette tâche.

Le groupe de travail pense que les changements proposés permettront d'élaborer un système de dotation plus juste, plus équitable et plus souple, un système que sera par conséquent plus apte à fournir à la fonction publique fédérale le personnel de qualité indispensable pour remplir son mandat qui consiste à offrir des services de qualité au public ainsi qu'au gouvernement au pouvoir.

INTRODUCTION

INTRODUCTION

L'objectif du projet Fonction publique 2000, annoncé par le premier ministre, est de favoriser une fonction publique qui :

- . soit professionnelle, hautement qualifiée, non partisane et chargée d'une mission de service au public;
- . considère les employés comme un capital qu'il faut estimer et perfectionner;
- . accorde autant d'autorité que possible aux employés de premier niveau et aux gestionnaires; et
- . pave la voie à différentes formes d'organisation pour répondre à des besoins différents et cela, dans le contexte d'une seule fonction publique.

Le présent rapport expose les recommandations finales du Groupe de travail FP 2000 sur la dotation, dont les travaux ont commencé en décembre 1989 et devaient durer huit mois. Le Groupe de travail avait pour mandat d'examiner le système de dotation dans sa conception et son application et de proposer des modifications qui iraient dans le sens des objectifs du programme FP 2000.

La fonction publique est une organisation qui repose sur des gens. La capacité de la fonction publique de servir le gouvernement et le public repose sur la capacité du système de dotation de fournir à la fonction publique le personnel dont elle a besoin. Le Groupe

de travail a entrepris son étude en tenant compte de l'importance des employés et du système de dotation.

Bien que le Groupe de travail ait examiné les statistiques, les politiques et les textes de loi, la démarche pour s'acquitter de son mandat a été largement axée sur la consultation. Des fonctionnaires, des groupes de fonctionnaires, des spécialistes en dotation et des organisations touchées directement par des dispositions de la loi relative à la dotation ont été consultés, afin de connaître leur point de vue sur les problèmes du système de dotation et les moyens de l'améliorer. Tous les chefs syndicaux ont été conviés à des rencontres officieuses avec le Groupe de travail, non seulement pour discuter des difficultés que le système leur cause, mais aussi pour connaître leur réaction au sujet des principes qui guideront le Groupe de travail dans ses recommandations.

Vingt-trois groupes de discussion ont été consultés à l'échelle nationale, formés de fonctionnaires choisis au hasard à tous les échelons administratifs, dans des ministères n'ayant pas la même taille et la même vocation. Toutes les propositions du Groupe de travail ont été discutées dans le détail avec ces groupes. Outre les groupes de discussion, les membres du Groupe de travail sur la dotation ont consulté des gestionnaires et des employés de leur ministère. Des groupes de discussion ont été constitués pour discuter de sujets précis comme l'emploi pour une période déterminée et les nominations au niveau.

Ces groupes ont présenté nombre d'idées et de suggestions utiles dont il a été tenu compte dans le présent rapport. Toutefois, ce

qui a été le plus frappant au sujet des groupes de discussion est l'empressement, l'engagement et la bonne foi de tous les employés à tous les échelons. Chaque fois qu'ils ont quitté un groupe de discussion, et cela partout au pays, les membres du Groupe de travail n'ont pu s'empêcher de se sentir fiers d'être les collègues des fonctionnaires qui les composaient.

Les rencontres que le Groupe de travail a eues avec ces groupes l'ont aidé à croire fermement en la possibilité du changement. Il ne faisait aucun doute que ces fonctionnaires étaient prêts à relever le défi de Fonction publique 2000 et qu'ils avaient la volonté et la capacité d'assumer les responsabilités que ce défi présentait.

Le Groupe de travail a abordé le système de dotation à deux niveaux : il a étudié des problèmes précis et les problèmes d'ensemble qui débordent toute composante du système de dotation. Dans les pages suivantes, nous explorons d'abord le système de dotation dans son ensemble, puis nous examinons chacune de ses composantes.

APERÇU DU SYSTÈME DE DOTATION

APERÇU DU SYSTÈME DE DOTATION

Le problème :

On pourrait évaluer le succès d'un système selon plusieurs critères. Toutefois, le critère le plus révélateur est sans doute le degré de compréhension du système par utilisateurs et sa fréquence d'utilisation pour les aider à atteindre leurs objectifs. C'est le test le plus important que le groupe de travail sur la dotation a imposé au système et c'est à ce test que le système a le plus clairement échoué.

Les gestionnaires n'ont pas l'impression de participer au système de dotation. Ils en parlent comme d'un fardeau qui leur est imposé. Ils le tolèrent avec une impatience non déguisée ou mettent en oeuvre toute leur ingéniosité pour le contourner.

De nombreux gestionnaires n'en connaissent ni les règles, ni la raison d'être. Ils estiment que le système est l'affaire des spécialistes en dotation et des organismes centraux et qu'il n'est pas l'outil de ceux qui dirigent le personnel : les chefs hiérarchiques.

Nombre de fonctionnaires à tous les échelons de la hiérarchie partagent ces points de vue. Leur perception du système de dotation est qu'il est inutilement compliqué, axé sur des règles et appliqué de façon injuste, en particulier au chapitre des concours.

Déterminer dans quelle mesure le personnel croit que le système est appliqué avec intégrité est une autre façon importante de juger de son succès. Là encore, on trouve que le système est souvent insuffisant. Parce que les gestionnaires voient le système comme un dédale de chinoïseries administratives à contourner, les employés, qui voient le système contourné, doutent de ses capacités d'assurer l'impartialité de la dotation et doutent de la bonne foi des gestionnaires.

La cause :

Cette situation n'est pas essentiellement attribuable à l'irrationalité des diverses composantes du système de dotation. Le Groupe de travail a examiné toutes les composantes dans le détail et a découvert que même si certaines sont imparfaites, bon nombre d'entre elles fonctionnent assez bien. Leurs imperfections n'expliquent pas pourquoi le système n'a pas réussi à rallier ni la direction, ni les employés.

Le Groupe de travail admet que le système de dotation, tel qu'il existe aujourd'hui, est le produit de 75 années d'effort destinés à garantir l'impartialité au moyen de règles. Il suppose de façon générale que l'accès équitable à un emploi dans la fonction publique sera garanti non pas en tenant les gestionnaires responsables, mais en confiant à des spécialistes l'application d'un ensemble de règles et de marches à suivre.

Le Groupe de travail est d'avis que la principale source du problème est la philosophie de la direction à l'égard de l'actuel système de dotation - une philosophie qui favorise le contrôle

externe plutôt que la responsabilité individuelle, une philosophie qui favorise la prévention des erreurs plutôt que l'obligation de rendre compte, une philosophie qui repose sur des règles, plutôt que sur le jugement.

Cette philosophie est en partie le reflet de la législation et de la réglementation en vigueur, qui sont normatives en ce qui concerne les méthodes administratives, et en partie le reflet de la sélection, de la formation et de la supervision de spécialistes en dotation qui, dans le passé, ont insisté sur l'aspect réglementaire du système de dotation. Cette philosophie a créé une culture administrative qui résiste au changement.

Le Groupe de travail croit qu'il faut s'attaquer aux diverses lacunes du système de dotation. Le présent rapport renferme plusieurs recommandations à cette fin. Toutefois, des mesures intelligentes ont déjà été prises au sujet des lacunes du système, sans grand succès pour ce qui est de le changer dans l'ensemble. Le système de dotation est plus que la somme de ses parties; c'est toute l'approche quant à la gestion de la dotation qui doit être changée. Ce changement demande un bouleversement important de la culture administrative dans laquelle s'intègre le système de dotation. Sans ce bouleversement, les changements que l'on apportera aux composantes du système risquent de ne pas avoir tous les effets voulus. Le Groupe de travail est d'avis que ce genre de changement est possible et qu'il y a chez tous les responsables de la dotation une volonté de faire fonctionner le système.

En résumé, le Groupe de travail recommande que les modifications au système de dotation aient pour objectifs premiers de créer un

système qui permette aux gestionnaires de se sentir responsables de la sélection, du perfectionnement et de la promotion de leur personnel et qui soit considéré par les employés comme étant intègre. Ces changements nécessitent que l'on s'écarte de la culture administrative qui favorise une conformité exagérée aux règles.

Le contexte :

Le système de dotation est une réussite quand, grâce à lui, es grands objectifs de la gestion des ressources humaines du secteur public sont atteints. C'est en comprenant les objectifs du système de dotation dans le contexte des grands objectifs de la gestion des ressources humaines que l'on peut déterminer l'orientation des améliorations. On trouvera ci-dessous la description de certains des objectifs de la gestion des ressources où entre en ligne de compte le rôle de la dotation.

Le premier objectif est de **fournir le meilleur service possible au public et au gouvernement en place** - telle est la raison d'être de la fonction publique. C'est aussi la raison d'être du système de dotation. Le genre de personnes que nous recrutons, le genre de comportement que nous récompensons par des promotions et la facilité avec laquelle nous déployons des employés pour répondre aux besoins des clients ont d'importantes répercussions sur l'efficacité de notre service.

Le deuxième objectif est **d'offrir à nos employés un milieu de travail humain et positif**. Cela englobe plusieurs éléments qui se chevauchent. Un milieu de travail positif est celui où les employés

ont le sentiment d'être traités équitablement. C'est celui où les employés sont traités avec respect. C'est un milieu où les employés ne sont pas malmenés ou menacés. C'est aussi un milieu de travail où les employés ont la possibilité d'apprendre et de se perfectionner. C'est un milieu de travail où l'on fait valoir aux employés la signification et l'importance du travail à faire. C'est un milieu de travail où l'employé a un sentiment d'appartenance à une collectivité. En termes clairs, la façon dont sont prises et expliquées les décisions relatives aux promotions, l'ampleur des déploiements pour le perfectionnement du personnel, le degré de bonne foi dans le traitement des recours et les méthodes de fonctionnement de toutes les autres composantes du système de dotation auront de profondes répercussions sur la perception qu'ont les employés de leur milieu de travail.

Le troisième objectif porte sur les **exigences de la gestion dans une grande organisation**. Les nominations doivent être faites non seulement pour répondre aux besoins opérationnels de l'unité administrative où la dotation est effectuée, mais aussi pour répondre aux besoins d'une plus grande organisation. Les besoins de cette organisation peuvent être notamment de réaffecter un employé provenant d'un autre service de l'organisation, d'offrir une diversité de possibilités de nomination au personnel des unités plus petites et d'investir dans le perfectionnement des employés prometteurs à long terme, afin qu'ils apportent leur contribution à l'organisation dans son ensemble.

Outre ces trois catégories d'objectifs de la gestion des ressources humaines, il y a des obligations qui sont inhérentes à la nature particulière de la gestion dans la fonction publique : les

gestionnaires de la fonction publique sont jugés en public sur leur efficacité. Il faut aussi comprendre que ces obligations s'insèrent dans le contexte dans lequel fonctionne le système de dotation.

L'**obligation de rendre compte** en est une. Le système de dotation n'est pas simplement un outil administratif pratique. Il est fondé sur un texte de loi et ses activités sont assujetties à l'examen des tribunaux. Les gestionnaires de la fonction publique doivent être en mesure de présenter des rapports sur leur gestion des ressources humaines et de l'expliquer.

L'**égalité d'accès à un emploi** est une autre obligation. Le système de dotation est le moyen par lequel le public a accès à un emploi dans la fonction publique fédérale. Il doit donc être appliqué de façon juste et en conformité avec le processus administratif auquel on peut s'attendre d'un système qui sert à gérer un programme public.

La troisième obligation est la **représentation** de la diversité canadienne dans la fonction publique. Le système de dotation est le moyen par lequel nous déterminons la composition de la main-d'oeuvre qui rend opérante une bonne partie de notre politique nationale. On s'attend donc à ce que le système produise une main-d'oeuvre à l'image de la diversité régionale, linguistique, culturelle et humaine du pays.

Bien que les objectifs et les obligations auxquelles le système de dotation doit répondre soient nombreux, ils sont généralement complémentaires. Les employés qui travaillent dans un milieu

positif, qui se sentent bien et ont l'impression d'être appréciés et d'être bien traités sont certainement plus enclins à assurer le service attentif que leurs fonctions exigent. De la même façon, les employés qui offrent avec sérieux un service utile seront sûrement plus positifs à l'égard de leur vie au travail.

La santé générale de l'ensemble d'un ministère se répercutera sur le plan de l'efficacité de chaque unité. Un recrutement impartial aide à attirer les plus talentueux . Un effectif représentatif des personnes qu'elle sert est mieux en mesure de leur offrir un bon service. Enfin, le besoin de rendre compte favorise des pratiques de gestion judicieuses.

La solution :

Les objectifs et les obligations sont relativement complémentaires quand on considère l'organisation dans son ensemble. Toutefois, les objectifs multiples rendent les choix difficiles au moment de doter un poste. L'amélioration du service et le perfectionnement du personnel peuvent être des exigences conflictuelles quand vous décidez entre l'utilisation d'un poste à des fins de perfectionnement et sa dotation par un employé ayant déjà eu toute la formation requise. De la même manière, faire preuve d'une équité évidente à l'égard du personnel et servir le public peuvent être des valeurs conflictuelles quand vous décidez des moyens de pourvoir à un poste de façon expéditive.

Ainsi, le système de dotation doit inévitablement répondre à des demandes ayant différentes priorités qui, dans l'ensemble de l'organisation, sont complémentaires, mais qui, à l'échelon de

l'opération de dotation, sont souvent conflictuelles.

Répondre équitablement et promptement à ces demandes et avec l'obligation de rendre compte publiquement est à la base des problèmes du gestionnaire de la fonction publique et cela est rendu plus difficile par un système de dotation axé sur les règles.

La question centrale qu'il faut se poser au moment d'examiner le système de dotation est la suivante : comment résoudre ces demandes conflictuelles? Devrait-il y avoir des politiques, des règles et des règlements pour guider les gestionnaires quand ils sont confrontés à de telles demandes ou faudrait-il laisser le gestionnaire exercer son libre arbitre?

La tentation de rédiger des règles est forte. Or l'expérience montre que cette approche est source de problèmes. Il est impossible de prévoir des règles pour l'énorme diversité des situations auxquelles la dotation du secteur public doit s'appliquer. Bien que les meilleures règles puissent viser juste pour le système en général, elles rateront leur but dans nombre de circonstances individuelles. La réponse aux situations où les règles n'apportent pas de solutions est souvent de rédiger toujours plus de règles détaillées pour guider le comportement dans toutes les circonstances possibles et imaginables. Il en résulte un système rigide que les spécialistes prennent en charge parce qu'ils sont les seuls à prétendre avoir la compétence pour interpréter les nombreux volumes de règles. Il en résulte un système dans lequel la marque d'un gestionnaire compétent est son habileté à contourner les règles. En bref, c'est ce qu'on retrouve dans le système actuel.

Quelle est alors la solution? Il n'est pas question d'accorder aux gestionnaires une autorité sans entrave, mais plutôt de leur donner plus de responsabilités: des responsabilités qui doivent être assumées dans un cadre de principes généraux et de politiques, la responsabilité de se servir de son jugement pour décider du bien-fondé d'une mesure, étant donné la nature de la situation. La responsabilité englobe l'obligation de rendre compte d'une décision faisant appel au jugement. Dans la partie "Mise en oeuvre", on propose une approche qui offre un plan d'ensemble dans le cadre duquel peuvent être élaborées et exercées ces responsabilités et cette obligation de rendre compte.

Les recommandations du Groupe de travail sur les composantes du système de dotation ont été élaborées en tenant compte de cette approche. Les recommandations au sujet des modifications des textes de loi et l'approche générale pour leur mise en application tiennent aussi compte de cette démarche.

Dans les pages qui suivantes, on présente d'abord les grands principes qui devraient être à la base du système de dotation. Sont ensuite exposées les recommandations au sujet des modifications aux composantes du système de dotation. Enfin, on trouvera des recommandations précises pour les modifications aux textes de loi et la proposition générale pour la mise en oeuvre d'une stratégie.

PRINCIPES DIRECTEURS

PRINCIPES DIRECTEURS

Pour traiter de chaque composante du système de dotation, le Groupe de travail a formulé les grands principes et les politiques permettant aux gestionnaires le libre arbitre quand ils prendront des mesures de dotation. Avant d'aborder chacune des composantes du système, le Groupe de travail a formulé un ensemble de principes auxquels toute la fonction publique devrait se conformer et qui constituent un cadre dans lequel doivent s'insérer les recommandations relatives à chaque composante.

Le Groupe de travail croit qu'un système de dotation doit, pour fonctionner, se conformer aux principes suivants:

- . Il est assez souple pour répondre aux besoins de ressources humaines des ministères pour les aider à s'acquitter de leurs responsabilités envers le public canadien et le gouvernement en place.
 - . Il contribue à la très grande compétence de la fonction publique.
 - . Il ne présente aucune barrière systématique à une fonction publique représentative de la diversité canadienne et peut s'adapter aux politiques visant la correction des déséquilibres dans cette représentation.
 - . Il satisfait aux exigences de l'équité et permet un processus administratif juste.
-

- . Il exige que le recrutement et la promotion des fonctionnaires soient libres de tout favoritisme politique, bureaucratique ou personnel.
- . Son fonctionnement est simple et efficace.

Une question d'équilibre :

Ayant accepté les six principes ci-dessus, le Groupe de travail reconnaît que tout système de dotation devra en tenir compte et s'accommoder des valeurs conflictuelles suivantes :

- . Le libre arbitre accordé aux gestionnaires par opposition à l'obligation qui leur est faite d'être justes et ouverts en matière de dotation.
 - . Répondre aux besoins immédiats de dotation d'un poste et, d'un autre côté, répondre aux besoins à plus long terme de l'organisation.
 - . Traiter le personnel comme des fonctionnaires dans l'ensemble du gouvernement et, d'un autre côté, les traiter comme des employés attachés à leur ministère.
 - . Maintenir une fonction publique de carrière et, d'autre part, ouvrir la fonction publique aux nouvelles recrues à tous les échelons.
-

Le Groupe de travail ne croit pas qu'il soit possible, ni souhaitable de résoudre les conflits qui existent entre ces valeurs; il est d'avis qu'il vaudrait mieux chercher à viser un équilibre optimal. Il croit ce qui suit :

- . Le système doit être juste et perçu ainsi, mais il ne faudrait pas que ce soit au détriment du libre arbitre des gestionnaires, nécessaire pour s'assurer que les responsabilités des ministères à l'égard du public et du gouvernement sont respectées.
 - . On peut présumer que le candidat choisi pour un emploi sera en principe capable de s'acquitter de ses tâches avec compétence, mais il faut retenir que le principe clé pour le choix des candidats est le degré de capacité du candidat à répondre aux besoins à plus long terme de la fonction publique.
 - . Quoiqu'il soit naturel pour un gestionnaire de chercher d'abord dans son organisation pour doter des postes, le système de dotation doit faire en sorte que les employés aient un accès raisonnable aux multiples possibilités d'emploi à l'échelle du gouvernement.
 - . Les postes au-dessus du niveau d'entrée seront en principe comblés par des fonctionnaires, mais le système doit permettre un recrutement extérieur à tous les échelons. Quand un gestionnaire décide de recruter des candidats à l'extérieur de la fonction publique pour des postes à des niveaux autres que celui d'entrée, il doit faire en sorte qu'il y ait un
-

certain équilibre entre ses besoins immédiats et ceux à long terme de la fonction publique.

Dans les pages qui suivent, nous examinons comment ces principes s'appliquent aux diverses composantes du système de dotation.

ÉLÉMENTS DU SYSTÈME DE DOTATION

RECRUTEMENT À LA FONCTION PUBLIQUE

Dans le présent rapport, l'expression «recrutement» désigne les activités liées à l'embauchage de personnes de l'extérieur de la fonction publique. Cet ensemble d'activités soulève plusieurs facteurs, soit quand embaucher, par qui embaucher, les critères de recrutement et toute la question de la vitesse et de la qualité de réaction. À l'exception des employés aux niveaux de soutien et subalterne, les fonctionnaires trouvent le processus actuel de recrutement trop lent, encombrant et alourdi par la réglementation. On reconnaît la nécessité d'officialiser l'équité, mais l'on estime que les nombreux procédés et niveaux d'approbation entravent sérieusement l'aptitude des ministères à recruter des gens compétents. Aux niveaux de soutien et subalterne, où l'intervention individuelle dans les décisions de recrutement est relativement minime, on se préoccupe surtout de l'incidence du recrutement sur les possibilités personnelles d'avancement et de perfectionnement. C'est pourquoi les personnes à ces niveaux accordent une importance considérable au contrôle par la Commission de la fonction publique, pour assurer l'équité. Les recommandations du Groupe de travail dans ce domaine tentent de concilier raisonnablement ces préoccupations qui se situent à l'opposé.

Quand recruter

Bien que dans certaines situations les exigences opérationnelles ou l'efficacité d'un organisme exigent un recrutement externe en

vue de postes au-dessus du niveau d'entrée, la possibilité pour nos employés de progresser dans leur carrière au sein de la fonction publique reste une valeur importante qui devrait être reconnue par les politiques.

Les lois et règlements actuels obligent les ministères à obtenir l'autorisation de la CFP pour le recrutement au-dessus du niveau d'entrée, alors que c'est la direction qui est le mieux en mesure de déterminer quand un recrutement externe s'impose et que c'est donc elle qui devrait assumer cette responsabilité.

Recommandations

1. Les politiques devraient reconnaître comme étant la norme le recrutement dans la fonction publique au niveau d'entrée.
2. La responsabilité de décider lorsqu'il faut recruter à l'extérieur de la fonction publique au-dessus du niveau d'entrée devrait revenir aux ministères. L'obligation législative actuelle d'obtenir l'autorisation de la CFP devrait être éliminée compte tenu des politiques globales en matière de gestion des ressources humaines et l'employeur devrait élaborer des lignes directrices afin d'orienter les décisions par les ministères de procéder au recrutement.

Qui devrait recruter

Le maintien de la neutralité politique de la fonction publique demeure une valeur importante. L'expérience d'autres juridictions révèle que lorsque l'on supprime les modalités structurelles

appuyant cette tradition, c'est souvent la neutralité de la fonction publique qui en souffre. L'un des éléments structurels critiques assurant la neutralité de la fonction publique consiste à confier le recrutement à un organisme comptable au Parlement, plutôt qu'au gouvernement du jour.

Recommandation

3. Le recrutement à l'extérieur de la fonction publique, à n'importe quel niveau, devrait continuer de relever d'un organisme parlementaire qui, de par la Loi, doit procéder au recrutement d'une façon respectant la neutralité politique de la fonction publique. (Cependant, de nouvelles mesures législatives ne devraient pas exclure la possibilité de déléguer le recrutement.)

Critères de sélection des candidats

La Loi actuelle part du principe que l'embauchage vise un poste, et non un organisme. L'embauchage en est donc venu à viser des postes particuliers, plutôt qu'une carrière dans la fonction publique, ce qui a entraîné une sélection se fondant sur les aptitudes requises pour un poste initial, plutôt que sur les besoins à plus long terme de la fonction publique. La plupart des candidats recrutés restent dans la fonction publique, afin d'y poursuivre leur carrière et occuperont probablement plusieurs postes autres que celui pour lequel on les a embauchés au départ. Une décision en fait de recrutement représente un investissement et il faudrait songer au rendement à long terme plutôt que seulement aux besoins immédiats.

Recommandation

4. La sélection d'une recrue ne devrait pas se limiter à son aptitude à s'acquitter des fonctions du premier poste visé par le recrutement, mais porter également sur la mesure dans laquelle cette sélection répond aux besoins à long terme en ressources humaines de la fonction publique.

Dans certains cas, il faudra plus qu'auparavant mettre l'accent sur des candidats plus prometteurs à long terme. Il faudra parfois également appliquer des stratégies de recrutement plus rigoureuses et, par conséquent, moins expéditives à court terme.

Vitesse et qualité de réaction

En général, les gestionnaires et les fonctionnaires trouvent le processus de recrutement lent et encombré de procédures inutiles. Les employés de niveau moins élevé ont tendance à insister sur l'incidence du recrutement à l'extérieur de la fonction publique sur leurs possibilités d'avancement et de perfectionnement. Dans le régime actuel, on a eu tendance à tenir plus compte des préoccupations des employés que des besoins des gestionnaires. Les recommandations qui suivent partent du principe qu'il faudrait assouplir les règles pour laisser plus de place au jugement. Ce principe répond aux besoins des gestionnaires, mais par contre on jugera ces derniers sur leur rendement dans le domaine de l'équité envers leurs employés.

Recommandations

5. Le recrutement à l'extérieur de la fonction publique devrait se faire au niveau de la direction, être sans appel et non assujéti à des détails de procédure. Il faudrait ériger en norme des stratégies de recrutement rehaussant la vitesse et l'efficacité, menées d'une façon qui reflète le contexte particulier de chaque mesure ou campagne de recrutement. Lorsque la situation s'y prête, il faudrait adopter les techniques ayant fait leurs preuves dans le secteur privé.
 6. Le Groupe de travail avait proposé dans son rapport provisoire plusieurs recommandations de mesures pouvant être adoptées immédiatement pour améliorer le système de dotation. Certaines d'entre elles touchent la question du recrutement, plus spécifiquement la recommandation selon laquelle la Commission de la fonction publique devrait définir les situations où l'on peut envisager la présentation de candidats nommément désignés; il faudrait déterminer les moyens et le coût d'un processus de recrutement plus efficace par une automatisation plus poussée et un accès ministériel direct; il faudrait rendre plus efficaces les enquêtes de sécurité et étudier le recours à des réserves de ressources pour le recrutement de généralistes. En plus de ces recommandations et compte tenu du paragraphe 5 qui précède, le Groupe de travail estime qu'il y aurait une amélioration mesurable de la vitesse et de la qualité de réaction du processus de recrutement si l'on adoptait également les mesures suivantes:
-

- Les agents de recrutement devraient être en contact direct avec les gestionnaires effectuant l'embauchage. Actuellement, dans plusieurs ministères, cette relation s'effectue par l'entremise d'agents ministériels de dotation. En plus d'affaiblir la communication, ce processus amenuise la responsabilité d'offrir un service dans les meilleurs délais.
 - Les besoins en ressources peuvent faire l'objet de prévisions plus fréquentes et l'on pourrait embaucher des candidats à l'avance, en fonction de ces prévisions.
 - Il faudrait accroître l'utilisation de répertoires de candidats présélectionnés, tant au niveau de l'organisme parlementaire qu'à celui des ministères.
 - Des numéros d'autorisation en matière de priorités pourraient être attribués en bloc pour des périodes déterminées de moins de six mois.
 - Lorsque c'est indiqué, on pourrait tenir simultanément des concours externes et internes.
 - Le délai de réponse à des annonces pourrait être réduit à une durée qui reste toutefois raisonnable pour les candidats.
 - On pourrait utiliser plus souvent des énoncés de qualités généraux.
-

- On pourrait réduire la documentation à un minimum.
 - Diverses étapes d'évaluation des candidats pourraient se dérouler simultanément.
 - Les listes d'admissibilité pourraient faire l'objet d'une utilisation plus générale.
-

OPTIONS D'EMPLOI

L'emploi pour une période déterminée représente l'un des domaines où les gestionnaires ont exploité avec le plus d'imagination les dispositions actuelles du système de dotation.

La structure de l'emploi dans la fonction publique repose en grande partie sur le principe de la carrière. On présume que la majorité des fonctionnaires passeront la plus grande partie de leur carrière dans la fonction publique. Les conditions d'emploi et la protection contre les mises à pied que l'on offre aux fonctionnaires découlent en grande partie de ce principe.

Dans bon nombre de cas, la réalité du travail ne correspond pas à ce principe d'une carrière dans la fonction publique. Beaucoup de tâches dans la fonction publique sont de durée limitée, intermittentes ou à temps partiel. De plus, bien que l'emploi permanent soit l'option privilégiée par plusieurs, les gens sont maintenant moins portés de choisir une carrière linéaire ininterrompue, de leur arrivée sur le marché du travail jusqu'à leur retraite.

Les dispositions actuelles régissant l'emploi pour une période déterminée ont procuré une partie de la souplesse nécessaire pour s'adapter aux changements, mais la réalité du travail dans la fonction publique est beaucoup plus complexe que la simple distinction entre les emplois pour une période déterminée et ceux pour une période indéterminée. Cette réalité a mené à des

utilisations de l'emploi pour une période déterminée qui vont bien au-delà de l'intention de départ. Certaines de ces pratiques sont décrites ci-après.

En général, l'expérience révèle aux gestionnaires que le processus normal de dotation est souvent rigide et peu réaliste et ils utilisent de façon imaginative l'emploi pour une période déterminée afin d'être en mesure de respecter leurs exigences opérationnelles.

Comme les employés pour une période déterminée **n'ont pas droit** à des avantages sociaux en vertu des politiques de réaménagement de l'effectif, ils représentent souvent pour les gestionnaires un effectif variable qui peut augmenter ou diminuer dans le contexte incertain des budgets.

Comme on peut se départir d'un employé pour une période déterminée en laissant simplement la période expirer, ce type d'employé remplit souvent des fonctions de stagiaire et l'on évoque rarement les dispositions prévues au moment du recrutement pour le renvoi en cours de stage.

De plus, à cause de l'impression (sans fondement) que l'on peut embaucher des employés pour une période déterminée sans avoir vraiment à envisager des candidats prioritaires, en portant moins attention aux exigences en matière de sécurité et avec une surveillance moins rigoureuse de la part de la Commission de la fonction publique, on a souvent tendance à les embaucher, au lieu de recruter des employés pour une période indéterminée. La situation en est arrivée au point où la majorité des nouveaux employés pour une période indéterminée sont maintenant d'abord

embauchés pour une période déterminée, au lieu d'être embauchés directement pour une période indéterminée.

En bref, nous vivons actuellement une situation où l'emploi pour une période déterminée sert souvent à contourner les éléments les plus restrictifs du système de dotation, et non pour son objectif prévu de combler des besoins en main-d'oeuvre pour une période définie.

Le Groupe de travail en est arrivé à la conclusion qu'il faudrait aborder de front les difficultés que pose le recrutement externe et l'utilisation des stages qui ont généralisé le recours à des employés pour une période déterminée. (On traite de ces questions dans des sections précédentes du présent rapport.) Une carrière dans la fonction publique devrait demeurer la norme, mais il est évident que les gestionnaires ont besoin de plus de souplesse sur le plan de l'embauchage afin de répondre aux exigences opérationnelles. C'est pourquoi, le Groupe de travail recommande que soient plus répandus les modes d'embauchage auxquels peuvent recourir les gestionnaires et qui reflètent la diversité des besoins de la fonction publique.

Recommandation

1. La gamme des options ouvertes aux gestionnaires pour l'embauchage dans la fonction publique devrait être élargie et modifiée pour offrir les grandes catégories suivantes :
-

- Emploi pour une période indéterminée
 - a) temps plein
 - b) temps partiel (redéfini)
- Emploi pour une période déterminée
- Emploi occasionnel (redéfini)

Emploi pour une période indéterminée

a) Temps plein

Cette formule sous-entend habituellement un engagement à offrir une carrière et de l'emploi pour une période non spécifiée. Il s'agit de l'option privilégiée dans la plupart des situations. Nous sommes le mieux en mesure d'attirer les gens les plus talentueux lorsque nous pouvons leur offrir un emploi à temps plein. Il est peu probable que les meilleurs nouveaux diplômés et les employés très appréciés oeuvrant dans d'autres organismes acceptent des offres d'emploi d'une durée limitée. Il faut tout faire pour utiliser les nominations à temps plein à titre de formule privilégiée de recrutement dans la fonction publique.

Même dans les cas où la durée du travail est incertaine, il faudrait d'abord choisir le recrutement à temps plein. Lorsque les exigences du travail changent, les employés recrutés sur la base d'un bon processus de sélection seront faciles à réaffecter.

b) Temps partiel (redéfini)

Lorsque le travail se présente de façon sporadique ou à des intervalles réguliers, la formule d'emploi choisie devrait en tenir compte. Les options établies de travail saisonnier et à temps partiel jouent un rôle utile, mais elles manquent de souplesse. Le travail saisonnier est habituellement associé à une saison de l'année et le travail à temps partiel se limite à une partie de la semaine. Il devrait être possible pour des employés dont l'emploi offre tous les avantages d'un emploi pour une période indéterminée, de travailler pendant n'importe quelle période régulière ou non d'une semaine, d'un mois ou d'une année.

Nombre de gens, généralement des femmes, préfèrent harmoniser leurs heures de travail avec leurs obligations domestiques et familiales. Des modalités plus souples devraient permettre au gouvernement d'attirer plusieurs nouveaux candidats qui ne se présenteraient pas autrement. De plus, ce genre de modalités permettrait à certains employés qui le désirent de passer à un emploi à temps partiel pendant certaines périodes de leur vie sans quitter la fonction publique. Parallèlement, du côté de l'employeur, la charge de travail peut varier énormément selon la situation. Pour s'adapter à cette situation, les gestionnaires devraient avoir la latitude de conclure des contrats avec des personnes intéressées, afin de les embaucher pour des périodes intermittentes, c'est-à-dire les appeler lorsqu'il y a du travail et les mettre en situation d'inactivité lorsqu'il n'y a pas de travail ou à leur demande.

Dans l'une ou l'autre des situations précédentes, les employés devraient pouvoir accumuler des années de service, comme si leur emploi avait été continu, aux fins du régime de pensions et des autres avantages liés au nombre d'années de service.

Recommandations

2. Il devrait être exigé dans la politique que le recrutement s'effectue pour une période indéterminée, à moins que l'on puisse clairement démontrer que à travail sera d'une durée limitée.
3. La définition de l'emploi à temps partiel pour une période indéterminée devrait englober les dispositions existantes en ce qui concerne l'emploi saisonnier et à temps partiel avec les précisions et les ajouts suivants:

SAISONNIER: toute période régulière au cours de l'année;

À TEMPS PARTIEL: toute partie d'un jour, d'une semaine, d'un mois ou d'une année, à intervalles réguliers ou non;

INTERMITTENT : alternance de situations d'inactivité et de rappel au travail, par consentement mutuel de l'employé et de l'employeur, selon les fluctuations de la charge de travail ou la disponibilité de l'employé.

4. Les avantages sociaux offerts aux employés à temps partiel devraient être proportionnels aux heures de travail accumulées et toute la durée de leur service au cours d'une année devrait
-

être considérée comme une période d'emploi continue.

5. Les employés à temps partiel devraient faire l'objet d'une sélection conforme aux normes et procédés habituels de recrutement et il devraient être admissibles au déploiement et aux concours internes.
6. Les définitions qui précèdent devraient être normalisées dans la Loi sur l'emploi dans la fonction publique, de même que dans l'ensemble des politiques et mesures législatives touchant l'emploi.

Nominations pour une période déterminée

L'emploi pour une période déterminée devrait se limiter au travail pour une période déterminée. Comme les employés nommés pour une période déterminée deviennent souvent des fonctionnaires permanents, il faut procéder avec rigueur à leur sélection et à leur recrutement, et non les traiter comme des employés de catégorie inférieure.

Recommandations

7. La politique devrait limiter l'embauchage d'employés pour une période déterminée aux situations où la durée du travail est limitée. Lors de l'embauchage d'employés pour une période déterminée, les gestionnaires devront décrire la tâche précise qui nécessite une nomination pour une période déterminée. La période déterminée devrait normalement s'établir à moins de deux ans.
-

8. Les employés nommés pour une période déterminée devraient faire l'objet d'une sélection conforme aux normes et procédés habituels de recrutement. Ils devraient être admissibles à participer à des concours internes de la fonction publique et pouvoir être envisagés en vue d'une nomination sans concours.
9. Les employés nommés pour une période déterminée devraient jouir des mêmes conditions d'emploi et avantages sociaux que les employés nommés pour une période indéterminée, sauf en ce qui fait que leur nomination vise une période spécifique.

Emploi occasionnel

L'embauchage de personnel occasionnel ne devrait pas faire l'objet des mêmes exigences que l'embauchage d'employés actuellement ou éventuellement permanents. Cependant, les employés qui ne sont pas embauchés dans les formes ne devraient pas devenir permanents, sauf par le biais du processus normal.

Les gestionnaires qui prévoient que le travail peut se prolonger au-delà de la période initiale ou qui prévoient des postes vacants auxquels les employés occasionnels pourraient poser leur candidature devraient avoir recours à l'une des autres options de recrutement.

Recommandations

10. Les ministères devraient pouvoir recruter des employés occasionnels sans avoir à se conformer aux normes et procédés habituels de recrutement.
-

11. Les employés occasionnels ne devraient pas être admissibles à un emploi pour une période indéterminée, sauf à titre de candidats externes par le processus normal de recrutement.
 12. Afin d'éviter que les employés occasionnels ne deviennent un effectif parallèle embauché dans des conditions différentes, ils ne devraient pouvoir travailler pour le même ministère que pendant six des douze mois d'une période donnée.
 13. Les employés occasionnels devraient jouir d'avantages comparables et travailler dans des conditions comparables à ce que le régime actuel prévoit à l'égard des employés pour une période déterminée de moins de six mois.
 14. Les employés occasionnels peuvent être embauchés et rémunérés à l'heure ou pour des périodes continues allant jusqu'à six mois.
-

DÉPLOIEMENT

En vertu de la Loi sur l'emploi dans la fonction publique, le déploiement du personnel d'un poste à un autre est réputé constituer une nomination et est donc soumis aux mêmes considérations que les deux autres éléments du système de dotation, soit le recrutement et la promotion interne. En ce qui concerne ces éléments, les principales considérations concernent la nécessité de s'acquitter de ses fonctions d'une manière clairement exempte de tout favoritisme politique, bureaucratique ou personnel. À ce titre, toute la question d'équité, d'accès et de sélection du plus qualifié revêt une importance primordiale. Cependant, l'application des mêmes critères au déploiement nuit à l'aptitude des gestionnaires à répondre rapidement et efficacement aux besoins opérationnels et à offrir une expérience variée à leurs employés pour les perfectionner.

Le Groupe de travail en est arrivé à la conclusion que le déploiement ne devrait pas être assujéti au critère du mieux qualifié et plutôt découler d'un accord consensuel entre le gestionnaire et ses employés. Pour déterminer lesquels de ses subordonnés sont aptes à être affectés à un poste de perfectionnement ou à répondre aux besoins opérationnels, les gestionnaires doivent beaucoup tenir compte du principe d'équité. Le Groupe de travail est d'avis que le fait de consentir une souplesse importante dans ce domaine fera équilibre au régime plus restrictif régissant la promotion. Le Groupe ne croit pas qu'il soit dans l'intérêt de la fonction publique d'exprimer de la méfiance à l'égard de l'aptitude des gestionnaires à faire usage d'une telle souplesse, par le maintien de règles, de règlements et

de procédés tatillons en vue de protéger l'intégrité du système. Le Groupe de travail croit plutôt les gestionnaires parfaitement capables d'exercer leurs responsabilités en matière de déploiement d'une manière équitable et ouverte, sans qu'il soit nécessaire d'imposer des contrôles centraux.

Pour certains postes dans la fonction publique, la nécessité fonctionnelle du déploiement est telle qu'elle devrait constituer une condition d'emploi. Il n'y a qu'à songer par exemple au roulement dans le service extérieur du Canada. Cependant, dans la plupart des cas, la relation consensuelle normale entre la gestion et les employés devrait suffire à accorder aux gestionnaires la souplesse nécessaire pour exercer leurs responsabilités en matière de déploiement.

Les avantages opérationnels et de perfectionnement d'une souplesse accrue de déploiement seraient énormément intensifiés si la souplesse en question ne se limitait pas à des postes d'un niveau correspondant à celui de la personne visée par le déploiement. Cependant, le déploiement d'une personne à un poste de niveau supérieur (sous-classement) pose des problèmes particuliers. D'un côté, on peut avancer qu'il s'agit pour cette personne d'un avantage de perfectionnement dont les autres ne profitent pas et que l'on ne devrait donc pas ajouter l'avantage supplémentaire de la rémunération provisoire. D'autre part, les employés et leurs syndicats n'abandonneraient pas facilement les protections liées aux dispositions sur les affectations provisoires et la rémunération provisoire, surtout lorsque le sous-classement peut être perçu comme accordant un avantage inéquitable lors de concours subséquents. C'est pourquoi le Groupe de travail en est arrivé à

la conclusion que la souplesse accrue ne devrait pas s'étendre au déploiement de sous-classement autrement qu'en vertu des dispositions normales sur les affectations provisoires et la rémunération provisoire. Cette conclusion ne s'applique pas à la catégorie proposée de la direction, et tient compte de la plus grande latitude de déploiement latéral que recommande le Groupe de travail sur les structures des professions et de la classification.

Afin de maximiser le potentiel d'enrichissement personnel du déploiement, il est important de présenter des possibilités de déploiement les plus larges possible et de faire promouvoir activement par les ministères le perfectionnement des employés par le déploiement, en consacrant du temps et des ressources à la coordination de cette activité.

L'accès à l'expérience qu'apporte le déploiement est précieux pour tous les employés. Le déploiement doit être géré de façon équitable et ouverte, de façon à ne pas devenir un outil de favoritisme ou être perçu comme tel.

Recommandations

1. Afin d'assurer la souplesse nécessaire pour le service au public et le perfectionnement de l'effectif, le déploiement permanent ou temporaire de l'effectif devrait relever de la gestion (sous réserve des considérations ci-après).
 2. On s'attendra à ce que les gestionnaires exercent leurs responsabilités en ce domaine de façon équitable et qu'ils prennent l'initiative d'expliquer ouvertement leurs décisions
-

de déploiement à leur effectif.

3. On s'attend à ce que les gestionnaires continuent de respecter les politiques pertinentes de l'employeur, notamment en ce qui concerne les exigences linguistiques et les exigences en matière de sécurité des postes.
 4. Dans les postes où la liberté de déployer l'effectif est nécessaire à l'efficacité opérationnelle, l'employeur devrait détenir le pouvoir d'inclure dans les conditions d'emploi une clause par laquelle le candidat nommé consent à être éventuellement redéployé.
 5. Dans toutes les situations où le consentement à un éventuel redéploiement ne constitue pas une condition d'emploi, la décision relative au déploiement devrait reposer sur les relations normales de consentement mutuel entre la gestion et les employés.
 6. À l'exception des situations visées par les dispositions sur l'affectation provisoire et la rémunération provisoire, la souplesse accrue accordée aux gestionnaires ne devrait pas s'étendre au déploiement de personnes dont le niveau de classification est inférieur à celui du poste à pourvoir.
 7. Afin de faciliter le mouvement latéral, les ministères devraient établir des bureaux d'affectation qui faciliteront le déploiement entre unités organisationnelles et l'organisme central devrait établir un bureau facilitant le mouvement latéral interministériel.
-

PROMOTIONS

C'est dans le domaine des promotions que les fonctionnaires expriment le plus leur scepticisme au sujet du caractère équitable du système de dotation. Au sein des groupes de discussion mis sur pied pour le Groupe de travail, on avait le sentiment, à tous les échelons, que dans de nombreux cas, les promotions étaient décidées à l'avance. Aux yeux de nombreux employés, il s'agissait d'une formalité visant à légitimer une décision déjà arrêtée.

Un certain nombre de facteurs concourent à ce sentiment général d'injustice. Des employés citent le fait que, dans de fortes proportions, les promotions résultent de nominations sans concours, que de nombreux candidats reçus dans les concours ont exercé les fonctions à titre intérimaire pendant longtemps et que les énoncés de qualités sont souvent très spécialisés, ce qui donne l'impression qu'ils ont été conçus soit pour éliminer les candidats, soit pour privilégier certains candidats. À un palier plus fondamental, un fossé ne cesse de s'élargir entre la perception des cadres et celle des employés au sujet des critères sur lesquels les promotions devraient reposer. Depuis quelques années, des cadres de la fonction publique sont de plus en plus d'avis que leurs homologues du secteur privé sont en mesure de promouvoir des employés en vertu d'un régime de stimulation et de récompense, et non seulement pour respecter les besoins de l'entreprise à un échelon donné. Cela a amené les cadres de la fonction publique à délaisser l'approche traditionnelle d'attribution des promotions en fonction du mérite (ou des compétences) pour adopter une méthode qui s'harmonise mieux avec leur perception de l'évolution dans le secteur privé.

Parallèlement, les fonctionnaires continuent de considérer la fonction publique comme une institution au sein de laquelle les employés devraient être sur un pied d'égalité en ce qui concerne les occasions de promotion en fonction de leurs compétences.

Les membres du Groupe de travail sont d'avis qu'il est impératif d'adopter des mesures pour modifier cette perception d'injustice parmi nos employés. Ils ont la conviction que la souplesse considérablement accrue qui est inhérente aux recommandations relatives au déploiement fournit l'occasion de prendre les mesures nécessaires afin d'en revenir à l'essentiel en ce qui concerne les modalités de sélection des candidats en vue de promotions.

Le Groupe de travail estime que bien que la tenue de concours devrait être la règle, il y aura toujours des circonstances où le choix du candidat le mieux qualifié s'imposera de lui-même, de sorte qu'il serait contre-productif d'opter pour la voie du concours. C'est ce qui a amené le groupe de travail à recommander que soit maintenue la disposition favorisant les promotions sans concours.

La surutilisation de l'entrevue comme moyen exclusif d'évaluer la compétence des candidats soulève une préoccupation particulière en ce qui concerne la validité de cette évaluation dans le cadre du régime actuel. Selon les travaux de recherche, parmi l'éventail des moyens qui existent (tests <<in-basket>>, centres d'évaluation, entrevues, etc.), le moins fiable est l'entrevue. Étant donné cette préoccupation et le fait que si les employés doivent être affectés après avoir été promus, ils doivent s'adapter non seulement aux impératifs de leur poste en particulier, mais aussi

aux besoins plus généraux de l'organisme et de la fonction publique dans son ensemble, l'outil de sélection doit être conçu pour permettre d'évaluer le potentiel éventuel, ainsi que les compétences pratiques actuelles. C'est en tenant compte de ces impératifs que le Groupe de travail formule les recommandations suivantes.

Recommandations

1. La promotion devrait être fonction du choix du candidat "le mieux qualifié" par l'évaluation relative des aptitudes des divers postulants et en se référant à un énoncé de qualités tenant compte des exigences précises de la tâche, des impératifs du groupe, ainsi que de l'échelon du poste et des besoins de l'organisme.
 2. Les cadres devraient faire appel à l'éventail des outils d'évaluation mis à leur disposition lors de l'organisation des concours de promotion. Ils devraient choisir l'un de ces outils en s'en remettant de moins en moins à l'entrevue et en insistant sur les outils qui les aideront à connaître le potentiel éventuel des candidats.
 3. Le processus de promotion devrait se dérouler par voie de concours, sauf dans les cas où l'on peut démontrer que le candidat qui satisfait le mieux à l'énoncé de qualités peut être recruté sans concours.
 4. Dans les programmes de perfectionnement, l'évaluation relative des aptitudes des candidats (soit par concours) devrait
-

intervenir dès le recrutement. Au sein d'un programme, les employés devraient être promus en fonction du respect d'une norme de sélection pour le niveau en question.

5. Le processus de promotion devrait relever de l'organisme parlementaire; il faudrait cependant continuer de le déléguer au ministère dans toute la mesure du possible.
 6. L'organisme parlementaire devrait surveiller et, au besoin, vérifier les pratiques des ministères en matière de promotions.
 7. Les employés considèrent les nominations intérimaires de longue durée comme une source importante d'injustice au sein du système de dotation; il faudrait donc éviter ces nominations.
 8. Conformément à l'engagement d'établir une fonction publique axée sur la carrière, la zone de concours pour les promotions devrait être aussi vaste que le permettent les circonstances d'ordre pratique.
 9. Les promotions devraient faire l'objet d'un droit d'appel, y compris jusqu'à l'admission à la catégorie de la gestion.
 10. L'employeur devrait établir des politiques qui définissent ce qui constitue une promotion.
 11. L'employeur devrait préparer des normes de sélection pour chaque échelon au sein de chaque groupe professionnel.
-

STAGE PROBATOIRE

Le recours au stage probatoire représente la dernière étape du processus de recrutement et de promotion. Le stage probatoire vise à donner aux cadres le temps d'évaluer le bien-fondé de la décision de sélection en fonction du rendement de l'intéressé, en plus de leur permettre de lui communiquer des observations et d'assurer son orientation, ainsi que de tirer en général une conclusion qui permet de savoir si la sélection est appropriée ou non.

En ce qui concerne le recrutement effectué à l'extérieur de l'organisme, un principe bien établi dans le domaine des relations professionnelles veut que le renvoi en cours de stage donne lieu à un renvoi de l'organisme sans droit de recours. En ce qui concerne les promotions cependant, même si l'objectif du stage reste le même, le Groupe de travail est d'avis que le résultat du renvoi doit être différent; en d'autres termes, si on en conclut que la sélection n'est pas appropriée, il faut soit réaffecter l'intéressé à un autre poste à son nouvel échelon, soit le réaffecter à son ancien échelon. Cette conclusion ne doit pas donner lieu à un renvoi de la fonction publique.

Selon le Groupe de travail, le taux exceptionnellement faible de renvois en cours de stage témoigne du fait que la plupart des cadres ne comprennent pas la situation et (ou) hésitent à expliquer directement à l'employé les motifs de son renvoi. Même s'il est admis que le renvoi en cours de stage devrait demeurer un fait rare, il faut cependant y recourir dans les cas où le processus de sélection a échoué.

Recommandations

1. Il faudrait offrir aux cadres une formation et un soutien pour ce qui est du recours au renvoi en cours de stage suivant le recrutement et la promotion.
 2. Il ne devrait jamais y avoir de droit d'appel en cas de renvoi en cours de stage et l'organisme parlementaire ne devrait pas non plus faire enquête dans ces cas.
 3. Un échec lors du stage probatoire suivant une promotion ne devrait pas donner lieu à un renvoi, mais plutôt à une affectation à un autre poste du même échelon ou à une réaffectation à l'ancien échelon de l'intéressé.
-

ADMISSION DU PERSONNEL MILITAIRE, DE LA GRC ET DU SCRS DANS LES CONCOURS INTERNES

Les alinéas a, b et c de l'article 2(2) de la Loi actuelle sur l'emploi dans la fonction publique (LEFP) permettent au personnel militaire des Forces canadiennes, de la GRC et au personnel du SCRS de participer à des concours internes sur un pied d'égalité avec les fonctionnaires. Cette loi permet en effet aux ministères de définir la zone de concours. Par exemple, un concours peut s'adresser aux employés nommés en vertu de la LEFP à partir d'une certaine zone de la fonction publique ou d'un certain territoire géographique, ainsi qu'au personnel militaire des Forces canadiennes partout au pays.

L'alinéa d de l'article 2(2) autorise les ministères à étendre des zones de concours à d'autres fonctionnaires qui ne sont pas visés par la LEFP, à la condition que le gouverneur en conseil les désigne pour leur permettre d'être visés par ces mesures de dotation. Ces organismes s'adressent à la CFP, qui recommande au gouverneur en conseil de les inclure ou non. La CFP fonde sa recommandation sur les méthodes d'embauchage de l'organisme. Si ces méthodes sont considérées conformes aux principes du mérite, de l'équité et de l'impartialité les organismes peuvent être inclus dans les concours internes en vertu de l'alinéa d de l'article 2(2).

Le Groupe de travail sur les obstacles à l'avancement des femmes dans la fonction publique a constaté que l'admission du personnel

militaire dans les concours internes constitue un obstacle à l'avancement des civils, hommes ou femmes, en particulier dans certains groupes et certains ministères. Ce groupe de travail recommande par conséquent que le paragraphe 2 de l'article 2 de la LEFP soit supprimé.

Les représentants militaires sont d'accord pour reconnaître que la plupart des postes auxquels accède à l'heure actuelle le personnel militaire en vertu de cette préférence pourraient être accessibles selon les modalités normales. Ils sont cependant d'avis que l'élimination de cette préférence pourrait constituer, aux yeux des militaires, un message négatif sur leur importance à titre de «fonctionnaires».

Pour certains employeurs distincts et certains ministères, le mouvement d'employés entre les organismes en raison de l'application de l'alinéa d de l'article 2(2) représente un avantage énorme dans la gestion des ressources humaines. Il permet par exemple aux ministères de tirer parti de la compétence d'employés de petits organismes spécialisés qui constituent des employeurs distincts, en plus d'ouvrir aux employés de ces organismes des horizons professionnels qui débordent les cadres de leurs organismes employeurs.

Après avoir examiné la question sous divers angles, le Groupe de travail conclut que le processus de recrutement constitue le moyen approprié pour recruter le personnel auprès d'organismes qui ne sont pas visés par la LEFP. Les ministères qui ont la responsabilité de décider à quel moment il faut recruter au-delà du niveau d'entrée auront suffisamment accès à ce moyen dans les

cas où ils ne peuvent recruter le personnel dont ils ont besoin par le biais d'un concours interne. L'article 2(2) ne se justifie donc presque plus.

Recommandation

1. Le Groupe de travail recommande que le paragraphe 2(2) de la LEFP soit supprimé.

RECOURS

Des discussions avec des employés nous ont appris que l'existence de droits d'appel pour faire contrepoids au pouvoir discrétionnaire des cadres continue de représenter une caractéristique du système de dotation qu'ils jugent utile. L'importance des droits d'appel s'intensifiera au fur et à mesure de l'évolution du régime de dotation, qui était auparavant rigoureusement réglementé et qui oblige désormais les cadres à faire preuve de jugement dans le contexte d'un ensemble général de politiques et de principes directeurs. Le Groupe de travail croit fermement en une atmosphère d'ouverture d'esprit et encourage les gestionnaires à utiliser tous les mécanismes informels possibles pour favoriser cette atmosphère.

De nombreux cadres ont exprimé une préoccupation au sujet du nombre d'appels vexatoires et de la nécessité de recourir à la dotation défensive en raison de la menace d'appels.

Selon la recherche, le nombre réel d'appels vexatoires est faible; cependant, on s'en souvient pendant longtemps et on en discute fréquemment.

La tendance à recourir à la dotation défensive est beaucoup plus attribuable à la culture administrative globale du régime de dotation qu'à la nécessité de pouvoir résister à un appel éventuel. Les agents de dotation ont reconnu qu'ils utilisaient souvent la menace de l'appel pour amener les cadres à respecter ce qu'ils considèrent comme des exigences minimums pour de saines mesures de dotation.

Plusieurs solutions permettant de réduire le nombre d'appels vexatoires ont été examinées; cependant, on n'en a trouvé aucune qui n'entraînait pas également une baisse significative de l'accès général aux recours.

Les moyens qui, selon les constatations, réduisent le nombre d'appels sans diminuer l'accès légitime aux recours comportent notamment l'accroissement de la transparence du régime de dotation. Voici deux autres moyens :

- Les politiques actuelles en matière de dotation encouragent les cadres à fournir à tous les candidats intéressés des observations détaillées après l'entrevue de sélection. Dans ces cas, les appels sont rares. Toutefois, peu de cadres semblent être au courant de cette politique.
- Quand un employé interjette appel, le ministère est invité à fournir à l'appelant une documentation et de l'information au sujet des mesures de dotation (divulgarion de l'information). Depuis l'application de ce principe, les appels abandonnés sont passés de 14 à 40 pour cent, dans 90 pour cent des cas à la suite de la divulgation de l'information.

Recommandations

1. Les candidats non retenus qui ont participé à un concours de promotion ou, dans les processus sans concours, les personnes qui auraient dû, selon leur propre avis, être prises en

considération pour ladite promotion devraient continuer à bénéficier de droits de recours.

2. L'examen de la demande de recours doit permettre de déterminer dans quelle mesure le processus suivi était conforme aux politiques et principes qui sont censés guider le processus de promotion.
 3. Les cadres devraient fournir des observations postérieures à l'entrevue de sélection dans toutes les mesures de dotation.
 4. Les appelants et leurs représentants devraient être tenus de demander des observations après l'entrevue de sélection avant d'interjeter appel.
 5. La divulgation de l'information devrait être obligatoire dans tous les cas où un appel a été interjeté.
 6. Les moyens de recours et les décisions concernant les mesures correctives individuelles devraient relever de l'organisme parlementaire indépendant.
 7. Le rôle de tout organisme d'examen nommé par l'organisme parlementaire à cette fin devrait s'inscrire dans le cadre des politiques de cet organisme parlementaire et s'étendre à la recommandation de mesures correctives à l'intention de l'organisme parlementaire.
 8. L'organisme parlementaire devrait être habilité à dicter les mesures correctives pertinentes en ce qui concerne le
-

processus de sélection. Ce pouvoir ne devrait pas s'étendre à imposer le choix effectif du candidat à retenir.

ÉQUITÉ EN MATIÈRE D'EMPLOI

Le système de dotation doit non seulement s'harmoniser avec les objectifs de l'équité en matière d'emploi, mais aussi constituer l'un des outils qui permet de réaliser énergiquement ces objectifs.

La loi actuelle ne prévoit pas la correction des déséquilibres de représentation, sauf par le biais du processus de dotation normal, en interdisant expressément la discrimination qui contrevient aux droits exprimés à l'article 15 de la **Charte des droits et libertés**. Ceci n'a pas permis de réaliser les objectifs de représentation que le gouvernement a fixés pour la fonction publique. C'est pourquoi il existe, au sein du système de dotation, une certaine tension en ce qui concerne la franchise avec laquelle les stratégies d'équité en matière d'emploi sont décrites. Une loi qui tiendrait compte d'approches plus proactives en ce qui concerne l'équité en matière d'emploi permettrait de résoudre cette difficulté.

Recommandations

1. La loi devrait tenir compte des dispositions de l'article 15 de la Charte des droits et libertés et permettre que les processus de recrutement et de promotion corrigent les déséquilibres de représentation.
 2. L'employeur devrait définir les besoins de la fonction publique en ce qui concerne la représentation et fixer des objectifs pour la correction des déséquilibres particuliers.
-

3. L'organisme parlementaire devrait mettre au point, de concert avec les ministères et l'employeur, des stratégies de recrutement adaptées à ces besoins.
4. Il faudrait profiter davantage de la facilité accrue de réaffectation recommandée dans le présent rapport pour favoriser le perfectionnement des fonctionnaires qui sont membres des groupes cibles d'équité en matière d'emploi.

NOMINATION AU NIVEAU

Pour les besoins de l'analyse, il faut étudier indépendamment deux éléments de la notion de «nomination au niveau». Il s'agit tout d'abord de l'aspect relatif à l'affectation à un poste, puis de la promotion en fonction de norme applicable à ce niveau dans l'ensemble de la fonction publique, et non seulement en fonction des exigences particulières du poste à pourvoir.

Affectation à un poste

Le Groupe de travail admet les avantages relatifs à la possibilité d'affecter une personne à un poste sans tenir compte des possibilités de promotion, de la classification personnelle du candidat ou de la classification du poste.

Les recommandations exprimées précédemment dans le présent rapport en ce qui a trait à la réaffectation des employés auront pour effet, une fois adoptées, de mettre en oeuvre les dispositions relatives aux affectations à un poste dans le cadre du régime de nomination au niveau.

Promotion

Le Groupe de travail est d'avis que la promotion en fonction d'une norme de niveau pour l'ensemble de la fonction publique convient davantage à certains groupes professionnels et (ou) à certaines situations organisationnelles. C'est notamment le cas

pour les affectations de personnel permutant à l'étranger; elle a été appliquée avec succès dans le cas de scientifiques et d'avocats; il semble qu'il s'agisse d'une possibilité pour certains groupes professionnels (finances et gestion du personnel) et représente une option sérieusement envisagée pour l'ensemble ou une partie de la catégorie de la gestion.

Recommandations

1. La loi devrait être modifiée pour permettre que les promotions reposent sur les exigences professionnelles particulières (nomination au poste) ou sur les normes applicables à un certain niveau dans l'ensemble de la fonction publique (nomination au niveau).
2. L'application partielle ou totale du régime de promotion au niveau pour un groupe déterminé nécessiterait des correctifs importants; la décision portant sur la conversion à ce régime ne devrait pas être prise avant d'étudier et de discuter sérieusement avec les personnes en cause les incidences de cette modification.

Le Groupe de travail a examiné l'application pertinente de la promotion au niveau et en a conclu que son adoption devrait reposer sur les critères énoncés ci-après :

L'opportunité d'adopter ce principe pour un groupe ou une partie d'un groupe professionnel particulier dépend de deux facteurs :

- Les avantages de la promotion au niveau sont-ils pertinents au groupe professionnel?
- La nature du groupe professionnel permet-elle de gérer ce groupe de façon significative dans le cadre d'un régime de promotion au niveau.

Quel que soit le groupe professionnel, il faut connaître les réponses à ces deux questions avant d'évaluer les coûts et les avantages reliés à l'adoption de ce régime.

Les avantages de la promotion au niveau sont-ils pertinents au groupe professionnel?

Trois facteurs permettent d'établir la pertinence des avantages de ce régime :

- **La mesure dans laquelle il est nécessaire de réaffecter du personnel :** La promotion au niveau facilite l'affectation. Si on a fréquemment recours à la réaffectation, la promotion au niveau sera avantageuse. Il se peut que ce soit le cas dans les groupes professionnels où l'évolution des exigences contextuelles nécessite une réaffectation fréquente du personnel. Cela pourrait également être le cas pour les groupes professionnels où les employés peuvent acquérir une plus grande polyvalence grâce à diverses affectations, ce qui augmente leur utilité globale pour l'organisme.
-

- **La mesure dans laquelle il est nécessaire de rétribuer les employés qui ont réalisé des progrès sans obligatoirement les promouvoir à une autre fonction :**
Dans le régime de promotion au poste, une promotion signifie l'affectation à un nouveau poste. Dans le régime de promotion au niveau, il n'est pas nécessaire, en cas de promotion, d'affecter l'employé à un autre poste. En d'autres termes, les scientifiques très compétents peuvent continuer de travailler dans un laboratoire, les avocats spécialisés dans les litiges et qui excellent peuvent continuer d'exercer leurs fonctions auprès des tribunaux et les enseignants hors pair peuvent continuer d'enseigner tout en ayant droit aux promotions qu'ils méritent.
- **La mesure dans laquelle l'égalité d'accès aux possibilités de promotion est une valeur importante :**
Les énoncés de qualités plus spécialisés utilisés en cas de promotion au poste empêchent inévitablement de nombreux candidats de participer aux concours de promotion. L'accès aux possibilités de promotion est beaucoup plus facile et équitable dans le processus de promotion collectif qui caractérise le régime de promotion au niveau. Si ce type d'égalité d'accès est important dans un organisme, le régime de promotion au niveau est alors plus avantageux.

Avec quelle facilité le groupe professionnel peut-il être géré dans un régime de promotion au niveau?

Si le régime de promotion au niveau peut apporter de nombreux avantages à un groupe professionnel particulier, les frais de gestion de ce groupe dans le cadre de ce régime peuvent par contre éclipser ces avantages. Cinq facteurs permettent de chiffrer les coûts correspondants :

- **La mesure dans laquelle les exigences communes pour un niveau l'emportent sur les exigences particulières de chaque poste classé à ce niveau :** Le régime de nomination au niveau fait appel à une norme de niveau plutôt qu'à une norme de poste quand il s'agit de décider des personnes à promouvoir. Il fonctionne le mieux dans les cas où la norme de niveau témoigne de façon réaliste des exigences de la plupart des postes classés à ce niveau. Si les postes d'un même niveau sont très hétérogènes, la norme de niveau ne peut correspondre exactement aux exigences du poste. Dans ces cas, la promotion à un poste constitue une solution plus réaliste.
 - **La mesure dans laquelle on peut distinguer les différences de compétences de personnes à divers niveaux :** Dans le régime de nomination au niveau on classe les personnes selon plusieurs niveaux. Si les compétences qui caractérisent un niveau ne se distinguent pas clairement de celles d'un autre niveau, la classification des personnes sera peu crédible. Généralement, moins il y a de niveaux au sein d'un groupe professionnel, plus on pourra mettre en oeuvre de façon réaliste le régime de promotion au niveau.
-

- **La mesure dans laquelle on considère que le personnel appartient à l'organisme plutôt qu'à un poste :** Si l'on considère les membres du personnel comme des ressources collectives et non pas seulement comme les titulaires de certains postes, le régime de promotion au niveau est appropriée, puisque selon ce régime, les promotions reposent sur les exigences organisationnelles du niveau, plutôt que sur les exigences du poste. Si l'on considère vraiment que les membres du personnel sont affectés à des postes déterminés plutôt qu'à l'organisme en général, le régime de nomination au poste semble alors plus appropriée.
- **La mesure dans laquelle la taille du groupe permet de le gérer comme une entité :** Le processus de promotion au niveau exige que tous les candidats admissibles au sein d'un groupe fassent l'objet d'une comparaison afin de décider lequel satisfait le mieux aux critères de promotion. Plus le groupe est important, plus il est difficile de s'acquitter de cette tâche de façon réaliste.
- **La mesure dans laquelle l'organisme s'est engagé à assurer une gestion rigoureuse et collective des ressources humaines :** Dans le régime de promotion au niveau, il est nécessaire de prendre un engagement rigoureux et collectif dans le domaine de la planification des ressources humaines et de l'évaluation du rendement. Les promotions doivent

tenir compte de l'ensemble des besoins de l'organisme, plutôt que de l'intérêt d'un cadre en particulier. Dans les cas où cette démarche collective est contraire à la culture administrative, il est difficile de mettre en oeuvre le régime de promotion au niveau.

DISPOSITIONS LÉGISLATIVES

DISPOSITIONS LÉGISLATIVES

Approche générale:

- La Loi en vigueur est fortement prescriptive et laisse peu de possibilités d'adapter les procédures administratives en fonction de l'évolution des politiques. Voilà pourquoi le Groupe de travail est d'avis qu'une nouvelle loi devrait prévoir un maximum de souplesse permettant de s'adapter à l'évolution des réalités administratives.

Avant-propos :

- La Loi devrait comporter un exposé énonçant :
 - le principe selon lequel le recrutement et la promotion des fonctionnaires sont affranchis de tout favoritisme politique, bureaucratique ou personnel;
 - l'importance d'une fonction publique très compétente et représentative;
 - la nécessité d'un système de dotation suffisamment souple pour s'adapter aux besoins en ressources humaines des ministères, afin de les aider à s'acquitter de leurs responsabilités à l'endroit du public canadien et du gouvernement actuel;
 - l'importance d'un système de dotation qui traite les employés de façon équitable.
-

Dispositions législatives :

- La Loi devrait préciser que le processus de recrutement relève de l'organisme parlementaire et qu'il doit être exécuté de façon à favoriser la neutralité politique de la fonction publique.
 - La Loi devrait préciser que la description des besoins de recrutement et la décision au sujet des cas où il faut recruter relèvent des ministères.
 - La Loi devrait permettre la sélection en fonction des exigences d'un poste ou d'un groupe de postes, d'un groupe professionnel, d'un niveau, des besoins de l'organisme ou des besoins à long terme en ressources humaines de la fonction publique, selon le cas.
 - La Loi devrait permettre des nominations pour une période indéterminée (à plein temps ou selon une nouvelle formule de travail à temps partiel), pour une période déterminée ou des nominations occasionnelles.
 - La Loi devrait préciser que les employés engagés pour une période déterminée peuvent être renvoyés pour motif grave, ou parce que la tâche pour laquelle ils ont été engagés est terminée ou n'est plus nécessaire.
 - La Loi devrait préciser que les employés occasionnels peuvent être embauchés par les ministères et qu'ils ne sont pas admissibles à une nomination pour une période
-

indéterminée, sauf comme candidats externes dans le cadre du processus normal de recrutement, et qu'ils ne peuvent travailler dans un ministère en particulier pour plus six mois au cours de toute durée de douze mois.

- La Loi devrait préciser que l'affectation permanente ou temporaire du personnel devrait relever de l'**administrateur général**, sous réserve des politiques générales de l'employeur.
 - La Loi devrait préciser qu'il n'est pas permis de recourir au sous-classement, sauf dans les cas où les dispositions relatives aux affectations intérimaires et à la rémunération intérimaire sont applicables.
 - La Loi devrait préciser que les règlements définissant les promotions relèvent de l'employeur.
 - La Loi devrait préciser que le processus de promotion relève de l'organisme parlementaire et devrait être suivi conformément aux politiques établies par l'organisme.
 - Les dispositions législatives en vigueur qui permettent aux membres des forces armées, de la GRC, du SCRS et à d'autres fonctionnaires non visés par la loi de participer à des concours internes sur un pied d'égalité avec les fonctionnaires devraient être supprimées.
 - La Loi devrait préciser que les promotions peuvent faire l'objet d'appel.
-

- La Loi devrait préciser que l'organisme parlementaire peut surveiller et vérifier les méthodes de recrutement et de promotion déléguées aux ministères.
 - La Loi devrait préciser que les appels relèvent de l'organisme parlementaire et doivent être traités conformément aux règlements, politiques et méthodes établis par ce dernier.
 - La Loi devrait préciser que l'organisme parlementaire est habilité à dicter les mesures correctives pertinentes après qu'un appel a été interjeté, mais que ce pouvoir ne l'autorise pas à orienter le choix du candidat retenu.
 - La Loi devrait préciser que le rôle de tout organisme d'examen nommé par l'organisme parlementaire pour entendre un appel consisterait à exercer ses activités dans le contexte des politiques de l'organisme et s'étendrait à la formulation de recommandations à l'organisme parlementaire.
 - La Loi devrait prendre en compte les dispositions de l'article 15 de la **Charte des droits et libertés** et permettre que les processus de recrutement et de promotion corrigent les déséquilibres de représentation.
 - La Loi devrait permettre à l'organisme parlementaire, de concert avec l'employeur, d'exiger la nomination ou de prendre en considération la nomination de personnes ou de catégories de personnes ayant priorité sur d'autres
-

candidats, conformément aux politiques établies par l'organisme.

- La Loi devrait permettre les nominations à un poste ou à un niveau déterminé.
- Toute disposition particulière de la Loi en vigueur concernant le déroulement du processus de dotation, à l'exception des dispositions déjà mentionnées devrait être retranchée de la Loi et, dans la mesure nécessaire, remplacée par un règlement.

CONCLUSION

CONCLUSION

Dans l'exécution de ses travaux, le Groupe de travail a relevé, au sein du régime de dotation, un certain nombre de difficultés, dont le conflit entre l'impératif de rapidité et de souplesse et le besoin de justice n'est pas le moindre. Dès le début de ses délibérations, le Groupe de travail a conclu que la mise au point d'un système de dotation visant à la réalisation des **objectifs de Fonction publique 2000** nécessiterait un équilibre délicat entre les recommandations qui favoriseraient une souplesse accrue de la part des cadres tout en étoffant la confiance de nos employés à l'endroit du caractère équitable du système de dotation. Ces travaux débouchent sur un ensemble de recommandations qui, selon l'avis du Groupe de travail, assurent un **équilibre raisonnable**, en plus de favoriser la réalisation des **quatre objectifs** fixés par Fonction publique 2000.

Le processus de **déploiement** proposé et l'aménagement d'un régime de **nomination au niveau** élargiront les perspectives de perfectionnement des employés, tout en permettant aux cadres de réaffecter rapidement leurs subordonnés pour assurer la continuité des **services offerts** au public. La Commission de la fonction publique, les agents de dotation des ministères et les cadres seront libérés de la plus grande partie du fardeau administratif lié à la mutation latérale des employés. Ceci aura pour effet de leur permettre de consacrer leur temps et leurs ressources aux éléments constitutifs du système de dotation, soit **le recrutement et la promotion au sein de la fonction publique**, ce qui favorise le plus le maintien d'une fonction publique très

compétente tout en mettant l'accent sur l'**équité** à l'endroit de ses employés.

Les efforts qu'on propose de consacrer au recrutement pour **répondre aux besoins à long terme** de la fonction publique et l'utilisation appropriée du **stage probatoire** contribueront à **l'excellence au sein de la fonction publique**. Ces mesures permettront de s'assurer que les personnes recrutées peuvent s'adapter à l'évolution des besoins de la fonction publique et que ceux et celles qui, malgré une assistance professionnelle et une orientation, ne peuvent atteindre ou maintenir le niveau de rendement requis, seront rapidement mis à l'écart de la fonction publique. Il en résultera une fonction publique dynamique, efficace, dévouée et axée sur la carrière.

Les recommandations relatives à la **sécurité d'emploi**, aux **recours**, à la **divulgaration de l'information** et à la suppression du pouvoir de renvoyer un employé de la fonction publique au cours d'un **stage probatoire** consécutif à une promotion visent à considérer nos employés comme des collaborateurs qu'il faut valoriser et perfectionner, et qui méritent un traitement équitable et conforme aux normes administratives.

L'importance accordée à l'élargissement **des zones de concours**, le respect du principe de **promotion interne** et les recommandations visant à **exclure le personnel militaire et autre** des concours internes, constituent des éléments essentiels d'une **fonction publique axée sur la carrière**. Par ailleurs, la recommandation selon laquelle les ministères, plutôt que la Commission de la fonction publique, décident dans quel cas il faut **recruter de**

l'extérieur de la fonction publique confère l'autorité aux **gestionnaires responsables du rendement de leurs unités.**

Grâce à l'extension des **possibilités d'emploi**, les cadres pourront adapter leurs effectifs aux variations de la charge de travail, ce qui améliorera **le service offert au public.** Les employés pourront parallèlement mettre en équilibre leurs **responsabilités professionnelles et familiales.** Les cadres seront également en mesure d'embaucher plus facilement des **employés occasionnels** en période de pointe, ce qui atténuera les tensions imposées inutilement au personnel permanent.

Les recommandations relatives à **l'autorité et à la responsabilité** donneront aux gestionnaires un sentiment plus aigu de prise en charge du processus de dotation, ce qui les obligera ensuite à faire preuve d'un engagement profond à l'endroit des **principes** énoncés au début du présent rapport.

Les manuels de directives étant remplacés par des énoncés de principe et une plus grande responsabilité étant imposée à chacun des intervenants, le processus de justification se déroulera de façon plus directe. Les cadres ne devront plus se contenter de respecter les règles; ils seront aussi responsables d'intervenir dans le respect des principes. Il ne sera plus admis de contourner le système uniquement pour se conformer aux directives sans se soucier de l'objectif visé. Nous devons être prêts à dire «Je l'ai fait parce qu'à mon avis, c'était ce qu'il fallait faire.» et pouvoir expliquer nos décisions d'après ce critère à nos subordonnés et supérieurs.

Il ne sera plus nécessaire de mettre au point des moyens de plus en plus habiles pour contourner le système afin d'obéir à la logique. Nous pourrons ainsi consacrer notre énergie créatrice à la mise au point de la meilleure méthode de gestion des ressources humaines. Les mesures adoptées seront désormais évaluées en fonction de leur logique dans une situation donnée et en tenant compte de l'ensemble des principes adoptés.

Ces changements devraient rendre le système plus humain. Les décisions seront prises par et pour les fonctionnaires. D'où un système favorisant davantage de relations interpersonnelles dans la mesure où les employés seront personnellement responsables des mesures adoptées, ce qui, de pair avec la responsabilité directe à l'endroit du principe du traitement équitable, intensifiera l'esprit d'équité.

Finalement, le résultat global de ces nombreuses modifications permettra de résumer le régime en un seul mot : **INTÉGRITÉ.**

MISE EN OEUVRE

MISE EN OEUVRE

Généralités

La mise en oeuvre représente la phase la plus importante d'un processus d'évolution. Pour être fructueuse, la mise en oeuvre nécessite un engagement permanent de la part de la haute direction et fait intervenir, dans le cas des recommandations du Groupe de travail, deux grandes orientations.

La première porte sur **l'évolution de la culture administrative** à laquelle le système de dotation est intégré. Cette évolution entraîne un changement des attitudes, des convictions et des rôles des principaux intervenants, soit les cadres et les agents du personnel.

La deuxième orientation porte sur **l'évolution réelle de l'ensemble des règles** qui ont donné lieu à ces attitudes, convictions et rôles.

Le processus de réduction du nombre de règles est déjà bien avancé et il est essentiel que les recommandations exprimées dans le présent rapport ne se traduisent pas par de nouvelles règles détaillées. Cependant, l'évolution nécessaire des attitudes, convictions et rôles qui doit accompagner le passage d'un régime de directives à un régime de principes est à peine amorcée.

En ce qui concerne la première orientation, soit l'évolution de la culture administrative, **les cadres doivent être les premiers visés** dans le processus d'évolution. **Ils doivent être conscients**

du régime de responsabilités dans le cadre duquel ils seront appelés à travailler. Les communications qui leur sont adressées doivent insister tant sur la nécessité d'un système de dotation simple que sur le rôle essentiel réservé au jugement; la mise en place des nouvelles politiques et leur fonctionnement n'en seraient que plus efficaces. Les cadres doivent connaître et comprendre l'ensemble des politiques qu'ils seront appelés à respecter.

Ils doivent mesurer leur part de responsabilité et utiliser leur jugement en conséquence; ils doivent être parfaitement au courant des attentes et des responsabilités qui leur seront imposées. Les cadres doivent être encouragés à travailler selon les modalités prévues; or, l'encouragement le plus important est l'exemple donné par la haute direction de la fonction publique.

Les spécialistes de la dotation en personnel représentent la deuxième cible du processus d'évolution. Nombre d'entre eux ont déclaré qu'ils appuyaient fortement une nouvelle approche en matière de dotation qui susciterait un plus fort sentiment de prise en charge de la part des cadres. Il faudra les considérer comme des intervenants essentiels, étant donné l'aide qu'ils apporteront aux cadres pour exercer ce rôle de prise en charge. La deuxième orientation, soit l'évolution du régime de règles, est une activité axée essentiellement sur la Commission de la fonction publique et sur le Secrétariat du Conseil du Trésor; elle devrait obéir aux principes et aux recommandations du présent rapport.

Particularités

Le processus de réforme peut être amorcé bien avant que la loi ne soit modifiée. Même s'il est possible d'accomplir des progrès énormes dans le cadre de la loi actuelle, la mise en oeuvre complète des changements fondamentaux envisagés pour ce système doit attendre l'approbation, par le Parlement, d'une nouvelle loi.

Le Groupe de travail propose pour la mise en application une approche qui ferait intervenir un certain nombre d'équipes ayant à coeur la réalisation du processus. En mettant l'accent sur les deux grandes orientations définies ci-dessus, la première devrait se composer de membres d'organismes centraux et de ministères. Elle devrait être dirigée par un spécialiste du personnel de niveau supérieur et jouissant d'une forte crédibilité parmi les spécialistes de la dotation et les gestionnaires fonctionnels des ministères. Elle devrait se conformer aux directives du Groupe de travail sur la dotation ou d'un comité composé de sous-ministres siégeant à un comité directeur, afin de s'assurer que l'esprit et l'intention des recommandations du Groupe de travail sur la dotation sont respectés au fur et à mesure du processus de mise en application. Cette équipe centrale serait responsable à la fois de l'évolution de l'ensemble des règles et de la gestion en général du processus de modification de la culture administrative, y compris de l'articulation de la chaîne de responsabilités qui permettrait de diffuser la nouvelle culture.

En ce qui concerne la deuxième orientation, soit l'évolution de la culture administrative, le Groupe de travail envisage de créer

une équipe de mise en oeuvre au sein de chaque ministère, en accordant une attention particulière aux régions où travaillent près de 70 pour cent des fonctionnaires. Ces équipes seraient multidisciplinaires. Leurs membres apporteraient leurs compétences dans les domaines de la formation, des communications, de la gestion et de la dotation. Pour assurer la diffusion des changements dans l'ensemble de la fonction publique, une stratégie de «formation des responsables de séances de formation» devrait être adoptée. Cette stratégie permettrait de répercuter la formation en cascade à partir du centre jusqu'aux ministères, puis au sein des ministères jusqu'à l'échelon inférieur.

Il est absolument essentiel que les thèmes de communication et l'intention des recommandations du Groupe de travail sur la dotation se correspondent, non seulement dans l'ensemble de la fonction publique, mais à l'extérieur, vis-à-vis des parlementaires, des syndicats et des médias.

Toute évolution progressive de la culture administrative court toujours le risque de régresser et revenir à son point d'origine. Le respect du processus d'évolution, le sentiment d'urgence et d'importance et un calendrier réaliste doivent être omniprésents pendant la première période de transition. Le processus d'évolution doit faire l'objet d'une surveillance pendant toute cette période de transition et être corrigé au besoin.

Les membres du Groupe de travail sont d'avis qu'une approche comme celle que nous venons de décrire offre les meilleures

perspectives de réalisation des **modifications fondamentales** nécessaires pour passer du système actuel à un système de dotation **JUSTE, ÉQUITABLE ET ADAPTÉ AUX BESOINS PARTICULIERS.**

| | | | | |
|----|---|-------------------------------------|-----|---|
| AO | - | Navigation aérienne | CAI | Inspecteurs de l'aviation civile |
| | | | HPS | Pilotes d'hélicoptère et surveillants |
| | | | ETP | Pilotes ingénieurs d'essai |
| AI | - | Contrôle de la circulation aérienne | | |
| PY | - | Photographie | | |
| SI | - | Soutien des sciences sociales | | |
| PI | - | Inspection des produits primaires | | |
| RO | - | Radiotélégraphie | | |
| SO | - | Officiers de navire | MAO | Navigation maritime |
| | | | FLP | Installations flottantes |
| | | | INS | Instructeurs |
| CX | - | Services correctionnels | STI | Instructeurs du personnel |
| | | | COF | Agents des services correctionnels |
| | | | LUF | Unités résidentielles |
| GL | - | Manoeuvres et hommes de métier | ELT | Fonctions élémentaires |
| | | | MAN | Manipulation |
| | | | MDO | Conduite et actionnement des machines |
| | | | MOC | Conduite et surveillance des machines |
| | | | PRW | Travail de précision |
| | | | PCI | Peinture et finitions |
| | | | AMD | Fabrication de munitions |
| | | | AIM | Entretien d'aéronefs |
| | | | INM | Entretien d'instruments |
| | | | MAM | Entretien de machines |
| | | | VHE | Entretien de véhicules et de matériel lourd |
| | | | BOB | Chaudronnerie - Forge |
| | | | EIM | Électricité et entretien |
| | | | PIP | Tuyauterie |
| | | | SMW | Tolierie |
| | | | WCW | Ménuiserie |
| | | | MET | Usinage de métaux |
| | | | GHW | Maintenance et peseurs de grains |
| | | | COI | Inspection de la construction |
| PR | - | Services d'imprimerie | BIN | Reliure |
| | | | COM | Composition |
| | | | OFE | Préparation à l'impression par offset |
| | | | OFO | Production par offset |
| | | | MAI | Entretien |
| | | | PRC | Contrôle de l'impression |
| | | | SES | Supervision de niveau supérieur |
| FR | - | Pompiers | | |
| GS | - | Services divers | | |
| HP | - | Chauffage, force motrice et | | |
| | | opération de machines fixes | | |
| HS | - | Services hospitaliers | | |
| LI | - | Gardiens de phare | | |

| | | |
|-----|---|--|
| MA | - | Mathématiques |
| MD | - | Médecine |
| OP | - | Ergothérapie et physiothérapie |
| PC | - | Sciences physiques |
| SG | - | Réglementation scientifique |
| PS | - | Psychologie |
| DE | - | Art dentaire |
| ES | - | Économie, sociologie et statistique |
| ED | - | Enseignement |
| DS | - | Services scientifiques de la Défense |
| EN | - | Génie et arpentage |
| LA | - | Droit |
| SE | - | Recherche scientifique |
| SW | - | Service social |
| UT | - | Enseignement universitaire |
| VM | - | Médecine vétérinaire |
| AC | - | Actariat |
| AR | - | Architecture et urbanisme |
| AU | - | Vérification |
| CH | - | Chimie |
| PH | - | Pharmacie |
| DD | - | Dessin et illustrations |
| EU | - | Soutien de l'enseignement |
| LAI | | Moniteurs de langues |
| PEI | | Moniteurs d'éducation physique |
| TEA | | Aides-enseignants |
| EL | - | Électronique |
| BG | - | Soutien technologique et scientifique |
| GT | - | Techniciens divers |
| TJ | - | Inspection technique |
| MOF | | Médecins fonctionnaires |
| MSP | | Médecins spécialistes |
| SRE | | Réglementation scientifique |
| PEM | | Examen des brevets |
| LAT | | Enseignement des langues |
| EST | | Enseignement élémentaire et secondaire |
| EDS | | Services d'enseignement |
| ENG | | Génie |
| SUR | | Arpentage |
| RES | | Chercheurs scientifiques |
| REM | | Directeurs de recherches |
| CHA | | Aumôniers |
| SCW | | Bien-être social |
| ADR | | Consultation et réglementation |
| DIS | | Distribution |

GROUPES ET SOUS-GROUPES PROFESSIONNELS

| GROUPES | | SOUS-GROUPES | |
|---------|---|---|--|
| OE | - | Mécanographie | BEO Opérateurs de machines comptables |
| | | | CEO Opérateurs de machines à calculer |
| | | | DEO Mécanographes-polycopistes |
| | | | MSE Opérateurs de machines à courtier |
| | | | MEO Opérateurs d'appareils de microphotographie |
| ST | - | Secrétariat, sténographie et dactylographie | TYP Dactylos |
| | | | STN Sténographes |
| | | | OCE Mécanographes - Composition de bureau |
| | | | COR Sténographes judiciaires |
| | | | SCY Secrétaires |
| CR | - | Commis aux écritures et aux règlements | |
| CM | - | Communications | |
| DA | - | Traitement mécanique des données | CON Conversion des données |
| | | | PRO Production des données |
| AS | - | Services administratifs | |
| AT | - | Stagiaires en administration | |
| CO | - | Commerce | |
| CS | - | Gestion des systèmes d'ordinateurs | |
| FI | - | Gestion des finances | |
| FS | - | Service extérieur | |
| IS | - | Services d'information | |
| PE | - | Gestion du personnel | |
| OM | - | Organisation et méthodes | |
| TR | - | Traduction | |
| WP | - | Programmes de bien-être social | |
| PC | - | Achat et approvisionnement | |
| PM | - | Administration de programmes | MCO Agents de médiation et de conciliation |
| MT | - | Météorologie | |
| AG | - | Agriculture | |
| NU | - | Sciences infirmières | HOS Infirmières d'hôpital |
| FO | - | Sciences forestières | CHN Infirmières communautaires |
| HR | - | Recherche historique | |
| HE | - | Sciences domestiques | ADV Conseillers |
| | | | DIT Diététiciens |
| | | | HME Economistes ménagères |
| LS | - | Bibliothéconomie | |

LISTE DES MEMBRES

| | |
|--|------------------|
| Travaux publics Canada | Robert Giroux |
| Secrétariat d'État du Canada | Jean Fournier |
| Service correctionnel du Canada | Ole Ingsrup |
| Commission de la fonction publique | Michel Cardinal |
| Emploi et Immigration Canada | Treffle Lacombe |
| Affaires indiennes et du Nord | Don Goodwin |
| Communications Canada | Mike Binder |
| Pêches et Océans | Francois Pouliot |
| Conseil du Trésor (personne-ressource) | Lise Oulmet |
| Centre canadien de gestion | Joe Landriault |
| Travaux publics Canada | Terry Kelleher |

ANNEXES

| | | |
|------|---|--------------|
| I. | Liste des membres | |
| II. | Groupe et sous-groupe professionnels actuels | |
| III. | Agents de négociation et unités de négociation actuels | Mars 1990 |
| IV. | Nouveaux groupes professionnels proposés | Juillet 1990 |

3. a) Un plan de cotation commun s'appliquera à tous les groupes professionnels, sauf aux groupes de la direction, de la recherche, du droit, du service extérieur et des services d'imprimerie. Le plan sera fondé sur les principes d'équité salariale prévus dans la Loi canadienne sur les droits de la personne.
- b) Le plan de cotation comprend 4 facteurs.
- c) Toutes les descriptions de poste devront être présentées sur 3 pages.
- d) Le plan de cotation sera informatisé dans la mesure du possible.
4. La Loi sur les relations de travail dans la fonction publique (LRTFP) sera modifiée de façon que la détermination d'une "unité de négociation" corresponde à la définition d'un groupe ou sous-groupe professionnel.
5. La LRTFP continuera d'exclure les gestionnaires de la négociation collective.
6. La transposition à la nouvelle structure se fera selon les principes suivants:
 - a) tous les employés dont la rémunération actuelle est supérieure au niveau maximal de la nouvelle échelle de traitement bénéficieront d'une protection salariale;
 - b) les employés qui n'auront pas atteint le maximum de leur ancienne échelle de traitement conserveront cette échelle jusqu'à ce qu'ils aient atteint le maximum prévu;
 - c) les employés qui auront atteint le maximum de leur échelle seront placés dans une nouvelle échelle où leur traitement sera égal à leur traitement actuel (le maximum de l'ancienne échelle) ou se situera au plus proche échelon supérieur dans la nouvelle échelle.

Aucun changement

5

NAVIGATION AÉRIENNE

Aucun changement

5

MÉDECINE VÉTÉRINAIRE

| | | |
|------------------------------|---|--|
| INFORMATIQUE | 5 | Aucun changement |
| SCIENCES | 5 | Sciences physiques |
| | | Chimie |
| | | Sciences biologiques |
| | | Sciences forestières |
| | | Météorologie |
| | | Réglementation scientifique |
| | | Agriculture |
| VÉRIFICATION | 5 | Aucun changement |
| SCIENCES SOCIALES | 5 | Économie, sociologie et statistique |
| | | Mathématiques |
| | | Actuariat |
| | | Soutien des sciences sociales |
| OFFICIERS DE NAVIRE | 5 | Officiers de navire |
| ARCHITECTURE ET GÉNIE | 5 | Architecture et urbanisme |
| | | Génie et arpentage |
| RECHERCHE | 5 | Recherche scientifique |
| | | Service scientifique de la Défense |
| | | Recherche historique |
| ÉLECTRONIQUE | 5 | Aucun changement |
| SÉCURITÉ AÉRIENNE | 5 | Contrôle de la circulation aérienne |
| | | Radiotélégraphie |
| SERVICES DE SANTÉ | 5 | Sciences domestiques |
| | | Sciences infirmières |
| | | Pharmacie |
| | | Ergothérapie et physiothérapie |
| | | Psychologie |
| | | Art dentaire |
| | | Médecine |
| | | Service social |
| ENSEIGNEMENT | 5 | Enseignement |
| | | Enseignement universitaire |
| | | Soutien de l'enseignement |
| COMMERCE | 4 | Aucun changement |
| SERVICE EXTÉRIEUR | 4 | Groupe FS plus postes SM et EX |
| | | non gestionnaires aux Affaires extérieures |
| TRADUCTION | 5 | Aucun changement |
| SERVICES D'IMPRIMERIE | | Aucun changement |
| DROIT | 3 | Aucun changement |

RECOMMANDATIONS

Le Groupe de travail recommande les mesures suivantes:

1. Abolir les 6 catégories professionnelles existantes.
2. Créer 23 groupes professionnels et 8 sous-groupes professionnels en fusionnant les 72 groupes et 106 sous-groupes actuels comme suit:

NOUVEAUX GROUPES PROPOSÉS

| NOUVEAU GROUPE | SOUS-GROUPES | NOMBRE DE MEMBRES | GROUPES ACTUELS |
|----------------------------|---|----------------------|--|
| DIRECTION | | 3 | Gestion supérieure Groupe de la direction |
| ADMINISTRATION | | 6 | Services administratifs Gestion des finances Gestion du personnel Services d'information Administration des programmes Organisation et méthodes Achat et approvisionnement Programmes de bien-être social Commis aux écritures et aux règlements Secrétariat, sténographie et dactylographie Communications Traitement mécanique des données Mécanographie Soutien des sciences sociales Bibliothéconomie |
| OPÉRATIONNEL | Pompiers Gens de métier Opérationnels Gardiens de phare Réparation de navires Équipages de navires | 7 | Pompiers Manœuvres et hommes de métier Services divers Services hospitaliers Chauflage et force motrice Gardiens de phare Réparation de navires Équipages de navires |
| TECHNIQUE | | 5 | Dessins et illustrations Soutien technologique et scientifique Techniciens divers Photographie Inspection technique Inspection des produits primaires Radiotélégraphie |
| SERVICES CORRECTIONNELS | | 2 | Aucun changement |

CONSÉQUENCES SUR LA MOTIVATION DES EMPLOYÉS

Le Groupe de travail croit que ses recommandations ouvriront de nouvelles possibilités d'enrichissement professionnel, de perfectionnement, de primes au rendement, de dé-hiérarchisation, d'accroissement des pouvoirs et des responsabilités au niveau de travail et devraient donc atténuer sensiblement la frustration attribuable au système de classification et de dotation.

Par suite de la fusion des groupes et de la réduction du nombre de niveaux, beaucoup d'employés et de gestionnaires devront repenser leurs attitudes face à leur emploi et à leur carrière. Certains seront démoralisés parce qu'on aura fusionné leur groupe ou qu'ils auront été assignés à un niveau inférieur, même si leur rémunération n'en sera aucunement modifiée. Par ailleurs, le nombre de mesures de classification et de dotation diminuant, la charge de travail en ressources humaines baissera, d'où une réduction du nombre d'années-personnes qui pourrait donner lieu à un certain réaménagement des effectifs.

CONCLUSION

Le renouvellement de la fonction publique nous offre l'occasion de simplifier et d'améliorer les systèmes de gestion du personnel en les adaptant à la gestion des ressources humaines des années 90. La réduction du nombre de groupes et de niveaux rendra la gestion plus efficace et plus efficiente, au bénéfice des gestionnaires et des employés, commandera une redéfinition des tâches, reconnaîtra la polyvalence, favorisera l'avancement professionnel, motivera l'effectif en accordant plus de responsabilités et de pouvoirs aux employés de première ligne, et intensifiera les communications entre les gestionnaires et les employés de première ligne. Nous canaliserons nos énergies vers le travail utile plutôt que de l'innover avec le système.

chargés du personnel. Il faudra peut être déplacer des ressources afin de mieux servir le public. Des ressources seront libérées à la suite de la réduction du nombre de niveaux dans les postes de gestion et de supervision et du moins grand nombre de mesures de classification et de dotation.

CONSÉQUENCES OPÉRATIONNELLES

La réduction du nombre de niveaux dans presque tous les groupes commandera un réexamen des structures organisationnelles de nombreux ministères. Il y aura diminution du nombre de niveaux de gestion et de supervision, et des pouvoirs accrus seront confiés aux niveaux de travail. Nous considérons cela comme une évolution positive, comme un facteur d'enrichissement professionnel pour le personnel et un mode de travail plus efficace. La baisse du nombre de mesures de classification et de dotation éliminera un grand nombre de contraintes et de retards bureaucratiques, réduira les coûts et libérera des ressources qui pourront être plus utilement affectées au service au public.

En revanche, l'instauration de la rémunération au rendement aux niveaux inférieurs à ceux du groupe de la direction accroîtra la charge de travail relative au processus d'évaluation et risque d'ouvrir la voie à la multiplication des griefs. Cependant, cette mesure renforcera le processus de ressources humaines et rendra les gestionnaires plus responsables de leur personnel, d'où une meilleure gestion.

CONSÉQUENCES AU NIVEAU PARLEMENTAIRE

Il faudra modifier la Loi sur les relations de travail dans la fonction publique.

CONSÉQUENCES POUR LES SYNDICATS

Pour les syndicats, la restructuration se fera surtout sentir au niveau des unités de négociation touchées par la fusion des groupes, dans la mesure où les structures professionnelles demeurent le principal critère d'accréditation des agents de négociation. Seront surtout affectées l'Association des gestionnaires financiers de la fonction publique, représentant le groupe FI intégré au nouveau groupe de l'administration, et l'Association canadienne des professionnels de l'exploitation radio, qui représente le groupe RO, qui, selon notre recommandation, sera réparti entre le groupe de la sécurité aérienne et le groupe technique.

TRANSITION À LA NOUVELLE STRUCTURE

La transition des 72 groupes professionnels en 23 exigera beaucoup de temps et d'énergie. Pour la transition, le Groupe de travail recommande ce qui suit:

- a) que tous les employés dont la rémunération actuelle est supérieure au niveau maximal de la nouvelle échelle de traitement bénéficient d'une protection salariale;
- b) que les employés qui n'ont pas atteint le maximum de leur ancienne échelle de traitement conservent cette échelle jusqu'à ce qu'ils en aient atteint le maximum prévu;
- c) que les employés qui ont atteint le maximum de l'échelle soient placés dans une nouvelle échelle où leur traitement sera égal à leur traitement actuel (le maximum de l'ancienne échelle) ou se situera au plus proche échelon supérieur de traitement dans la nouvelle échelle.

Aux yeux du Groupe de travail, la transition consistera à réorganiser les classifications existantes aux nouveaux niveaux (le Groupe a recommandé un nombre précis de niveaux pour les nouveaux groupes formés) à une date qui tiendra compte du renouvellement des conventions collectives en vigueur.

Une fois la transition effectuée, le plan de cotation pour l'évaluation des postes pourra être appliqué, en s'inspirant de postes-repères établis pour chacun des niveaux du groupe.

Avec le temps, chaque description de poste devra être réécrite (en trois pages) et cotée de façon à en confirmer le niveau ou à le changer si la transition a donné lieu à une erreur.

Le Groupe de travail est convaincu que cette façon de procéder est plus rapide, plus économique et garante de meilleurs résultats pour le personnel que la méthode traditionnelle du BRC (1965-1970), qui commande l'élaboration d'un plan de cotation, l'évaluation de tous les postes (avec de nouvelles descriptions de poste) et leur transition au nouveau plan, processus qui pourrait s'étendre sur cinq ans.

CONSEQUENCES SUR LA TAILLE DE LA FONCTION PUBLIQUE

Le Groupe de travail considère que certaines de ses recommandations pourraient avoir un impact sur l'organisation du travail dans la fonction publique, sur le volume et la nature du travail de gestion des ressources humaines effectué par les gestionnaires et les employés

Tous les syndicats ont déclaré que la classification devrait être négociée. Les syndicats déterminent l'organisation du travail. Le Groupe de travail croit que ce serait une tâche herculéenne que de négocier le contenu et les modalités d'application d'un système d'évaluation commun avec une quinzaine d'agents de négociation. La direction a tout intérêt à établir un plan de classification équitable et efficace. C'est pourquoi le système d'évaluation des emplois et le nombre de niveaux pour chaque groupe ne devrait pas être négociable. La direction devrait aussi avoir pleine latitude pour répartir les postes dans les groupes professionnels - sous réserve de l'approbation de ses décisions par la Commission des relations de travail dans la fonction publique - aux fins de la négociation des conventions collectives. Cependant, d'autres aspects du processus, comme la détermination (évaluation) du niveau des postes ou le processus de règlement des griefs présentés contre les décisions de classification, pourraient très bien se négocier. Les syndicats et les employés auraient de ce fait une meilleure prise sur le processus de classification et celui-ci n'en serait que plus transparent.

Rémunération

La réduction du nombre de groupes professionnels et du nombre de niveaux à l'intérieur de chaque groupe s'accompagne d'un élargissement des échelles de traitement et devrait éventuellement permettre d'instaurer un régime de primes ou de rémunération au rendement.

CONSULTATIONS

Le Groupe de travail a rencontré au moins une fois chacun des agents de négociation et dans certains cas, plus d'une fois. Les syndicats ont aussi fait parvenir des observations par écrit au Comité. Si les agents de négociation conviennent en principe de la nécessité de simplifier et de restructurer les groupes professionnels, ils ne veulent pas que l'opération se fasse au détriment de leur unité de négociation. Des agents de négociation comme l'ACGFRP et l'ACPFR sont tout à fait opposés à la fusion proposée de leur unité de négociation. La fusion d'une unité de négociation avec d'autres qui relèvent d'un autre agent de négociation est rejetée par les syndicats touchés dans la mesure où il s'agit d'une fusion forcée. Ils préconisent un vote libre au sujet de l'accréditation. La plupart des syndicats ne veulent pas être laissés en plan lors de la restructuration définitive. Et ils ont tous déclaré que la nouvelle structure devait être négociée.

classification mais aussi celui de négociation collective, que les unités de négociation soient établies en fonction de la définition des groupes et des sous-groupes professionnels. Il faudrait maintenir dans la Loi sur les relations de travail dans la fonction publique une disposition permettant à un regroupement de syndicats de représenter une unité de négociation.

Modification du système de dotation

Grâce à la structure simplifiée des groupes professionnels, qui comprennent moins de niveaux et qui accordent une plus grande latitude quant au déploiement d'employés à un même niveau, on pourra réduire sensiblement (des deux tiers, selon les estimations) le nombre de mesures de dotation touchant les promotions et les mutations latérales ou inter-groupes.

Relations de travail

La réduction de 72 à 23 du nombre de groupes professionnels se répercutera sur un certain nombre d'agents de négociation. Par exemple, les unités de négociation suivantes seront touchées par les regroupements: AI, FI, ES, LS, MA, SI, EDS, ED, RO. Un grand nombre d'unités de négociation devront être fusionnées; ainsi, dans le groupe de l'administration, 13 unités seront intégrées en une seule. Le Groupe de travail reconnaît, par ailleurs, que certains des groupes qu'il propose d'inclure dans ce nouveau groupe (UT, PE, OM) étaient exclus des négociations collectives depuis l'entrée en vigueur de la LRTFP. Il faudra donc déterminer s'il y a lieu de maintenir cette exclusion. Si l'exclusion est maintenue (totallement ou partiellement), elle devrait être similaire à celle qui est présentement prévue pour les gestionnaires aux termes de la LRTFP.

La restructuration des groupes professionnels rendra le processus de négociation plus efficace. Il y aura moins d'unités de négociation, et moins d'échelles de traitement à négocier, et moins de négociations qui traitent en longueur avec d'autres groupes.

Il est difficile d'évaluer quels effets la négociation avec de plus grandes unités aura sur les opérations de l'administration fédérale. À l'heure actuelle, des négociations ont lieu simultanément avec plusieurs unités. Si, d'un côté, il semble plus difficile pour un agent de négociation d'inciter un grand nombre d'employés à déclencher la grève, d'un autre côté, le gouvernement serait placé dans une situation difficile si les syndicats d'une de ces grandes unités décidaient de débrayer. Cependant, le gouvernement serait encore plus vulnérable si certains groupes clés (CR, PM), maintenus intacts, se mettaient en grève, car, étant donné la fonction stratégique qu'ils exercent au sein de la fonction publique, ils pourraient ainsi paralyser toutes les opérations de l'administration fédérale.

La solution consiste donc à établir un nouveau plan de cotation qui tiendrait compte de la rémunération dans la fonction publique. Ce plan doit être réaliste et correspondre aux besoins des années 90. D'après la Loi canadienne sur les droits de la personne, le plan de cotation doit mesurer la valeur relative des postes à l'aide de quatre facteurs : « les compétences », qui désignent les qualités intellectuelles et physiques tirées de l'expérience, la formation, l'éducation ou le talent; l'« effort », qu'il soit intellectuel ou physique; les « responsabilités », c'est-à-dire l'étendue des responsabilités de l'employé sur les plans technique, financier et des ressources humaines; et les « conditions de travail », qui englobent le milieu de travail physique et psychologique - bruit, température, isolement, risques physiques, risques pour la santé, stress, entre autres.

Ces facteurs seront pris en compte dans le plan de cotation de chacun des nouveaux groupes professionnels. Pour chaque facteur, l'échelle et les critères de cotation seront structurés de façon à mesurer les caractéristiques propres du groupe. Les échelles de cotation et leurs descriptions pourront alors varier d'un groupe à l'autre. Nous recommandons l'établissement d'un plan qui repose sur ces 4 facteurs pour tous les groupes, à l'exception des nouveaux groupes suivants: DIRECTION, RECHERCHE, DROIT, SERVICE EXTÉRIEUR, SERVICES D'IMPRIMERIE; ainsi que des sous-groupes des gens de métier et de la réparation de navires dans le groupe OÉRATIONNEL. Compte tenu du travail qui s'est fait à différents niveaux ces dernières années, nous pensons qu'un plan pourrait être mis en place en 24 mois. La conception du nouveau plan de cotation devra être confiée à des experts.

On pourrait rendre le système beaucoup plus efficace en l'informatisant. La plupart des descriptions de poste pourraient tenir dans une formule uniformisée de 3 pages au maximum, ce qui faciliterait l'informatisation du système. Pour la simplicité du système, il est essentiel de ne s'arrêter qu'aux caractéristiques essentielles des postes, ce qui demandera moins de temps et d'énergie et découragera la reclassification à répétition. Il faudra pour cela changer non seulement le système, mais aussi les mentalités.

MODIFICATIONS NÉCESSAIRES À LA MISE EN ŒUVRE

Modification des lois

Il faudra supprimer, dans la Loi sur les relations de travail dans la fonction publique, tous les renvois aux catégories professionnelles, et ne conserver que les renvois aux groupes professionnels. Il est très important, afin de simplifier non seulement le processus de

GROUPE DES SERVICES D'IMPRIMERIE

Le Groupe de travail croit que ce groupe, propre à un ministère, doit être conservé tel quel. Il recommande de ne pas établir de plan de classification (titres de postes seulement) pour les postes opérationnels et les postes ne comportant aucune responsabilité de surveillance.

GROUPE DU DROIT

Le Groupe de travail ne voit pas l'opportunité d'effectuer de changement dans ce groupe (propre à un ministère).

GROUPE DE LA MÉDECINE VÉTÉRINAIRE

Le Groupe de travail croit qu'il n'y a pas lieu d'effectuer de changement dans ce groupe, du fait qu'il est propre à un ministère.

GROUPE DE LA NAVIGATION AÉRIENNE

Le Groupe de travail recommande de conserver le groupe tel quel.

SYSTEMES D'ÉVALUATION DES EMPLOIS

Le Groupe de travail a étudié différentes possibilités de systèmes d'évaluation des emplois. La priorité du groupe était de simplifier et d'uniformiser le système de cotation. Le système actuel a été conçu à partir des méthodes et des techniques des années 60 et son administration demande beaucoup de ressources. En outre, pour le Groupe de travail, le système devrait répondre aux exigences de la législation sur les droits de la personne qui a entériné le principe du salaire égal pour un travail d'égale valeur. En vertu de ce principe, les groupes professionnels à prédominance masculine et ceux à prédominance féminine dans un même établissement doivent bénéficier d'un traitement égal si le travail est équivalent, bien que de nature différente. La rémunération devra donc se fonder largement sur la valeur relative des postes. Le Groupe de travail croit que ses recommandations visant la fusion des groupes et la réduction du nombre de niveaux aideront grandement à résoudre le problème lié à l'inégalité salariale, car le système de classification actuel ne laisse aucune place à la parité salariale. En raison du nombre de normes et de plans de classification, il est impossible de faire des comparaisons entre différents groupes, étape nécessaire au calcul de la parité salariale. Il faut pour cela un plan de classification commun.

travail sont très similaires, de même que les conditions d'emploi, tandis qu'il existe une communauté d'intérêts entre ces groupes, notamment en ce qui a trait au perfectionnement et au maintien des aptitudes professionnelles, les deux étant tout aussi importants. Le Groupe de travail recommande une structure de travail à 5 niveaux pour tous les groupes, sauf pour l'art dentaire et la médecine. Ces deux derniers domaines pourraient constituer des sous-groupes distincts, en raison de l'accréditation professionnelle et des études exigées ainsi que des besoins en matière de rémunération, qui sont particuliers à ces deux professions.

GROUPE DE L'ENSEIGNEMENT

Ce nouveau groupe réunirait les groupes: Enseignement; Enseignement universitaire et soutien de l'enseignement. Il rassemblerait les enseignants de niveau primaire, secondaire et universitaire. Tous appliquent des méthodes et techniques d'enseignement acquises au moyen d'une formation spécialisée. Compte tenu de la nature des tâches exécutées, tous les membres de ce groupe sont intéressés à maintenir leurs aptitudes professionnelles. La rémunération est fondée sur le rendement. Il y aurait lieu de doter les postes par des nominations au niveau. Le Groupe de travail recommande une structure à 5 niveaux fondée sur les compétences et le rendement.

GROUPE DU COMMERCE

Le Groupe de travail recommande de conserver ce groupe et sa structure à 4 niveaux.

GROUPE DU SERVICE EXTÉRIEUR

Le Groupe de travail considère qu'il faudrait créer une nouvelle structure à 4 niveaux dans ce groupe. Cette structure permettrait d'absorber les postes de service extérieur autres que les postes de gestion qui sont actuellement rattachés au groupe de la DIRECTION de la catégorie de gestion (exception faite des postes de SMA), et offrirait de meilleures possibilités d'avancement pour les employés de ce groupe. Le maintien du groupe repose sur le fait que le service extérieur constitue un domaine de travail particulier.

GROUPE DE LA TRADUCTION

Le Groupe de travail recommande de n'apporter aucun changement à ce groupe du fait qu'il est propre à un ministère.

GROUPE DE LA RECHERCHE

Le nouveau groupe rassemble les groupes: Recherche scientifique; Services scientifiques de la Défense et Recherche historique. Pour l'essentiel, les membres de ces trois groupes mènent et gèrent des projets de recherche et de développement en sciences naturelles ou en sciences sociales. Le Groupe de travail recommande d'établir une structure à 5 niveaux fondée sur les compétences et le rendement des employés. La nomination au niveau est caractéristique de ce groupe. Les membres sont rémunérés et reconnus selon leurs connaissances et leurs aptitudes plutôt que d'après les tâches à exécuter. Par ailleurs, nous recommandons que les personnes chargées de la gestion de ces activités soient elles aussi incluses dans le groupe de la recherche et non dans le nouveau groupe de la direction. Ceci leur permettrait de demeurer en contact avec les activités scientifiques, au lieu d'avoir à se retirer de leur profession pendant leur mandat de gestionnaire. En étant intégrés dans ce groupe, les gestionnaires pourront conserver leur statut professionnel et scientifique.

GROUPE DE L'ÉLECTRONIQUE

Le Groupe de travail recommande que ce groupe soit maintenu, assorti d'une structure à 5 niveaux.

GROUPE DE LA SÉCURITÉ AÉRIENNE

Le nouveau groupe de la sécurité aérienne rassemblerait les groupes: Contrôle de la circulation aérienne et Radiotélégraphie, ainsi que les spécialistes de l'information de vol et des services de soutien opérationnel, actuellement classifiés comme GT et CR à Transports Canada (pour ce qui est des employés qui s'occupent des communications avec les aéronefs). L'objet de ces postes est de fournir des services assurant le déplacement rapide et sécuritaire des aéronefs. Un tel regroupement améliorerait les possibilités d'avancement professionnel, tout en optimisant l'utilisation des ressources. Le Groupe de travail recommande une structure à 5 niveaux. Ces groupes professionnels ont une communauté d'intérêts et des conditions de travail similaires.

GROUPE DES SERVICES DE SANTÉ

Ce nouveau groupe comprendrait les groupes: Sciences domestiques; Sciences infirmières; Pharmacie; Service social; Ergothérapie et physiothérapie; Psychologie; Art dentaire et Médecine. Ces groupes, pour l'essentiel, font la promotion de la santé individuelle et publique, s'occupent de la prévention, du traitement et de la gestion des maladies, ainsi que de l'élaboration et de la mise en oeuvre de programmes de promotion de la santé. Les milieux de

de la promotion, du développement et de la réglementation de l'industrie et du commerce agricoles et doivent eux aussi recourir à une masse de connaissances spécialisées. Le Groupe de travail recommande la création d'un nouveau groupe des sciences assorti d'une structure à cinq niveaux.

GROUPE DE LA VÉRIFICATION

Le Groupe de travail ne recommande aucun changement pour ce groupe, propre à un ministère - la plupart des employés de ce groupe travaillent pour Revenu Canada, soit à l'impôt, soit à Douanes et Accise. Le Groupe de travail recommande une structure à 5 niveaux, à des fins de simplification.

GROUPE DES SCIENCES SOCIALES

Ce nouveau groupe intégrerait les employés chargés des analyses et des études économiques, socio-économiques et sociologiques à l'appui des programmes et politiques de l'administration fédérale. Il s'étendrait aussi à ceux qui s'occupent de l'élaboration, de l'application et de l'évaluation des méthodes et des mesures statistiques et d'enquêtes aux fins de l'analyse et du rapport des données. L'actuel groupe Économique, Sociologie et statistique, ainsi que les groupes Mathématiques, Actuariat Soutien des sciences sociales s'acquittent essentiellement de ce genre de fonctions. Une structure à 5 niveaux est recommandée pour ce groupe. Les membres du groupe Soutien des sciences sociales (SI) seront répartis entre les nouveaux groupes de l'administration et des sciences sociales d'après leur travail.

GROUPE DES OFFICIERS DE NAVIRE

Le Groupe de travail ne recommande aucun changement pour ce groupe.

GROUPE DE L'ARCHITECTURE ET DU GÉNIE

Ce nouveau groupe fusionne l'actuel groupe de l'architecture et de l'urbanisme et celui du génie et de l'arpentage. Les postes de ces groupes exigent l'application de connaissances spécialisées en architecture et en génie dans l'exécution de tâches liées à la planification et la conception des travaux de construction et de modification d'ouvrages, ou à l'exécution des plans, à la construction, à l'installation ou à l'entretien d'immeubles, d'ouvrages, de réseaux de transport et d'autres systèmes. Pour être embauché dans ce groupe, il faut avoir suivi les études prescrites et détenir une accréditation professionnelle conférée, à partir de critères précis, par un organisme légalement constitué.

matières et de substances biologiques, chimiques et physiques; de conception, de construction, d'inspection et de fonctionnement d'équipements, de systèmes et de processus complexes. Les connaissances et les aptitudes sont en général acquises au terme d'études secondaires complètes d'une formation spécialisée. Le Groupe de travail recommande d'envisager une structure à cinq niveaux pour ce groupe.

GROUPE DES SERVICES CORRECTIONNELS

Le Groupe de travail croit que, en raison de la nature particulière des emplois et du travail propres aux institutions correctionnelles au Canada, le Service correctionnel pourrait bénéficier du statut d'employeur distinct, ce qui lui permettrait de regrouper les métiers, professions et fonctions qu'on trouve dans ces institutions dans un seul groupe de classification. Les groupes actuels ont une communauté d'intérêts, des conditions de travail assez semblables, notamment au plan de la durée de l'emploi et des avantages sociaux, ainsi que des possibilités équivalentes d'avancement professionnel. Ce nouveau groupe serait régi par un régime de rémunération fondé sur la classification. Il comprendrait tous les postes et les fonctions qui ont trait aux détenus

GROUPE DE L'INFORMATIQUE

Le Groupe de travail ne recommande aucun changement à ce groupe, qui s'appelle actuellement groupe de gestion des systèmes d'ordinateurs. Le maintien de ce groupe se justifie par le fait qu'il existe une certaine communauté d'intérêts chez ses membres et par la croissance de ce secteur, qui constitue une nouvelle profession correspondant à un marché privé fortement concurrentiel.

GROUPE DES SCIENCES

Ce nouveau groupe comprendrait les groupes suivants: Sciences physiques; Chimie; Sciences biologiques; Sciences forestières; Météorologie; Réglementation scientifique et Agriculture. Ces groupes partagent un mode de fonctionnement commun qui consiste à appliquer un ensemble de connaissances acquises à l'université, et qui se limitent à une spécialité bien définie. Il s'agit d'ailleurs de l'aspect le plus important du travail d'un scientifique. Par exemple, le groupe de la chimie s'occupe essentiellement de l'analyse, de l'interprétation, de la classification, de la mesure et de l'examen de la composition chimique et des propriétés et des réactions de substances, tandis que les membres du groupe des sciences biologiques analysent, identifient, interprètent, classifient, mesurent, examinent et gèrent des ressources, organismes ou systèmes biologiques. De la même façon, les membres du groupe de l'agriculture s'occupent

Si l'on réunit la structure à six niveaux du groupe de l'administration à la structure à trois niveaux du groupe de la direction, on constate qu'il y aura une hiérarchie de neuf niveaux à partir du poste de bureau le moins élevé jusqu'à celui de sous-ministre adjoint. Cette réduction du nombre de niveaux permettra la délégation des pouvoirs et des responsabilités de décision au plus bas niveau possible. La gestion ministérielle pourra ainsi simplifier son processus décisionnel et accordera aux employés de première ligne une plus grande latitude pour ce qui est des décisions et des interventions. Cela permettra en outre de supprimer la distinction artificielle qui est présentement établie entre les «agents» et les «commis».

On a proposé que les fonctions de réglementation ou d'exécution (par exemple les agents des douanes et des enquêtes, les agents des pêches) forment un groupe distinct. Le Groupe de travail estime que les arguments à l'appui de cette position ne sont pas assez forts pour justifier leur exclusion du groupe de l'administration.

GRUPPE OPÉRATIONNEL

Ce nouveau groupe rassemblerait les groupes suivants: Pompiers; Manoeuvres et personnes de métier; Services divers; Services hospitaliers; Chauffage et force motrice; Gardiens de phare; Équipes de navires et Réparation de navires. Ce nouveau groupe se subdiviserait en six sous-groupes: 1. un sous-groupe opérationnel, comportant une structure à sept niveaux, qui comprendrait les emplois qui ne correspondent pas à des métiers précis; 2. un sous-groupe des gens de métiers, qui regrouperait tous les métiers identifiables par titre de postes et les traiterait selon une classification séparée; 3. un sous-groupe des pompiers qui conserverait la même structure; 4. un sous-groupe des gardiens de phare qui conserverait la même structure; 5. un sous-groupe des équipes de navires qui conserverait la même structure; et 6. un sous-groupe de la réparation de navires qui conserverait la même structure. Une telle réorganisation procurerait une grande marge de manoeuvre dans la détermination de la rémunération de ce groupe.

GRUPPE TECHNIQUE

Ce nouveau groupe rassemblerait les groupes: Dessin et illustration; Soutien technologique et scientifique; Techniciens divers; Photographie; Inspection technique; Inspection des produits primaires ainsi que les Opérateurs radiomaritimes postés à terre. La nature du milieu de travail, les conditions de travail et les dispositions de la convention collective, dont les avantages sociaux, témoignent d'une communauté d'intérêts entre les membres de ces groupes. Tous ces groupes professionnels exécutent grosso modo des tâches d'analyse, d'expérimentation et d'enquête en sciences naturelles et physiques; de préparation, d'inspection et de mesure de

LA NOUVELLE STRUCTURE DES GROUPES PROFESSIONNELS

GRUPPE DE LA DIRECTION

Le nouveau groupe de la DIRECTION comblera les groupes de la direction et de la gestion supérieure dans la catégorie de gestion. Le groupe de la DIRECTION comprendra les hauts fonctionnaires chargés de l'élaboration des politiques et de la prestation de conseils ainsi que ceux qui exercent des fonctions de gestion. Le Groupe de travail recommande que le plan soumis par la firme Hay soit retenu comme plan d'évaluation des postes, sous réserve des équivalences à établir au niveau des postes professionnels supérieurs. Les gestionnaires de la fonction publique sont d'avis que, si l'on se réfère au niveau de classification actuel, certains postes sont sous-évalués par rapport à d'autres. On désigne plus précisément les postes des régions comparés à ceux de l'administration centrale et des organismes centraux; les postes de gestion opérationnelle comparés à ceux touchant les politiques et la prestation de conseils; les postes des ministères à vocation sociale comparés aux postes des ministères à vocation économique ou de gestion des activités. Le Groupe de travail appuie donc sans réserve l'étude entreprise par le Conseil du Trésor qui consiste à analyser ces postes pour vérifier si les inégalités perçues sont fondées. Le Groupe de travail propose une structure à trois niveaux pour remplacer la structure actuelle à six niveaux. La nouvelle structure regrouperait les SM avec les EX-1, les EX-2 avec les EX-3, et les EX-4 avec les EX-5. Elle ne distingue pas plus de trois niveaux de responsabilité nettement démarqués dans ce type de postes. Le Groupe de travail sur la catégorie de gestion s'est penché sur la question et approuve cette recommandation.

GRUPPE DE L'ADMINISTRATION

Le nouveau groupe professionnel comprendra des postes et activités de réglementation visant à offrir des services au public dans le cadre de divers programmes de l'administration fédérale et b) à assurer la gestion interne de la fonction publique, y compris les activités de soutien et de gestion de bureau, les communications, le traitement des données et la gestion de l'information. Ce nouveau groupe réunit les groupes suivants: Services administratifs; Gestion des finances; Gestion du personnel; Services d'information; Administration des programmes; Organisation et méthodes; Achat et approvisionnement; Programmes de bien-être social; Comités aux écritures et aux règlements; Secrétariat, sténographie et dactylographie; Communications; Traitement mécanique des données; Mécanographie; Soutien des sciences sociales et Bibliothèque économique. Le Groupe de travail croit qu'il n'y a pas plus de cinq ou six niveaux de travail nettement démarqués dans ce groupe. Il propose donc une structure à six niveaux, qui facilitera la transposition.

c)

Des niveaux de classification correspondant à des genres de travail qui se démarquent nettement les uns des autres.

d)

Ce n'est pas le cas dans le système actuel. Les différences entre les niveaux d'un même groupe professionnel sont généralement si ténues que les gestionnaires se sentent obligés de modifier leur organisation afin de rétribuer et de promouvoir les employés méritants. En outre, dans la plupart des groupes professionnels, et en particulier ceux qui s'occupent des tâches administratives, ces différences ne sont pas assez marquées pour justifier les écarts de traitement. Les fonctions rattachées à ces postes sont devenues floues dans le seul but de répondre aux exigences des plans de classification en vigueur. Un système simplifié sera plus facile à comprendre et à maîtriser.

Pour la fonction publique d'aujourd'hui et pour celle de l'avenir, le déploiement facile et rapide des effectifs afin de répondre à des priorités qui changent constamment.

Les changements proposés permettraient de réduire les formalités administratives imposées aux spécialistes de la classification et de la dotation, puisque la paperasserie à remplir ne serait plus requise que pour des postes clairement distincts les uns des autres. Les documents de nomination ne serviraient qu'aux nominations initiales et aux promotions. Les mutations d'un emploi à un autre se limiteraient à une opération comptable.

e)

Des échelles de traitement étendues pour chaque niveau de classification afin de faciliter le versement de primes au rendement.

Le Groupe de travail croit que, si l'on veut responsabiliser pleinement les gestionnaires, il faut aussi les rendre responsables de la rémunération. Des échelles de traitement plus étendues faciliteraient l'établissement de régimes de primes au rendement, ce qui permettrait aux gestionnaires de récompenser les employés produits. Cette disposition donnera aux gestionnaires une meilleure prise sur le système de classification et de rémunération.

f)

La concorde la plus étroite possible entre les groupes et les affiliations syndicales.

Le Groupe de travail croit que, afin de maintenir une certaine stabilité dans la refonte du système de classification, et afin de reconnaître que certains groupes professionnels représentent véritablement des occupations spécifiques, il y a lieu de conserver la structure de négociation existante dans la mesure du possible et sans porter atteinte au principe des classes d'emplois apparentes et des regroupements naturels de fonctions.

C'est donc dire que les fonctions requises pour la gestion interne d'un organisme, c'est-à-dire l'administration, le personnel, les finances et le soutien, seront réunies avec d'autres fonctions qui consistent à exécuter les programmes ou les activités de la fonction publique fédérale. Il n'y aura plus de barrières artificielles entre les employés qui fournissent un service ou administrent un règlement et ceux qui assurent un soutien opérationnel, technique aux employés de première ligne. Le groupe a procédé de la même façon pour les professions et les métiers opérationnels, techniques, scientifiques et les emplois dans le domaine de la santé.

La notion de classes générales d'emplois apparentées s'applique à l'échelle de la fonction publique, ce qui n'empêche pas l'existence de certains groupes propres à un ministère. En revanche, certains ministères pourront faire valoir que tous leurs postes devraient être regroupés dans une même classification, même s'ils appartiennent à différentes classes d'emplois apparentés. Par exemple, les Services correctionnels du Canada pourraient décider que tous les postes dans les institutions qui s'occupent des détenus devraient recevoir la même classification, même s'ils appartiennent à différentes classes d'emplois (gardes, gens de métier, administration de programme). Le même raisonnement s'applique à Revenu Canada, Impôt, qui souhaite fondre dans une même catégorie d'impôt les avocats, les comptables et les administrateurs de programmes. Le Groupe de travail est conscient de la limite de tels projets, mais doit les rejeter afin de maintenir la cohésion de la fonction publique. Si l'on procédait de la manière décrite, chaque ministère serait susceptible de se doter de son propre plan de classification, une situation répandue avant 1965 et qui avait été justement rejetée au profit du système actuel. Les aspirations légitimes de ces ministères pourraient être satisfaites en leur accordant un statut d'employeur particulier qui leur permettrait d'établir un plan de classification pour leur seul organisme.

b)

Le maintien de groupes particuliers si l'accréditation professionnelle obligatoire et la comparaison avec le secteur privé le justifient.

Le Groupe de travail reconnaît que les membres de certains groupes particuliers, comme les avocats, les vérificateurs et les vétérinaires, doivent être détenteurs d'une accréditation professionnelle pour pratiquer et qu'ils travaillent parallèlement à un marché privé très circonscrit dont la fonction publique doit surveiller l'évolution de près si elle souhaite attirer et conserver des professionnels de calibre. Le Groupe de travail croit qu'il y a lieu de conserver ces groupes comme des entités distinctes dans le but de se doter d'un effectif professionnel et qui entend faire carrière à la fonction publique.

sous-groupes qui pourraient former des unités de négociation distinctes en vertu du nouveau système de classification.

La refonte que propose le Groupe fera disparaître les catégories professionnelles. Nous partons du principe que l'avancement professionnel doit suivre une progression logique et nous constatons qu'il y a des recoupements dans le travail des catégories du Soutien administratif et de l'Administration et du service extérieur en particulier. En fait, la principale recommandation du Groupe est de créer un groupe de l'Administration qui comprendra la plupart des groupes et sous-groupes de ces deux catégories. L'établissement de cette super-catégorie répondra en grande partie aux doléances du Groupe de travail sur les obstacles rencontrés par les femmes dans la fonction publique.

La mise en oeuvre de ces principes donnera les résultats suivants:

- a) **L'intégration des groupes dans des classes plus générales d'emplois apparentés à l'échelle interministérielle et le maintien, dans certains cas, de groupes propres à un ministère.**

Le maintien ou la fusion des groupes actuels se fonde sur la nature générale du travail exécuté et sur la communauté d'intérêts entre les groupes professionnels. Cette dernière englobe des facteurs comme la similitude des tâches, la durée du travail, les conditions d'emploi, les qualités professionnelles et techniques requises, la formation exigée, les régimes de rémunération et d'évaluation, les avantages sociaux, l'interdépendance des fonctions, les possibilités d'avancement ainsi que le mouvement normal au sein d'un même groupe, par opposition aux mutations latérales à d'autres groupes. Les nouvelles classes générales compteront des gestionnaires et des non-gestionnaires, mais la négociation des conventions collectives exclurait les gestionnaires, en vertu de la LRTFP.

Ces nouvelles classes générales donneront aux gestionnaires une plus grande marge de manoeuvre dans la gestion des ressources humaines. Il ne sera plus nécessaire de créer des différences arbitraires afin de rééquilibrer les allocations d'années-personnes entre les groupes d'une même catégorie dans le seul but de redéployer du personnel. Les gestionnaires pourront porter toute leur attention à l'objet du travail, par exemple de fournir une certaine forme d'expertise. Les connaissances et les aptitudes requises pour un poste particulier tiendront lieu de critères de sélection.

PARAMETRES DE L'ELABORATION DE LA NOUVELLE STRUCTURE

Le Groupe de travail croit que la nouvelle structure doit réunir les groupes et les sous-groupes en des classes plus générales d'emplois apparentes, à l'échelle de la fonction publique ou d'un seul ministère. Par ailleurs, il faut éviter d'appliquer aveuglément cette notion d'emplois

apparentes et reconnaître que certains groupes ont développé des éléments communs au cours des années, que d'autres exigent une accréditation professionnelle, tandis que d'autres encore sont très influencés par la rémunération accordée dans le secteur privé. La recherche d'un

équilibre entre ces deux réalités aidera grandement à établir la parité salariale et la valeur comparative des postes. Une autre grande préoccupation du Groupe de travail était de créer, à l'intérieur des nouveaux groupes, des niveaux qui se démarquent nettement les uns des autres, d'où une réduction substantielle de leur nombre qui, conjuguée à celle du nombre de groupes et

de sous-groupes, simplifiera grandement le système et le rendra plus transparent et plus souple.

Le nouveau système confèrera à la direction le pouvoir de déployer des effectifs à un même

niveau de classification pour répondre aux exigences opérationnelles et à des fins de perfectionnement. Cela contribuera dans une large mesure à assouplir l'organisation du

travail et encouragera l'enthousiasme et l'avancement professionnel. Le comité mixte de consultation (CMC) partage cet avis. Dans son rapport du 7 mars 1990, le sous-comité du CMC sur la mobilité professionnelle conclut que la réduction du nombre de groupes professionnels

couplée à la nomination au niveau à l'intérieur d'une échelle de traitement très étendue, facilite la mutation d'employés à d'autres postes de la même plage de traitement tout en évitant le

processus d'appel. Une telle rotation permet aux employés d'acquérir une expérience

diversifiée en occupant des postes qui exigent des aptitudes différentes. En outre, la réduction du nombre de niveaux rendra possible l'instauration de la rémunération au rendement comme

moyen de favoriser la productivité, au lieu de la reclassement, moyen privilégié dans le

système actuel.

Le dernier paramètre est celui qui présentait le plus de difficultés. Etant donné que le système

de classification détermine la structure des unités de négociation menant à l'accréditation des agents de négociation, le Groupe de travail souhaitait que ses propositions respectent autant

que possible les affiliations syndicales. On ne peut tirer un trait sur l'expérience des vingt

dernières années, menée sous l'égide de la Loi sur les relations de travail dans la fonction publique, qui a suscité la création d'unités de négociation conformes aux intérêts communs et

aux besoins particuliers de certains groupes. Le Groupe de travail a cherché à répondre à ces

besoins dans la mesure où cela n'entraîne pas en contradiction avec ses objectifs (voir aux pages 4 et 5), notamment en conservant certains groupes tels quels ou en prévoyant la constitution de

5. Partit  salariale

Le nouveau syst me doit  tre  quitable et rem dier   la sous-r mun ration des m tiers principalement occup s par des femmes qui sont d' gale valeur aux m tiers   pr dominance masculine. Il ne doit donner lieu   aucune discrimination syst matique fond e sur le sexe.

6. Facteurs externes

Le nouveau syst me doit pouvoir suivre les tendances de la r mun ration dans le secteur priv .

7. Facteurs internes

Le syst me doit mesurer la valeur relative des postes tout en tenant compte de la diversit  des fonctions au sein de la fonction publique.

8.  largissement du champ d'action gr ce   une r duction du nombre de niveaux

Le nouveau syst me doit favoriser une communication intense entre employ s et surveillants et faciliter la prise de d cision et le partage des responsabilit s au niveau de travail.

9. Engagement de la gestion

Les gestionnaires doivent comprendre et promouvoir le syst me et s'y sentir   l'aise. Le syst me ne doit pas  tre con u   l'intention des seuls sp cialistes de la gestion du personnel, et il doit se pr ter   la d l gation de pouvoirs aux gestionnaires de premi re ligne, dans un climat de confiance que devront entretenir les organismes centraux et les hauts fonctionnaires.

Ces valeurs et objectifs m neront   l' tablissement d'un syst me de classification susceptible d'attirer et de conserver des fonctionnaires de haut calibre, qui obtiendront une r mun ration ad quate et dont la carri re suivra une progression logique. Le syst me sera donc beaucoup plus simple, administr  largement par les gestionnaires et se pr tera   l'informatisation. Ces valeurs et objectifs inciteront   l'innovation dans l'organisation du travail, d'o  une r duction du nombre de niveaux de gestion et un accroissement des pouvoirs et responsabilit s d l gu s aux employ s de premi re ligne.

1. Milieu de travail favorisant la productivité

L'objectif fondamental du nouveau système est de créer un milieu de travail axé sur le service au public, l'excellence de la gestion, ainsi que l'efficacité et l'équité de la gestion des programmes. Ce système doit représenter davantage qu'un simple moyen de récompenser, de promouvoir et de rémunérer des employés. Il faudra d'ailleurs changer les attitudes des gestionnaires à l'égard des structures de classification. Le nouveau système ne doit pas entraver le travail des gestionnaires. Il ne doit pas coûter cher à administrer et doit se prêter à l'information.

2. Simplicité et transparence

Le nouveau système doit être considérablement plus facile à gérer, moins lourd, facile à expliquer et facile à comprendre pour les spécialistes en ressources humaines, les gestionnaires, les employés et les syndicats. Il doit amener une réduction substantielle du nombre de groupes, de sous-groupes et de niveaux professionnels et s'en tenir aux véritables différences dans l'exécution du travail.

3. Souplesse

Le nouveau système doit faciliter le redéploiement rapide des effectifs à l'intérieur comme à l'extérieur du gouvernement et s'adapter facilement au changement, qu'il soit technologique, social, économique ou structurel. Il doit également être suffisamment souple pour permettre de résoudre des situations exceptionnelles sans établir de précédent dangereux. Il doit enfin permettre le partage des responsabilités, de l'obligation de rendre compte et de l'autorité entre les niveaux, les bureaux régionaux et l'administration centrale d'une part, et entre le personnel et les groupes organiques d'autre part.

4. Stimuler l'avancement professionnel

Le nouveau système doit tenir compte des attitudes dominantes et des facteurs qui jouent un rôle dans le travail et la carrière des employés : le plafonnement, la carrière des deux conjoints d'un ménage, la mobilité, le désir d'apprentissage, etc. Afin d'attirer et de conserver ces employés, les structures de classification doivent favoriser l'avancement et l'enrichissement professionnels.

L'embauchage pour une durée déterminée ou le renouvellement de contrats. Ce nombre correspond à près de 47% du nombre total de fonctionnaires (214 000). En d'autres mots, près d'un employé sur deux a fait l'objet d'une mesure de dotation ou de changement de groupe ou de niveau professionnel l'an dernier.

C'est donc dire que le système de classification actuel:

- est trop complexe
- est trop coûteux et exige un personnel nombreux pour le faire fonctionner
- présente trop de risques de manipulation
- est l'objet de trop d'exigences contradictoires
- pose trop d'obstacles à l'avancement professionnel
- s'adapte mal à l'évolution de la technologie et du mode de travail
- n'est pas équitable sur le plan salarial
- donne lieu à des réorganisations de trop grande ampleur et exige une infinité de mesures de reclassement en vue de la rémunération ou de la promotion d'employés

PRINCIPES DIRECTEURS

Tout au long de son examen, le Groupe de travail s'est inspiré des objectifs et des valeurs de Fonction publique 2000. Plus particulièrement, il a voulu jeter les bases d'une fonction publique:

- qui soit un organisme professionnel, compétent, impartial ayant pour mandat de servir le public;
- qui reconnait l'importance du facteur humain dans la réalisation de ses objectifs et qui fait en sorte que ses employés se sentent valorisés;
- qui délègue autant de pouvoir que possible aux employés et aux gestionnaires de première ligne;
- qui, tout en maintenant une unité d'ensemble, laisse place à la diversité, reflète des différentes fonctions qui y sont exécutées.

Dans la refonte du système de classification, de nouveaux objectifs doivent être fixés pour répondre aux exigences du milieu de travail des années 90. Pour le Groupe de travail, ces objectifs sont les suivants:

Il est indiscutable que la nature du travail effectuée au sein de la fonction publique est en pleine transformation. Dans bien des cas, les différences qui existaient entre les postes lors que l'actuel système a été élaboré se sont estompées. Il y a moins de différences perceptibles dans les valeurs professionnelles aujourd'hui. Les progrès de la science et de l'informatique, la nécessité pour l'organisation de se doter de nombreux postes polyvalents, l'augmentation du nombre de diplômés universitaires sur le marché du travail et les possibilités limitées d'avancement professionnel ont contribué à supprimer ou du moins à atténuer ces différences et commandent des changements en profondeur.

Le système actuel est très lourd: il compte 6 catégories, 72 groupes et 106 sous-groupes professionnels. Face à un système aussi complexe, les gestionnaires et les employés ne comprennent pas, et donc n'acceptent pas les écarts salariaux propres aux différents groupes, sous-groupes et catégories. À l'heure actuelle, il faut créer des distinctions artificielles entre les postes ou les organisations pour donner aux gestionnaires la souplesse nécessaire au redéploiement de leurs effectifs. Cela est une grande source de frustration pour les gestionnaires, les administrateurs du personnel et les employés. L'administration du système de classification est coûteuse et exige beaucoup de temps, sans compter qu'elle nécessite une quantité invraisemblable de données, de documents et d'informations pour la prise de décisions. En 1989-1990, on a dû prendre environ 202 446 mesures de classification pour environ 320 000 postes. Une analyse récente révèle que le niveau de mesures de classification se situe normalement autour de 40% à 50% du nombre total de postes dans la fonction publique. Les activités de classification entreprises par les ministères en raison des nombreuses réorganisations et révisions de postes, de même que les politiques du Conseil du Trésor relatives aux révisions régulières, aux modifications à la norme de classification et aux mesures de classification des ministères produisent quelque 150 000 mesures de classification par année. En 1988, plus de 1 500 mesures de classification, soit un nombre égal au tiers du nombre total de postes, ont été prises dans la catégorie de gestion. En 1989, le quart de toutes les promotions dans la fonction publique résultait de reclassements.

En outre, le système actuel est inéquitable sur le plan salarial, du fait de l'orientation masculine ou féminine des groupes. Un récent rapport intitulé **Au-delà des apparences** considère que l'actuel système de classification stéréotype certains postes comme étant "féminins", et recommande une refonte du système.

Il est évident que plus un système de classification est complexe, plus il exige un grand nombre de mesures de dotation, en particulier dans le cas de mutations, de promotions et de reclassements. En 1989, environ 100 000 mesures de dotation ont été prises dans la fonction publique, que ce soit pour du recrutement, des promotions, des mutations latérales,

**RAPPORT DU GROUPE DE TRAVAIL
SUR LE SYSTEME DE CLASSIFICATION ET
LA STRUCTURE DES GROUPES PROFESSIONNELS**

INTRODUCTION

Le mandat du Groupe de travail sur le système de classification et la structure des groupes professionnels était de réexaminer l'organisation et l'administration de l'actuel système de classification, en fonction des valeurs et des objectifs présidant au renouvellement de la fonction publique.

Dans sa recherche, le Groupe de travail a consulté le comité des sous-ministres sur les questions de classification; il a étudié les plans et principes de classification, les regroupements professionnels et les structures en vigueur; il a examiné l'organisation du travail et des niveaux, la grille de rémunération et les taux limites, ainsi que les propositions du Conseil du Trésor et des autres organismes visant à simplifier les processus et les structures actuels de classification; et il a envisagé les conséquences d'éventuels changements du système de classification pour les syndicats et les unités de négociation. Le Groupe de travail s'est aussi penché sur les effets de l'actuel système sur le mode de rémunération, la dotation, l'avancement professionnel et la gestion des ressources humaines en général, y compris la culture et les habitudes acquises dans la gestion de l'organisation. Il a tenu un atelier auquel ont participé des gestionnaires organiques et des bureaux régionaux, et les membres du Groupe ont participé à des ateliers de discussion des propositions. Il a reçu de nombreuses suggestions de la part des syndicats, de la direction régionale et des services du personnel. Enfin, il a tenu des réunions avec des spécialistes de la classification.

NECESSITE DE LA REFORME

Dans son rapport préliminaire du 31 janvier 1990, le Groupe de travail a conclu qu'il était nécessaire de réformer le système, d'une manière pratique et raisonnable, et de réduire de façon significative le nombre de groupes et de niveaux professionnels. Le Groupe de travail a remis en question l'utilité de certaines catégories professionnelles dans le système de classification. Il a conclu que le processus décisionnel en matière de classification, y compris les plans d'évaluation des postes et les descriptions de poste, devait être considérablement simplifié.

TABIE DES MATIERES

| <u>PAGE</u> | |
|-------------|--|
| 1 | Sommaire du rapport |
| 1-3 | Introduction |
| 3-5 | Nécessité de la réforme |
| 6-9 | Principes directeurs |
| 10-16 | Paramètres de l'élaboration de la nouvelle structure |
| 16-17 | Nouvelle structure des groupes professionnels |
| 17 | Systèmes d'évaluation des emplois |
| 17-18 | Modifications nécessaires à la mise en oeuvre de la nouvelle structure |
| 18 | Modifications des lois |
| 18-19 | Modifications du système de dotation |
| 19 | Relations de travail |
| 20-22 | Rémunération |
| 22 | Transition à la nouvelle structure |
| 23-26 | Conséquences des recommandations |
| | Conclusion |
| | Recommandations |
| | Annexes |

Le 20 juillet 1990

RAPPORT DU GROUPE DE TRAVAIL SUR LE SYSTEME DE CLASSIFICATION ET LA STRUCTURE DES GROUPES PROFESSIONNELS

INTRODUCTION

Le mandat du Groupe de travail sur le système de classification et la structure des groupes professionnels était de réexaminer l'organisation et l'administration de l'actuel système de classification, en fonction des valeurs et des objectifs présidant au renouvellement de la fonction publique.

Dans sa recherche, le Groupe de travail a consulté le rapport du comité des sous-ministres sur les questions de classification; il a étudié les plans et principes de classification, les regroupements professionnels et les structures en vigueur; il a examiné l'organisation du travail et des niveaux, la grille de rémunération et les taux limites, ainsi que les propositions du Conseil du Trésor et des autres organismes visant à simplifier les processus et les structures actuels de classification; et il a envisagé les conséquences d'éventuels changements du système de classification pour les syndicats et les unités de négociation. Le Groupe de travail s'est aussi penché sur les effets de l'actuel système sur le mode de rémunération, la dotation, l'avancement professionnel et la gestion des ressources humaines en général, y compris la culture et les habitudes acquises dans la gestion de l'organisation. Il a tenu un atelier auquel ont participé des gestionnaires organiques et des bureaux régionaux, et les membres du Groupe ont participé à des ateliers de discussion des propositions. Il a reçu de nombreuses suggestions de la part des syndicats, de la direction régionale et des services du personnel. Enfin, il a tenu des réunions avec des spécialistes de la classification.

NECESSITE DE LA REFORME

Dans son rapport préliminaire du 31 janvier 1990, le Groupe de travail a conclu qu'il était nécessaire de réformer le système, d'une manière pratique et raisonnable, et de réduire de façon significative le nombre de groupes et de niveaux professionnels. Le Groupe de travail a remis en question l'utilité de certaines catégories professionnelles dans le système de classification. Il a conclu que le processus décisionnel en matière de classification, y compris les plans d'évaluation des postes et les descriptions de poste, devait être considérablement simplifié.

TABLE DES MATIERES

| <u>PAGE</u> | |
|-------------|--|
| | Sommaire du rapport |
| 1 | Introduction |
| 1-3 | Nécessité de la réforme |
| 3-5 | Principes directeurs |
| 6-9 | Paramètres de l'élaboration de la nouvelle structure |
| 10-16 | Nouvelle structure des groupes professionnels |
| 16-17 | Systèmes d'évaluation des emplois |
| 17 | Modifications nécessaires à la mise en oeuvre |
| 17-18 | de la nouvelle structure |
| | Modifications des lois |
| 18 | Modifications du système de dotation |
| 18-19 | Relations de travail |
| 19 | Rémunération |
| 20 | Transition à la nouvelle structure |
| 20-22 | Conséquences des recommandations |
| 22 | Conclusion |
| 23-26 | Recommandations |
| | Annexes |

3. a) Un plan de cotation commun s'appliquera à tous les groupes professionnels, sauf aux groupes de la direction, de la recherche, du droit, du service extérieur et des services d'imprimerie. Le plan sera fondé sur les principes d'équité salariale prévus dans la Loi canadienne sur les droits de la personne.
b) Le plan de cotation comprend 4 facteurs.
c) Toutes les descriptions de poste devront être présentées sur 3 pages.
d) Le plan de cotation sera informatisé dans la mesure du possible.
4. La Loi sur les relations de travail dans la fonction publique (LRTFP) sera modifiée de façon que la détermination d'une "unité de négociation" corresponde à la définition d'un groupe ou sous-groupe professionnel.
5. La LRTFP continuera d'exclure les gestionnaires de la négociation collective.
6. La transposition à la nouvelle structure se fera selon les principes suivants:
a) tous les employés dont la rémunération actuelle est supérieure au niveau maximal de la nouvelle échelle de traitement bénéficieront d'une protection salariale;
b) les employés qui n'auront pas atteint le maximum de leur ancienne échelle de traitement conserveront cette échelle jusqu'à ce qu'ils aient atteint le maximum prévu;
c) les employés qui auront atteint le maximum de leur échelle seront placés dans une nouvelle échelle où leur traitement sera égal à leur traitement actuel (le maximum de l'ancienne échelle) ou se situera au plus proche échelon supérieur dans la nouvelle échelle.

| | | | |
|-----------------------|---|-------------------------------------|--|
| ARCHITECTURE ET GÉNIE | 5 | Architecture et urbanisme | Génie et arpentage |
| RECHERCHE | 5 | Recherche scientifique | Service scientifique de la Défense |
| | | | Recherche historique |
| ELECTRONIQUE | 5 | Aucun changement | |
| SÉCURITÉ AÉRIENNE | 5 | Contrôle de la circulation aérienne | Radiotélégraphie |
| SERVICES DE SANTÉ | 5 | Sciences domestiques | Sciences infirmières |
| | | Pharmacie | Ergothérapie et physiothérapie |
| | | Psychologie | Art dentaire |
| | | Médecine | Service social |
| ENSEIGNEMENT | 5 | Enseignement | Enseignement universitaire |
| | | | Soutien de l'enseignement |
| COMMERCE | 4 | Aucun changement | |
| SERVICE EXTÉRIEUR | 4 | Groupe FS plus postes SM et EX non | gestionnaires aux Affaires extérieures |
| TRADUCTION | 5 | Aucun changement | |
| SERVICES D'IMPRIMERIE | | Aucun changement | |
| DROIT | 3 | Aucun changement | |
| MÉDECINE VÉTÉRINAIRE | 5 | Aucun changement | |
| NAVIGATION AÉRIENNE | 5 | Aucun changement | |

| | | | |
|---------------------|----------------|---|--|
| OPÉRATIONNEL | Pompiers | 7 | Pompiers Manoeuvres et hommes de métier Services divers Services hospitaliers Chauffage et force motrice Gardiens de phare Réparation de navires Équipages de navires |
| TECHNIQUE | | 5 | Dessins et illustrations Soutien technologique et scientifique Techniciens divers Photographie Inspection technique Inspection des produits primaires Radiotélégraphie |
| SERVICES | CORRECTIONNELS | 2 | Aucun changement |
| INFORMATIQUE | | 5 | Aucun changement |
| SCIENCES | | 5 | Sciences physiques Chimie Sciences biologiques Sciences forestières Météorologie Réglementation scientifique Agriculture |
| VÉRIFICATION | | 5 | Aucun changement |
| SCIENCES SOCIALES | | 5 | Économie, sociologie et statistique Mathématiques Actuariat Soutien des sciences sociales |
| OFFICIERS DE NAVIRE | | 5 | Officiers de navire |

Le renouvellement de la fonction publique nous offre l'occasion de simplifier et d'améliorer les systèmes de gestion du personnel en les adaptant à la gestion des ressources humaines des années 90. La réduction du nombre de groupes et de niveaux rendra la gestion plus efficace et plus efficiente, au bénéfice des gestionnaires et des employés, commandera une redéfinition des tâches, reconnaitra la polyvalence, favorisera l'avancement professionnel, motivera l'effectif en accordant plus de responsabilités et de pouvoirs aux employés de première ligne, et intensifiera les communications entre les gestionnaires et les employés de première ligne. Nous canaliserons nos énergies vers le travail utile plutôt que de finasser avec le système.

RECOMMANDATIONS

Le Groupe de travail recommande les mesures suivantes:

1. Abolir les 6 catégories professionnelles existantes.
2. Créer 23 groupes professionnels et 8 sous-groupes professionnels en fusionnant les 72 groupes et 106 sous-groupes actuels comme suit:

NOUVEAUX GROUPES PROPOSÉS

| NOUVEAU GROUPE | SOUS-GROUPES | NOMBRE DE MEMBRES | GROUPES ACTUELS |
|----------------|--------------|-------------------|-----------------|
|----------------|--------------|-------------------|-----------------|

| | | |
|----------------|---|---|
| DIRECTION | 3 | Gestion supérieure Groupe de la direction |
| ADMINISTRATION | 6 | Services administratifs Gestion des finances Gestion du personnel Services d'information Administration des programmes Organisation et méthodes Achat et approvisionnement Programmes de bien-être social Commis aux écritures et aux règlements Secrétariat, sténographie et dactylographie Communications Traitement mécanique des données Mécanographie Soutien des sciences sociales Bibliothéconomie |

Il doit se prêter à la délégation de pouvoirs aux gestionnaires de première ligne, dans un climat de confiance que devront entretenir les organismes centraux et les hauts fonctionnaires. Ces valeurs et objectifs mèneront à l'établissement d'un système de classification susceptible d'attirer et de conserver des fonctionnaires de haut calibre, qui obtiendront une rémunération adéquate et dont la carrière suivra une progression logique. Le système sera donc beaucoup plus simple, administré largement par les gestionnaires et se prêtera à l'informatisation. Ces valeurs et objectifs ininterrompue à l'innovation dans l'organisation du travail, d'où une réduction du nombre de niveaux de gestion et un accroissement des pouvoirs et responsabilités délégués aux employés de première ligne.

Le Groupe de travail croit que la nouvelle structure doit réunir les groupes et les sous-groupes en des classes plus générales d'emplois apparentes, à l'échelle de la fonction publique ou d'un seul ministère. Par ailleurs, il faut éviter d'appliquer aveuglément cette notion d'emplois apparentes et reconnaître que certains groupes ont développé des éléments communs au cours des années, que d'autres exigent une accréditation professionnelle, tandis que d'autres encore sont très influencés par la rémunération accordée dans le secteur privé. La recherche d'un équilibre entre ces deux réalités aidera grandement à établir la partie salariale et la valeur comparative des postes. Une autre grande préoccupation du Groupe de travail était de créer, à l'intérieur des nouveaux groupes, des niveaux qui se démarquent nettement les uns des autres, où une réduction substantielle de leur nombre qui, conjuguée à celle du nombre de groupes et de sous-groupes, simplifiera grandement le système et le rendra plus transparent et plus souple.

On ne peut tirer un trait sur l'expérience des vingt dernières années, menée sous l'égide de la Loi sur les relations de travail dans la fonction publique, qui a suscité la création d'unités de négociation conformes aux intérêts communs et aux besoins particuliers de certains groupes. Le Groupe de travail a cherché à répondre à ces besoins dans la mesure où cela n'entraîne pas en contradiction avec ses objectifs, notamment en conservant certains groupes tels quels ou en prévoyant la constitution de sous-groupes qui pourraient former des unités de négociation distinctes en vertu du nouveau système de classification.

Le système devrait répondre aux exigences de la législation sur les droits de la personne qui a entériné le principe du salaire égal pour un travail d'égal valeur. En vertu de ce principe, les groupes professionnels à prédominance masculine et ceux à prédominance féminine dans un même établissement doivent bénéficier d'un traitement égal si le travail est équivalent, bien que de nature différente. La rémunération devra donc se fonder largement sur la valeur relative des postes. Le Groupe de travail croit que ses recommandations visant la fusion des groupes et la réduction du nombre de niveaux aideront grandement à résoudre le problème lié à l'inégalité salariale, car le système de classification actuel ne laisse aucune place à la partie salariale. En raison du nombre de normes et de plans de classification, il est impossible de faire des comparaisons entre différents groupes, étape nécessaire au calcul de la partie salariale. Il faut pour cela un plan de classification commun.

La solution consiste donc à établir un nouveau plan de cotation qui tiendrait compte de la partie salariale et qui poserait la valeur relative des postes comme principe fondamental de rémunération dans la fonction publique.

Pour chacun des nouveaux groupes professionnels, quatre facteurs seront pris en considération dans le plan de cotation afin de respecter les exigences de la Loi sur les droits de la personne. Pour chaque facteur, l'échelle et les critères de cotation seront structurés de façon à mesurer les caractéristiques propres du groupe. Les échelles de cotation et leurs descriptions pourront alors varier d'un groupe à l'autre.

SOMMAIRE DU RAPPORT

Le mandat du Groupe de travail sur le système de classification et la structure des groupes professionnels était de réexaminer l'organisation et l'administration de l'actuel système de classification, en fonction des valeurs et des objectifs présidant au renouvellement de la fonction publique.

Dans son rapport préliminaire du 31 janvier 1990, le Groupe de travail a conclu qu'il était nécessaire de réformer le système, d'une manière pratique et raisonnable, et de réduire de façon significative le nombre de groupes et de niveaux professionnels. Le Groupe de travail a remis en question l'utilité de certaines catégories professionnelles dans le système de classification. Il a conclu que le processus décisionnel en matière de classification, y compris les plans d'évaluation des postes et les descriptions de poste, devait être considérablement simplifié.

L'administration du système de classification est coûteuse et exige beaucoup de temps, sans compter qu'elle nécessite une quantité invraisemblable de données, de documents et d'informations pour la prise de décisions. En 1989-1990, on a dû prendre environ 202 446 mesures de classification pour environ 320 000 postes. Une analyse récente révèle que le niveau de mesures de classification se situe normalement autour de 40% à 50% du nombre total de postes dans la fonction publique. Les activités de classification entreprises par les ministères en raison des nombreuses réorganisations et révisions de postes, de même que les politiques du Conseil du Trésor relatives aux révisions régulières, aux modifications à la norme de classification et aux mesures de classification des ministères produisent quelque 150 000 mesures de classification par année.

Dans la refonte du système de classification, de nouveaux objectifs doivent être fixés pour répondre aux exigences du milieu de travail des années 90.

L'objectif fondamental du nouveau système est de créer un milieu de travail axé sur le service au public, l'excellence de la gestion, ainsi que l'efficacité, l'efficacité et l'équité de la gestion des programmes.

Le nouveau système doit être considérablement plus facile à gérer, moins lourd, facile à expliquer et facile à comprendre pour les spécialistes en ressources humaines, les gestionnaires, les employés et les syndicats. Le nouveau système doit faciliter le redéploiement rapide des effectifs à l'intérieur comme à l'extérieur du gouvernement et s'adapter facilement au changement, qu'il soit technologique, social, économique ou structurel. Il doit enfin permettre le partage des responsabilités, de l'obligation de rendre compte et de l'autorité entre les niveaux, les bureaux régionaux et l'administration centrale d'une part, et entre le personnel et les groupes organiques d'autre part.

Le nouveau système doit favoriser l'avancement et l'enrichissement professionnels.

Il ne doit donner lieu à aucune discrimination systématique fondée sur le sexe.

Le nouveau système doit pouvoir suivre les tendances de la rémunération dans le secteur privé.

Le système doit mesurer la valeur relative des postes tout en tenant compte de la diversité des fonctions au sein de la fonction publique.

Le nouveau système doit favoriser une communication intense entre employés et surveillants et faciliter la prise de décision et le partage des responsabilités au niveau de travail.

POUR DISCUSSION

FONCTION PUBLIQUE 2000 : RAPPORT DU GROUPE DE TRAVAIL
SUR LE SYSTÈME DE CLASSIFICATION
ET LA STRUCTURE DES GROUPES
PROFESSIONNELS

Le 20 juillet 1990

Les nouvelles situations exigent souvent de nouvelles approches. L'initiative Fonction publique 2000 propose une "nouvelle perspective" en matière de gestion des employés pour être en mesure de faire face aux importants défis d'une nouvelle décennie et d'un nouveau siècle. Le Groupe de travail sur la rémunération et les avantages sociaux a abordé cette tâche particulière dans cet esprit.

Maintenant que le Groupe de travail a achevé son examen et son rapport, il considère que ce rapport n'est que la première phase d'un processus permanent. Les membres conviennent unanimement que leur travail ne se terminera pas avec la présentation de leur rapport, mais plutôt avec la mise en oeuvre d'une approche "moderne" en matière de rémunération et d'avantages sociaux.

Pour ce faire, les membres du Groupe de travail sont prêts, au cours des prochains mois, à travailler en collaboration avec les organismes centraux et avec les experts pertinents pour concevoir un système moderne et, plus important encore, pour rencontrer les employés et les représentants des syndicats pour discuter de leurs conclusions et de leurs recommandations.

globaux d'une approche révisée visant à augmenter l'efficacité des opérations.

Le groupe de travail reconnaît qu'il existe deux sources possibles de financement pour contrebalancer l'augmentation des coûts. La première se veut le résultat d'économies prévues à partir de l'ensemble des recommandations des groupes de travail de Fonction publique 2000, et la deuxième, par l'absorption des coûts à même les budgets d'exploitation existants grâce à l'amélioration de l'efficacité et de l'efficacité. L'utilisation de ces contrepois serait donc nécessaire, par exemple, au chapitre du remplacement recommandé du régime de rémunération fondée sur le rendement par un nouveau programme de récompenses fondées sur le rendement ou par la mise en œuvre du concept recommandé visant à offrir des avantages souples aux employés. Les contrepois nécessaires seraient alors relativement modestes.

6.5 DÉFIS RELIÉS À LA MISE EN ŒUVRE

La mise en œuvre de "l'approche stratégique de gestion des récompenses" et l'administration corollaire de la rémunération, des avantages sociaux et des conditions d'emploi est l'un des services les plus essentiels et les plus fondamentaux au chapitre du personnel. À ce titre, l'équité, la constance, la souplesse, le caractère opportun et le professionnalisme de l'administration du régime sont la clé de la confiance des employés, mais également dans l'approche globale visant la gestion des ressources humaines d'une organisation. L'administration efficace du régime des récompenses peut contribuer à l'utilisation de ce régime à titre d'outil de gestion stratégique.

Le groupe de travail s'est penché sur la question de l'administration et de la mise en œuvre du régime des primes. L'annexe 9 renferme de plus amples renseignements à cet égard.

6.6 FUTURES ACTIVITÉS DU GROUPE DE TRAVAIL

L'initiative Fonction publique 2000 est une entreprise complexe qui comporte de nombreux défis, donc certains exigent des décisions difficiles. Elle reconnaît les changements fondamentaux qui sont intervenus dans la main-d'œuvre active et dans le milieu de travail et accepte que des changements s'imposent également dans la fonction publique du Canada.

Fonction publique! nous avons également reçu des lettres provenant de l'Alliance de la fonction publique du Canada, de la Fraternité internationale des électriciens et d'autres organisations.

Le groupe de travail sur la rémunération et les avantages sociaux est parti du principe de base qu'il n'y aura aucune mise en oeuvre unilatérale par l'employeur du régime proposé des récompenses, en ce qui a trait aux employés représentés. En fait, le groupe de travail a recommandé que la rémunération et les avantages sociaux, pour les employés représentés, continuent d'être établis par le biais de la négociation collective.

Le groupe de travail est prêt à rencontrer de nouveau les syndicats intéressés pour présenter ses recommandations et les raisons qui les sous-tendent et pour en discuter avec eux.

6.4 CONSÉQUENCES AU CHAPITRE DES COÛTS

Le groupe de travail est conscient des coûts reliés à ses recommandations et du désir exprimé de garder au neutre le coût d'ensemble de l'initiative Fonction publique 2000. Le groupe de travail a organisé des consultations avec d'autres représentants du Conférence Board of Canada et avec d'autres organisations du secteur privé lorsqu'il est devenu évident que des régimes de rémunération et d'avantages sociaux sont déjà des outils importants de gestion stratégique dans bon nombre des organisations les plus progressistes et les plus prospères. Le groupe de travail a également conclu que la sage application d'un régime de rémunération et d'avantages sociaux convenablement structuré aura un impact direct et positif sur l'efficacité et l'efficacité des opérations. Compte tenu de l'importance de ses principales conclusions, le groupe de travail a jugé essentiel de proposer un ensemble progressiste de recommandations qui permettra à la rémunération et aux avantages sociaux d'être appliqués efficacement en tant qu'outil de gestion stratégique.

Le groupe de travail a réalisé qu'il n'était pas en mesure de concevoir un régime qui ne représenterait aucune augmentation des coûts, s'il se contentait d'essayer de jouer avec les dépenses actuellement engagées dans ce domaine. Il importe de noter que le secteur privé, dans certains cas, en est arrivé à la même conclusion lorsqu'il a tenté d'élaborer des régimes acceptables dans les limites des crédits existants. Néanmoins, le groupe de travail a jugé bon d'aller de l'avant et, ce faisant, de reconnaître pleinement les avantages

6.2 COMMUNICATIONS ET CONSULTATIONS AVEC LES EMPLOYES

Même si 90 employés de la fonction publique ont participé directement aux délibérations des groupes de travail, de nombreux autres ont participé indirectement à des groupes divers, à des sondages téléphoniques et à des séances d'information ou à des ateliers dirigés sous les auspices des ministères, du forum sur la politique publique, de l'association des cadres professionnels et d'autres entités. Toutefois, il demeure que les recommandations du groupe de travail, lorsqu'elles seront approuvées par les ministres, auront une incidence directe sur tous les employés de la fonction publique du Canada, et engendreront une fonction publique renouvelée par un esprit de professionnalisme, d'innovation, de rendement élevé et d'amélioration des services au public.

Le défi des prochains mois consistera donc à présenter et à discuter ouvertement avec tous les employés, qu'ils soient représentés ou non, aux paliers de la gestion ou de soutien, dans la région de la capitale nationale, dans le Nord ou dans les postes étrangers,

- les objectifs de Fonction publique 2000,
- les recommandations des groupes de travail, et
- l'élaboration de stratégies de transition et de mise en oeuvre.

Étant donné que le résultat final de l'initiative Fonction publique 2000 représentera un changement fondamental au chapitre des plans de carrière et du milieu de travail, la participation et l'engagement de tous les employés s'avère nécessaire pour moderniser et simplifier les pratiques et les politiques actuelles.

Les gestionnaires de la fonction publique seront aux premières lignes du processus de modernisation. Ils doivent être prêts à aider les employés à comprendre le concept d'une fonction publique moderne, à y contribuer et à s'y adapter.

6.3 COMMUNICATIONS ET CONSULTATIONS AVEC LES SYNDICATS

Tout au long de ses délibérations, le groupe de travail sur la rémunération et les avantages sociaux était conscient du rôle et des responsabilités des syndicats de la fonction publique. Le groupe de travail a rencontré des représentants de dix syndicats en février, organisé des rencontres bilatérales avec l'Association professionnelle des agents du service extérieur et avec l'Institut professionnel de la

6. LES DÉFIS

Les discussions des sept derniers mois et les nombreuses lettres que nous avons reçues des employés de la fonction publique du pays tout entier ont offert au groupe de travail sur la rémunération et les avantages sociaux de nombreux défis et de nombreuses possibilités de repenser l'approche actuelle en matière de rémunération et d'avantages sociaux. Les sept prochains mois présenteront probablement autant de défis pour les groupes de travail et pour l'initiative Fonction publique 2000. Il reste encore beaucoup de travail et de consultation à faire avant de présenter des recommandations aux ministres, puis au Parlement pour effectuer la réforme législative nécessaire.

Le groupe de travail sur la rémunération et les avantages sociaux envisage des défis dans six domaines particuliers.

6.1 RECOMMANDATIONS DES AUTRES GROUPES DE TRAVAIL

Les dix groupes de travail doivent formuler plus de 100 recommandations visant à moderniser la fonction publique du Canada. Le défi consistera à intégrer les grandes questions et les recommandations importantes dans un tout logique qui permettra à la fonction publique du Canada d'amorcer le 21^e siècle du bon pied.

"L'approche stratégique de gestion des récompenses", et les trois composantes du régime des récompenses, soit

- la rémunération fondamentale,
- les avantages souples, et
- les primes et les récompenses

doit être fusionnée aux recommandations des autres groupes de travail, notamment la réduction proposée des paliers de la catégorie de la gestion, la réduction proposée du nombre des groupes professionnels et des classifications, l'introduction possible du principe des nominations à des niveaux plutôt qu'à des postes, et l'adoption d'un système de "budget d'exploitation".

Le groupe de travail sur la rémunération et les avantages sociaux recommande que les employés prennent un congé sans solde et les avantages sociaux recommandés de leurs options avant de prendre leur congé.

RECOMMANDATION XXXIX

Le groupe de travail sur la rémunération et les avantages sociaux recommande que la loi sur la pension de la fonction publique (LFPF) soit modifiée pour permettre le remboursement sur une plus longue période de temps, comme celle prévue pour le service facultatif, au choix de l'employé.

RECOMMANDATION XXXVIII

Le groupe de travail sur la rémunération et les avantages sociaux note que, même s'il existe actuellement une disposition pour étendre la période de remboursement, cette dernière exige de l'employé une déclaration de ses problèmes financiers. Cette disposition n'est pas actuellement bien connue et utilisée par les employés, n'est généralement pas encouragée par le système actuel de pension et est jugée humiliante pour l'employé.

RECOMMANDATION XXXVII

Le groupe de travail sur la rémunération et les avantages sociaux recommande que la Loi sur les pensions de la fonction publique (LPPF) soit modifiée :

- pour inclure à titre de cotisants les employés à temps partiel qui travaillent moins de 30 heures par semaine;
- pour permettre aux employés de préparer leur retraite en travaillant moins d'heures par semaine sans que cela affecte leurs prestations de pension futures; et
- pour permettre aux employés à la retraite de retourner au travail pour de courtes périodes sans perdre leurs prestations.

LES CONGES SANS SOLDE ET LA LPPF

5.2.2

Discussions

Les employés qui reviennent d'une période de congé sans solde sont normalement tenus de rembourser la part de l'employé et de l'employeur des cotisations de pension pour une période équivalant à celle du congé sans solde. Outre leurs cotisations courantes, cela signifie qu'ils doivent payer jusqu'à trois parts de cotisations en même temps, représentant jusqu'à 22,5 % de leur salaire. Cela préoccupe particulièrement les employés qui prennent des congés pour prendre soin de leurs enfants, habituellement des femmes, pour équilibrer leurs responsabilités familiales et qui sont déjà en situation de désavantage sur le plan professionnel en raison de leur absence. Cette question touche également les employés qui prennent un congé sans solde pour accompagner leur conjoint dans une autre ville et pourrait affecter la réalisation du conjoint au sein de la fonction publique.

Discussion

Comme nous le faisons remarquer à la section 5.1.6 portant sur le travail à temps partiel, le travail à temps partiel permet aux gestionnaires d'exécuter le travail lorsqu'il le juge nécessaire, ce qui contribue à réduire les coûts et permet aux employés d'équilibrer leur travail et leurs responsabilités familiales. Il peut également permettre à des employés à se retirer graduellement de la main-d'œuvre active pour prendre leur retraite et peut permettre aux gestionnaires de profiter de l'expérience d'employés retraités pour des affectations à court terme ou des charges de travail excessives.

En dépit des avantages du travail à temps partiel, la LPPF agit souvent de façon à décourager le travail à temps partiel. Les employés qui travaillent moins de 30 heures par semaine ne peuvent cotiser au régime de pension, ni accumuler des années de service donnant droit à pension. Cela a un impact particulièrement néfaste sur les femmes, car la majorité des employés à temps partiel sont actuellement des femmes. Cette situation pourrait également avoir une incidence négative sur les employés désireux de préparer leur retraite, car ils pourraient cesser d'accumuler des années de service donnant droit à pension.

La réponse la plus évidente consisterait à inclure les employés à temps partiel comme cotisants en vertu de la LPPF. Toutefois, si les cotisations sont rendues obligatoires, comme elles le sont actuellement pour les employés travaillant plus de 30 heures par semaine, cela pourrait avoir une incidence négative sur les employés à la retraite qui retournent au travail à temps partiel ou pour de courtes affectations car, dans certaines circonstances, ils pourraient perdre leur pension. Étant donné que les pensions sont établies en fonction du salaire moyen le plus élevé, les employés désireux de préparer leur retraite pourraient être touchés, car les périodes de travail à temps partiel pourraient entraîner l'établissement d'un salaire moyen inférieur pour déterminer les prestations de pension.

partiel, y compris des cours de formation et de perfectionnement, et les agents de dotation soient encouragés à établir un inventaire des emplois désirables de partager un emploi ou de travailler à temps partiel.

5.2 AMÉLIORATIONS ET CHANGEMENTS LÉGISLATIFS

La Loi sur la pension de la Fonction publique (LPFP) assure à la majorité des employés de la fonction publique un excellent régime de pension, qui peut être considéré comme l'un des meilleurs au pays. À cet égard, il répond aux principes définis pour un régime moderne et stratégique de rémunération et d'avantages sociaux.

Néanmoins, des groupes et des employés de l'extérieur ont souligné un certain nombre de préoccupations. Le rapport du groupe de travail sur les obstacles auxquels font face les femmes dans la fonction publique identifiait certaines des mêmes préoccupations. Un agent du Conseil du Trésor a effectué une présentation à l'intention des membres du groupe de travail sur les changements possibles à la LPFP, qui a également soulevé certaines inquiétudes.

Des amendements possibles à la LPFP pourront améliorer les dispositions en matière de droits acquis et de transfert. Bon nombre des autres préoccupations ont trait à l'âge de la retraite, aux pénalités ou aux réductions actuarielles et au calcul du salaire moyen au titre des pensions. Le groupe de travail reconnaît qu'il est possible d'en arriver à de meilleurs avantages dans ces domaines, mais comprend qu'un coût important s'y rattache. Pour que le régime de pension soit sain sur le plan actuariel et compte tenu de la qualité des prestations actuelles de pension, le groupe de travail a choisi de ne formuler aucune recommandation visant l'amélioration des avantages.

Néanmoins, des préoccupations demeurent dans deux domaines : le travail à temps partiel et les périodes de congés sans solde.

responsabilités familiales,
etc.

les avantages du travail à temps partiel pour les employés, notamment la suppléance nécessaire pour visser des buts personnels (étude, activités sociale, etc.), qui engendrent l'amour-propre et la satisfaction au travail, faciliter les exigences de l'égalité des chances pour les femmes, fournir aux employés plus âgés le moyen d'effectuer plus graduellement la transition pour leur retraite définitive, permettre aux personnes handicapées de combler leurs besoins et leurs aspirations, fournir une formation en cours d'emploi aux étudiants pour les préparer à une carrière au sein de la fonction publique, leur enseigner les compétences nécessaires et financer leurs études, etc.

les droits et les obligations des employés et de leurs gestionnaires lorsqu'ils signent une entente de travail à temps partiel.

RECOMMANDATION XXXVI

Le groupe de travail recommande également que :

les gestionnaires identifient, au sein du ministère, les possibilités de travail à temps partiel ou de partage d'un emploi, puis invitent les employés à s'en prévaloir,

les ministères élaborent des plans de carrière pour les employés travaillant à temps

Le groupe de travail sur la rémunération et les avantages sociaux recommande que :

RECOMMANDATION XXXIV

Le Secrétariat du Conseil du Trésor et le personnel des ministères lancent une campagne d'information à l'intention des gestionnaires et des employés visant à faciliter le travail à temps partiel.

RECOMMANDATION XXXV

Le groupe de travail sur la rémunération et les avantages sociaux recommande que :
cette campagne d'information s'attache aux thèmes suivants :

• les avantages du travail à temps partiel pour les gestionnaires en tant que moyen d'atteindre avec efficacité leurs objectifs opérationnels et en matière de ressources humaines, par exemple une meilleure productivité, une meilleure qualité du travail, une plus grande souplesse sur le plan opérationnel et organisationnel (un meilleur équilibre des ressources nécessaires pour faire face aux périodes de pointe et aux périodes creuses, adapter les services en fonction des heures de travail, étendue et fréquence de la demande locale, etc.), amélioration du moral des employés, capacité de conserver des emplois compétents et expérimentés qui auraient autrement quitté la fonction publique ou qui n'y auraient pas travaillé à plein temps de toute façon, utilisation réduite des congés pour de maladie et des congés pour

accepter ou refuser la demande d'un employé visant un travail à temps partiel;

• meilleure imputabilité pour les gestionnaires dans l'évaluation de la demande d'un employé visant un travail à temps partiel et l'exigence portant qu'un "mémoire d'élucidissement" soit signé avec le nouvel employé à temps partiel. Ce document énonce les modalités de l'entente; et

• l'exigence pour les ministères de communiquer à leurs gestionnaires l'esprit de la politique de l'employeur.

La politique révisée est en place depuis un peu plus d'un an. Il est trop tôt pour effectuer une évaluation objective de son impact, mais les données statistiques et les contacts permanents que le Conseil du Trésor entretenait avec les ministères laissent entendre qu'elle fonctionne raisonnablement bien. On a remarqué que certains sous-chefs appuient fortement et facilitent le travail à temps partiel au sein de leurs organisations. En fait, le refus de toute demande d'un employé doit être cosignée par le sous-chef. Cette exigence visant la cosignature du sous-chef vise à faire en sorte que les gestionnaires des ministères examinent à fond les demandes de travail à temps partiel des employés.

L'étude réalisée en 1988 démontrait que près de 95 % des employés à temps partiel travaillaient 15 heures ou plus par semaine et que toutes leurs conditions d'emploi négociables sont établies par l'entremise de la négociation collective. Toutefois, des employés qui travaillaient moins de 30 heures par semaine n'accumulent pas de service donnant droit à pension. Cette question est débattue plus à fond dans la section portant sur le travail à temps partiel et la loi sur la pension de la Fonction publique.

Les employés à temps partiel disent s'inquiéter de la piètre idée que les gestionnaires et les employés se font généralement du travail à temps partiel. Les gestionnaires et les employés ont en main des renseignements subjectifs sur le travail à temps partiel.

l'autorité de négocier les règlements visant les indemnités de cessation d'emploi soit déléguée au sous-chef en conformité des lignes directrices établies et sous réserve des mécanismes d'imputabilité appropriés; et

l'on recommande aux gestionnaires de traiter les cas de rendement médiocre en ayant recours aux évaluations de rendement, et à la réaffectation et de n'avoir recours aux indemnités de fin d'emploi que dans les situations où tous les autres moyens ont été explorés et se sont avérés inutiles.

TRAVAIL À TEMPS PARTIEL

5.1.6

Discussion

Le travail à temps partiel permet aux gestionnaires d'exécuter le travail lorsqu'ils le jugent nécessaire, ce qui contribue à réduire les coûts et permet aux employés d'équilibrer leur travail et leurs responsabilités familiales. Il peut également permettre à des employés à se retirer graduellement de la main-d'oeuvre active pour prendre leur retraite et peut permettre aux gestionnaires de profiter de l'expérience d'employés retraités pour des affectations à court terme ou des charges de travail excessives.

La politique du Conseil du Trésor sur le travail à temps partiel a été révisée et améliorée en 1989, suite à son évaluation en 1988. Voici les améliorations les plus notables qui ont été apportées à cette politique :

une déclaration claire indiquant que le Conseil du Trésor encourage cette formule de travail et précisant que les besoins opérationnels sont les principaux critères utilisés par la direction pour

cas. Par conséquent, ces décisions au chapitre du contrôle des règlements visant les indemnités de cessation d'emploi peuvent parfois être artificielles.

Il faut encourager les gestionnaires à faire face aux situations de rendement médiocre, dès les premiers signes de travail insatisfaisant. Il faut leur donner une meilleure formation au chapitre des techniques nécessaires pour faire face à de telles situations, notamment les services d'orientation, la formation des employés ayant un rendement médiocre, la mise à pied ou la rétrogradation, ainsi que les transferts appropriés sur réaffectation.

Malgré ces approches, il est inévitable que les gestionnaires continueront à faire face au rendement médiocre de certains employés, qui ne pourra être résolu grâce à des services d'orientation, à une formation ou à une réaffectation. Dans ces cas, l'application judicieuse de règlements au chapitre des indemnités de cessation d'emploi constitue le moyen le plus efficace et le plus efficace de résoudre une situation difficile.

RECOMMANDATION XXXIII

Le groupe de travail recommande que :

- la politique actuelle sur les indemnités de cessation d'emploi soit élargie pour s'appliquer à tous les fonctionnaires;

- les modalités de la politique actuelle sur les indemnités de cessation d'emploi soient élargies pour inclure une catégorie spéciale de rémunération destinée spécifiquement à contrebalancer une partie ou la totalité de la pénalité au chapitre de la pension actuarielle qui pourrait toucher les employés visés;

selon leurs besoins. Le groupe de travail est d'avis que cette question doit être examinée plus à fond.

RECOMMANDATION XXXII

Que le Secrétariat du Conseil du Trésor effectue des études plus poussées pour déterminer si des mesures d'encouragement s'imposent et mette sur pied des projets pilotes, au besoin, visant à réduire l'utilisation des congés de maladie de façon rentable et équitable pour tous les employés, sans mettre en danger les niveaux de protection du revenu contre la maladie.

INDEMNITÉS DE FIN D'EMPLOI (EXTENSION ET DÉLÉGATION)

5.1.5

Discussion

Toute organisation d'importance, peu importe comment elle est gérée, doit accepter qu'un certain pourcentage de ses employés deviendront dysfunctionnels. Ces situations peuvent avoir de nombreuses causes : une erreur de sélection, un changement graduel au chapitre des capacités et des intérêts des employés, des conflits entre l'employé, ses pairs et la direction. Occasionnellement, les indemnités de fin d'emploi sont un moyen approprié de faire face à la situation.

Le contrôle central de cette composante rend son application très difficile. Les sous-chefs doivent négocier (par l'entremise d'un agent supérieur du personnel) entre l'individu et les représentants du Secrétariat du Conseil du Trésor. Ce contrôle, exercé par une tierce partie qui ne participe directement aux négociations, peut rendre le processus long, coûteux et difficile.

L'organisme central se préoccupe, on le comprend bien, de veiller à ce que les règlements puissent être justifiés. Toutefois, étant donné qu'il ne participe pas directement aux négociations, il ne comprend pas parfaitement les complexités de chaque

Il existe clairement un chevauchement au chapitre des avantages sociaux visant à protéger le revenu lorsque l'on considère la couverture totale des congés de maladie, de l'assurance-chômage et de l'assurance invalidité, même si seuls les congés de maladie protègent le salaire à 100 %. À la surface, il est clair qu'il y a peu d'incitation pour un employé, outre la motivation interne, à maintenir ses crédits de congés de maladie au-delà du nombre nécessaire pour être admissible à d'autres avantages reliés à la protection du revenu. Néanmoins, de nombreux employés ayant de longs états de service ont en banque un nombre important de congés de maladie. On a souligné au groupe de travail que des employés sont susceptibles d'avoir recours à leurs congés de maladie pour s'acquitter d'obligations familiales. Les recommandations qui figurent ailleurs dans le présent rapport et qui traitent des responsabilités familiales régleront ce problème.

On considère actuellement les congés de maladie comme une assurance à terme, c'est-à-dire que si vous n'en avez pas besoin, vous ne les utiliserez pas. Le groupe de travail a envisagé un certain nombre d'options aux dispositions actuelles des congés de maladie pour inciter les employés à en réduire l'usage. On y retrouvait l'encasement de tous les crédits accumulés au moment de quitter la fonction publique, un encasement annuel inversement proportionnel à l'usage, la conversion des crédits de congés de maladie non utilisés en service donnant droit à pension au moment de la retraite. Nous avons également envisagé de recommander une approche entièrement nouvelle à la protection du revenu pour cause de maladie qui établirait une distinction claire entre les exigences d'une protection à court et à long terme.

Le groupe de travail est arrivé à la conclusion qu'aucune mesure d'encouragement ne s'impose. En outre, nous avons pu établir qu'aucune des options susmentionnées ne fournirait une incitation efficace qui serait équitable pour tous les employés et qui entraînerait une réduction de l'utilisation des congés de maladie de façon rentable, sans mettre en danger les niveaux de protection du revenu. Le groupe de travail reconnaît qu'il incombe aux gestionnaires de contrôler l'utilisation des congés de maladie afin de minimiser les abus, tout en respectant les droits des employés d'avoir recours à cet avantage

RECOMMANDATION XXXI

Le groupe de travail sur la rémunération et les avantages sociaux recommande que :

- les sous-chefs se servent davantage des programmes d'affectation existants comme moyen de répondre aux situations uniques en matière de recrutement;

- les sous-chefs envisagent l'utilisation des communications électroniques pour permettre aux employés de travailler davantage à la maison afin de réduire leurs déplacements quotidiens; et

- le Conseil du Trésor augmente, pour une période bien précise, l'indemnité des postes visés par le régime de rémunération des affectations spéciales, pour les ministères ayant des bureaux dans des régions où le coût de la vie est extrêmement élevé.

CRÉDITS DE CONGÉS DE MALADIE

5.1.1.4

Discussion

Certains employés ont abordé les membres du groupe de travail avec des propositions visant à permettre aux employés "d'encaisser" leurs crédits de congés de maladie non utilisés. Le raisonnement qui sous-tend cette demande est apparemment d'encourager les employés à augmenter leurs présences en réduisant l'usage des congés de maladie. On sait que les employés en général abusent des congés de maladie immédiatement avant de prendre leur retraite. Cette assertion est surtout appuyée par des anecdotes, même si les statistiques révèlent effectivement qu'il existe des écarts importants au chapitre de l'utilisation des congés de maladie, selon les groupes professionnels.

Un changement d'attitude qui permettrait et qui encouragerait les gestionnaires à gérer les encouragerait à chercher des moyens de régler leurs propres problèmes. Il incombe aux gestionnaires d'utiliser tous les outils dont ils disposent et, en retour, d'assumer la responsabilité de leur jugement.

Actuellement, la fonction publique fédérale dispose d'un éventail de moyens pour effectuer du recrutement dans des circonstances particulières. Le groupe de travail note à cet égard "Interchange Canada", "Business/Government Exchange" et "Indian Oil and Gas Canada (IOGC)". Veuillez consulter l'annexe 8 pour de plus amples renseignements.

Dans l'esprit de Fonction publique 2000 visant à accorder une plus grande souplesse aux sous-chefs pour répondre stratégiquement aux besoins, aux valeurs et aux objectifs de leur organisation et du gouvernement et du public qu'ils desservent :

RECOMMANDATION XXX

Le groupe de travail sur la rémunération et les avantages sociaux recommande que :

- Les sous-chefs soient autorisés à établir des indemnités spéciales afin de combler les besoins particuliers en matière de recrutement, de maintien et de relogement; et

- Des indemnités spéciales, qu'elles soient fondées sur les connaissances ou les compétences ou conçues pour attirer les employés dans des régions urbaines où le coût de la vie est plus élevé soient établies en dehors du domaine de la négociation collective, mais en consultation avec les syndicats (tout comme les indemnités pour les postes isolés et la directive visant le service extérieur sont établies par le Conseil mixte national).

SOUPLESSE DANS LES MINISTÈRES - RÉPONSE AUX QUESTIONS PARTICULIÈRES TOUCHANT LE RECRUTEMENT ET LE MAINTIEN DES EMPLOYÉS

Discussion

Les changements au chapitre de la nature du travail au sein des organisations plus complexes a suscité un intérêt considérable et sans cesse croissant envers des solutions de *rechange* aux formes traditionnelles de rémunération.

La fonction publique fédérale, en raison de sa taille, de sa nature fortement décentralisée et de la portée de ses programmes et de ses services exige de ses employés qu'ils habitent ou se relogent dans des régions où le coût de la vie est très élevé. La fonction publique fédérale a également besoin de certains employés hautement spécialisés. Actuellement, il n'existe au sein de la fonction publique fédérale aucune forme alternative de rémunération comme la rémunération en fonction des connaissances ou des compétences ou encore des indemnités pour les régions urbaines où le coût de la vie est très élevé. Les allocations pour les postes isolés et la directive sur le service extérieur sont toutefois des exceptions à cet énoncé.

Le Groupe de travail sur la rémunération et les avantages sociaux, dans le cadre de cette sous-rubrique, a examiné comment il serait possible de faire preuve de souplesse pour répondre aux situations uniques et difficiles de recrutement et de maintien des employés en raison

- du marché extrêmement concurrentiel pour des groupes particuliers,
- d'une rare combinaison de compétences, et
- des lieux de travail où le coût de la vie est très élevé (salaire et indemnité de vie chère).

Souvent, le problème ne provient pas du système lui-même; parfois, les gestionnaires ne sont pas conscients de la souplesse dont ils disposent, hésitent à s'en prévaloir car ils ont l'impression que de nombreux mécanismes ne conviennent pas à leur situation ou encore sont des applications trop rigides des outils existants.

de l'administration centrale et des bureaux régionaux.

Le groupe de travail sur la rémunération et les avantages sociaux en conclut qu'il faut établir une politique spécifique en matière de mobilité, reliée aux exigences des ministères et qui encourage le logement en se fondant sur les éléments suivants :

- le service au public,
- le perfectionnement des gestionnaires, et
- l'amélioration des grandes lignes de la politique générale et de la perspective des ministères.

Les gestionnaires des ministères devraient être en mesure de choisir à même un éventail d'options et de chercher le régime qui convient le mieux aux employés et aux ministères. Cela pourrait inclure les transferts demandés par les employés, les transferts des employés excédentaires, le perfectionnement professionnel et le relogement des gestionnaires. Un soutien adapté devrait être offert pour le logement dans les endroits plus coûteux (aide hypothécaire ou locative uniquement).

RECOMMANDATION XXIX

Le groupe de travail sur la rémunération et les avantages sociaux recommande que le Secrétariat du Conseil du Trésor élabore, avec l'aide des sous-chefs, une politique en matière de mobilité visant à :

- répondre aux besoins des gestionnaires des ministères en matière d'efficacité et d'opérations,
- mieux développer les employés, et
- mieux servir le public.

pressions exercées en vue d'avoir accès à des installations de conditionnement physique ont également augmenté et le groupe de travail est d'avis que les sous-chefs doivent être autorisés à mettre sur pied de telles installations pour répondre aux besoins des employés.

RECOMMANDATION XXVIII

Le groupe de travail sur la rémunération et les avantages sociaux recommande que les sous-chefs soient autorisés à fournir des programmes et des installations de conditionnement physique au sein de leur organisation.

MOBILITÉ

5.1.2

Discussion

La politique actuelle de relogement du Conseil du Trésor repose exclusivement sur le remboursement des coûts et ne fait pas référence au fait qu'elle pourrait être un instrument "stratégique" pour promouvoir le perfectionnement des employés et de la direction et pour augmenter l'efficacité opérationnelle.

Le gouvernement fédéral est l'employeur canadien le plus important. Il a des employés dans les régions les plus isolées et pourtant, il ne dispose pas d'une politique exhaustive en matière de mobilité. La politique actuelle vise "à reloger les employés de la façon la plus efficace possible et au coût le plus raisonnable pour le public".

En ce qui a trait à la souplesse des ministères, la politique de relogement élimine effectivement cette possibilité en soulignant que "les dispositions en matière de relogement et toutes les restrictions qui s'y appliquent sont publiées à titre de directives, et non de lignes directrices facultatives". La directive sur le relogement renferme environ 130 pages. Elle ne souligne nullement la valeur de la mobilité ou l'expérience

fémmin. Si cet adulte compétent est également en voyage, travaille le soir ou la nuit ou n'est pas disponible pour une autre raison, les dépenses ne sont pas remboursées.

RECOMMANDATION XXVII

Directive sur le relogement - Aide au relogement

Le groupe de travail recommande que la directive du Conseil sur le relogement soit passée en revue et modifiée pour

• reconnaître les "familles à deux carrières";

• acquitter les honoraires des agences de placement pour le conjoint qui ne travaille pas pour la fonction publique,

• payer pour un nombre déterminé de déplacements pour permettre au conjoint de chercher un emploi dans la nouvelle localité, et

• fournir une aide et faire preuve de souplesse pour les mariages où les conjoints sont séparés, par exemple un nombre accru d'appels interurbains et le remboursement des frais de transport.

Les changements démographiques au sein de la main-d'œuvre active ont entraîné des changements au chapitre du mode de vie, où le bien-être physique est important. La fonction publique n'échappe pas à la règle. Les employés peuvent désormais travailler dans un environnement exempt de la fumée du tabac. Les

Un conjoint à l'emploi de la fonction publique peut se prévaloir de certains congés et a un statut prioritaire auprès de la CFP.

RECOMMANDATION XXV

Congés personnels sans solde

Le groupe de travail recommande de faire preuve d'une plus grande souplesse dans l'octroi des congés personnels. Les règlements actuels ne permettent qu'une seule utilisation d'un congé personnel de moins de trois mois et qu'une seule utilisation de ce congé pour une période maximale d'un an.

RECOMMANDATION XXVI

Directive sur les déplacements -
Aide pour des soins consentis à des enfants

Le groupe de travail :

recommande que les dispositions de la directive du Conseil du Trésor sur les déplacements concernant l'aide reliée aux soins consentis aux enfants soit passée en revue et modifiée pour permettre le remboursement des dépenses légitimes reliées aux soins consentis à des enfants; et

recommande que l'aide varie selon le nombre d'enfants dont il faut prendre soin (l'aide actuelle prévoit un montant fixe, qu'il y ait un enfant ou cinq).

Le rapport du Groupe de travail sur les obstacles auxquels font face les femmes au sein de la fonction publique souligne que la directive du Conseil du Trésor sur les déplacements ne prévoit le remboursement des dépenses engagées pour des soins dispensés aux enfants uniquement s'il n'y a pas d'autres adultes compétents qui résident avec l'employé

destinées aux enfants et aux personnes âgées.

RECOMMANDATION XXII

Congés pour obligations familiales

Le groupe de travail recommande que les cinq jours alloués pour responsabilités familiales puissent être pris consécutivement, au besoin, par l'employé, pour faire face à une situation familiale particulière.

RECOMMANDATION XXIII

Intégration des congés

Le groupe de travail recommande l'intégration des congés actuels pour obligations familiales aux congés de maladie payés afin de permettre aux employés de faire preuve de souplesse dans l'utilisation de leurs congés accumulés et ce, pour répondre à leurs besoins particuliers.

RECOMMANDATION XXIV

Congés sans solde pour prendre soin des enfants d'âge préscolaire

Le groupe de travail recommande l'expansion de l'application de ce congé afin de permettre aux employés de prendre des congés sans solde pour prendre soin d'un enfant ou d'un parent atteint d'une maladie chronique.

lignes directrices, qu'elles émanent des organismes centraux ou des sous-chefs, reconnaissent

- les doubles responsabilités des employés envers leur travail et leurs familles, et

- la nécessité pour l'employeur de comprendre les besoins des employés au chapitre de l'équilibre entre leur travail et leurs responsabilités familiales.

RECOMMANDATION XX

Service de garde au travail

Le groupe de travail :

- appuie la "politique des services de garde au travail" proposée par le Secrétaire du Conseil du Trésor;
- recommande que cette politique soit réexaminée et mise à jour, au besoin, à tous les trois ans; et
- recommande l'adoption rapide par le Conseil du Trésor de cette politique.

RECOMMANDATION XXI

Recommandations sur les soins destinés aux enfants et aux personnes âgées

Le groupe de travail recommande d'élargir les programmes actuels d'aide aux employés des ministères pour qu'ils incluent des renseignements et des services d'orientation sur les ressources communautaires en matière de soins

Le taux de participation des femmes à la main-d'œuvre active a augmenté considérablement en raison de son acceptation par la société et de la nécessité d'avoir un deuxième revenu. En outre, l'augmentation du nombre des divorces a fait grimper le nombre de familles monoparentales.

Cela signifie que de plus en plus de travailleurs ont d'importantes responsabilités familiales en dehors de leur travail. Les femmes doivent assumer le gros du fardeau de l'éducation des enfants, des emplois à temps plein et, de plus en plus, des soins donnés aux parents âgés ou aux grands-parents. Cette tendance se maintiendra, car la population vieillissante continuera d'augmenter au cours du siècle prochain.

Le succès des employés à équilibrer travail et responsabilités familiales dépend des employés eux-mêmes. Toutefois, si les politiques et les attitudes compliquent la tâche des employés lorsqu'un parent âgé ou un enfant est malade, cet équilibre s'avère être un objectif impossible.

Des politiques et des initiatives visant à appuyer les familles qui travaillent contribueront à éliminer les obstacles auxquels les femmes font face sur le plan professionnel.

En faisant preuve de souplesse au travail, on encourage les employés à assumer leurs responsabilités et leur rendement.

Le groupe de travail réitère donc son appui envers les principes d'une "approche stratégique en matière de gestion des récompenses", soit :

- une souplesse suffisante à l'égard des employés individuels pour faciliter l'équilibre entre le travail et les responsabilités familiales; et

- une qualité de vie au travail favorisant la productivité et la satisfaction au travail.

RECOMMANDATION XIX

Le groupe de travail sur la rémunération et les avantages sociaux recommande que les futures politiques, directives et

5. CHANGEMENTS ET AMÉLIORATIONS SUPPLÉMENTAIRES

Le groupe de travail sur la rémunération et les avantages sociaux a reçu de nombreuses suggestions d'employés de toutes les régions et discute d'un éventail de questions qui ne touchent pas directement la rémunération et les avantages sociaux mais qui font partie des "conditions" d'emploi au sein de la fonction publique du Canada.

Dans l'ensemble, la majorité des améliorations proposées dans le présent chapitre exigent simplement un *changement d'attitude* et la *volonté de moderniser* les "conditions" d'emploi. Le groupe de travail a conclu que, dans le domaine des "conditions" d'emploi, la fonction publique du Canada ne doit pas devancer le secteur privé. Toutefois, il est impératif que les "conditions" d'emploi soient "comparables" et "concurrentielles" avec celles que l'on offre aux employés du secteur privé.

Le groupe de travail conclut également que dans les domaines d'un salaire égal pour un travail d'égal valeur et du travail versus les responsabilités familiales, la fonction publique du Canada, à titre de principal employeur du pays, doit jouer un rôle de leadership sur le plan social. Soutpless et innovation au chapitre des idées et des mesures concrètes, au niveau de la gestion individuelle et corporative, sont essentielles pour attirer, conserver et motiver une fonction publique représentative du pays tout entier.

5.1 CHANGEMENTS ET AMÉLIORATIONS À L'ÉCHELLE DE LA FONCTION PUBLIQUE

5.1.1 ÉQUILIBRER TRAVAIL ET RESPONSABILITÉS FAMILIALES

Discussion

Les changements démographiques de la main-d'œuvre ont été bien documentés. Nous sommes tous conscients de l'augmentation du nombre de familles à deux revenus, de l'impact des "bébés d'après-guerre" qui vieillissent et qui sont moins mobiles, du niveau d'éducation plus élevé du travailleur moyen, ainsi que des pénuries de main-d'œuvre prévues en raison de la diminution constante du taux de natalité.

En outre, avant la phase de mise en oeuvre et pour veiller à ce que les programmes de primes et de récompenses soient efficaces, un lien bien défini entre les actions, les résultats et les récompenses devra être établi et accepté par les employés. En d'autres mots :

les ministères devront au préalable établir des mécanismes adéquats et acceptés en matière de feedback et d'évaluation du rendement.

accordées chaque année, si l'initiative Fonction publique 2000 mène à un nombre inférieur de groupes professionnels et à des bandes de paye élargies, pourra être appliqué à la rémunération de base afin de permettre une certaine progression professionnelle à l'intérieur de l'échelle salariale des groupes professionnels qui ne disposent pas d'augmentation de paliers;

la valeur monétaire des récompenses fondées sur le rendement et le pourcentage devant être appliqué à la rémunération de base doit être laissée à la discrétion du sous-chef; et

la valeur monétaire des récompenses fondées sur le rendement doit être limitée uniquement par les budgets pertinents et non par des quotas ou des restrictions aux cotes de rendement.

4.4 CONCLUSIONS

Avant d'adopter des programmes de primes et de récompenses, les ministères devront évaluer le mélange approprié des mesures d'encouragement, des primes et des récompenses correspondant à leurs besoins et à leurs objectifs, ainsi qu'à leur culture et à leur climat de travail.

Pour veiller à ce que le programme soit efficace, les gestionnaires des ministères devront comprendre le but du programme et les principes de sa mise en oeuvre et en devenir des promoteurs et des participants actifs. En d'autres

mot :

les gestionnaires des ministères devront au préalable comprendre et intégrer les objectifs des programmes de primes et de récompenses et introduire la "planification des primes et des récompenses" dans le cadre du processus de planification stratégique.

que les récompenses fondées sur le rendement pour les groupes représentés soient offertes par l'entremise de la négociation collective.

RECOMMANDATION XVIII

Voici les principes pour la conception de la composition des récompenses fondées sur le rendement :

les récompenses sur le rendement peuvent être accordées à des employés individuels ou un groupe d'employés;

les récompenses fondées sur le rendement doivent reposer sur l'année le rendement réel pour l'année visée et non sur le rendement éventuel;

les récompenses fondées sur le rendement doivent reconnaître un rendement excellent et un rendement compétent, en plus des cotes supérieures et exceptionnelles;

régler générale, les récompenses fondées sur le rendement ne doivent pas devenir partie intégrante de la rémunération de base;

les récompenses fondées sur le rendement doivent être méritées chaque année; il ne s'agit pas d'un droit ou d'un privilège;

la valeur monétaire de la récompense fondée sur le rendement doit, pour être une incitation financière efficace, représenter un montant important;

un pourcentage des récompenses fondées sur le rendement

Le régime actuel de paye fondé sur le rendement est actuellement limité à 5 % des coûts en salaires. L'écart au chapitre des primes financières entre un rendement pleinement satisfaisant et un rendement exceptionnel n'est pas suffisamment important pour reconnaître de façon adéquate la différence au chapitre de la contribution des employés visés, ni pour agir comme une mesure permettant d'encourager les employés à viser des réalisations plus importantes. Le principe d'une rémunération plus élevée pour des réalisations plus importantes est au centre du nouveau régime proposé des primes fondées sur le rendement.

En d'autres mots, le fait de lier les récompenses au rendement, plutôt que de lier la paye au rendement, permettrait de faire preuve de plus de souplesse pour atteindre les objectifs de l'organisation et de fournir une reconnaissance tangible aux employés au-delà des programmes de primes d'encouragement et de reconnaissance énoncés à la section 4.1.

RECOMMANDATION XVI

Le groupe de travail sur la rémunération et les avantages sociaux recommande :

- l'abandon graduel des régimes actuels de paye fondés sur le rendement, et

- l'adoption graduelle des récompenses fondées sur le rendement, c'est-à-dire une approche monétaire visant à appuyer et à récompenser l'excellence du rendement.

RECOMMANDATION XVII

Le groupe de travail sur la rémunération et les avantages sociaux recommande :

- que l'adoption des récompenses fondées sur le rendement s'applique initialement à la catégorie de la gestion et aux groupes exclus et non représentés;

Les programmes de paye au rendement ou au mérite. Même si le concept de paye fondé sur le rendement est attrayant, il n'est pas établi clairement que les mesures d'encouragement monétaires sont ou peuvent effectivement être reliées à l'amélioration de la motivation au travail et du rendement pour toute l'organisation ou les groupes d'employés. L'annexe 7 intitulée "Les primes au rendement sont-elles efficaces", préparée par le Centre de psychologie du personnel de la Commission de la fonction publique, énonce les évaluations des spécialistes du comportement sur les questions complexes reliées aux primes au rendement.

Un récent rapport du Conférence Board of Canada intitulé "Strategic Rewards Management: The Variable Approach to Pay" indique qu'au sein du secteur privé, les régimes monétaires sont ceux qui ont le plus de valeur sur le plan de l'incitation au travail. Ce rapport sur les pratiques et les tendances du secteur privé indique que, à titre d'outil de motivation d'ordre financier, les mesures d'encouragement monétaires et les régimes de primes sont considérés par la majorité des experts en rémunération comme ayant une meilleur valeur d'incitation que les régimes d'achat d'actions. Actuellement, ces régimes monétaires s'appliquent surtout à la direction, à la gestion et aux professionnels. Toutefois, leur utilisation est à la hausse et leur admissibilité est graduellement étendue pour inclure les employés des paliers inférieurs mais, dans la majorité des cas, les organisations visées ne sont pas syndiquées.

Les restrictions financières, la réduction des effectifs et l'abandon de certains paliers, ainsi que les recommandations découlant des travaux des groupes de travail sur la catégorie de la gestion et sur la structure de classification et des groupes professionnels de fonction publique 2000 entraîneront peut-être une structure de classification comportant moins de paliers et des bandes de paye élargies. Un tel système réduirait nécessairement le nombre de promotions auxquelles les employés pourraient aspirer. Ainsi, il y aura moins d'occasions de motiver les employés supérieurs grâce à des promotions. Il est donc de plus en plus important de trouver d'autres méthodes de rémunération pour récompenser l'excellence du rendement. En fait, le groupe de travail sur la rémunération et les avantages sociaux en est arrivé à la conclusion que, dans la mesure du possible, le fait d'attacher des primes monétaires uniques au rendement fournirait une reconnaissance visible de la valeur et de la contribution des employés de la fonction publique au cours d'une période d'évaluation; nous espérons que cela favorisera également des niveaux de service plus élevés et une meilleure productivité.

Le groupe de travail sur la rémunération et les avantages sociaux appuie le concept des récompenses selon la productivité, représentant le partage des gains, et recommande que :

- la conception, la mise en oeuvre et la mesure d'un tel programme soient déléguées aux sous-chefs, et
- que le financement des récompenses pertinentes proviennent des budgets d'exploitation des ministères.

4.3 RÉCOMPENSES FONDÉES SUR LE RENDEMENT

Discussion

Les employés sont les ressources les plus indispensables de la fonction publique du Canada. Ils sont la clé de la prestation efficace des objectifs, des programmes et des services du gouvernement. Les changements en matière de rémunération ont généralement été obtenus par l'entremise de la négociation collective pour les employés représentés et des comparaisons avec le secteur public pour les paliers de gestion et les groupes non représentés. Seuls un petit nombre de groupes ont eu des régimes de primes au rendement ou au mérite. L'annexe C renferme un historique des primes au rendement au sein de la fonction publique.

Actuellement, la catégorie de la gestion, certains groupes non représentés, y compris le groupe des professeurs universitaires et deux groupes représentés, le service extérieur et les sciences de la défense, ont des régimes de paye fondés sur le rendement. Les régimes de groupes ont été abandonnés en raison des insatisfactions reliées aux dispositions des régimes particuliers ou à leurs méthodes d'application.

Même si les experts en rémunération ont indiqué que de nombreuses organisations adoptent des programmes de paye fondés sur le rendement dans le but d'améliorer leur productivité, de mieux contrôler les coûts fixes et d'améliorer les normes de rendement, des experts de la science du comportement font remarquer que ce ne sont pas toutes les organisations et tous les employés qui acceptent

RECOMMANDATION XIV

Voici les principes qui sous-tendent un programme de récompenses selon la productivité, représentant un partage des gains :

- aucun programme établi unilatéralement par l'employeur;
- les programmes proposés doivent être débattus et entérinés par les représentants des employés;
- les objectifs du programme, les normes, les critères de rendement et l'importance des récompenses doivent être établis en consultation avec les employés visés;
- il faut confirmer aux employés qu'ils ont la possibilité d'être transférés à une autre unité de travail au sein du même ministère n'ayant pas de programme de récompenses selon la productivité, représentant un partage des gains;
- il faut assurer aux employés que la sécurité d'emploi ne sera pas affectée par les économies réalisées;
- les gains réalisés sont mesurés en fonction du groupe et non des employés individuels; et
- les normes de travail ne sont pas "rajustées à la hausse" en fonction des gains réalisés.

reconnaisance des contributions de leurs groupes et de leurs équipes.

L'annexe 5 renferme des renseignements supplémentaires sur le concept de la reconnaissance et des primes.

4.2 RÉCOMPENSES SELON LA PRODUCTIVITÉ

Discussion

En vertu des récompenses selon la productivité, représentant un partage des gains, les employés admissibles partagent les gains réalisés grâce à l'accroissement de la productivité du groupe. Il s'agit d'un régime d'encouragement "de groupe". Ces récompenses visent la motivation à court terme, la promotion de l'esprit d'entreprendre et l'amélioration de la productivité. Ces programmes sont habituellement "conçus sur mesure" pour répondre aux besoins de l'organisation. D'après la Conférence Board of Canada, le principal avantage de cet élément est qu'il favorise le travail d'équipe.

Le groupe de travail sur la rémunération et les avantages sociaux est conscient des situations où le travail ne peut être quantifié et mesuré en termes d'extrants. Dans de tels cas, une norme pourrait être établie et une échelle de récompenses (paye supplémentaire, congés, etc.), pourrait être établie pour chaque niveau de production au-delà de la norme.

Si la négociation collective le permet et compte tenu du fait que les ministères qui s'intéressent aux méthodes et aux extrants seraient les principales parties intéressées à l'établissement de récompenses selon la productivité, la responsabilité de la conception et de l'établissement d'un tel programme devrait être entièrement déléguée aux sous-chers. Les récompenses seraient alors adaptées sur mesure pour répondre aux besoins de l'organisation et de ses employés. Tel que recommandé à la fin du présent chapitre, l'établissement d'un bon système de mesure du rendement sera un prérequis au succès d'un tel programme.

Les récompenses selon la productivité, représentant un partage des gains, est un nouveau concept pour la fonction publique fédérale. Les récentes expériences à ce chapitre ont entraîné des réactions négatives de la part des syndicats. Le groupe de travail reconnaît qu'aucun programme de ce genre ne peut être mis en oeuvre unilatéralement par l'employeur.

félicite le Conseil du Trésor pour les améliorations qu'il a annoncées récemment au programme des primes de la fonction publique du Canada, et particulièrement pour l'introduction de la "prime spéciale";

appuie les programmes des primes des ministères :

- primes à l'initiative,
- primes au mérite,
- primes spéciales, et
- primes pour longs états de service;

appuie les programmes de primes à l'échelle de la fonction publique :

- certificats de retraite des agents supérieurs,
- primes d'excellence, et
- primes pour réalisations exceptionnelles;

recommande que les sous-chefs utilisent pleinement le nouveau programme de "primes spéciales" et établisse pour leur organisation des primes d'encouragement "spéciales" pour souligner des objectifs ou des préoccupations particulières;

recommande que le Secrétaire du Conseil du Trésor établisse un relevé du succès remporté par les primes d'encouragement et de reconnaissance dans les grandes et les petites organisations; et

recommande que les gestionnaires des ministères soient remboursés pour les dépenses raisonnables qu'ils engagent pour organiser des célébrations spéciales, en

RECOMMANDATION XII

Voici les principes qui sous-tendent les primes d'encouragement et de reconnaissance des ministères et de la fonction publique tout entière :

- souples, établies sur mesure et contrôlées par les sous-chefs en fonction des objectifs de l'organisation,
- il faut déléguer leur application, dans la mesure du possible, aux gestionnaires afin d'assurer qu'elles arrivent à motiver les employés, et qu'elles demeurent simples, opportunes et largement utilisées,
- courte période entre l'événement à célébrer et la remise de la prime, dans la mesure du possible,
- conçues pour reconnaître et récompenser les employés individuels et les groupes d'employés,
- publiciser l'événement pour avoir le plus d'impact possible sur les pairs,
- reconnaître les "héros anonymes" ainsi que les "employés de renom", et
- accorder de nombreuses petites primes en plus de quelques primes importantes.

RECOMMANDATION XIII

Le groupe de travail sur la rémunération et les avantages sociaux :

réalisations exceptionnelles des individus ou des groupes. Les primes se composent d'un montant en espèces ou d'un certificat ou les deux.

La fonction publique fédérale dispose d'un programme de "primes pour longs états de service" visant à reconnaître les longs et loyaux services de ses employés et un programme de "certificat de retraite des agents supérieurs" pour reconnaître leur contribution lorsqu'ils prennent leur retraite. Dans les deux cas, les primes n'ont pas de valeur monétaire. Il s'agit d'une plaque, d'un médaillon ou d'un certificat.

La fonction publique fédérale a un programme de "primes d'excellence" pour reconnaître les contributions les plus exemplaires à la fonction publique résultant de suggestions d'employés ou de l'exécution méritoire de leurs fonctions". Cette prime est non monétaire. Il s'agit d'une plaque.

En outre, la fonction publique fédérale a un programme de "primes pour réalisations exceptionnelles" destiné à reconnaître officiellement le rendement exceptionnel à long terme d'un employé. La prime est une citation et un prix en espèces. Elle est réservée aux gestionnaires supérieurs ou aux niveaux équivalents.

L'utilisation stratégique de programmes de primes d'encouragement et de reconnaissance offre des occasions uniques de motiver les employés.

Toutefois, la fonction publique fédérale n'a pas de programmes de "célébration" visant à permettre aux gestionnaires et à leurs employés de se réunir pour prendre du café et des beignes ou d'aller dîner pour célébrer les efforts et les réalisations d'une équipe. Règle générale, les gestionnaires défrangent eux-mêmes le coût de ces célébrations.

Pour que leurs efforts de motivation soient couronnés de succès, les gestionnaires doivent toujours se rappeler qu'il est fondamental de faire en sorte que leurs employés aient le sentiment de contribuer aux objectifs, aux résultats et aux défis de l'organisation.

aux programmes des primes à l'initiative" ont été annoncées le 20 juin 1990 afin d'encourager une meilleure participation des employés. Les employés peuvent désormais recevoir une prime monétaire pour une suggestion adoptée qui s'inscrit dans les fonctions de l'employé, pourvu que l'employé n'ait pas l'autorité de mettre en oeuvre la suggestion en question. Les "gagnants" d'une prime à l'initiative sont admissibles au programme des "primes d'excellence".

Primes de reconnaissance et de réalisations

Les programmes de "reconnaissance et de réalisations" sont de plus en plus populaires. Les primes peuvent avoir une valeur monétaire ou non ou les deux; ces programmes sont habituellement souples et discrétionnaires, c'est-à-dire qu'il existe à leur égard peu de directives concernant la forme de la prime (monétaire ou non monétaire), la valeur monétaire de la prime, le moment où elle est accordée ou les bénéficiaires admissibles.

Ces programmes ont pour but de reconnaître la contribution et les efforts particuliers d'un employé ou d'un groupe d'employés et ce, d'une manière appropriée et immédiate. Par exemple : un employé qui aime le sport ou les événements culturels et qui a consacré toute une fin de semaine à terminer un projet important dont le délai a été avancé peut recevoir de son gestionnaire, en reconnaissance de ses efforts, deux billets pour une partie de hockey ou pour un concert.

Depuis le 20 juin 1990, la fonction publique du Canada dispose de la souplesse nécessaire pour élaborer rapidement un programme de reconnaissance et de réalisations qui permet maintenant aux gestionnaires des ministères d'accorder une prime "sur-le-champ". Les organisations peuvent désormais établir leurs propres critères de participation et d'admissibilité à ces primes spéciales et ce, pour répondre à leurs besoins particuliers. Les procédures et les délais de traitement, ainsi que le type de primes non monétaires qui pourraient être accordées en vertu du nouveau programme des "primes spéciales" sont laissés à la discrétion de l'organisation. Toutefois, la prime accordée ne peut dépasser 200 \$, y compris l'impôt sur le revenu qui doit être réduit.

Le programme des "primes au mérite" de la fonction publique fédérale reconnaît officiellement les

Les primes peuvent avoir une valeur monétaire ou non (par exemple un certificat, une plaque ou une note de remerciement). Une prime est quelque chose qu'un employé peut désirer et qu'un employeur est à même d'offrir en échange d'une contribution de l'employé au-dessus de la moyenne ou exceptionnelle. Essentiellement, la prime a de la valeur pour l'individu ou le groupe qui la reçoit.

Il existe un large éventail de programmes de primes; un nombre sans cesse croissant d'employeurs s'attachent aujourd'hui à des programmes destinés aux employés individuels ou à des groupes d'employés. L'exemple suivant illustre certains de programmes de primes d'encouragement et de reconnaissance les mieux connus du secteur privé. (Les programmes de primes correspondants de la fonction publique fédérale sont décrits sous chaque rubrique - dans des paragraphes en italique et en retrait).

Primes d'encouragement axées sur les objectifs

Ces programmes de primes d'encouragement peuvent viser des individus ou des équipes dans des postes particuliers ou des services fonctionnels et peuvent viser des objectifs précis. La prime peut avoir une valeur monétaire ou non ou une combinaison des deux.

Par exemple : un programme peut être conçu pour réduire le taux de roulement et combattre l'absentéisme en accordant des primes en espèces reliées au rendement d'un employé, à son assiduité et à ses états de service.

La fonction publique fédérale n'a pas de programmes de "primes spéciales d'encouragement".

Primes à l'initiative

Encourager les nouvelles idées, la créativité et la participation des employés sont certains des objectifs qui sous-tendent les programmes de primes à l'initiative. On encourage les employés à présenter des suggestions sur la façon d'améliorer certains aspects des activités de l'organisation. Les améliorations peuvent être tangibles (réduction des coûts, productivité ou revenus) ou non tangibles (esthétique, qualité du milieu de travail). Les primes peuvent avoir une valeur monétaire ou non, ou une combinaison des deux.

La fonction publique fédérale a un programme de "primes à l'initiative". Les primes sont un montant en espèces ou un certificat ou les deux. Des améliorations aux critères régissant l'admissibilité

4. PRIMES ET RÉCOMPENSES (SUITE)

Le fait d'utiliser la composante des primes et récompenses de façon stratégique signifie que les trois composantes :

- Les primes d'encouragement et de reconnaissance,
- Les récompenses selon la productivité, représentant le partage des gains, et
- Les récompenses fondées sur le rendement

doivent être utilisées de façon concertée pour rendre l'organisation efficace tout en établissant un milieu de travail motivant, en favorisant l'esprit d'équipe et en améliorant le moral et la productivité des employés.

Les programmes de primes et de récompenses, qu'ils soient utilisés pour reconnaître les efforts individuels ou de groupes, ont fait leurs preuves. Le groupe de travail sur la rémunération et les avantages sociaux entérine cette composante clé et recommande dans le présent chapitre des principes pour la conception et la structure des programmes pertinents.

4.1 PRIMES D'ENCOURAGEMENT ET DE RECONNAISSANCE

Les primes d'encouragement et de reconnaissance ont pour but de reconnaître les efforts et les contributions exceptionnelles pendant une période donnée. Il peut s'agir d'une carrière toute entière, du temps nécessaire pour atteindre un résultat particulier, d'une période normale d'évaluation ou d'une période plus courte de quelques jours ou de quelques semaines pendant laquelle un employé ou un groupe d'employés a fourni une contribution spéciale.

Discussion

Les programmes de primes, lorsqu'ils sont utilisés à bon escient, contribuent stratégiquement à :

- développer l'engagement envers l'organisation,
- créer un bon esprit d'équipe,
- influencer le comportement, par exemple en incitant les employés à mieux travailler pour atteindre un objectif particulier,
- à reconnaître les réalisations et le mérite, et
- à promouvoir les innovations et les nouvelles idées.

promouvoir l'efficacité de l'organisation et à démontrer que les employés sont une ressource-clé lui permettant de réaliser son mandat et ses objectifs.

Les expériences des gestionnaires et les recherches sur les organisations ont démontré que des programmes efficaces de reconnaissance et de récompense améliorent la motivation des employés, leur engagement envers l'organisation, leur moral, leur esprit d'équipe et leur productivité, tout en étant rentables.

Les études effectuées par le Conférence Board of Canada indiquent que les programmes de primes et de récompenses constituent un mécanisme très efficace pour maximiser l'excellence des ressources humaines; ils sont supérieurs à la moyenne au chapitre de la capacité de réaliser les buts et les objectifs énoncés pour les programmes.

RECOMMANDATION XI

La troisième composante du régime de récompenses est : un "programme de primes et de récompenses" centré sur trois éléments :

- des primes d'encouragement et de reconnaissance,
- des récompenses selon la productivité, représentant un partage des gains, et
- des récompenses fondées sur le rendement.

Le chapitre 4 du présent rapport explique plus en détail le programme des primes des récompenses, ainsi que ses trois composantes.

Les programmes de primes et de récompenses, adaptés aux besoins, aux valeurs et à la culture et aux objectifs d'une organisation, sont un outil de gestion stratégique visant à encourager et à

Discussion

PRIMES ET RÉCOMPENSES

3.2.3

L'annexe 3 renferme les résultats du sondage de EKOS. L'annexe 4 fournit des renseignements supplémentaires sur les composantes des avantages

souples.

- un programme efficace de communication et de services de consultation doit être établi à l'intention des employés afin de veiller à fournir des renseignements clairs et précis à l'égard des choix qui s'offrent à eux en matière d'avantages.
- elle doit être conçue de façon à permettre aux employés d'effectuer de nouveaux choix lorsque leurs circonstances personnelles changent, et elle doit être conçue de façon à permettre des changements pendant la durée du programme,
- elle doit être conçue de façon à fournir la flexibilité maximale réalisable,
- elle doit respecter les dispositions de la loi de l'impôt sur le revenu,
- le gouvernement fédéral rejette l'adoption d'une approche "rémunération fondamentale plus" doit être absorbé par le budget d'exploitation actuel,

Le Groupe de travail sur la rémunération et les avantages sociaux a conclu que les avantages sociaux sont un élément positif pour recruter et conserver une main-d'oeuvre diversifiée et changeante.

Une approche axée sur des avantages flexibles faciliterait l'introduction d'avantages et de conditions de travail permettant d'équilibrer la vie au travail et les responsabilités familiales. Une telle approche appuierait également certaines recommandations contenues dans le rapport intitulé "Au-delà des apparences" : Le rapport du Groupe de travail sur les obstacles rencontrés par les femmes dans la fonction publique.

RECOMMANDATION VIII

La deuxième composante du régime de récompenses est : une approche "rémunération fondamentale plus" reliée aux avantages sociaux, c'est-à-dire une rémunération fondamentale plus des avantages sociaux choisis individuellement.

RECOMMANDATION IX

Pour les employés représentés, la composante "rémunération fondamentale plus" serait offerte par l'entremise de la négociation collective.

RECOMMANDATION X

Les principes reliés au développement de la composante "rémunération fondamentale plus" sont les suivants :

• aucun frais supplémentaire pour l'employé qui choisit de conserver son niveau actuel d'avantages, mis à part le coût des avantages existants,

sociaux souples devraient être offerts initialement aux employés exclus et à ceux de la catégorie de la gestion. Pour les employés syndiqués, ils devraient être offerts par l'entremise de la négociation collective. Qu'il s'agisse de la catégorie de la gestion, des employés exclus ou des employés représentés, les avantages sociaux souples pourraient inclure :

- des congés annuels de plus de 2 semaines
- une assurance-santé plus complète
- un régime dentaire
- des heures supplémentaires**
- une assurance-vie pour le conjoint
- des services de planification financière
- une assurance pour les morts accidentelles
- un REER
- une assurance-invalidité à long terme
- une contribution pour la garde
- une contribution pour les soins aux parents âgés
- un stationnement subventionné
- des évaluations de la condition physique
- l'adhésion à une association professionnelle
- une meilleur assurance après retraite

Dans le cadre de ses activités, le groupe de travail a demandé l'opinion de Revenu Canada, l'impôt concernant le caractère impossible de certains avantages offerts en vertu d'un nouveau régime "d'avantages sociaux souples". Un avis préliminaire indique qu'un avantage actuellement non impossible demeurerait non impossible en vertu d'un nouveau régime, si ses caractéristiques demeuraient inchangées. Toutefois, si un régime d'avantages souples prévoit un "versement en espèces" à la place d'avantages sociaux, cette option sera impossible. De plus, si des avantages actuellement non impossibles sont modifiés de façon importante ou si de nouveaux avantages sont ajoutés (par exemple une contribution pour les soins aux parents âgés), ils pourront devenir impossibles en vertu du nouveau régime d'avantages souples.

La catégorie de la gestion ne serait pas admissible au temps supplémentaire. À titre d'avantage social souple, le remboursement du temps supplémentaire serait offert soit sous forme de compta ou selon la valeur équivalente de l'un des autres avantages souples.

sociaux souples "de base plus". Il est intéressant de noter que ce sondage ne fait état que de légères divergences d'opinions entre les employés syndiqués et non syndiqués. Il en va de même pour les groupes d'âge et les antécédents culturels.

Étant donné que le groupe de travail s'intéressait également à une gamme de nouveaux avantages sociaux, ce sondage a également permis de tester l'intérêt des fonctionnaires à l'égard de huit nouveaux avantages sociaux et leurs désirs d'échanger certains de leurs avantages actuels pour de nouveaux. Voici les nouveaux avantages en question :

- congés annuels supplémentaires,
- assurance supplémentaire,
- aide pour les soins aux parents âgés,
- clubs de conditionnement physique,
- programmes de conditionnement physique,
- stationnement payé,
- garderie, et
- conseils financiers.

Comme le démontre la pièce 3.3 du rapport de EKOS (annexe 3), des congés annuels supplémentaires constituent la priorité absolue des employés de la fonction publique parmi les choix qu'on leur donnait : trois répondants sur quatre ont manifesté un intérêt pour cet avantage. En outre, plus de 50 % sont prêts à échanger certains avantages actuels pour augmenter leurs congés annuels. Le deuxième nouvel avantage le plus populaire est un régime d'assurance supplémentaire, mais le niveau d'intérêt diminue de façon importante par rapport aux congés annuels supplémentaires (74 % à 44 %). Pour cet avantage, tout comme l'aide pour les soins aux parents âgés, un répondant sur trois a manifesté l'intérêt d'échanger ses avantages actuels.

Les Associés de recherche EKOS inc. ont également mené pour le compte du groupe de travail sur la catégorie de la gestion un sondage téléphonique national auprès de 800 SM et EX. Ce sondage a révélé que 81 % des employés interviewés appuient modérément ou fortement une approche plus souple en ce qui a trait aux avantages sociaux.

Les avantages sociaux souples exigeront une approche faisant appel à une gestion stratégique et à une mise en oeuvre graduelle. Les avantages

soient établis par l'entremise de la négociation collective; et

la "rémunération fondamentale" pour les employés non représentés soit déterminée par le gouvernement.

RECOMMANDATION VII

Le groupe de travail sur la rémunération et les avantages sociaux recommande, pour les employés représentés, au cas où l'initiative fonction publique 2000 engendrerait un nombre moindre de groupes et de niveaux professionnels et des bandes de paye élargies, que le nombre actuel de paliers soient réexaminés dans le but d'introduire un nombre plus important de petites augmentations annuelles jusqu'au maximum du groupe et du niveau.

3.2.2

AVANTAGES SOCIAUX SOUPLES

Discussion

Les avantages sociaux "cafétéria" ou "au menu" permettent un système souple qui donne aux employés le choix de certains avantages sociaux, selon leurs circonstances particulières.

Dans le cadre de ses recherches sur les avantages sociaux flexibles ou de style cafétéria, le groupe de travail sur la rémunération et les avantages sociaux a demandé à la compagnie Les Associés de recherche EKOS inc. d'effectuer un sondage téléphonique à l'échelle nationale auprès de quelque 414 employés à temps plein de la fonction publique fédérale embauchés pour une période indéterminée, donc la classification est inférieure au niveau SM. Des 414 employés interviewés, 81 % étaient des employés exclus. Quatre-vingt-dix pour cent ont indiqué avoir une préférence pour une forme quelconque de régime d'avantages sociaux souples; l'autre 10 % optait pour le statu quo. Des 90 %, 74 % ont choisi l'approche des avantages

Jusqu'au maximum du groupe et du niveau. En plus des augmentations annuelles prévues par le système de paliers, les employés seront éligibles à l'application à leur rémunération de base d'un pourcentage de la récompense fondée sur le rendement qu'ils auront mérités (voir la section 4.3).

Les "avantages sociaux de base" peuvent inclure : les congés annuels (2 semaines), les congés statutaires, les allocations et les prix, les avantages sociaux de base aux assurés, comme les frais médicaux et d'hôpital, les pensions, l'assurance-vie et les congés à court terme pour incapacité ou obligations familiales.

Le Bureau de recherches sur les traitements, une entité de la Commission sur les relations de travail dans la fonction publique, continuerait de jouer son rôle impartial en matière de recherche sur la rémunération pour obtenir des renseignements sur les échelles salariales et les conditions d'emploi au sein de la fonction publique et à l'extérieur.

RECOMMANDATION V

La première composante du régime de récompenses est la "rémunération fondamentale" pour tous les employés, c'est-à-dire un niveau de rémunération et d'avantages sociaux de base, équitable et concurrentiel ayant pour but de rémunérer le travail exécuté, indépendamment du lieu géographique où le travail est exécuté.

RECOMMANDATION VI

Le groupe de travail sur la rémunération et les avantages sociaux recommande que :

- les aspects négociables de la "rémunération fondamentale" et les rajustements économiques pertinents, pour les employés représentés,

Discussion

que ce soit au sein de la catégorie de la gestion, des groupes exclus ou des groupes représentés par un syndicat, les employés ont droit à une juste rémunération fondamentale et à des avantages sociaux adéquats pour le travail accompli, indépendamment du lieu géographique où ils travaillent. La rémunération fondamentale reposerait sur le niveau de rémunération et d'avantages sociaux nécessaires pour attirer et conserver les employés qualifiés qui s'imposent pour permettre au gouvernement de réaliser ses objectifs.

La détermination de la rémunération fondamentale serait fondée sur une comparaison avec d'autres organisations (équité externe) et sur des comparaisons internes entre des groupes professionnels de la fonction publique.

La rémunération fondamentale aurait un caractère non discrétionnaire en ce sens que les sous-chefs ne joueraient aucun rôle dans sa détermination. Pour les employés exclus et ceux de la catégorie de la gestion, la détermination de la rémunération fondamentale et les rajustements économiques à cette dernière seraient établis par le gouvernement, par exemple par le Comité Burns. Pour les employés syndiqués, la rémunération fondamentale et les rajustements économiques à cette dernière, seraient déterminés par l'entremise de la négociation collective.

La rémunération fondamentale doit inclure la "rémunération de base" et les "avantages sociaux de base".

La "rémunération de base" peut inclure : l'échelle salariale de base et les suppléments de paye de base (comme les primes de quart et la paye de rappel). Si l'initiative Fonction publique 2000 engendre un nombre moindre de groupes et de niveaux professionnels et des bandes de paye élargies, le groupe de travail conclut que, pour les employés ne faisant pas partie de la catégorie de la gestion, la "rémunération de base" doit conserver le système des paliers, mais avec un nombre plus important d'augmentations annuelles de moindre envergure,

conservant des employés compétents;

• encourager et promouvoir l'engagement et la participation des employés et aider les employés à se concentrer sur les grands objectifs du gouvernement et du ministère pertinent; et

• faire preuve de souplesse envers la direction ministérielle et les employés individuels.

RECOMMANDATION IV

Voici la pierre angulaire de "l'approche stratégique de gestion des récompenses" :

un "régime de récompenses" complet comprenant trois éléments :

- une rémunération fondamentale (rémunération et avantages sociaux de base),
- des avantages sociaux souples, et
- des primes et des récompenses :

- primes d'encouragement et de reconnaissance,
- récompenses selon la productivité, représentant un partage des gains, et
- récompenses fondées sur le rendement.

3.2 LE RÉGIME DES RÉCOMPENSES

Les trois composantes du "Régime des récompenses" sont décrites dans les sections suivantes :

Voici les objectifs de "l'approche stratégique de gestion des récompenses" :

- accroître l'efficacité organisationnelle en attirant des candidats qualifiés et en

RECOMMANDATION III

- une qualité de vie au travail qui favorise la productivité et la satisfaction au travail.
- la suppléance nécessaire pour faciliter l'équilibre entre la vie au travail et les responsabilités familiales; et les employés individuels; et
- la suppléance nécessaire pour aider la direction ministérielle à donner suite aux besoins, aux valeurs et aux objectifs;
- des primes et des récompenses pour veiller à ce que l'on reconnaisse les contributions des employés individuels envers les objectifs de l'organisation;
- des récompenses fondées sur le rendement pour aider la direction ministérielle à promouvoir des niveaux élevés de rendement chez les employés;
- des niveaux concurrentiels de rémunération et avantages sociaux de base pour attirer et conserver les employés les plus brillants;
- un salaire égal pour un travail d'égal valeur;

Pour que le gouvernement puisse efficacement réaliser ses objectifs, ses programmes et ses services dans le contexte des restrictions financières actuelles, la fonction publique fédérale doit répondre aux besoins d'une main-d'œuvre en évolution, établir un milieu de travail motivant, améliorer le moral et la productivité des employés et tout mettre en œuvre pour être perçu comme un "employeur concurrentiel".

Le *défi* pour la fonction publique fédérale dans les années 1990 consistera à établir des régimes de rémunération qui assureront l'efficacité opérationnelle et répondront aux besoins divergents de la main-d'œuvre. Pour remplir cette tâche et relever le défi, la fonction publique aura besoin de choisir la rémunération dans toute une gamme de régimes de payes, d'avantages sociaux, de primes, de stimulants et de programmes de récompenses et de rétributions, ainsi que de planifier et de gérer cette rémunération de façon stratégique.

Le groupe de travail sur la rémunération et les avantages sociaux conclut donc que la contribution apportée par des régimes de rémunération et d'avantages sociaux au règlement fructueux de la *question des ressources humaines* repose dans l'adoption d'une approche stratégique.

RECOMMANDATION I

Le groupe de travail sur la rémunération et les avantages sociaux recommande l'adoption d'une "approche stratégique de gestion des récompenses" visant à motiver les employés à atteindre leur pleine capacité et un niveau élevé de rendement en leur fournissant des primes et des récompenses liées au rendement.

RECOMMANDATION II

Voici les principes qui sous-tendent l'approche stratégique de gestion des récompenses":

Dans l'ensemble, un régime *moderne* de rémunération et d'avantages sociaux dans la fonction publique fournirait un outil de gestion stratégique qui pourrait attirer les candidats les mieux qualifiés, motiver les employés à atteindre leur pleine capacité, et retenir les employés compétents.

- tend à traiter tous les employés (exceptionnels et médiocres) de la même façon. Elle ne peut pas être utilisée de façon stratégique comme un outil de gestion pour exercer une influence sur l'efficacité de la fonction publique. Elle fait peut d'efforts, les initiatives ou réalisations exceptionnelles, pas plus qu'elle ne punit le rendement médiocre;
- fournit peu de possibilités aux employés individuels de choisir leurs avantages sociaux d'une façon qui réponde à leurs besoins particuliers; et
- n'est pas conçue de façon à répondre aux besoins, aux valeurs et aux objectifs spécifiques des ministères. Par exemple, elle n'a pas la souplesse nécessaire pour faire face aux difficultés dans les domaines comme le recrutement et le maintien des spécialistes, les marchés particuliers (lieux de travail), le redéploiement géographique et les nouveaux intérêts des employés à l'égard des avantages sociaux.
- Conséquemment, l'approche actuelle de la fonction publique en matière de rémunération et d'avantages sociaux n'arrive pas à donner aux employés ou aux gestionnaires un sentiment d'appartenance envers les buts, objectifs et valeurs d'un ministère ou du gouvernement.
- Le groupe de travail est d'avis que la fonction publique *moderne* doit adopter une approche souple et exhaustive envers la rémunération fondamentale, les avantages sociaux et les récompenses fondées sur le rendement. Cette approche doit être gérée de façon stratégique de façon à fournir :
- aux employés individuels ou aux groupes d'employés la reconnaissance et les récompenses nécessaires pour leur contribution ou leurs efforts particuliers et le choix de leur régime d'avantages sociaux.
- à la direction ministérielle des moyens stratégiques visant à améliorer les niveaux de rendement des employés et, par conséquent, l'efficacité de la fonction publique;
- aux organisations la souplesse nécessaire pour faire face aux difficultés dans les domaines comme le recrutement et la conservation de spécialistes et le redéploiement géographique.

de manière à maintenir les rapports nécessaires entre les secteurs d'activité de la fonction publique;

la plupart des fonctionnaires fédéraux ont le droit de participer à la détermination de leur rémunération et de leurs conditions d'emploi particulières au moyen d'une négociation collective sérieuse;

les règlements salariaux dans la fonction publique fédérale contribuent à réduire l'inflation et sont judiciaires sur le plan financier.

La politique de rémunération pour la catégorie de la gestion (annexe 2) repose généralement sur le concept de la comparabilité globale avec la moyenne des autres secteurs de l'économie, pour les deux premiers niveaux, soit SM et EX-1. Un système d'écarts salariaux est calculé pour les autres niveaux de direction et de sous-ministre.

Cette politique, approuvée par le gouverneur en conseil, a été ensuite autorisée par le Conseil du Trésor. Elle avait pour objectif fondamental d'accorder aux gestionnaires SM et EX-1 une rémunération comparable à celle du secteur privé et, parallèlement, de mettre sur pied un système d'écarts salariaux afin de lier la hausse de la rémunération à l'augmentation des responsabilités.

La rémunération pour les employés exclus qui ne font pas partie de la catégorie de la gestion est déterminée en leur accordant le même niveau de rémunération que celui accordé aux employés syndiqués par l'entremise de la négociation collective. Les employés exclus peuvent également opter pour une assurance supplémentaire et les employés exclus de niveau supérieur sont assujettis à un régime de paye fondé sur le rendement.

2.6 CONCLUSIONS

Suite à ses délibérations, le Groupe de travail sur la rémunération et les avantages sociaux en est arrivé aux conclusions suivantes :

L'approche actuelle de la fonction publique en matière de rémunération et d'avantages sociaux est très uniforme, centralisée et strictement contrôlée. Une telle approche :

employés) ne cadre pas avec la notion d'une meilleure participation des employés et avec l'objectif visant à jumeeler la rémunération et les avantages sociaux à une stratégie commerciale;

la paye doit être reliée au rendement et appuyer un rendement élevé;

il importe de maintenir une équité externe pour attirer et conserver les employés, mais la capacité de contrôler les coûts doit avoir préséance;

il faut promouvoir l'équité interne en assurant une équité salariale entre les employés et en donnant aux employés subalternes la possibilité de se mériter une rémunération supplémentaire;

un régime d'avantages sociaux doit tenir compte des besoins changeants d'une main-d'oeuvre diversifiée en offrant des choix aux employés.

2.5 LA RÉMUNÉRATION ET LES AVANTAGES SOCIAUX AU SEIN DE LA FONCTION PUBLIQUE FÉDÉRALE

Philosophie actuelle

La fonction publique a deux politiques de rémunération : une pour les employés représentés par un syndicat et l'autre pour les employés de la catégorie de la gestion et d'autres groupes exclus. Les deux politiques reposent essentiellement sur la prémisse que la rémunération et les avantages sociaux des fonctionnaires doivent être comparables, mais non supérieurs à ceux des employés du secteur privé qui effectuent un travail semblable.

Caractéristiques et principes clés

La politique de rémunération de la fonction publique fédérale aux fins de la négociation collective (annexe 1) repose depuis de nombreuses années sur les principes suivants :

les comparaisons de la rémunération globale avec le secteur privé tiennent compte de facteurs tels que la sécurité d'emploi, les pensions, la durée du travail et les autres avantages sociaux;

la rémunération des fonctionnaires fédéraux doit être suffisante pour pouvoir recruter et conserver les employés qualifiés; elle doit être déterminée

on adopte de nouveaux moyens de rémunérer les gens en les payant en fonction de leurs connaissances ou de leurs compétences.

Le Conférence Board of Canada indique également que la planification de la rémunération en général n'est pas encore devenue partie intégrante du processus de planification stratégique dans la majorité des organisations et que peu d'entre elles ont utilisé les récompenses proactivement au niveau stratégique.

Toutefois, tout prouve que l'on assiste à un changement d'orientation, même prudent, envers une approche variable ou liée au rendement en matière de rémunération! Les organisations canadiennes sont de plus en plus conscientes qu'un régime de rémunération conçu de façon stratégique peut aider les organisations à attirer, à motiver et à conserver des employés auxquels on tient vraiment.

2.4 LA RÉMUNÉRATION ET LES AVANTAGES SOCIAUX AU SEIN DU SECTEUR PRIVÉ

Philosophie actuelle

La philosophie générale qui sous-tend la rémunération et les avantages sociaux au sein du secteur privé consiste à aider les employés à atteindre leur plein potentiel, ce qui permet également de maximiser, dans un environnement hautement compétitif, leur contribution à la profitabilité et à la survie de l'organisation.

Caractéristiques et principes clés

Dans le rapport qu'il a présenté au groupe de travail sur la rémunération et les avantages sociaux, le Conférence Board of Canada soulignait que, au sein du secteur privé, de plus en plus d'employeurs concentrent leur approche en matière de rémunération et d'avantages sociaux sur sept caractéristiques et principes clés :

- Le régime de rémunération et d'avantages sociaux d'une organisation doit compléter son système global de valeurs ou sa culture corporative, pour être efficace et utile sur le plan stratégique;
- La souplesse de la rémunération en espèces d'une organisation est fondamentale dans un milieu commercial compétitif qui évolue rapidement;
- une approche centralisée en matière de rémunération (un seul régime de rémunération pour tous les

fonctionner dans les limites d'une saine gestion financière et des exigences juridiques.

2.3 LE NOUVEAU CONTEXTE DE LA RÉMUNÉRATION ET DES AVANTAGES SOCIAUX

Au cours des dernières années, les objectifs fondamentaux consistant à attirer, à motiver et à conserver les employés sont devenus de plus en plus difficiles à réaliser. Les expériences récentes de certains ministères du gouvernement fédéral visant à attirer et à conserver des employés dans la région métropolitaine de Toronto le démontrent bien.

Les recherches effectuées par le Conférence Board of Canada¹ révèlent que l'on assiste au Canada à des changements au chapitre des pratiques et des orientations en matière de rémunération. En voici les points saillants :

- de plus en plus d'organisations ont recours à une rémunération variable : cette dernière est liée au rendement et s'applique à toute l'organisation;
- un pourcentage accru de la rémunération totale est désormais variable;

- on a davantage recours aux primes et aux récompenses, comme les régimes de primes à l'initiative, le partage des bénéfices et des gains, les options d'achat d'actions, les distinctions pour réalisations particulières et les programmes de reconnaissance visant à encourager la participation des employés;

- on met de plus en plus l'accent sur la création d'un mélange de mesures d'encouragement et de récompenses individuelles, d'équipe et globales pour appuyer les objectifs stratégiques de l'organisation;

- on met en place des plans spécialisés pour divers services de l'organisation, particulièrement lorsque les entreprises s'attaquent à de nouveaux marchés, mettent au point de nouveaux produits et adoptent de nouveaux groupes clients; et

Les recherches du Conférence Board of Canada ne visent que le secteur privé et surtout des milieux de travail non syndiqués.

2. RÉMUNÉRATION ET AVANTAGES SOCIAUX

2.1 DÉFINITIONS

La définition traditionnelle de la "rémunération" est la suivante : "toute forme de paiement consentie aux employés en échange du travail effectué pour leur employeur".

Spécifiquement, la "rémunération" inclut les traitements, les salaires, les sommes versées pour le temps supplémentaire, les commissions et les primes.

Les employés sont également rémunérés pour leurs efforts par l'entremise "d'avantages sociaux", notamment les pensions, les congés, l'assurance, d'autres types de congés, les régimes dentaires et ainsi de suite.

2.2 RÔLE DE LA RÉMUNÉRATION ET DES AVANTAGES SOCIAUX

Que ce soit au sein du secteur public ou du secteur privé, le principal objectif d'un régime de rémunération et d'avantages sociaux vise à améliorer l'efficacité de l'organisation. On y parvient :

- en attirant des candidats qualifiés : un régime de rémunération et d'avantages sociaux mieux coté que celui d'un compétiteur peut attirer des candidats plus qualifiés (les autres conditions étant les mêmes).

- en motivant les employés : la reconnaissance du rendement grâce à la rémunération, aux avantages sociaux et aux récompenses peut motiver les employés et engendrer un meilleur rendement et une plus grande productivité.

- en conservant les employés compétents : le fait de garder compétitif un régime de rémunération et d'avantages sociaux (en assurant une égalité interne l'extérieur) et de maintenir une justice interne (égalité interne) sont des facteurs importants pour conserver ses employés.

En outre, les avantages sociaux peuvent engendrer une plus grande efficacité organisationnelle en augmentant la capacité d'une organisation d'être un employeur qui a ses employés à cœur.

Dans le cadre de ces objectifs, le régime de rémunération et d'avantages sociaux d'une organisation doit également

Cominco. Les Associés de recherche Ekos inc. a réalisé un sondage téléphonique auprès de quelque 400 employés de la fonction publique pour mesurer l'importance relative qu'ils accordent aux avantages sociaux et l'intérêt qu'ils manifestent envers une approche de style cafétéria.

Le groupe de travail a également rencontré des représentants des groupes de travail sur les relations de travail, la dotation, la catégorie de la gestion et la structure professionnelle et de classification, pour assurer la fusion des conclusions et des recommandations.

1.3 AU SUJET DU PRÉSENT RAPPORT

Au cours de ses délibérations, le groupe de travail s'est rendu compte qu'un régime moderne de rémunération et d'avantages va beaucoup plus loin que les sommes versées aux employés pour services rendus. Il doit également englober les distinctions et les récompenses monétaires et non monétaires à la disposition d'un employeur, tenir compte des questions connexes relatives à la rémunération et aux avantages sociaux, notamment les programmes touchant les familles et l'aide au logement et inclure une nouvelle perspective sur la façon dont la fonction publique doit administrer la rémunération.

Le groupe de travail considère également que le présent rapport s'inscrit dans un processus permanent. Les membres sont d'avis que leur travail ne se terminera pas avec le dépôt de leur rapport, mais plutôt avec la mise en oeuvre d'une approche moderne en matière de rémunération et d'avantages sociaux.

À cette fin, les membres du groupe de travail se mettront à la disposition des organismes centraux et des experts, au cours des prochains mois, pour concevoir un régime moderne et, plus important encore, pour rencontrer des employés et des représentants syndicaux pour discuter de leurs conclusions et de leurs recommandations.

1. INTRODUCTION

1.1 DONNÉES DE BASE

Des changements importants au chapitre de la démographie et la modification des besoins et des valeurs des employés, jumelés aux pressions permanentes auxquelles font face les employés au chapitre de la concurrence, de l'économie, de la technologie et des lois, ont forcé un réexamen des contrats et des rapports traditionnels employés-employés. Les employés à la page du secteur privé examinent actuellement leurs régimes de rémunération et d'avantages sociaux pour en réduire le coût et pour s'assurer d'être des "employés concurrentiels", c'est-à-dire en mesure de se battre pour obtenir les meilleurs employés, tout en conservant un avantage sur la concurrence dans une économie globale hautement concurrentielle.

Le gouvernement fédéral, à titre d'employeur, n'échappe à ces pressions. Il vit également une période de changements rapides et fondamentaux; il doit lui aussi passer en revue ses pratiques de gestion et ses structures organisationnelles pour être en mesure de maintenir et d'améliorer son efficacité. L'initiative Fonction publique 2000 reconnaît cette réalité et suggère :

- une réévaluation de la gestion traditionnelle des ressources humaines;
- une réévaluation du rôle stratégique de la rémunération et des avantages sociaux; et
- une nouvelle perspective sur les moyens nouveaux et innovateurs de reconnaître et de récompenser les employés.

C'est dans ce cadre que le groupe de travail sur la rémunération et les avantages sociaux s'est attaqué au défi qui s'offrait à lui.

1.2 ACTIVITÉS DU GROUPE DE TRAVAIL

Depuis que le Premier ministre a lancé Fonction publique 2000, le 12 décembre 1989, le groupe de travail a tenu 18 séances plénières et de nombreuses réunions en sous-comités, a commandé et reçu un rapport du Conférence Board of Canada sur la rémunération et les avantages sociaux au sein du secteur privé, s'est réuni avec les chercheurs du Conférence Board et avec des représentants des syndicats de la fonction publique, a discuté des régimes de paye et de rendement et des programmes d'encouragement et de primes à l'initiative avec IBM (Canada) et des avantages genre cafétéria avec

MANDAT

Le Groupe de travail Fonction publique 2000 sur la rémunération et les avantages sociaux a pour mandat :

d'établir un ensemble de principes visant à guider l'élaboration d'un système moderne de rémunération, d'avantages sociaux et de récompenses pour la fonction publique fédérale.

AVANT-PROPOS

Accepter la responsabilité de diriger le Groupe de travail Fonction publique 2000 sur la rémunération et les avantages sociaux s'est avéré sans nul doute un défi à la fois intéressant et exigeant.

Le défi qui consiste à moderniser la fonction publique pour répondre à l'évolution des besoins de la société canadienne a été facilité par les efforts et le dévouement des membres du Groupe de travail :

- Ivan P. Fellegi, Statistique Canada;
- Peter B. Lesaux, Agence de promotion économique du Canada Atlantique;
- Georgina Wymann, Approvisionnements et Services Canada;
- John D. McLure, Défense nationale;
- Shirley Serafini, Multiculturalisme et Citoyenneté Canada;
- Lynne Pearson, Commission de la fonction publique du Canada;
- J.J. Whiting, Agence canadienne de développement international;
- Dennis Wallace, Diversification de l'économie de l'Ouest Canada;
- Don Love, Secrétariat du Conseil du Trésor;
- Alan Ross, Approvisionnements et Services Canada;
- Pat McLaughlin, Statistique Canada;
- Rhoda Barrett, Transports Canada;
- Sylvia Lauzon, Transports Canada; et
- Cliff Cullen, Transports Canada.

Les membres du Groupe de travail ont entériné au début de décembre 1989 les objectifs de Fonction publique 2000, c'est-à-dire promouvoir une fonction publique :

- qui soit professionnelle, hautement qualifiée, non partisane et ayant pour mission de servir le public;
- qui reconnaisse ses employés comme des ressources qu'il faut apprécier et développer;
- qui donne toute l'autorité possible aux employés et aux gestionnaires de première ligne; et
- qui fasse place à diverses formules organisationnelles pour répondre à divers besoins, mais dans le contexte d'une seule et unique fonction publique.

Le présent rapport est le résultat du dévouement et de l'engagement des membres du Groupe de travail.

Glen Shortliffe

Le directeur du Groupe de travail,

REMERCIEMENTS

1

Les membres du Groupe de travail Fonction publique 2000 sur la rémunération et les avantages sociaux tiennent à remercier les nombreux employés de la fonction publique du pays tout entier qui ont pris la peine de nous écrire et de nous faire part de leurs points de vue et de leurs expériences, et, plus important encore, de nous offrir leurs suggestions.

Nous tenons tout particulièrement à remercier les employés d'Approvisionnement et Services Canada qui, sous la direction de Georgina Wymann et de Jill Stern, ont préparé et présenté au Groupe de travail une rapport sur l'équilibre entre la vie au travail et les responsabilités familiales. Nous remercions également André Desjardins du Secréariat du Conseil du Trésor pour sa contribution à la section sur les primes de reconnaissance, Len Slivinski et Linda Grauer, de la Commission de la fonction publique et Inez Clark, du Secréariat du Conseil du Trésor, pour la section portant sur les récompenses fondées sur le rendement.

Nous tenons également à remercier les dirigeants et les membres des autres groupes de travail qui ont participé à nos réunions et partagé des renseignements au sujet de leurs activités. Merci également à l'équipe du projet Fonction publique 2000 qui, sous la direction de John Edwards, a fait progresser nos discussions et donné le ton et l'orientation de l'initiative Fonction publique 2000.

Nous sommes également reconnaissants aux nombreux employés de la fonction publique qui, dans leurs ministères respectifs, ont appuyé le travail et les efforts des membres du Groupe de travail. Nous avons beaucoup apprécié les connaissances d'expert: Cliff Cullen, de Transports Canada, dans les domaines de la paye, des avantages sociaux, des pensions et des congés, ainsi que le soutien administratif fourni par June Johnston et Lise Charbonneau, de Transports Canada, qui ont assuré le bon fonctionnement du Groupe de travail.

Le Groupe de travail souhaite souligner le travail de Sylvie Lauzon, de Transports Canada, et de ses employés. Sa contribution à l'organisation et aux travaux du Groupe de travail, ainsi qu'à la production du présent rapport, a été cruciale.

| | | |
|-------|--|----|
| 5. | CHANGEMENTS ET AMÉLIORATIONS SUPPLÉMENTAIRES | |
| 5.1 | Changements et améliorations à l'échelle de la fonction publique..... | 35 |
| 5.1.1 | Équilibre entre le travail et les responsabilités familiales..... | 35 |
| 5.1.2 | Mobilité..... | 41 |
| 5.1.3 | Souplésses dans les ministères - Réponse aux questions particulières touchant le recrutement et le maintien des employés | 43 |
| 5.1.4 | Crédits de congés de maladie..... | 45 |
| 5.1.5 | Indemnités de fin d'emploi..... | 47 |
| 5.1.6 | Travail à temps partiel..... | 49 |
| 5.2 | Améliorations et changements législatifs..... | 53 |
| 5.2.1 | Le travail à temps partiel et la LFP..... | 54 |
| 5.2.2 | Les congés sans solde et la LFP..... | 55 |
| 6. | LES DÉFIS | |
| 6.1 | Recommandations des autres groupes de travail... | 57 |
| 6.2 | Communications et consultations avec les employés | 58 |
| 6.3 | Communications et consultations avec les syndicats | 58 |
| 6.4 | Conséquences au chapitre des coûts..... | 59 |
| 6.5 | Défis reliés à la mise en oeuvre..... | 60 |
| 6.6 | Futures activités du groupe de travail..... | 60 |
| 7. | ANNEXES | |
| 1- | La politique de rémunération de la fonction publique fédérale aux fins de la négociation collective | |
| 2- | La politique de la comparabilité aux fins de la rémunération des gestionnaires de la fonction publique | |
| 3- | Résultats du sondage - Les Associés de recherche Ekos inc. | |
| 4- | Les avantages sociaux souples/gamme des avantages | |
| 5- | Reconnaissances et récompenses | |
| 6- | Historique des primes au rendement dans la fonction publique | |
| 7- | Les primes au rendement sont-elles efficaces? | |
| 8- | Options de souplésses des ministères | |
| 9- | Administration du régime des récompenses | |

Nota Bene: Les annexes sont disponibles de Transports Canada; s'il vous plaît composer (613) 990-7127 ou communiquer par voie de fac-simile (613) 991-0851.

| | | |
|-------|--|----|
| 1. | INTRODUCTION | 1 |
| 1.1 | Données de base..... | 1 |
| 1.2 | Activités du groupe de travail..... | 1 |
| 1.3 | Au sujet du présent rapport..... | 2 |
| 2. | RÉMUNÉRATION ET AVANTAGES SOCIAUX | |
| 2.1 | Définition..... | 3 |
| 2.2 | Rôle de la rémunération et des avantages sociaux..... | 3 |
| 2.3 | Le nouveau contexte de la rémunération et des avantages sociaux..... | 4 |
| 2.4 | La rémunération et les avantages sociaux au sein du secteur privé..... | 5 |
| 2.5 | La rémunération et les avantages sociaux au sein de la fonction publique fédérale..... | 6 |
| 2.6 | Conclusions..... | 7 |
| 3. | GESTION STRATÉGIQUE DES RÉCOMPENSES | |
| 3.1 | Le défi..... | 10 |
| 3.2 | Le régime des récompenses..... | 12 |
| 3.2.1 | Rémunération et avantages sociaux de base..... | 13 |
| 3.2.2 | Avantages sociaux souples..... | 15 |
| 3.2.3 | Primes et récompenses..... | 19 |
| 4. | "PRIMES ET RÉCOMPENSES" (SUITE) | |
| 4.1 | Primes d'encouragement et de reconnaissance..... | 21 |
| 4.2 | Récompenses selon la productivité, représentant un partage des gains..... | 27 |
| 4.3 | Récompenses fondées sur le rendement..... | 29 |
| 4.4 | Conclusions..... | 33 |

Le rapport du Groupe de travail sur la rémunération et les avantages sociaux recommande également des principes et des objectifs pour l'approche stratégique de gestion des récompenses" et propose un "régime de récompenses" complet comprenant trois éléments :

- rémunération fondamentale (rémunération de base et avantages sociaux),
- avantages souples, et
- primes et récompenses:
- primes d'encouragement et de reconnaissance,
- récompenses selon la productivité,
- représentant un partage des gains, et
- récompenses fondées sur le rendement.

Le Groupe de travail sur la rémunération et les avantages sociaux recommande également

- des changements et améliorations dans l'organisme pour régler les questions :
- d'équilibre entre la vie au travail et les responsabilités familiales,
- de mobilité,
- de souplesse ministérielle pour répondre aux questions de recrutement et de conservation de spécialistes,
- de crédits de congés de maladie,
- d'indemnités de cessation d'emploi, et
- des changements législatifs à la Loi sur la pension de la fonction publique visant l'emploi à temps partiel et les congés non payés.

L'adoption d'une "approche stratégique de gestion des récompenses" visant à motiver les employés à atteindre leur pleine capacité et un niveau élevé de rendement en leur fournissant des primes et des récompenses liées au rendement.

Le Groupe de travail sur la rémunération et les avantages sociaux recommande donc que la contribution apportée par des régimes de rémunération et d'avantages sociaux au règlement fructueux de la **question des ressources humaines** repose dans :

Le **défi** pour la fonction publique fédérale dans les années 1990 consistera à établir des régimes de rémunération qui assureront l'efficacité opérationnelle et répondront aux besoins divergents de la main-d'oeuvre. Pour remplir cette tâche et relever le défi, la fonction publique aura besoin de choisir la rémunération dans toute une gamme de régimes de paie, d'avantages, de primes, de stimulants et de programmes de récompenses et de rétributions ainsi que de planifier et de gérer cette rémunération de façon stratégique.

4. RECOMMANDATIONS

Dans l'ensemble, un système moderne de rémunération et d'avantages sociaux à la fonction publique fournirait un outil de gestion stratégique qui pourrait attirer les candidats les mieux qualifiés, motiver les employés à atteindre leur pleine capacité, et retenir les employés compétents.

aux organismes la suppléance nécessaire pour faire face aux difficultés dans les domaines comme le recrutement et la conservation de spécialistes et le redéploiement géographique.

à la direction ministérielle des moyens stratégiques visant à améliorer les niveaux de rendement des employés et, par conséquent, l'efficacité de la fonction publique.

3. CONCLUSIONS

L'approche actuelle de la fonction publique concernant la rémunération et les avantages sociaux est très uniforme, centralisée et contrôlée de façon rigoureuse. Une telle approche :

- a tendance à traiter tous les employés (exceptionnels et médiocres) de la même façon, elle ne peut donc être utilisée d'une manière stratégique quelconque comme outil de gestion pour influencer l'efficacité de la fonction publique. Elle fait peu pour reconnaître ou récompenser les efforts exceptionnels, les initiatives ou les réalisations, et n'a pas de moyens de dissuasion contre un piètre rendement;

- n'est pas assez souple pour permettre à chacun des employés de choisir des avantages qui conviennent mieux à ses besoins particuliers; et

- n'est pas conçue de façon à répondre aux besoins, aux valeurs et aux objectifs particuliers du ministère. Par exemple, elle n'a pas la souplesse nécessaire pour permettre de faire face, de façon appropriée, aux difficultés dans les domaines comme le recrutement et la conservation des spécialistes, les marchés spéciaux (certains endroits), le redéploiement géographique et l'intérêt changeant des employés à l'égard des avantages.

Par conséquent, l'approche actuelle de la fonction publique en matière de rémunération et d'avantages sociaux n'incite pas les employés ou les gestionnaires à s'identifier aux buts, objectifs et valeurs d'un ministère ou du gouvernement.

Le Groupe de travail est d'avis que la fonction publique devrait avoir une approche souple et complète de rémunération de base, d'avantages sociaux et de récompenses fondées sur le rendement. Cette approche devrait être gérée de façon stratégique afin de fournir :

- à chaque employé ou groupe d'employés de la reconnaissance et des récompenses pour sa contribution ou ses efforts spéciaux, et de lui permettre de choisir son régime d'avantages.

Le Groupe de travail Fonction publique 2000 sur la rémunération et les avantages sociaux a pour mandat d'établir un ensemble de principes visant à orienter l'élaboration d'un système moderne de rémunération, d'avantages sociaux et de récompense pour la fonction publique fédérale.

2. CONTEXTE

Les grands changements dans la démographie, les nouveaux besoins et nouvelles valeurs des employés, et les pressions concurrentielles, économiques, technologiques et législatives continuellement exercées sur les employés ont incité à réexaminer les contrats et les rapports traditionnels entre employeurs et employés. Les employeurs modernes du secteur privé examinent actuellement leurs régimes de rémunération et d'avantages sociaux pour réduire les coûts et s'assurer qu'ils sont des "employeurs concurrentiels", c'est-à-dire des employés pouvant rivaliser entre eux pour obtenir les meilleurs employés tout en maintenant un avantage compétitif dans une économie globale hautement concurrentielle.

Le gouvernement fédéral, en tant qu'employeur, n'a pas été à l'abri de ces pressions. Il vit aussi dans une période de changement fondamental et rapide; il doit également examiner ses méthodes de gestion et sa structure organisationnelle pour pouvoir maintenir et améliorer son efficacité. L'Initiative Fonction publique 2000 reconnaît cette réalité et incite :

- à réévaluer la gestion traditionnelle des ressources humaines,
- à repenser au rôle stratégique de la rémunération et des avantages, et
- à jeter un regard neuf sur des moyens nouveaux et créateurs de récompenser et de répartir les employés.

C'est dans ces limites que le Groupe de travail sur la rémunération et les avantages sociaux s'est attaqué à la question.

Juillet 1990

SOMMAIRE EXECUTIF

FONCTION PUBLIQUE 2000 : RAPPORT DU GROUPE DE TRAVAIL
SUR LA RÉNUMÉRATION ET LES
AVANTAGES SOCIAUX

POUR DISCUSSION

POUR DISCUSSION

FONCTION PUBLIQUE 2000: RAPPORT DU GROUPE DE TRAVAIL
SUR LA RÉNUMÉRATION ET LES
AVANTAGES SOCIAUX

Juillet 1990

(41) Dans le cas des licenciements régis par la *Loi sur la gestion des finances publiques*, il doit y avoir une seule procédure de redressement sous le régime de la *Loi sur les relations de travail dans la fonction publique*. Cette procédure ne devrait pas porter atteinte aux droits garantis par la *Loi canadienne sur les droits de la personne*.

(42) Il y va de l'intérêt supérieur de toutes les parties que les conflits soient réglés rapidement. Les parties sont encouragées à utiliser plus pleinement l'autorité qui existe actuellement sous le régime de la *LRTFP* pour avoir recours aux services d'arbitres privés. En cas de licenciement justifié, la *LRTFP* devrait prévoir un délai, disons, comme le fait l'article 45 de la *Loi sur les relations de travail* de l'Ontario.

(43) Il existe un conflit entre la *LEFP*, qui accorde à la CFP le pouvoir exclusif en matière de nomination, et la *LRTFP*, qui accorde à un arbitre le pouvoir de réintégrer — c'est-à-dire d'effectuer également des nominations. Ce conflit doit être résolu en faveur de l'arbitre. L'arbitre qui estime que la réintégration s'impose, doit avoir le pouvoir soit de prononcer la réintégration au poste original, soit d'accorder la priorité pour la nomination à un poste équivalent.

(44) Les sous-ministres doivent avoir le pouvoir de négocier des règlements monétaires afin d'éviter un licenciement formel et les procédures de redressement.

Que faire avec les mauvais employés?

L'un des problèmes les plus vexants des gestionnaires du secteur public est la bonne gestion des employés au rendement non satisfaisant. Le rendement insuffisant est néfaste pour l'organisation, exerce une influence négative importante sur les collègues, et les gestionnaires y consacrent un temps et des ressources démesurés. Dans la majorité des cas, les gestionnaires possèdent actuellement le pouvoir nécessaire d'agir et n'ont besoin que de l'encouragement pour le faire. Souvent, on peut encourager l'employé à améliorer son rendement. Les techniques de motivation englobent l'établissement d'objectifs, l'enrichissement du travail, les observations immédiates sur le rendement, des récompenses ou des encouragements tangibles et l'utilisation des services de counselling ou même du centre d'évaluation.

Les gestionnaires de la Fonction publique ne sont ni bien formés ni motivés pour utiliser les outils dont ils disposent.

(39) Les gestionnaires doivent être formés pour bien utiliser les périodes de probation, l'entraînement, l'entrevue dans des situations délicates, l'identification des faiblesses dans le rendement et les techniques de gestion des employés qui posent des problèmes.

Il existe un problème particulier dans la minorité des cas disciplinaires où des mesures de redressement ne marchent pas et où le licenciement est indiqué.

Le congédiement pour inconduite est à la fois rare et relativement bien compris. Il existe une législation et une jurisprudence arbitrale qui offrent des balises suffisamment précises. Ce sont les zones grises de l'incompétence, l'incapacité, l'abandon, la paresse et employés assidus et dévoués que de faire le travail d'un paresseux ou d'un incompétent. Dans un contexte où le travail en équipe est essentiel, chacun doit faire sa part, sinon le moral de toute l'équipe en prend un coup.

Les gestionnaires acceptent que la décision de licenciement est une décision grave qui ne doit être prise qu'après de vaines tentatives soutenues en vue d'améliorer un rendement non satisfaisant qui persiste. De plus, on accepte que toutes les étapes qui mènent au licenciement doivent être soigneusement documentées, puisque l'employé doit bénéficier de la possibilité de demander un redressement en cas de licenciement injustifié. Ce qui n'est pas tout à fait satisfaisant est l'actuel système de la multiplicité de voies d'appel, du temps qu'on peut prendre pour terminer leurs procédures.

Ces observations nous amènent à formuler les recommandations suivantes :

(40) L'article 31 de la Loi sur l'emploi dans la fonction publique doit être supprimé et tous les motifs de licenciement, à l'exception du renvoi en cours de probation et de l'ingérence politique, qui doivent demeurer sous le régime de la Loi sur l'emploi dans la fonction publique, doivent être régis par la Loi sur la gestion des finances publiques.

La fonction fondamentale du processus d'évaluation du rendement est d'indiquer à l'employé comment il a accompli les tâches au cours de la période écoulée, de reconnaître et de renforcer les comportements qui sont à la base d'un degré élevé d'efficacité et de fournir des conseils à propos de ceux qui pourraient être améliorés. Lorsqu'il est question de primes de rendement ou d'autres mesures de compensation, un système de notation s'avère nécessaire.

Avec la délégation du processus d'évaluation du rendement aux ministères, il reste très peu à faire au niveau du système lui-même. Le Groupe de travail sur la formation et le perfectionnement pourrait être intéressé à considérer ce qui suit :

(36) Les rôles et les attentes raisonnables des deux parties dans le processus d'évaluation du rendement doivent être clarifiés au cours des programmes d'orientation à l'intention de nouveaux employés.

(37) Les cours de base pour les surveillants et les gestionnaires doivent enseigner les aptitudes en matière d'évaluation du rendement.

Il existe cependant une recommandation plutôt d'envergure que nous aimerions formuler :

(38) Pour l'ensemble des cadres, en commençant avec les sous-ministres, les options des subordonnés sur la qualité du leadership dont ils ont fait preuve au cours de la période d'évaluation doit être prise en considération par les responsables de l'évaluation.

Les opinions des subordonnés ne doivent pas être leur seule contribution à l'évaluation des gestionnaires, ni nécessairement le facteur dominant — surtout pour les sous-ministres, dont les responsabilités sont multiples. Toujours est-il que si l'amélioration de la qualité de la gestion, surtout en ce qui concerne les ressources humaines, est une condition sine qua non de la FP 2000, les personnes les mieux placées pour formuler des observations sont celles qui la subissent.

Ceci peut être un processus effrayant, aussi devrait-on commencer avec les sous-ministres. Mais l'expérience dans de nombreuses organisations privées et publiques indique que le fait de faire appel à un tiers neutre peut préserver la candeur et empêcher la rétribution. À EACL, par exemple, le rapport de la tierce partie est discuté par la personne qui fait l'évaluation et ses subordonnés, ce qui entraîne souvent un nouveau degré de compréhension et un plan d'action. Dans certaines compagnies, le rapport se limite à la personne qui fait l'objet de l'évaluation. Nous estimons qu'il devrait en être ainsi : ce n'est que là que le supérieur peut noter et corriger les problèmes, et savoir de façon quelque peu détaillée et avec certitude l'ensemble des talents existants pour s'occuper du prochain défi.

Du point de vue de l'adaptabilité, les sous-ministres doivent mettre les ressources discrétionnaires entre les mains de leurs meilleurs employés, indépendamment de leur ancienneté ou de leur rang. Ces ressources comprennent l'argent, les personnes, les locaux, l'équipement, la reconnaissance et même la promotion. Ces personnes doivent par ailleurs s'occuper des problèmes les plus difficiles et les plus urgents.

(35) L'adoption d'un nouveau système de classification constitue une occasion unique d'abolir les règles comme « un PM-3 ne peut relever d'un PM-4 » et « seuls les PM-3 peuvent être candidats à des postes de PM-4 », qui rendent inutiles les échelles professionnelles ministérielles.

(34) Le fait de rajuster le système Hay aux circonstances de la Fonction publique fédérale semble produire en surnombre le personnel d'état-major par rapport au personnel d'exécution, ce qui fait en sorte que les emplois plus haut classés se trouvent dans la région de la capitale nationale par rapport aux régions et dans les administrations centrales par rapport aux ministères responsables. Cette question a besoin d'être examinée, discutée et (probablement) réglée objectivement. Nous applaudissons la détermination de la Direction générale de la politique du personnel à apporter les résultats des études nécessaires au CCSCCT cet automne.

(33) Plus généralement, le nombre de cadres doit automatiquement être rajusté pour correspondre au nombre de postes classifiés à ce niveau, en tenant compte de la flexibilité normale.

(32) Lorsque la redistribution de points selon le système Hay a l'occasion d'une décentralisation augmente le nombre de postes de cadre, le SCT doit être disposé à rajuster l'effectif.

Les deux recommandations qui suivent sont formulées à titre de recommandations de second ordre dans le cas où la recommandation bien meilleure du Groupe de travail sur la catégorie de gestion ne serait pas acceptée.

ne leur permet de combler. On sait depuis longtemps qu'il s'agit là d'une conséquence naturelle de la charge de travail grandissante ou de l'étendue de la responsabilité du ministre. On n'a pas largement apprécié le fait que la décentralisation et la déstratification peuvent contribuer à augmenter le nombre de postes de cadre. Considérons par exemple un ministre avec huit bureaux régionaux et une certaine fonction qui est exécutée par des PM-6 en région, sous le contrôle strict d'un EX-2 à l'administration centrale. La décentralisation de cette fonction place par exemple la moitié des PM-6 au-dessus de la cote magique de 835 dans le système Hay et élimine l'EX-2. Résultat net : des salaires globaux moins élevés, un poste éliminé, un échelon éliminé — et bénéfices nets, trois nouveaux membres dans la catégorie de cadre.

Dans un système de dépenses courantes, il n'y a pas lieu d'établir des limites arbitraires au nombre de cadres. Nous appuyons fermement la recommandation du Groupe ministériel sur la catégorie de gestion à cet égard. Selon les règles en vigueur, les ministères peuvent légitimement se retrouver avec beaucoup plus de postes de cadre qu'on

gestion d'une manière visible et responsable. L'idée est fondamentale à de nombreuses réformes précises entreprises ailleurs, allant de l'investissement dans la formation à l'allocation du coût de la mauvaise sur les **dépenses courantes**. Sans cela, l'efficacité ne se produit que de façon accidentelle actuel de ressources bigarées, gratuites, fongibles et infiniment chiffrées à un système sont de premier ordre. Parmi celles-ci, on compte le concept du passage de notre système De toutes les recommandations qui sont envoyées à la FP 2000, seules quelques-unes

Vous demandez un canard. Le Conseil du Trésor vous donne un poulet plumé avec la responsabilité totale de le faire voler.

Ressources

caractéristiques importantes des organisations qui valorisent la productivité. tâches à accomplir, les fenêtres qui s'ouvrent et un peu d'intimité sont tous des propre milieu est un élément important du pouvoir des employés. L'éclairage adapté aux **existants**. Ce faisant, ils doivent tenir compte du fait que la capacité d'influencer son modèles pour les nouveaux bâtiments ainsi que pour la refecton de bâtiments utilisent les normes les plus sanitaires et les plus efficaces du secteur privé comme pour les matériaux, l'air, la chaleur et l'éclairage dans les bâtiments fédéraux et qu'ils Travaux publics entreprennent d'urgence une réévaluation générale de leurs normes recommandons que le Bureau de la gestion des biens immobiliers et le ministère des (31) Quand les bâtiments sont malades. Nous ne peux même pas allumer ou éteindre les lumières. » « Au moins elles sont arrosées, nettoyées et débarrassées d'insectes chaque semaine! Et je Une employée nous a déclaré que les plantes dans son bureau sont mieux traitées qu'elle. nombre de machines de bureau augmentait considérablement la chaleur dans les bâtiments. L'énergie. L'air frais et la climatisation ont décliné juste au moment où l'augmentation du pétrole de 1973, lorsqu'on est passé de l'extravagance à la parcimonie dans l'usage du L'air viciés sont bien trop répandus, surtout dans les bâtiments construits après la crise du une étude générale des normes et de la gestion des installations. Les bâtiments malades et de plus en plus de la santé personnelle et écologique — il est nécessaire d'entreprendre Enfin — et il semble curieux d'avoir à l'admettre dans cette ère où on se préoccupe

seulement » et qui assurent un service exceptionnel au public. » À ceci nous ajoutons fonctions et qui font des propositions pratiques d'améliorations. » aux personnes à l'emploi de la Fonction publique qui assurent leurs fonctions d'une façon exceptionnelle; qui ont à leur crédit d'autres réalisations méritoires en rapport avec leurs Conseil du trésor selon laquelle de tels programmes ont pour objet « de rendre hommage

(26) Les employés qui retournent d'un congé sans solde devraient avoir la possibilité de choisir des périodes de remboursement de pension plus longues, tout en restant responsables de la valeur-temps de l'argent, ou de choisir de renoncer à la fois aux paiements et aux avantages.

(27) Les employés devraient avoir la possibilité de terminer progressivement leur carrière sans être pénalisés en matière de pension. Par exemple, une personne qui a 63 ans doit pouvoir accepter deux années de travail à moitié temps, mais que l'ensemble de son salaire pour cette période soit considéré comme celui de l'une des six meilleures années aux fins du calcul de la pension ou, subsidiairement, accepter un poste moins exigeant avec un taux de rémunération moins élevé pour une certaine période avant sa retraite sans subir de pénalité quant à sa pension — l'employeur s'occupant peut-être de payer la différence dans le compte. De tels arrangements doivent tenir compte des besoins opérationnels, tout en permettant à l'employeur de bénéficier de la flexibilité et seraient particulièrement indiqués dans un régime de dépenses courantes.

(28) À l'occasion, un employé très estimé accumule l'âge et le service nécessaires pour faire en sorte que sa présence continue dans la Fonction publique ne soit véritablement qu'une question d'amour. Pour contourner l'incitation financière des départs inopportuns, nous recommandons qu'à la discrétion de l'employeur, ou bien a) le droit au salaire des six meilleures années, jusqu'à concurrence de 70 % soit porté à 80 %, l'employé continuant à cotiser au régime comme avant, ou bien b) que l'employeur ait la discrétion d'offrir un régime contributif séparé.

(29) Dans un système de dépenses courantes et de primes de rendement, les négociations collectives doivent mieux tenir compte des circonstances particulières de chaque ministère de manière que les employés puissent bénéficier directement des avantages que l'ensemble de la collectivité tire de l'augmentation de la productivité. Le processus de négociation collective doit permettre la négociation de conventions complémentaires entre les rondes importantes de négociations pour couvrir des régimes particuliers de productivité.

Le pain est important, le jambon l'est tout autant. L'honneur et l'hommage sont des facteurs de motivation particulièrement importants et ont une place plus grande dans les organisations modernes. La reconnaissance effective et les programmes de primes d'encouragement exigent que les ministères aient la souplesse nécessaire pour établir des systèmes compatibles avec leur mission tout en permettant aux gestionnaires d'offrir des récompenses individuelles au moment opportun.

(30) Nous recommandons que la politique sur les primes d'encouragement incorporée dans le Régime des primes d'encouragement du Conseil du trésor (Chapitre 365 du Manuel de la politique administrative) soit révisée pour accorder aux administrateurs généraux le pouvoir discrétionnaire d'établir des programmes de reconnaissance et de primes d'encouragement bien conçus pour leur ministère. Les limitations opérationnelles et les critères d'attribution actuellement prévus par la Politique des primes d'encouragement doivent être éliminés. Les ministères devraient cependant être tenus d'inscrire leurs programmes dans le cadre général de la politique du

- pension** pour les employés excédentaires âgés de plus de 55 ans et comptant au plus de 20 ans de service n'ajoutent aucune valeur, n'est qu'une perte de temps et devrait cesser.
- (22) Rien n'agace plus les employés sur le terrain que le temps et la paperasse nécessaires pour avoir accès aux outils. Le MAS devrait avoir pour mandat d'adopter un système complètement libre de la paperasse pour les achats ordinaires de manière à ce que tout agent compétent dans un ministère puisse puiser électroniquement dans les stocks et les offres permanentes à des taux de frais de service considérablement moindres.
- (23) Il ne faudrait pas avoir un système généralisé de déstratification ou de renonciation aux services de nombre d'employés actuellement dans la catégorie SM-EX. C'est une mesure très coûteuse, qui tend à encourager les mauvaises personnes à partir, qui ignore les réalités très différentes de chacun des ministères et qui, compte tenu de l'expérience passée, ne permettrait pas d'avoir une main-d'oeuvre représentative par la suite.
- (24) Plutôt, la déstratification devrait être considérée comme une conséquence de la **décentralisation et du pouvoir**. Elle doit se faire au niveau du ministère ou de la direction générale. Elle ne devrait pas constituer la priorité la plus urgente en 1991 et en 1992, parce que digérer toutes les autres réformes de la FP 2000 devrait avoir préséance. Pour les cadres supérieurs qui s'apprennent à décentraliser, l'action clé sera de saisir et de réaffecter les nouveaux excédentaires avant qu'ils n'inventent de nouvelles tâches affaires plus nuisibles.
- Les mesures d'encouragement**
- L'encouragement le plus efficace pour les employés est la nature du travail à effectuer. Les employés doivent s'occuper de tâches utiles et emballantes qui démontrent leur valeur à l'organisation et renforcent leur estime de soi.
- Ils doivent par conséquent recevoir une rémunération comparable à celle versée dans le secteur privé. Nous appuyons pleinement la méthode de la rémunération et des avantages en trois temps recommandée par le groupe de travail sur ce sujet. Nous appuyons expressément leurs recommandations concernant les changements à la LPPF et pour les carrières épisodiques — les carrières qui permettent les mises en disponibilité ou le travail à temps partiel pour s'occuper des responsabilités familiales, pour prendre des congés sabbatiques, voyager, faire du bénévolat ou du travail communautaire, terminer progressivement sa carrière, et ainsi de suite.
- (25) Les employés à temps partiel pour des durées indéterminées devraient avoir la possibilité de contribuer à un fonds de pension et accumuler des années de service proportionnellement à leur temps au travail.

nouveau chaque jour. Passer une semaine sans apprendre quelque chose de mémorable, c'est perdre une semaine. Cela veut également dire que l'un des styles classiques de la bureaucratie — refuser de partager l'information pour assurer la sécurité de son emploi par la monopolisation — serait un comportement qui ne serait pas récompensé.

Un Groupe de travail sur la formation et le perfectionnement vient d'être nommé. Le coût total enregistré pour la formation et le perfectionnement pour tous les organismes au titre de l'article 1.1 de la *LRTFP* pour 1984-1984 était de 274 millions de dollars. Ce montant couvrirait la totalité des coûts de fonctionnement y compris les salaires des stagiaires, à tous égards, à l'exception de la formation linguistique. De ce montant, moins de 1/3 a été consacré au perfectionnement professionnel, par opposition à la formation professionnelle en tant que telle. L'importance de la formation en ce qui concerne surtout les fonctions hautement techniques qui ont peu de pendants dans le secteur privé continuera d'augmenter. Toutefois, l'investissement qui est fait dans le perfectionnement — clé de l'adaptativité — est manifestement insuffisant. Nous formulons quatre recommandations générales à l'intention de ce groupe de travail:

(17) Le Groupe de travail sur la formation et le perfectionnement doit étudier les recommandations qui auraient pour effet d'augmenter l'accent qui est mis le perfectionnement dans un investissement d'ensemble généralement croissant.

(18) La distinction actuelle entre la formation et le perfectionnement doit être réduite de manière que l'employeur assume une plus grande partie du coût total du perfectionnement. Les deux constituent des voies vers l'adaptativité et le perfectionnement doit être encouragé plutôt que limité.

(19) L'accès aux possibilités de perfectionnement est la pierre angulaire de l'équité en matière d'emploi, ce qui veut dire que l'accès préférentiel doit être accordé sur la base de l'adaptativité de l'employé ainsi que sur la valeur qu'en tirera la Fonction publique dans l'avenir par opposition à l'expérience de travail précise.

(20) Tous les programmes des cours de formation pour les surveillants et les gestionnaires doivent comprendre des cours sur la gestion efficace dans une Fonction publique qui valorise de nombreuses cultures et l'égalité des chances.

Le pouvoir

L'accession au pouvoir est le thème central de toutes les organisations adaptatives. Avec les réformes récentes au SCT et dans les organisations de service commun, la plupart des autres mesures doivent être prises au niveau du ministère. Le système ne limite plus fortement le bon sens, bien qu'il y ait des secuteurs dans lesquels une certaine destruction créatrice des règles pourrait toujours être entreprise. Par exemple :

(21) Obliger les sous-ministres à signer des formules d'indemnisation des excédentaires en vertu du programme d'adaptation de la main-d'œuvre ou à demander personnellement au secrétaire du Conseil de Trésor de renoncer à la réduction de

Fonction publique dans son ensemble, on a la chance que ces différences semblent toujours se manifester dans les grands centres métropolitains, ce qui fait qu'en général, recruter sur place est une solution de rechange au déplacement des fonctionnaires.

(15) Néanmoins, dans le contexte des dépenses courantes, le Conseil du Trésor devrait déléguer aux administrateurs généraux la latitude de combler une seule fois les remboursements normaux dans les cas individuels. Cette mesure n'est pas conçue pour régler le problème des salaires non concurrentiels pour certaines catégories professionnelles, qui demeure sous la responsabilité générale du Conseil du Trésor en tant qu'employeur.

* * *

Les marchés de travail fonctionnent le mieux lorsqu'ils sont irrigués avec beaucoup d'information. Malheureusement, il est rare que les Plans pluriannuels des ressources humaines fassent mieux que des projections à court terme des objectifs d'équité en matière d'emploi en s'attaquant véritablement à la planification des ressources humaines. La projection statistique établie sur plusieurs années des vacances dans une organisation en évolution est un élément fondamental de la planification effective dans les grandes organisations. Cela exige, d'une part, que la gestion ait un modèle évolutif des compétences, et du nombre de ces compétences, qu'elle aura besoin plusieurs dans l'avenir et, d'autre part, que les spécialistes en matière du personnel prévoient les retraites, les promotions, les départs et les décès. La différence entre les deux est la marge d'opportunité pour les employés actuels à la recherche de nouveaux défis et pour les gestionnaires de refaçonner l'organisation grâce à un programme structuré de recrutement et de perfectionnement.

(16) Nous recommandons que les grands ministères, et le SCT, pour le compte de l'ensemble de la Fonction publique, publient annuellement des rapports indiquant le nombre de vacances par catégorie et par niveau prévues pour chaque année au cours des cinq années suivantes. Il s'agirait de projections statistiques, et on s'attendrait à des regroupements des petites catégories.

* * *

L'apprentissage continu est le leitmotiv des organisations adaptatives. Pour la Fonction publique, cela veut dire une attention renouvelée à la formation et au perfectionnement professionnel sous tous les angles.

Le problème réside avant tout dans les attitudes. Au ministère des Affaires indiennes et du Nord canadien, un slogan que les cadres supérieurs utilisent généralement est « Chacun peut enseigner, chacun peut apprendre ». Cela veut dire que chaque employé possède quelque information unique pertinente à la mission et est tenu de partager cette information et que chaque personne a une obligation positive d'apprendre quelque chose de

(14) Nous ne recommandons pas le remboursement variable basé sur la variation régionale du coût du logement. Même s'il est vrai que le coût de la vie est actuellement cher à Toronto et à Vancouver, cela est dû en grande partie au coût du logement. Lorsque les employés achètent leur propre maison, les avantages qu'ils tirent personnellement augmentent avec les coûts qu'ils engagent personnellement. C'est le taux de changement du prix du logement dans l'avenir qui fait la différence : l'employé qui entre dans un marché à la hausse s'en tire bien alors que celui qui entre dans un marché statique ou à la baisse s'expose à une pénalité relative. Compte tenu des délais longs dans lesquels ces effets se produisent, il serait très difficile de concevoir un système dont on aurait la certitude qu'il serait moins inéquitable que le système actuel. Du point de vue de la

beaucoup plus communs.
cartières épisodiques (ou épisodiquement sédentaires) mais ces phénomènes deviendront En général, le système informel ne s'occupe pas très mal de ces cas ni d'autres genres de familles avec des enfants dans les collèges locaux ne sont pas intégralement remboursés. Les coûts de la mobilité, surtout pour les couples qui travaillent tous les deux et les

* * *

Ceci serait compatible avec l'adoption limitée de la nomination au niveau de travail. Nous appuyons la recommandation du Groupe de travail sur la dotation que la LEFP soit modifiée de manière à permettre et même à exiger la nomination au niveau de travail à des postes inférieurs au niveau de cadre. Cela serait également compatible avec la rotation d'emploi et les programmes d'avancement professionnel au niveau du ministère.

Le nombre d'étapes en général plus petit prévu dans le nouveau système de classification, associé à la structure d'âge actuelle de la Fonction publique, signifie que les promotions seront moins fréquentes et qu'en même temps les mouvements latéraux seront plus importants en présentant des défis nouveaux et variés. Nous sommes d'accord avec les recommandations du Groupe de travail sur la dotation en ce qui concerne les mouvements latéraux : des affectations pouvant faire l'objet d'un grier que l'employeur effectue dans le même rayon de navette et des bureaux d'affectation actifs au niveau du ministère et au niveau de la Fonction publique pour apparter les employés à la recherche d'affectations avec les gestionnaires à la recherche d'employés.

(13) L'évaluation intensive des forces et faiblesses d'un agent par un tiers objectif peut être exceptionnellement utile à la planification de sa carrière. Par exemple, on dit parfois que l'évaluation des candidats dans le cadre des Cours et affectations de perfectionnement peut être plus utile que toutes les étapes ultérieures dans le programme. Nous recommandons que chaque employé comptant au moins sept ans d'expérience ait la possibilité d'être évalué une fois, à la discrétion de l'employé, par le Service d'évaluation des employés. Les services d'évaluation doivent être choisis non parce qu'ils relèvent du secteur public ou du secteur privé, mais en fonction de l'efficacité avec laquelle ils donnent suite à l'adaptativité dans un programme général de bonne réputation.

À cet égard, l'une des plus importantes réformes de la FP 2000 est la grande simplification du système baroque de classification professionnelle qui est recommandée par le Groupe de travail sur la classification. Abattre les murs améliore la mobilité et attaque le phénomène des ghettos (surtout pour les femmes). Il s'agit d'une réforme cruciale.

La plupart des choses qui doivent être faites en ce qui concerne l'équité en matière d'emploi doivent se faire au niveau du ministère ou de la direction générale. L'amélioration du rendement n'est pas assujétie à des contraintes systématiques. Tout de même, il est des mesures positives qui pourraient être améliorées ou entreprises de nouveau.

L'orientation professionnelle dans la Fonction publique est insuffisante. Elle a besoin d'aptitudes et d'une sensibilité très développées; elle doit s'intégrer dans la fonction de dotation en personnel.

(11) Il est recommandé que soit établi au sein de la Commission de la Fonction publique un service d'orientation professionnelle pleinement professionnel; ce service :

- a) identifiera à l'intention des gestionnaires des candidats qualifiés pour des concours donnés et des postes offrant des possibilités de perfectionnement;
- b) aidera les individus à établir des objectifs professionnels réalistes et à établir un plan personnel de perfectionnement;

c) sera à la disposition de tous les fonctionnaires, la priorité étant accordée aux groupes visés par les programmes de promotion sociale à l'échelon de débutant et aux postes d'entrée dans la catégorie de gestion.

La plupart des gens qui gravissent rapidement les échelons dans les grandes organisations ont eu la chance d'avoir des mentors : des supérieurs qui apprennent à les connaître en milieu de travail et qui prolongent la relation en leur donnant des conseils professionnels, de l'information sur la façon dont le système fonctionne vraiment et les possibilités de perfectionnement. De nombreuses femmes se sentent exclues de ce système informel, ce « réseau des anciens » juste au moment où elles estiment que la marginalité et les rôles sociaux compétitifs rendent de tels avis encore plus cruciaux. Aujourd'hui, le Centre canadien de gestion a la réputation d'être le nouveau point de mire brillant sur le chemin de la mobilité ascendante, son mandat étant de former les futurs dirigeants de la Fonction publique.

(12) Nous recommandons que le CCG établisse, sur une base expérimentale, un inventaire des cadres — pas seulement féminins — qui désirent consacrer une heure ou deux par semaine à conseiller les professionnelles. Même si un tel système ne peut se substituer aux rapports avec un mentor, de nombreuses femmes estiment qu'il est nécessaire d'augmenter considérablement les sources de bons conseils personnels.

Une précision spéciale à propos de ces derniers groupes. Comme on l'a déjà noté, une Fonction publique qui représente pleinement la population qu'elle sert est généralement (et suffisamment) justifiée sur la seule base de l'équité. Cela ne tient pas compte de l'argument très convaincant de l'efficacité — qu'une caractéristique clé de l'adaptativité est la diversité. L'organisation qui peut attirer des gens dont l'expérience de travail est variée possède des sources plus riches de créativité qu'une organisation homogène. Qu'on se dise, les dinosaures ont disparu en raison de leur répertoire limité et spécialisé. Ils ont été remplacés par des mammifères divers, rusés, rapides, omnivores et non spécialisés. Les organisations qui ignorent l'utilité de la diversité interne le font également à leurs dépens. Pour pleinement atteindre les objectifs de la représentativité, il faudra un changement continu des attitudes dans tout le système plutôt que des solutions magiques provenant des organismes centraux. Nous nous empêchons donc d'établir des quotas, à la seule exception des pools de recrutement de diplômés d'université, préférant plutôt mettre l'accent sur les processus susceptibles d'amener le système dans la bonne direction.

Un aspect pour lequel le secteur privé ne peut rivaliser avec la Fonction publique est la diversité, le défi et l'importance sociale des tâches à accomplir. Cela est particulièrement vrai pour les jeunes gens qui souvent se trouvent chargés de dossiers d'une telle importance que leurs collègues du secteur privé n'ont pas la possibilité de traiter avant d'avoir pu accumuler beaucoup plus d'ancienneté. Le simple fait d'avoir d'immenses possibilités d'apporter une contribution appréciable et concrète dans la Fonction publique est l'une de ses caractéristiques les plus attrayantes. Le défi est de déterminer comment exploiter cette diversité de manière a) à ne pas faire perdre aux gens toute leur énergie, b) à récompenser les personnes adaptatives en leur procurant dans leur travail la diversité qui leur avait attiré au départ dans un monde où la promotion sera inévitablement lente et c) à donner la chance aux personnes les plus capables, spécialement aux femmes, aux autochtones, aux handicapés ou aux minorités visibles.

Les occasions

groupes minoritaires.

(10) Les comités de sélection chargés du recrutement, de la promotion et du perfectionnement doivent être composés de femmes, d'hommes et de membres de

publique dans l'avenir.

(9) Les organisations qui ont du ressort, autodidactes regroupent une diversité d'expérience et d'antécédents. C'est le besoin d'adaptativité autant que la nécessité d'une Fonction publique représentative dans une société démocratique qui est le moteur de l'équité en matière d'emploi. Par conséquent, un accent spécial doit être mis sur la surreprésentation des femmes, des autochtones, des minorités visibles et des handicapés dans les groupes de l'Administration et de l'analyse offrant des possibilités de perfectionnement. En tant que gestionnaire des pools, le SCT doit veiller à ce que leur composition contribue de façon substantielle à la représentativité de la Fonction

L'orientation vers l'avenir : Les personnes adaptatives sont orientées vers l'avenir. Elles tendent à anticiper plutôt qu'à réagir. La prise de risques ne les effraie pas. Pour elles, la sécurité n'est pas leur première préoccupation.

En ce qui concerne les débutants, ces prédispositions peuvent être plus latentes que manifestes, mais elles peuvent et doivent être prospectées.

(1) Dans le marché du travail des années 1990 et après, recruter et retenir des agents débutants sortant des universités sera notre seul enjeu majeur. Nous recommandons que la CFP s'assure le concours des dirigeants ministériels et des modèles dans une campagne dynamique et à long terme visant à faire produire par les universités canadiennes un flot continu de candidats hautement adaptatifs.

(2) Sous la rubrique générale de l'adaptabilité personnelle, dans toute la Fonction publique, mais particulièrement en ce qui concerne le recrutement des débutants ayant une formation postsecondaire et des cadres de l'extérieur, les critères de présélection et de sélection doivent englober les diverses dimensions de l'adaptativité.

(3) La CFP doit développer des méthodes d'évaluation de l'adaptativité personnelle.

(4) Le recrutement hardi signifie se présenter tôt sur les campus et pouvoir très tôt faire des offres d'emploi précises. Nous recommandons la mise sur pied de pools spéciaux offrant des possibilités de perfectionnement accélérées pour les nouveaux groupes de l'Administration et de l'analyse en remplacement du groupe AT qui a disparu et pour étendre les programmes ES actuels.

(5) Dans la mise sur pied de programmes de perfectionnement, on a tendance à mettre trop d'accent sur l'expérience du personnel de l'administration centrale. Il importe que l'expérience acquise par les stagiaires englobe le service en région sur la ligne de front de la prestation des programmes.

(6) Jusqu'à ce que la méthode des dépenses courantes soit mise en oeuvre, les pools devraient être constitués d'années-personnes provenant pour moitié des ministères et pour moitié des organismes centraux. Dès que la méthode des dépenses courantes aura été mise en oeuvre, les pools devraient être constitués uniquement sur la base des engagements globaux des ministères en matière de recrutement.

(7) La gestion et l'administration des nouveaux programmes de formation devraient être centralisés entre les mains du SCT sous la direction d'un « conseil d'administration » composé de cadres supérieurs des ministères garantissant les postes. Les demandes pour ces postes offrant des possibilités de perfectionnement devraient être acceptées au titre d'un concours où seuls seraient inscrits des candidats travaillant maintenant au sein de la Fonction publique.

PARTIE 2 : LES ÉLÉMENTS D'UNE BONNE GESTION

Les neuf dixièmes de ce qui doit être fait relèvent du domaine des pratiques de gestion plutôt que des échecs du système, et s'appliquent par conséquent au niveau des ministères et des organismes. Les contraintes législatives ou celles de l'administration centrale ne sont généralement pas importantes et, le cas échéant, d'autres groupes de travail s'en occupent d'habitude. Néanmoins, il conviendrait de considérer la possibilité d'apporter quelques changements résiduels au système dans son ensemble afin de favoriser l'adaptivité. C'est parce qu'il faut combler ces lacunes que les recommandations formulées dans la présente partie sont moins détaillées qu'elles l'auraient été, n'était la contribution de neuf autres groupes de travail et, au départ, une organisation fondamentale rationnelle de la fonction publique.

Recrutement

Les personnes adaptatives ne manquent pas dans les organisations adaptatives. Même s'il n'est pas nécessaire que tous les membres soient adaptatifs pour que l'organisation soit efficace, leurs dirigeants doivent l'être, et cet esprit doit imprégner l'organisation. Les gens peuvent apprendre; les attitudes et les comportements inflexibles peuvent changer, si le milieu s'y prête. Il reste qu'en matière de recrutement et de promotion, cela aide qu'on recherche certaines caractéristiques chez les candidats éventuels, particulièrement en ce qui a trait aux débutants diplômés d'université. Les personnes que nous cherchons à recruter doivent avoir les qualités suivantes à un niveau supérieur à la moyenne :

La versatilité : Il s'agit de personnes qui ont (ou qui veulent développer) des **aptitudes multiples**, et qui acquièrent une **expérience diversifiée**. Au fond, ce sont des **généralistes**, même si souvent elles augmentent leurs compétences et leurs aptitudes à partir d'une formation de spécialiste. Elle sont **énergiques et persistantes**.

La curiosité : Elles sont **intellectuellement curieuses, honnêtes et ouvertes d'esprit**; elles **favorisent l'écoute active et ne cessent jamais d'apprendre**. Elles ont un goût pour la **complexité, la nouveauté et l'ambiguïté**. Elles ne sont pas **dogmatiques**. Elles font plus que tolérer des **idées non conventionnelles**, elles y trouvent goût et les suscitent.

Le sens de partage : Elles se prêtent bien à la **collaboration, au partage et au travail en équipe**, et elles constituent, puis abandonnent facilement les partenariats au fur et à mesure que les problèmes changent. Leur **moi est solide** parce que la **confiance en soi** est la clef, mais également **résistant** puisqu'il y a dans la bataille des nouvelles idées, une personne fragile ou fragile est facilement blessée. Elles ont un **sens d'humour**, aiment jouer, et tendent à l'irrévérence.

Puisque le critère ultime de la réussite d'une organisation publique est la satisfaction des clients, il existe des mécanismes pour l'évaluer, formellement ou informellement. On peut utiliser des sondages pour évaluer la satisfaction des clients. Les résultats sont utilisés pour améliorer les services — quant à la quantité, à la qualité, aux modes de prestation, et ainsi de suite. La réputation publique de l'entreprise adaptative est le moteur des efforts d'amélioration. Mais ces améliorations sont plus en profondeur qu'en surface. Il en résulte « l'excellence au moindre coût ».

L'ensemble de l'organisation, transmise par les dirigeants et évaluée constamment. La communication écrite et verbale est adaptée au langage du consommateur des services plutôt qu'au jargon des groupes d'intérêt internes. Tous les intervenants sont consultés lorsqu'on entreprend la recherche, l'élaboration et la mise en oeuvre des programmes d'action.

Les entreprises moins adaptatives consacrent généralement moins de temps et d'efforts à examiner comment une idée peut réussir, mais plus de temps et d'efforts à examiner ce qui est susceptible d'échouer. Les nouvelles idées ne sont pas adoptées parce qu'elles ne semblent pas être meilleures que les idées actuelles ou parce qu'elles n'ont pas été éprouvées. De plus, un mauvais système peut être adopté en désespoir de cause parce qu'il semble être la seule solution (ou le seul expédient), ou parce que toute autre solution est perçue comme conduisant à l'échec du système. Toutefois, les organisations adaptatives ne pensent pas en termes d'alternative. Elles fournissent toujours des mécanismes pour la recherche active d'autres solutions, pour remettre en question le statu quo. Elles accordent une valeur positive aux comportements qui entraînent des changements, la diversité et même le désaccord. En fait, les dirigeants ne peuvent connaître pire sort que celui d'avoir des subordonnés qui décident qu'ils ne feront exactement et uniquement que ce qu'on leur demande de faire. Les incitatifs jouent un grand rôle. Le fait d'imaginer et de mettre à l'essai les innovations est récompensé, mais les récompenses ne sont pas considérées comme subordonnées à la réussite de l'innovation. Les erreurs constituent la source la plus féconde de l'apprentissage, et on considère qu'il est important de les comprendre.

Une autre caractéristique fondamentale est que **différents points de vue sont examinés et les divergences d'opinion sont encouragées**. Par exemple, il y a un

regroupement perpétuel des personnes, des fonctions et des services pour produire des combinaisons inattendues, créatives et nouvelles. On exhorte les individus à se mettre à l'écoute d'autres milieux à l'intérieur et à l'extérieur de l'organisation. Ils se livrent à la pensée horizontale touchant à tous les services. Ils découvrent des synergies qui multiplient la valeur.

Les dirigeants prennent des mesures pour s'assurer qu'ils entendent plus que ce que les subordonnés voudraient qu'ils entendent — généralement des choses agréables. Les organisations adaptatives savent créer une atmosphère qui permet à leur personnel de se sentir à l'aise de s'exprimer. Les dirigeants écoutent et provoquent les dissensions de manière à leur permettre de voir tous les côtés d'un problème avant de prendre une décision. Les comités d'orientation essaient de susciter des opinions contradictoires sans établir en même temps un système de portiers chargés de filtrer cette information. Les dirigeants tolèrent l'excentricité. Ils sont accessibles et pratiquent la « gestion ambulante ». Ils n'érigent pas de barrières ou n'établissent pas de système de punition ou de sanctions négatives.

Les organisations qui appliquent ces normes découvrent qu'elles sont plus aptes à prévoir le changement, qui, pour elles, ne survient pas comme une surprise désagréable. Elles ont une perspective proactive, découvrant de plus en plus de voies et moyens de bâtir des coalitions avec des groupes et des entités — des alliances qui, un jour, ont pu être considérées comme imaginables.

Enfin — et fondamentalement — les organisations publiques adaptatives sont **fortement orientées vers le service aux clients**. Elles écoutent attentivement et régulièrement leurs clients. Le client est identifié et il devient le point de mire de toute l'activité de l'organisation. Les employés sont satisfaits lorsqu'ils servent des clients beaucoup plus que lorsqu'ils servent la bureaucratie. C'est là une norme applicable à

La réceptivité est une caractéristique notable des meilleures organisations. Presque sans exception, elles sont axées sur leur milieu, ouvertes vers l'extérieur plutôt que d'être repliées sur elles-mêmes. L'enjeu que représente la gestion du changement a fait prendre conscience à plusieurs qu'elles ne peuvent se permettre d'être limitées par les règles et les procédures; par conséquent, les membres qui ont le pouvoir imposent la maîtrise de soi. Par exemple, on laisse à des équipes de travail efficaces le soin de travailler sans être placées dans la contrainte de plans formels, d'approbations de comités et autres retards bureaucratiques. La priorité est d'aller dans la bonne direction, ce qui a préséance sur la nécessité de bien faire les choses (sans la remplacer). Ainsi l'organisation n'est-elle pas toujours menée comme un navire à l'étrave, en surveillant de près ressources et procédures. Les dirigeants savent que c'est ce qui étouffera le plus souvent la créativité et retiroidra l'enthousiasme devant la prise de risques.

L'accèsion au pouvoir est un thème clé dans ces organisations. Le pouvoir décisionnel est partagé, les responsabilités sont distribuées et le dévouement est l'affaire de tous. Le pouvoir d'agir est accordé aux membres et ceux-ci tendent à représenter l'organisation selon leur meilleur jugement. Pour l'individu, cela peut vouloir dire, par exemple, que l'employé a la chance d'exécuter « l'ensemble » d'un service ou de produire lui-même un travail précis. Les employés ne sentent pas qu'ils constituent simplement des collaborateurs anonymes à la réalisation d'un document d'information qui finit par être méconnaissable à l'issue du processus hiérarchique d'approbation. Dans l'organisation, la confiance règne. Les ministères ont le pouvoir de développer des stratégies qui répondent à leur culture et à leur mandat particuliers.

L'encouragement à prendre des risques et à innover plutôt qu'à éviter des erreurs

On permet aux individus de remettre en question les principes établis et d'utiliser des méthodes non conventionnelles pour parvenir à des résultats. L'atmosphère est axée sur la possibilité de profiter des occasions de sorte que les idées sont évaluées au mérite, non en fonction du statut de leur auteur. La liberté d'échouer existe dans ces organisations un climat où on tolère qu'un nombre raisonnable d'erreurs soient commises en insistant qu'elles doivent servir de moyen d'apprentissage.

Les organisations publiques tiennent souvent à la tradition, au processus et à l'adhésion aux règles. Les organisations publiques adaptatives respectent ces valeurs, mais savent les modifier au besoin. On y tolère plus les erreurs, ce qui a pour effet de dégager l'énergie créatrice et fait souvent éclorre les meilleurs efforts des producteurs latents. C'est de cette manière que les services de haute qualité et les politiques innovatrices voient le jour. Pour les réaliser, on permet les échéances plus longues afin d'évaluer le succès ou l'échec de l'innovation, des ressources suffisantes sont allouées pour appuyer ces projets, dans chaque cas.

Dans les organisations adaptatives, les occasions pleines de défis. Les institutions flexibles offrent d'innombrables défis, à condition que leurs membres puissent être animés par autre chose que les motifs extrinsèques des augmentations salariales et des promotions. Les motifs intrinsèques ont pour eux préférence — par exemple la chance d'échanger des idées avec d'autres unités, avec d'autres ministères et avec le secteur privé. Les organisations publiques les plus efficaces développent des plans de carrière axés sur le talent plutôt que sur la nécessité de combler des postes dans la hiérarchie. L'accès aux occasions les plus embellissantes est fonction des résultats obtenus par l'individu plutôt que de l'étape suivante la plus logique qui lui reviendrait dans sa hiérarchie professionnelle. Il s'attache plutôt à la réalisation d'un projet en particulier qui peut produire des résultats.

Les personnes les plus adaptatives au sein des organisations publiques sont moins préoccupées par le plafonnement professionnel ou même par la perte de leur poste dans la hiérarchie. En fait, elles tendent à maintenir leur visibilité, leur valeur sur le marché du travail, leur qualité de généraliste, leur crédibilité et leur mobilité. Elles cultivent des réseaux et évitent la surspécialisation et les affectations à long terme. Elles cherchent à acquérir et à développer les compétences les plus transposables et sont conscients que leurs affiliations professionnelles peuvent n'avoir aucune importance ailleurs. Ces individus comptent moins sur l'organisation et beaucoup plus sur leurs propres aptitudes, ils trouvent plus facile de s'adapter. Ils profitent de leurs capacités à influencer le processus du gouvernement; le fait de les attirer et de les garder veut dire leur transmettre ces valeurs.

La plupart des organisations adaptatives se caractérisent par ailleurs par des **mécanismes inhérents de rétroaction périodique à tous les niveaux**. Elles s'auto-

examinent continuellement; leurs leaders y croient, ne craignent pas les résultats et y donnent invariablement suite. Elles passent du diagnostic à l'action dans le but de bien mettre au point l'entreprise. Des sondages d'opinion ou des groupes de consultation thématique peuvent être utilisés régulièrement pour évaluer le moral — l'organisation est réceptive aux contributions et aux suggestions de ses membres. Elle accorde à ses employés la possibilité d'exprimer leurs préoccupations sans crainte de sanction; ces derniers s'attachent profondément à un examen critique continu de leur organisation dans son ensemble.

La communication devient la plus efficace lorsqu'elle doit passer par un nombre minimum de cloisons pour atteindre sa cible. Les dirigeants efficaces adoptent la gestion participative. Ils associent les employés aux décisions qui les touchent et encouragent également les membres du personnel à partager l'information avec tous les autres niveaux dans l'organisation. De cette manière, les membres apprennent continuellement; personne ne peut dire qu'on le tient à l'écart.

Les systèmes de travail à dévouement élevé font souvent appel à des tiers pour clarifier les valeurs, amplifier les préoccupations, juger de l'a-propos des changements proposés et aider à légitimer ces changements. Les consultants sont considérés comme des agents importants de changement, qui apportent une large perspective, offrent des avis objectifs et ne s'arrêtent pas à la formulation des solutions mais facilitent leur application.

buts que fixent les divers groupes internes, par exemple les organismes centraux et les ministères, ou encore l'administration centrale et les régions.

De même, les organisations adaptatives gèrent le changement; elles sont plus actives que réactives. Dans les institutions publiques, le changement peut souvent être mal perçu (une réorganisation, par exemple) et devenir source d'anxiété considérable. Toutefois, le changement fait partie de la vie et n'en constitue pas une exception. Le conflit associé au changement doit être géré plutôt qu'évité, et les employés touchés doivent se sentir appuyés pour être capables de faire face aux nombreuses difficultés liées aux changements. Les organisations adaptatives et auto-critiques savent que le monde est désordonné; elles inventent ou adaptent des solutions avec opportunité et ne passent pas leur temps à défendre les actions passées. Les gens sont amenés à aimer le changement autant qu'ils le haïssaient dans le passé. Le changement est considéré comme une occasion plutôt que comme une menace. Dans les organisations adaptatives, les dirigeants savent comment sentir l'énergie latente et créer l'impulsion nécessaire à la mise en oeuvre des changements critiques.

Les dirigeants sont des maîtres du changement dotés d'une vision. Ils constituent de bons modèles internes, capables de saisir toutes les facettes d'une question. Leur autorité provient beaucoup plus de leur compétence, de leurs réalisations et de leurs rapports que de leur statut ou de leur rang. Ils sont plus que des gestionnaires ou des administrateurs, ils sont beaucoup plus attachés à leur vision qu'à leur image. Ils se concentrent sur les occasions plutôt que sur les problèmes. Ils pensent, planifient et se comportent « en contexte » et ne se laissent pas emprisonner dans des activités quotidiennes. Ils cherchent et provoquent les changements nécessaires au lieu de chercher d'abord à protéger plus fermement le statu quo. Ils assument personnellement la responsabilité de maintenir et d'accroître l'efficacité de l'organisation.

En tant que dirigeants, ces individus adaptatifs montrent l'exemple en traitant chacun avec respect et comme une source d'idées fécondes, en félicitant ceux qui proposent des idées nouvelles, en discutant ouvertement de questions délicates et en écoutant ceux qui ont des points de vue divergents. En encourageant l'expression de points de vue nouveaux, ils s'assurent que rien n'a été négligé. Ils parlent avec fierté de leur organisation et évitent la critique publiquement. Ils utilisent le pouvoir de façon non traditionnelle en puisant dans les sources de bonnes idées et en déterminant les personnes dont la collaboration est nécessaire pour mettre en oeuvre ces idées plutôt que de se fier à la hiérarchie. Les gestionnaires adaptatifs prennent l'initiative de projets inter-services et forment des partenariats stratégiques avec leur clientèle. Ils font office d'intégrateurs et d'animateurs et non de chiens de garde et d'interventionnistes. Ils anticipent les réponses d'autres groupes et sont d'avantage motivés par les projets audacieux que par les systèmes ordinaires de compensation. Ils rehaussent la réputation d'autrui. Ils rendent emballante la participation à une mission, au plaisir de la gloire et aux bénéfices du succès. Leurs employés sont généralement créatifs et souples, beaucoup plus à l'image des « prospecteurs » que des « défendeurs ». Eux aussi peuvent gérer l'ambiguïté. Ils tendent à considérer les autres employés comme leurs clients; il existe chez eux un sens aigu de l'identité de l'organisation.

Bien que les individus apportent leur contribution et soient récompensés chacun à sa manière, il reste que tous les membres connaissent le genre d'organisation idéale vers laquelle ils tendent (« une entreprise »). La promotion du partage des valeurs se fait par les dirigeants de l'organisation en tant qu'agents de transmission de la culture qui jouent un rôle très actif dans ce processus. Au lieu de laisser les choses arriver ou de les aider à arriver, ils les **provoquent**. Ils croient au consensus, et la « finalité » est utilisée pour mettre tout le monde sur la même longueur d'onde. Ce qui aboutit au rapprochement des

Il existe une culture distinctive et de solidarité que chacun comprend et possède. Les ministères peuvent — et doivent — développer les sous-cultures qui suscitent un meilleur rendement global. Chaque direction générale ou secteur est invité à adopter et à renforcer ces normes visant l'ensemble de l'organisation qui favorisent la réussite de l'organisation.

Les préoccupations quotidiennes sont comparées aux normes permanentes touchant l'avenir de l'organisation; plus l'écart est grand, plus la possibilité est grande que ces préoccupations finiront par entraver le moral et le rendement. Si on les laisse perdurer, ces écarts amèneront les groupes de travail à résister à toute tentative de changement et d'amélioration et à maintenir le statu quo à tout prix. Une organisation publique adaptative a besoin d'orienter son action vers des objectifs et non vers des programmes et des projets. Elle a besoin d'un énoncé réaliste de ses buts de manière à pouvoir faire valoir les accomplissements réalisables. Elle doit abandonner les normes d'objectivité et de neutralité concernant les orientations (par opposition à la politique) parce que ces normes découragent l'engagement passionné qui est si essentiel et si évident dans une entreprise adaptative. De plus, la culture de l'organisation doit attacher une grande priorité au leadership et à la gestion des ressources humaines.

Dans les entreprises les plus efficaces, le but et la mission sont imbriqués et s'appuient sur des valeurs fondamentales communes. La « mission » englobe les devoirs et les objectifs à long terme de l'organisation.

Leadership

Qu'elles soient privées ou publiques, les organisations adaptatives possèdent certaines qualités à des degrés divers. Le présent chapitre examine certaines caractéristiques clés à partir de deux points de vue : le leadership et l'ouverture sur l'extérieur.

Par exemple, les institutions publiques doivent se départir de leurs répertoires programmes à l'avance pour acquérir une capacité d'agir résolument, elles doivent transformer leur orientation ministérielle en une orientation entrepreneuriale et adopter des solutions dictées moins par le pouvoir que par les tâches à accomplir. Elles doivent chercher à développer davantage le sens de la décision (plutôt que le sens de l'analyse) pour trouver des solutions rapides et innovatrices susceptibles de mieux répondre aux besoins du public et ses diverses composantes tout en demeurant l'objet d'un examen minutieux et ininterrompu.

PARTIE 1 : L'ORGANISATION PUBLIQUE ADAPTATIVE

Introduction

Pourquoi avons-nous besoin d'organisations adaptatives? Parce que nous ne pouvons prédire l'avenir.

L'avenir nous réserve de nombreuses surprises. Certaines d'entre elles ne devront pas trop nous surprendre, car leur ombre est déjà visible. Par exemple :

- le public exige des services sophistiqués, mais moins coûteux;
- dans les décennies qui viennent, la main-d'œuvre sera relativement dépourvue de jeunes gens, surtout ceux possédant une formation technique avancée, à un moment où les forces économiques mondiales mettront plus que jamais au défi la compétitivité canadienne;
- la main-d'œuvre sera de plus en plus multiculturelle, sa plus grande composante dont la créativité est inexploitée étant composée de femmes;
- les attitudes à l'égard du travail changent;

- les vieux problèmes énoncés différemment — la gestion de l'environnement, les rapports entre les différents groupes dans la société canadienne, le régionalisme, les relations avec les États-Unis — reviendront à la une.

Ces questions, ainsi que leurs conséquences, sont au moins prévisibles, même si le moment de leur survenance, leur intensité et les conséquences de leur survenance en même temps que d'autres événements non reliés sont moins prévisibles. Toujours est-il que la grande partie de ce qui comptera vraiment sera une surprise. Souvenons-nous des chocs rudes que le monde a réservés aux hommes d'état depuis 1970 : les crises du pétrole, la démission d'un président américain, la montée de l'intégrisme islamique, l'effondrement du communisme dans toute l'Europe de l'est, la réunification prochaine des deux Allemandes. Dans tous ces cas, les réactions gouvernementales rapides et efficaces se sont distinguées des réactions hésitantes, maladroites et perdantes par la résistance et l'adaptativité.

Comme pour de nombreuses entreprises privées, les organisations publiques doivent s'adapter si elles veulent maintenir leur pertinence. Même si la tradition veut que les bureaucraties soient caractérisées par l'inertie, on prend de plus en plus conscience partout dans le monde que ces organisations doivent changer par choix stratégique plutôt que par simple réaction à leur milieu. Après tout, le terme « adaptatif » n'évoque pas simplement un accommodement passif, mais plutôt la tentative de modifier le milieu et d'influencer en profondeur les événements. L'adaptativité est synonyme d'efficacité et constitue une caractéristique essentielle des organisations prospères.

PREFACE

Ce rapport préliminaire du Groupe de travail sur l'adaptation de la main-d'oeuvre se divise en trois parties. La première partie résume brièvement certaines qualités que doit posséder une organisation adaptative. La revue de la littérature a révélé environ vingt-cinq caractéristiques clés, dont quatorze sont considérées à la fois comme fondamentales et pertinentes quant à l'organisation publique adaptative. Ces caractéristiques sont groupées et discutées comme suit :

a) La première partie décrit environ neuf caractéristiques couvrant les thèmes du leadership et de l'ouverture sur l'extérieur. Ces caractéristiques représentent les aspects plus larges du comportement et de la culture d'une organisation adaptative, lesquels transcendent les soucis de l'adaptation de la main-d'oeuvre dans certains cas. Les détails de ces questions seront sans doute abordés par plusieurs autres groupes de travail de la FP 2000.

b) La deuxième partie examine les autres caractéristiques dans leur rapport avec les considérations en matière de ressources humaines, justifiant la prise de mesures et orientées vers l'action, qui permettent une intervention relativement directe à court terme. Toutes les recommandations ayant trait à des modifications législatives précises ou à des changements précis au niveau de l'administration centrale sont formulées dans cette partie.

c) La troisième partie, qui sera rédigée cet été, se penchera sur les voies et moyens que les dirigeants du ministère peuvent choisir pour rapprocher leurs organisations de l'état désiré. Elle ne sera pas de nature prescriptive, mais présentera plutôt des exemples — elle sera source d'idées éprouvées plutôt qu'une série de recommandations.

TABLe DES MATIÈRES

Page

| | |
|---|----|
| PRÉFACE | 3 |
| PARTIE 1 : L'ORGANISATION PUBLIQUE ADAPTATIVE | 4 |
| Introduction | 4 |
| Leadership | 5 |
| Ouverture sur l'extérieur | 8 |
| PARTIE 2 : LES ÉLÉMENTS D'UNE BONNE GESTION | 11 |
| Recrutement | 11 |
| Les occasions | 13 |
| Le pouvoir | 17 |
| Les mesures d'encouragement | 18 |
| Ressources | 20 |
| Évaluations | 22 |
| Que faire avec les mauvais employés? | 23 |

Ressources

(20) Lorsque la redistribution de points selon le système Hay à l'occasion d'une décentralisation augmente le nombre de postes de cadre, le SCT doit être disposé à rajuster l'effectif.

(21) Plus généralement, le nombre de cadres doit automatiquement être rajusté pour correspondre au nombre de postes classifiés à ce niveau, en tenant compte de la flexibilité normale.

Évaluations

(22) Les rôles et les attentes raisonnables des deux parties dans le processus d'évaluation du rendement doivent être clarifiés au cours des programmes d'orientation à l'intention de nouveaux employés.

(23) Pour l'ensemble des cadres, en commençant avec les sous-ministres, les opinions des subordonnés sur la qualité du leadership dont ils ont fait preuve au cours de la période d'évaluation doit être prise en considération par les responsables de l'évaluation.

Que faire avec les mauvais employés?

(24) L'article 31 de la *Loi sur l'emploi dans la fonction publique* doit être supprimé et tous les motifs de licenciement, à l'exception du renvoi en cours de probation et de l'ingérence politique, qui doivent demeurer sous le régime de la *Loi sur l'emploi dans la fonction publique*, doivent être régis par la *Loi sur la gestion des finances publiques*.

(25) Dans le cas des licenciements régis par la *Loi sur la gestion des finances publiques*, il doit y avoir une seule procédure de redressement sous le régime de la *Loi sur les relations de travail dans la fonction publique*. Cette procédure ne devrait pas porter atteinte aux droits garantis par la *Loi canadienne sur les droits de la personne*.

(26) Il existe un conflit entre la *LEFP*, qui accorde à la CFP le pouvoir exclusif en matière de nomination, et la *LRTFP*, qui accorde à un arbitre le pouvoir de réintégrer — c'est-à-dire d'effectuer également des nominations. Ce conflit doit être résolu en faveur de l'arbitre. L'arbitre qui estime que la réintégration s'impose, doit avoir le pouvoir soit de prononcer la réintégration au poste original, soit d'accorder la priorité pour la nomination à un poste équivalent.

(27) Les sous-ministres doivent avoir le pouvoir de négocier des règlements monétaires afin d'éviter un licenciement formel et les procédures de redressement.

(14) Plutôt, la déstabilisation devrait être considérée comme une conséquence de la décentralisation et du pouvoir. Elle doit se faire au niveau du ministère ou de la direction générale. Elle ne devrait pas constituer la priorité la plus urgente en 1991 et en 1992, parce que digérer toutes les autres réformes de la FP 2000 devrait avoir préséance. Pour les cadres supérieurs qui s'approprient à décentraliser, l'action clé sera de saisir et de réaffecter les nouveaux excédentaires avant qu'ils n'inventent de nouvelles tâches affairées plus nuisibles.

Les mesures d'encouragement

(15) Les employés à temps partiel pour des durées indéterminées devraient avoir la possibilité de contribuer à un fonds de pension et accumuler des années de service proportionnellement à leur temps au travail.

(16) Les employés devraient avoir la possibilité de terminer progressivement leur carrière sans être pénalisés en matière de pension.

(17) À l'occasion, un employé très estimé accumule l'âge et le service nécessaires pour faire en sorte que sa présence continue dans la Fonction publique ne soit véritablement qu'une question d'amour. Pour contourner l'incitation financière des départs inopportuns, nous recommandons qu'à la discrétion de l'employeur, ou bien a) le droit au salaire des six meilleures années, jusqu'à concurrence de 70 % soit porté à 80 %, l'employé continuant à cotiser au régime comme avant, ou bien b) que l'employeur ait la discrétion d'offrir un régime contributif séparé.

(18) Dans un système de dépenses courantes et de primes de rendement, les négociations collectives doivent mieux tenir compte des circonstances particulières de chaque ministère de manière que les employés puissent bénéficier directement des avantages que l'ensemble de la collectivité tire de l'augmentation de la productivité. Le processus de négociation collective doit permettre la négociation de conventions complémentaires entre les rondes importantes de négociations pour couvrir des régimes particuliers de productivité.

(19) Nous recommandons que la politique sur les primes d'encouragement incorporée dans le Régime des primes d'encouragement du Conseil du trésor (Chapitre 365 du Manuel de la politique administrative) soit révisée pour accorder aux administrateurs généraux le pouvoir discrétionnaire d'établir des programmes de reconnaissance et de primes d'encouragement bien conçus pour leur ministère. Les limitations opérationnelles et les critères d'attribution actuellement prévus par la Politique des primes d'encouragement doivent être éliminés.

b) aidera les individus à établir des objectifs professionnels réalistes et à établir un plan personnel de perfectionnement;

c) sera à la disposition de tous les fonctionnaires, la priorité étant accordée aux groupes visés par les programmes de promotion sociale à l'échelon de débutant et aux postes d'entrée dans la catégorie de gestion.

(8) Nous recommandons que le CCG établisse, sur une base expérimentale, un inventaire des cadres — pas seulement féminins — qui désirent consacrer une heure ou deux par semaine à conseiller les professionnelles.

(9) Nous recommandons que chaque employé comptant au moins sept ans d'expérience ait la possibilité d'être évalué une fois, à la discrétion de l'employé, par le Service d'évaluation des employés. Les services d'évaluation doivent être choisis non parce qu'ils relèvent du secteur public ou du secteur privé, mais en fonction de l'efficacité avec laquelle ils donnent suite à l'adaptativité dans un programme général de bonne réputation.

(10) La distinction actuelle entre la formation et le perfectionnement doit être réduite de manière que l'employeur assume une plus grande partie du coût total du perfectionnement.

(11) L'accès aux possibilités de perfectionnement est la pierre angulaire de l'équité en matière d'emploi, ce qui veut dire que l'accès préférentiel doit être accordé sur la base de l'adaptativité de l'employé ainsi que sur la valeur qu'en tirera la Fonction publique dans l'aventir par opposition à l'expérience de travail précise.

Le pouvoir

(12) Rien n'agace plus les employés sur le terrain que le temps et la paperasse nécessaires pour avoir accès aux outils. Le MAS devrait avoir pour mandat d'adopter un système complètement libre de la paperasse pour les achats ordinaires de manière à ce que tout agent compétent dans un ministère puisse puiser électroniquement dans les stocks et les offres permanentes à des taux de frais de service considérablement moindres.

(13) Il ne faudrait pas avoir un système généralisé de déstratification ou de renonciation aux services de nombre d'employés actuellement dans la catégorie SM-EX. C'est une mesure très coûteuse, qui tend à encourager les mauvaises personnes à partir, qui ignore les réalités très différentes de chacun des ministères et qui, comme tenu de l'expérience passée, ne permettrait pas d'avoir une main-d'oeuvre représentative par la suite.

Recrutement

(1) Dans le marché du travail des années 1990 et après, recruter et retenir des agents débutants sortant des universités sera notre seul enjeu majeur. Nous recommandons que la CFP s'assure le concours des dirigeants ministériels et des modèles dans une campagne dynamique et à long terme visant à faire produire par les universités canadiennes un flot continu de candidats hautement adaptés.

(2) La CFP doit développer des méthodes d'évaluation de l'adaptativité personnelle.

(3) Le recrutement hardi signifie se présenter tôt sur les campus et pouvoir très tôt faire des offres d'emploi précises. Nous recommandons la mise sur pied de pools spéciaux offrant des possibilités de perfectionnement accélérées pour les nouveaux groupes de l'Administration et de l'analyse en remplacement du groupe AT qui a disparu et pour étendre les programmes ES actuels.

(4) Jusqu'à ce que la méthode des dépenses courantes soit mise en oeuvre, les pools devaient être constitués d'années-personnes provenant pour moitié des ministères et pour moitié des organismes centraux. Dès que la méthode des dépenses courantes aura été mise en oeuvre, les pools devraient être constitués uniquement sur la base des engagements globaux des ministères en matière de recrutement.

(5) Les organisations qui ont du ressort, autodidactes regroupent une diversité d'expérience et d'antécédents. C'est le besoin d'adaptativité autant que la nécessité d'une fonction publique représentative dans une société démocratique qui est le moteur de l'équité en matière d'emploi. Par conséquent, un accent spécial doit être mis sur la sureprésentation des femmes, des autochtones, des minorités visibles et des handicapés dans les groupes de l'Administration et de l'analyse offrant des possibilités de perfectionnement. En tant que gestionnaire des pools, le SCT doit veiller à ce que leur composition contribue de façon substantielle à la représentativité de la Fonction publique dans l'avenir.

(6) Les comités de sélection chargés du recrutement, de la promotion et du perfectionnement doivent être composés de femmes, d'hommes et de membres de groupes minoritaires.

Les occasions

(7) Il est recommandé que soit établi au sein de la Commission de la Fonction publique un service d'orientation professionnelle pleinement professionnel, ce service :
a) identifiera à l'intention des gestionnaires des candidats qualifiés pour des concours donnés et des postes offrant des possibilités de perfectionnement;

Pourquoi avons-nous besoin d'organisations adaptatives? Parce que nous ne pouvons prédire l'avenir.

Comme pour de nombreuses entreprises privées, les organisations publiques doivent s'adapter si elles veulent maintenir leur pertinence. Même si la tradition veut que les bureaux soient caractérisés par l'inertie, on prend de plus en plus conscience partout dans le monde que ces organisations doivent changer par choix stratégique plutôt que par simple réaction à leur milieu. Après tout, le terme « adaptatif » n'évoque pas simplement un accommodement passif, mais plutôt la tentative de modifier le milieu et d'influencer en profondeur les événements. L'adaptativité est synonyme d'efficacité et constitue une caractéristique essentielle des organisations prospères.

Par exemple, les institutions publiques doivent se départir de leurs répertoires programmatiques à l'avance pour acquérir une capacité d'agir résolument, elles doivent transformer leur orientation ministérielle en une orientation entrepreneuriale et adopter des solutions dictées moins par le pouvoir que par les tâches à accomplir. Elles doivent chercher à développer davantage le sens de la décision (plutôt que le sens de l'analyse) pour trouver des solutions rapides et innovatrices susceptibles de mieux répondre aux besoins du public et ses diverses composantes tout en demeurant l'objet d'un examen minutieux et ininterrompu.

La partie 1 du Rapport du groupe de travail sur l'adaptation de la main-d'œuvre résume en peu de mots les qualités d'une organisation adaptée. La partie 3, qui est à compléter, concentrera sur les façons dont les dirigeants ministériels peuvent atteindre ces qualités. Les neuf dixièmes de ce qui doit être fait relèvent du domaine des pratiques de gestion plutôt que des échecs du système, et s'appliquent par conséquent au niveau des ministères et des organismes. Les contraintes législatives ou celles de l'administration centrale ne sont généralement pas importantes et, le cas échéant, d'autres groupes de travail s'en occupent d'habitude. Néanmoins, il conviendrait de considérer la possibilité d'apporter quelques changements résiduels au système dans son ensemble afin de favoriser l'adaptativité. La partie 2 du Rapport traite de ces changements et les plus significatifs sont comme suit.

POUR DISCUSSION

FONCTION PUBLIQUE 2000 : RAPPORT DU GROUPE DE TRAVAIL SUR
L'ADAPTATION DE LA MAIN-D'OEUVRE

SOMMAIRE

Le 1^{er} juillet 1990

FONCTION PUBLIQUE 2000 : RAPPORT DU GROUPE DE TRAVAIL SUR
L'ADAPTATION DE LA MAIN-D'OEUVRE

Peter Glynn
Dan Goodleaf
Robert Gordon
Bruce Howe
Martha Hyma
Howard Ladd
Alain Landry
Kristina Liljefors
Jennifer McQueen
Peter Meyboom
Ken Sinclair
Harry Swain (président)
Ruth Cardinal (Communications)
John Edwards (membre d'office)
Roberta Santi (secrétaire)
Stuart Wightman (coordonnateur)

Le 1^{er} juillet 1990

- (m) Rôle du ministre dans la négociation collective (alinéa 63) :
- (i) Le rôle du ministre dans la négociation devrait être accru surtout pour ce qui est de l'élaboration des positions de l'employeur à l'égard des négociations ainsi que pour ce qui est des négociations qui suivront. Le gouvernement devrait envisager sérieusement (ii) la négociation à deux paliers. (iii) Il devrait incomber aux ministères de régler la plupart des griefs en arbitrage, sauf ceux qui ont des répercussions sur l'ensemble de la Fonction publique. (n) Commission des relations de travail dans la Fonction publique (CRTFP) (alinéa 66) :
- Les agents de négociation devraient être consultés pour la nomination du président, du vice-président et des présidents suppléants de la CRTFP.
- (o) Formation des cadres (alinéa 69) :
- (i) Les cadres devraient recevoir une bonne formation théorique en matière de relations de travail.
- (ii) L'employeur devrait mettre à la disposition des cadres des interprétations complètes des nouvelles conventions collectives, et leur donner la formation nécessaire.
- (p) Consultation (alinéa 70) :
- Il faudrait améliorer la consultation à l'échelle des ministères et de l'ensemble de la Fonction publique en élargissant l'étendue de la consultation et en veillant à ce qu'elle se produise au début du processus d'élaboration des politiques. Les cadres supérieurs devraient se montrer disposés à la consultation.

- (i) Révision des décisions arbitrales (alinéa 53) :
- La CRTFP devrait être autorisée à réviser les décisions arbitrales, afin qu'elles soient cohérentes et équitables.
- (j) Exclusions (alinéa 56) :
- (i) Les postes, et non les personnes, devraient être exclus.
- (ii) Devraient être principalement exclus les postes comportant d'importantes tâches liées à la gestion.
- (iii) Le nombre d'exclusions visant des postes comportant des fonctions « confidentielles » est excessif et devrait être considérablement réduit.
- Le Groupe de travail recommande la révision de l'exclusion d'employés proposés à des fonctions « confidentielles », sauf dans le cas des postes concernant la gestion des relations de travail.
- (iv) Les exclusions devraient être considérées en vigueur au moment où elles sont proposées jusqu'à ce que la CRTFP rende une décision contraire.
- (k) Conseil national mixte (CNM) (alinéa 59) :
- Le Groupe de travail reconnaît le rôle consultatif important joué par le CNM en matière d'élaboration des politiques et souhaite l'accroître, mais recommande que les griefs concernant les politiques du ministère et de la CRTFP.
- (l) Avis de négociation (alinéa 62) :
- La période d'avis de négociation devrait être prolongée de 60 à 90 jours.

Résumé des recommandations

Annexe A

(c) Fournir des services d'arbitrage, y compris l'arbitrage des propositions finales, à la demande des deux parties lorsque la voie de la conciliation et de la grève a été retenue, et lorsque il semble que les autres méthodes n'aboutiront pas à un accord.

(d) Sanctions en cas de grève illégale (alinéa 42) :

Rendre les sanctions équivalentes à celles prévues dans le Code canadien du travail.

(e) Vote de grève (alinéa 44) :

Il doit y avoir un scrutin obligatoire et secret. Toutefois, la CRTFP doit faire enquête et rendre une décision lorsque des employés se plaignent d'irrégularités.

(f) Devoir de représentation équitable (alinéa 45) :

La Loi sur les relations de travail dans la Fonction publique (LRTFP) devrait imposer aux syndicats l'obligation de représenter équitablement les employés, comme il est prévu dans le Code canadien du travail.

(g) Grèves et arbitrage (alinéa 46) :

(i) Comité tenu de l'examen de ce qui a pu être observé dans les autres secteurs de la fonction publique, la procédure de règlement des grèves et d'arbitrage devrait pouvoir s'appliquer au plan de classification de l'employeur. Si des modifications importantes se produisent en ce qui concerne le groupe professionnel et la structure de classification actuels, cette recommandation devrait être appliquée à la suite d'une période préparatoire appropriée.

(ii) Il faudrait regrouper les dispositions concernant les recours. Il faudrait notamment que la procédure de règlement des grèves et d'arbitrage puisse s'appliquer au renvoi pour incapacité et à la rétrogradation, tout comme au congédiement pour motifs disciplinaires.

(iii) Les politiques approuvées par le Conseil national mixte (CNM) ne devraient pouvoir faire l'objet de grèves que par l'entremise de la dernière étape de règlement des grèves dont la dernière étape est l'arbitrage par la CRTFP.

(iv) Les services de médiation demandés conjointement par les parties devraient être fournis par la CRTFP avant l'arbitrage.

(h) Grèves collectifs (alinéa 52) :

La CRTFP devrait être autorisée à entendre un grieved (ou un nombre représentatif) à la demande de l'une ou l'autre partie plutôt qu'un grand nombre de grévistes semblables. La décision prise s'appliquerait à tous.

On trouvera ci-après un résumé des principales recommandations qui font l'objet d'un exposé plus détaillé dans la partie principale du rapport à partir de l'alinéa indiqué entre parenthèses.

(a) Structure des unités de négociation (alinéa 24) :

(i) Le Groupe de travail réaffirme le droit des employés de s'associer dans leurs meilleurs intérêts s'il devait y avoir des modifications importantes aux catégories professionnelles et à la structure de classification à la suite de l'FP 2000.

(ii) Il devrait y avoir une période de transition qui serait suivie de la détermination des unités de négociation appropriées et de l'accréditation des agents de négociation par la Fonction publique (CRTFP).

(b) Droit de grève (alinéa 27) :

(i) Le Groupe de travail réaffirme le droit fondamental à la grève, mais recommande des mesures pour protéger la population dans le cas des services publics considérés comme essentiels.

(ii) Le Groupe de travail propose que soient établis des critères pour définir les services essentiels et qu'un organisme soit institué pour administrer ces critères et déterminer le nombre d'employés désignés pour exercer les tâches essentielles.

(iii) La désignation devrait avoir lieu entre les rondes de négociation et devrait s'appliquer aux postes et non aux personnes, et rester en vigueur jusqu'à ce que les fonctions changent.

(c) Règlement des différends (alinéa 31) :

(i) Le Groupe de travail estime que l'objectif prépondérant du processus de règlement des différends doit être d'aider les parties à régler entre elles les différends.

(ii) Les agents de négociation devraient opter pour l'arbitrage obligatoire ou la conciliation et la grève au début des négociations, mais les parties et la CRTFP devraient avoir la possibilité d'avoir recours à un événement plus vaste de modalités au moment opportun pour faciliter le processus de négociation.

(iii) Le cadre de l'arbitrage devrait être aussi étendu que celui de la négociation.

(iv) La CRTFP ne devrait imposer d'arbitre ou de conseils d'arbitrage particuliers que lorsque les parties ne peuvent s'entendre sur une ou des personnes.

(v) La CRTFP devrait avoir les pouvoirs suivants :

(a) Fournir sur demande des services de médiation, de conciliation ou de recherche des faits, ou imposer ces services lorsque les négociations échouent.

(b) Offrir des services d'arbitrage seulement s'il est évident que d'autres méthodes sont inutiles et que les négociations sont dans une impasse.

Nous avons examiné les moyens qui s'offrent à la Commission des relations de travail dans la Fonction publique lorsqu'il s'agit de réglementer le déroulement des négociations et de parvenir à un accord. Nous avons conclu que la LRTFP et les pratiques courantes semblaient par trop rigides et qu'elles visaient à imposer, dans une certaine mesure du moins, des solutions plutôt qu'à inciter et à aider les parties à parvenir à une entente. À cette fin, nous suggérons qu'on adopte une approche beaucoup plus souple et qu'on y inclue une diversité de solutions de rechange qui pourront favoriser les négociations et être appliquées à la demande des parties ou en vertu d'une décision de la Commission.

Le Groupe de travail a également conclu qu'il y a trop de redressements possibles concernant les plaintes des employés et qu'en principe, on ne devrait pouvoir recourir qu'à un seul processus, savoir le grief, et en dernier recours, à l'arbitrage.

Par conséquent, le Groupe de travail a également proposé que la rétrogradation et le renvoi pour incompétence et incapacité ne soient plus assujettis à la Loi sur l'emploi dans la Fonction publique, et qu'ils puissent faire l'objet de griefs et d'arbitrage, tout comme le congédiement en vertu de la LRTFP.

L'application de schémas de classification sans possibilité d'accès à un arbitrage impartial est également une source importante de mécontentement chez les employés. Le Groupe de travail conclut qu'il y a de bonnes raisons de veiller à ce que les schémas de classification continuent d'échapper à la portée des négociations. Toutefois, sous réserve d'un examen de ce qui se fait dans d'autres secteurs de la fonction publique pour ce qui est de l'arbitrage en matière de classification, il apparaît raisonnable de permettre aux employés de recourir à la procédure de grief pour ce qui est de soumettre actuelle des groupes professionnels pourront surveiller et retarder pendant un certain temps la mise en application des nouvelles mesures touchant l'arbitrage en matière de classification.

Ces recommandations, ainsi que celles qui n'ont pas été résumées plus haut, contribueront, de l'avis du Groupe de travail, à créer un climat de confiance et d'acceptation des responsabilités mutuelles visant à assurer une amélioration des relations de travail, tout en favorisant la création d'un meilleur cadre et d'un meilleur processus de négociation collective.

secteur public, les syndicats sont moins préoccupés par le fait de savoir si l'employeur est en mesure de payer ou non, et par les répercussions possibles que peuvent avoir des règlements trop généraux sur la santé future de l'entreprise. De plus, le public est celui que ressent avec le plus d'acuité les répercussions des grèves ou des lock-outs dans le secteur public. On se préoccupe avec raison du besoin de préserver des conditions semblables dans la multitude de ministères, ainsi que de maintenir l'unité de la Fonction publique tout en accroissant l'efficacité et l'ampleur des services offerts au public. Cependant, il existe également une inquiétude fondamentale : l'employeur jouit du pouvoir législatif nécessaire pour modifier les règles et les résultats des négociations collectives.

Par conséquent, nous croyons que des règlements spécifiques devraient continuer à être en vigueur au sein de la Fonction publique, mais qu'on devrait assouplir substantiellement les prescriptions et les garanties, et qu'on devrait promouvoir un rapport de force équitable plus conforme à l'approche qu'adopte le secteur privé.

Au sein de l'administration de la Fonction publique, nous avons décelé des problèmes attribuables à la centralisation relative des responsabilités liées à la négociation collective. Nous proposons donc une participation accrue de la direction du Ministère à toutes les questions de relations de travail ainsi que l'adoption de mesures plus efficaces qui feront en sorte que les préoccupations liées au fonctionnement persont plus lourds dans la balance des négociations collectives. À notre avis, les gestionnaires de la Fonction publique devraient recevoir toutes les informations voulues concernant les nouvelles conventions collectives; ils devraient également recevoir une formation en relations de travail touchant le règlement des griefs et les consultations syndicales patronales.

Le Groupe de travail a remarqué que l'attribution excessive de personnel aux services dits «essentiels» au moment d'une grève générerait une frustration intense chez les agents négociateurs. Afin de rétablir un bon équilibre entre les droits légitimes des employeurs de retirer des services et le besoin de protéger le public contre les conséquences les plus graves des grèves dans des services essentiels, le Groupe de travail recommande que le gouvernement envisage la création d'une commission indépendante et l'élaboration de critères législatifs auxquels la Commission pourrait recourir lorsqu'il s'agit de déterminer quels services doivent être maintenus ainsi que le degré de service qu'on peut légitimement décrire comme étant essentiel.

Le Groupe de travail a également reconnu les problèmes administratifs liés à l'affectation et à l'exclusion de personnes plutôt que des postes, ainsi que le besoin de déterminer ces éléments à un moment autre que durant des négociations collectives. Ainsi, les recommandations ont été faites afin de résoudre les problèmes de synchronisation et d'application.

Résumé du Rapport du Groupe de travail sur les relations de travail

Etat des relations de travail

On a informé le Groupe de travail que les relations de travail, et particulièrement, le processus de négociation collective n'étaient pas dans une situation critique ni ne risquaient de s'effondrer. Pourtant, il semble que les relations entre l'employeur et les agents négociateurs se soient détériorées dernièrement, et que le processus soit parfois entravé en raison des règles et des procédures trop rigides. De plus, certains événements ont, au fil des ans, entraîné des déséquilibres du pouvoir dans le système. Parfois, ce déséquilibre favorisait l'employeur; d'autres fois, il empêchait une gestion efficace.

En outre, la Loi sur les relations de travail dans la Fonction publique (L.RTFP) qui est aujourd'hui en vigueur semble être par trop normative, rigide et quelque peu paternaliste. Nombreux sont ceux qui pourraient affirmer que cette loi protège à outrance la Fonction publique contre les effets d'une approche plus ouverte envers la négociation collective, une approche qui pourrait ressembler à celle du secteur privé.

Il est certain qu'une amélioration serait souhaitable au sein du Ministère et des instances de négociation collective en ce qui a trait à la participation des cadres au processus de négociation. Les relations où la consultation est, au mieux, superficielle, et où les fonctionnaires ne sont souvent pas suffisamment préparés ou adéquatement formés pour s'occuper des questions de relations de travail.

Conclusions

Le Groupe de travail croit que son objectif principal devrait consister à dégager les principes et les mesures générales qui assureraient l'équité aux employés, représentés par les unités de négociation, et au public canadien, que nous servons tous, lequel est représenté par le gouvernement.

Nous avons conclu que les meilleurs résultats étaient habituellement obtenus grâce au recours, non pas à des solutions imposées, mais plutôt à des pratiques qui aident les parties à trouver, elles-mêmes, des solutions à leurs divergences d'opinion. L'application judicieuse, au besoin, d'une gamme souple d'outils de négociation peut également faciliter le processus.

Le Groupe de travail reconnaît l'existence de différences de taille entre la Fonction publique et le secteur privé auxquelles il vaut la peine de s'attarder lorsqu'on traite de la législation qui régit les relations de travail. Dans le

Généralités

Au milieu de décembre 1989, le Premier ministre a lancé le projet «Fonction publique 2000» en vue de revitaliser la Fonction publique. Le Groupe de travail sur les relations de travail faisait partie de neuf groupes créés à l'époque. Le présent document consiste en un résumé des objectifs, de la méthodologie et des conclusions de ce groupe de travail. Ses recommandations sont présentées sous forme abrégée à l'annexe A. Les lecteurs qui désirent obtenir des explications plus approfondies sur les recommandations peuvent, à l'aide des renvois aux paragraphes, consulter le texte intégral du rapport.

Objectifs

Le Groupe de travail sur les relations de travail s'est inspiré des objectifs et de l'esprit du projet Fonction publique 2000 et, en particulier, du principe selon lequel les relations avec les membres du personnel doivent se fonder sur un souci réel de leur bien-être et de leurs intérêts.

Méthodologie

Au départ, le Groupe de travail a décidé de s'épargner des formalités, préférant recommander des principes et des mesures de portée générale à l'égard du système de négociations collectives. Le Groupe de travail a donc rédigé un «exposé des questions» qui décrit, de façon générale, les négociations collectives de la Fonction publique et les questions les plus importantes que soulève l'étude de ces sujets.

Afin d'obtenir des commentaires, des conseils et des réactions, le Groupe de travail a remis l'exposé des questions aux syndicalistes, aux spécialistes des relations de travail, à des consultants de l'extérieur et aux établissements qui participent au processus de négociation collective, à d'autres groupes de travail ainsi qu'à tous les sous-ministres. Le Groupe de travail a rencontré un grand nombre de représentants des parties intéressées; il a pris connaissance d'une grande quantité de documents écrits décrivant la perception de nombre d'intervenants de même que les régimes, les problèmes et les faits nouveaux qui caractérisent les relations de travail ailleurs au Canada et dans le monde entier. Les propositions écrites limitées à l'exposé des questions orales ne se sont pas plutôt un aperçu général de l'état actuel des relations de travail dans la Fonction publique et de ce qui peut être fait en vue d'améliorer la situation.

5. Conseillers spéciaux en matière de relations de travail :
M. Brian Keller
 Keller and Associates
M. William Kelly
 Ancien sous-ministre associé
 Travail Canada
M. Mike McDermott
 Sous-ministre adjoint principal
 Service fédéral de médiation et de conciliation
 Travail Canada
6. **M. Ian Deans**
 Président de la Commission des relations de travail
 Commission des relations de travail dans la Fonction publique
7. **M. L.M. Tenace**
 Secrétaire adjoint
 Direction générale des relations de travail
 Conseil du Trésor du Canada

8. **M^{me} Shirley Goldenberg**
 Experte-conseil en relations de travail
9. **M. Jim Thomas**
 Sous-ministre adjoint
 Secrétariat des ressources humaines
 Conseil de gestion du Cabinet, Ontario
10. **M. Des Davidge**
 Secrétaire général
 Comité national mixte
11. Les autres groupes de travail de Fonction publique 2000
12. Nous sommes redevables à de nombreuses autres personnes de leurs conseils, articles, avis et aide en général au cours des activités du projet Fonction publique 2000 ou parce qu'elles s'intéressent particulièrement aux relations de travail.

Liste des personnes officiellement invitées à s'adresser au Groupe de travail sur les relations de travail

Annexe C du Rapport du Groupe de travail sur les relations de travail

1. On a remis à tous les sous-ministres de la fonction publique fédérale un exemplaire de l'Énoncé des questions et on a invité leur ministère à rédiger une réponse.
2. Syndicats :

Association du Groupe des opérations aéronautiques
 Association des administrateurs financiers de la Fonction publique
 Association canadienne du contrôle du trafic aérien
 Association canadienne des professionnels de l'exploitation radio
 Guilde de la marine marchande du Canada
 Conseil des unions des arts graphiques de la Fonction publique du Canada
 Association des économistes, sociologues et statisticiens

Conseil des métiers et du travail du chanvrier maritime
 du gouvernement fédéral (Esquimalt)
 Conseil des métiers et du travail du chanvrier maritime
 du gouvernement fédéral (Est)
 Association des chefs d'équipe des chantiers maritimes du gouvernement fédéral
 Fraternité internationale des ouvriers en électricité
 Association professionnelle des agents du service extérieur
 Institut professionnel de la Fonction publique du Canada
 Alliance de la Fonction publique du Canada
 Syndicat canadien des employés professionnels et techniques

3. Spécialistes des relations de travail

M. J.C. Cloutier
 Directeur des relations de travail et de la rémunération
 Revenu Canada
 M. G.M. Allen
 Directeur général
 Relations de travail et rémunération
 Transports Canada
 M^{me} L. Brown
 Directrice des relations de travail
 Douanes et accises
 Revenu Canada

4. Cadres qui ont été invités à s'adresser au Groupe de travail vu leur expérience particulière concernant certains aspects de la négociation collective, de la consultation ou de l'administration des conventions :

Capitaine (N) C. Baker
 Commandant
 Unité de réparation des navires (Atlantique)
 M. G. Dittbener
 Inspecteur général de la Direction générale des opérations
 Direction générale de la production et de l'inspection des aliments
 Agriculture Canada
 M. Mike Hancock
 Directeur de district
 Emploi et Immigration Canada
 Bramford (Ontario)
 M. Tremblé Lacombe
 Directeur exécutif
 Région du Québec
 Emploi et Immigration Canada
 M. J. Phelps
 Sous-commissaire
 Programmes et opérations correctionnelles
 Ministère du Solliciteur général du Canada
 M. Serge Rainville
 Directeur exécutif
 Hôpital de Ste-Anne de Bellevue

M^{me} J. De Laat
 Directrice
 Relations de travail et rémunération
 Service correctionnel Canada
 M. R.E. Smart
 Chef
 Division des relations de travail et de la rémunération
 Affaires indiennes et du Nord
 M. J.K. Gibson
 Chef
 Relations de travail
 Conseil national de recherches

6. Consultation syndicale-patronale
 - Devrait-il y avoir des mécanismes officiels de consultation aux niveaux national, régional et local?
 - 7. Amélioration du processus de négociation collective
 - Quels changements pourraient être apportés à la structure actuelle des groupes d'occupation et des unités de négociation?
 - Quels changements pourraient être apportés aux autres méthodes et pratiques pour simplifier et accélérer la négociation collective et le règlement des différends.
 - 8. Rôle de la CRTFP
 - Quels changements, le cas échéant, devraient être apportés à la structure, aux fonctions et aux pouvoirs actuels de la CRTFP?
 - La responsabilité de la fonction publique devrait-elle être confiée au Conseil canadien des relations de travail?
 - 9. Exclusions
 - Quels principes et pratiques devraient régir l'exclusion des personnes de la négociation collective (exclusions des postes de direction et de confiance)?
 - 10. Droits et restrictions
 - Quels changements ou ajouts, le cas échéant, devraient être apportés aux droits et aux restrictions actuellement prévues par la LRTFP?
 - Les membres des unités de négociation devraient-ils avoir droit à la représentation et les syndicats devraient-ils avoir l'obligation de représenter équitablement leurs membres?
5. Cadre de négociation collective
 - Quel rôle, le cas échéant, le Conseil national mixte devrait-il jouer dans le processus de négociation collective?
 - Quelles dispositions, le cas échéant, devraient être établies pour la négociation d'une convention collective cadre pour l'ensemble de la fonction publique?
 - Quel processus de règlement des différends devrait être prévu dans une convention collective cadre pour l'ensemble de la fonction publique?
 - Quel rôle, le cas échéant, les ministères devraient-ils jouer dans le processus de négociation collective?
4. Griets et sentences arbitrales
 - Si les lignes directrices actuelles ne sont pas jugées appropriées, quelles sont celles qui devraient être données aux tiers pour faciliter la conclusion d'ententes et protéger l'intérêt du public?
 - Comment les coûts de règlement des différends devraient-ils être répartis?
 - Griets et sentences arbitrales
 - Quelles modifications devraient, le cas échéant, être apportées au processus s'appliquant actuellement aux griets et aux sentences arbitrales, afin de le rendre plus efficace et efficient?
 - Quelles autres questions, le cas échéant, devraient être comprises dans le processus s'appliquant aux griets ou aux sentences arbitrales?
 - Les arbitres de griets devraient-ils continuer d'être membres de la CRTFP ou devraient-ils être choisis par parties?
 - Comment les coûts de règlement des griets devraient-ils être répartis?
 - Quel rôle, le cas échéant, les ministères devraient-ils jouer dans la processus de règlement des griets?

Champ d'étude des relations de travail

pour résoudre les différends de façon juste et équitable, en tenant compte des intérêts du public. Bien que l'on doive donner suite à des préoccupations de longue date concernant la législation actuelle, les travaux du Groupe de travail visent à obtenir des parties concernées leur point de vue sur deux questions précises.

- Qu'est-ce qui a été à l'origine des conflits et des confrontations par le passé?
- Que peut-on faire pour minimiser les conflits à l'avenir et établir un dialogue plus efficace, un esprit d'ouverture et un climat de confiance?

En tenant compte de l'objectif premier du Groupe de travail, les parties concernées doivent répondre aux questions qui suivent.

1. Portée des négociations

- Que devrait-on ajouter, le cas échéant, aux questions qui sont déjà négociables en vertu de la LRTFP?
- Quelles questions devraient être exclues de la négociation collective et pourquoi?
- Comment devrait-on traiter les questions relatives à la cessation d'emploi qui sont déjà comprises dans d'autres lois (LRGP, LGFP)?

2. Droit de grève

- Le droit de grève devrait-il être maintenu?
- Devrait-on avoir le droit de procéder à des lock-out?
- Des employés devraient-ils être temporairement mis à pied si une grève donne lieu à une pénurie de travail?

- Quelles procédures devraient s'appliquer, le cas échéant, pour la tenue de votes de grève?
- Les sanctions prévues sont-elles suffisantes pour décourager les grèves illégales?

- Quelles modifications, le cas échéant, devraient être apportées aux principes et méthodes régissant la désignation des employés qui ne peuvent faire la grève parce qu'ils doivent assurer les services essentiels (désignation pour des raisons de sûreté et de sécurité)?

3. Règlement des différends

- Quels changements ou ajouts devraient être apportés aux méthodes actuelles de règlement des différends afin d'accélérer la négociation collective?
- Quelles autres questions, le cas échéant, devraient être soumises à l'arbitrage exécutoire?

La première démarche importante prise par le Groupe de travail a été d'élaborer un «Énoncé des questions» qui décrit les objectifs particuliers du travail et le champ d'étude que le Groupe entend couvrir. L'«Énoncé des questions» a ensuite été largement diffusé pour informer les parties intéressées des sujets d'examen et pour leur demander leurs réactions aux questions particulières soulevées.

Le Groupe de travail a tenu des réunions de consultation sur ces questions globales avec les syndicats et les cadres, d'autres groupes de travail, des universitaires, des spécialistes des relations de travail, des spécialistes de l'extérieur et des agents des principales institutions de négociation collective touchant la fonction publique. La plupart des syndicats et des institutions ont présenté des mémoires écrits, et des discussions en personne ont eu lieu avec tous les syndicats sauf deux. Néanmoins, tous les avis ont été exprimés librement et les conclusions et recommandations du présent rapport sont l'œuvre du Groupe de travail seul.

Énoncé des questions de travail dans la fonction publique fédérale

Primauté de l'intérêt public

La fonction publique a été établie pour servir loyalement un gouvernement élu de façon démocratique et pour faire profiter le public canadien, de façon efficiente et efficace, des programmes établis. Les pratiques et les lois touchant les relations de travail ne doivent pas aller à l'encontre de l'intérêt du public. Les lois doivent aussi tenir compte du rôle du Conseil du Trésor, comme employeur, et de celui des syndicats, comme représentants de leurs membres.

Objectif du Groupe de travail sur les relations de travail

Le Groupe de travail a abordé ses travaux en tenant compte du cadre et de l'esprit du projet Fonction publique 2000, lequel reconnaît l'importance d'établir un climat de travail où les rapports avec les employés reposent sur un souci évident d'assurer leur bien-être et de protéger leurs intérêts. L'objectif premier du Groupe de travail est donc de déterminer comment les relations de travail peuvent être améliorées, en vue de favoriser une plus grande collaboration et d'établir des mécanismes

Membres du Groupe de travail sur les relations de travail

A. Kroeger _____ Président du Groupe de travail

Sous-ministre et Président
Emploi et Immigration Canada

V. W. Barbeau

Sous-ministre adjoint
Groupe des aéroports
Transports Canada

D. Broadbent

Sous-ministre
Ministère des Anciens combattants

D. J. Fowler

Secrétaire adjoint - Division de la négociation collective
Direction des relations de travail
Conseil du Trésor du Canada

R. S. Lafleur

Sous-ministre adjoint
Services de l'immobilier
Travaux publics Canada

D. J. Lindley

Sous-ministre adjoint associé
Personnel
Ministère de la Défense nationale

D. Morley

Directeur exécutif
Région de l'Ontario
Emploi et Immigration Canada

J. S. Stanford

Sous-solliciteur général
Ministère du Solliciteur général du Canada

B. J. Morrissey

Sous-ministre adjoint des sciences
Pêches et Océans

Secrétariat du Groupe de travail

Le Groupe de travail était appuyé par un secrétariat sous la direction de Don Quiring, Commission de la Fonction publique du Canada, et comprenant en outre Tom McCready, Défense nationale, Penny Driscoll, Emploi et Immigration Canada, et Johanne Laplante, Travaux publics Canada. Aussi, Robert Land, directeur général, Affaires publiques, Emploi et Immigration Canada, s'est occupé des relations publiques.

essayé de porter aux situations qui les touchent de près, aussi bien à titre personnel qu'en leur qualité de membres des unités de négociation. Nos recommandations ne suffiront pas à régler tous les problèmes, mais elles devraient contribuer à apporter un certain nombre d'importantes améliorations pratiques aux relations entre les gestionnaires et les employés dans la fonction publique canadienne.

salaires et les principaux points monétaires, tandis que des ministères et les éléments syndicaux négocient tous les points concernant le milieu de travail. Cette idée peut être particulièrement intéressante étant donné les changements imminents possibles dans la structure des unités de négociation.

65. Les ministères devraient également avoir les pouvoirs pour régler les problèmes entre les périodes de négociation et pour traiter la plupart des griefs à l'étape de l'arbitrage.

Autres facteurs dans le rôle de la CRTFP

66. Le Groupe de travail recommande que le rôle principal de la CRTFP soit de faciliter les modalités par lesquelles les parties en arrivent elles-mêmes à un accord. Ainsi, la Commission devrait disposer d'un plus grand pouvoir pour favoriser le règlement des différends tout en s'inspirant de façon moins directe dans des questions de détail et le choix des méthodes.

67. Enfin, le Groupe de travail recommande que les syndicats soient consultés sur la nomination des membres de la CRTFP, y compris son président, son vice-président et ses présidents suppléants, tout comme ils le sont pour les autres membres.

Dispositions générales

68. Le Groupe de travail reconnaît que le climat des relations de travail dépend autant des relations entre les employeurs que des règles, modalités et institutions de la négociation collective. Cette dernière peut toutefois favoriser un climat de plus ou moins grande collaboration; elle peut encourager l'harmonie en milieu de travail, ou la confrontation. C'est pourquoi le Groupe de travail a attaché beaucoup d'importance aux dispositions législatives et à la structure, comme on a pu le constater dans ce qui précède.

69. Il est clair toutefois que les cadres de la fonction publique doivent recevoir une plus grande et une meilleure formation dans la planification et la gestion des relations de travail, ainsi que dans les modalités et les principes de la négociation collective et de l'administration des conventions. En outre, lorsqu'il survient des changements importants dans les conventions collectives, il appartient au cadre opérationnel de bien comprendre leur application. Il faut donc que l'employeur fournisse des interprétations approfondies des modalités des nouvelles conventions et toute la formation nécessaire pour leur application.

70. Le Groupe de travail est également d'avis qu'il faut améliorer d'avantage les mécanismes de consultation. Beaucoup de ce que l'on tient aujourd'hui pour de la consultation avec les employés n'est en réalité que de l'information. La véritable consultation commence dès le début du cycle de planification de façon à ce qu'on puisse tenir compte du point de vue des

Conclusions

75. Tant les syndicats que les cadres trouveront

cas. relations de travail sera avantageuse dans les deux au public, sauf dans la mesure où l'amélioration des de la taille de la fonction publique à la suite de ces délibérations, ni que ces propositions aient une incidence sur les activités du gouvernement ou de service

74. Le Groupe de travail ne prévoit aucune augmentation et de sa structure administrative. une meilleure idée de sa taille, de sa charge de travail liées d'établissement d'une telle commission, on aura vices essentiels». Dès qu'on aura examiné les modalités d'exception de la «Commission des services essentiels», l'exception de la «Commission des services essentiels» n'auront pas d'incidence sur les coûts actuels. Tout comme fait, le Groupe de travail trait aux griefs collectifs, pourraient bien réduire les

73. D'autres recommandations, comme celles qui ont trait aux griefs collectifs, pourraient bien réduire les coûts actuels. Tout comme fait, le Groupe de travail estime que ces propositions n'auront pas d'incidence monétaire à l'exception de la «Commission des services essentiels». Dès qu'on aura examiné les modalités d'établissement d'une telle commission, on aura une meilleure idée de sa taille, de sa charge de travail

Répercussions des recommandations

Coût et autres effets

72. Le nombre de griefs augmentera sûrement si la position de rendre arbitrale chacune des décisions de classification est acceptée. Par ailleurs, sans étude détaillée des facteurs pouvant déterminer le nombre de cas, la rémunération du personnel et les honoraires d'arbitre privé, etc., il est difficile d'établir les coûts exacts, mais ils seront probablement considérables.

71. Enfin, le Groupe de travail est encouragé par les recommandations qui semblent se dégager dans les autres groupes de travail, et qui visent un élargissement du pouvoir décisionnel et de l'étendue de la prise de décision aux niveaux inférieurs d'exécution, de façon que le dialogue aboutisse aux meilleures décisions. De tels changements devraient également favoriser l'amélioration des relations de travail.

70. Le Groupe de travail est également d'avis qu'il faut améliorer d'avantage les mécanismes de consultation. Beaucoup de ce que l'on tient aujourd'hui pour de la consultation avec les employés n'est en réalité que de l'information. La véritable consultation commence dès le début du cycle de planification de façon à ce qu'on puisse tenir compte du point de vue des personnes consultées et elle suppose qu'on soit disposé à reconnaître la valeur des opinions exprimées. Il appartient encore une fois aux cadres supérieurs de donner l'exemple en s'engageant activement à faire des consultations et à améliorer les relations de travail.

75. Tant les syndicats que les cadres trouveront probablement de quoi se réjouir, ou se désoler, dans ces propositions. Les syndicats peuvent penser que le rapport ne va pas assez loin en ce qui a trait au cadre de négociation ou en vue de réduire les frustrations associées au principe des services essentiels et de la désignation de postes. Les cadres peuvent trouver difficile à accepter l'idée de permettre les griefs de classification, par exemple. Chaque institution, qu'il s'agisse du Conseil du Trésor, du Comité national mixte et de la CRTFP, peut y trouver des gains et des pertes. Néanmoins, le Groupe de travail souhaite en particulier que les employés de la fonction publique soient encouragés par l'attention que nous avons

55. Quelle qu'en soit la source, les décisions arbitrales peuvent avoir des répercussions très importantes et les arbitres qui travaillent seuls peuvent rendre des jugements mal informés. La CRTFP devrait donc avoir le pouvoir de réviser les décisions arbitrales pour en assurer la cohérence et la qualité. Ce pouvoir devrait s'étendre à la sphère de compétence de l'arbitre et à la décision rendue.

Exclusions

56. De nombreux gestionnaires se plaignent des difficultés et des retards excessifs pour exclure les représentants de la gestion de négociation. Le problème semble exister particulièrement aux niveaux inférieurs de gestion. Or, le conflit d'intérêts découlant d'une exclusion refusée peut être grave. Le Groupe de travail recommande donc que le critère des exclusions dans la LRTFP soit élargi pour comprendre toutes les personnes qui doivent exercer d'importantes tâches de gestion. Les postes seraient réputés être exclus jusqu'à ce qu'une objection du syndicat fasse l'objet d'une décision définitive par la CRTFP. Une fois exclu, un poste le resterait jusqu'à ce qu'il y ait un changement dans l'organisation ou un changement dans la répartition des tâches aboutissant à un retrait volontaire par le ministère ou à une contestation du syndicat. Les titulaires suivants seraient donc normalement exclus.

57. Du même coup, le Groupe de travail reconnaît qu'il y a eu beaucoup trop d'exclusions de personnes occupant un poste «de confiance». Par exemple, tous les membres de la catégorie du personnel (PF) sont automatiquement exclus même si les tâches de questions délicates de gestion ou de relations de travail. Le Groupe de travail recommande que cette question soit examinée pour que le nombre d'exclusions soit sensiblement réduit. Le Groupe de travail fait observer que le Code canadien du travail n'exclut, pour des motifs de confiance, que les personnes s'occupant directement de relations de travail.

58. Comme dans le cas des désignations, les exclusions devraient s'appliquer aux postes plutôt qu'aux personnes.

Comité national mixte

59. Le Comité national mixte (CNM) est un forum en place depuis longtemps en vertu duquel les représentants des syndicats et des employeurs abordent les

questions communes et qui englobent toutes les unités de négociation au sein de la fonction publique. Des négociations sont menées et un règlement est obtenu en ce qui touche des questions telles que la politique sur la réinstallation, les directives sur les postes isolés, la politique de l'habilitation, la politique sur les voyages et ainsi de suite. S'il survient des impasses lors de ces négociations du CNM, il existe un processus de règlement en cas de désaccord. Tous les syndicats sont représentés équitablement au sein du CNM.

60. Le Groupe de travail est d'accord avec le rôle consultatif du Conseil national mixte en matière d'élaboration de politiques et la possibilité élargie de consultation qu'il procure. Du même coup, le Groupe de travail recommande que les clauses des conventions collectives. Étant donné la conclusion du Groupe de travail selon laquelle il devrait y avoir moins de mécanismes de réparation, nous recommandons que les griefs relatifs à ces politiques ne soient pas réglés par le Conseil mais suivent plutôt la procédure ministérielle habituelle aboutissant à l'arbitrage par la CRTFP.

61. Même si le CNM joue déjà un rôle utile et positif à titre d'entité consultative et dans la négociation de questions d'application et d'intérêt universels, il peut être désavantagé dans une certaine mesure par son manque de base statutaire. Le gouvernement pourrait ainsi décider d'inclure dans toute législation générale présentée au Parlement, une section particulière définissant cette base statutaire.

Retards dans les règlements

62. Le Groupe de travail recommande le prolongement de l'avis de négocier actuel de 60 jours à 90 jours de façon à allonger le temps de préparation et à réduire, espérons-le, les délais souvent longs entre l'expiration d'une convention et la signature d'une nouvelle. Le Groupe de travail reconnaît toutefois que, pour réduire les délais, il faudra avant tout modifier l'attitude prise par les deux parties à la table de négociation, et, dans une moindre mesure, mettre à leur disposition des instruments leur permettant d'en arriver à un règlement.

Rôle des ministères

63. Le Groupe de travail recommande qu'on envisage sérieusement de trouver des façons de faire participer davantage les cadres supérieurs des ministères aux négociations collectives, et plus particulièrement à l'élaboration des mandats et des compromis à proposer.

64. En outre, le Groupe de travail recommande que le gouvernement étudie la possibilité d'adopter la négociation dite à deux paliers, par laquelle le Conseil du Trésor et les dirigeants syndicaux négocient les

et avoir recours à la Commission des droits de la personne.

Procédure de grief et médiation des griefs

50. Le Groupe de travail averti qu'il y a trop de paliers dans la procédure actuelle de règlement des griefs. Dans certains cas, une délégation de pouvoirs insuffisante peut être un obstacle au règlement des différends au niveau approprié. En outre, du fait que les cadres supérieurs hésitent à renverser des décisions prises à des niveaux subalternes, un nombre moins élevé de griefs risque de ne pas être réglé avant l'étape de l'arbitrage alors qu'on aurait dû raisonnablement s'entendre auparavant.

51. Le Groupe de travail recommande par conséquent qu'on envisage d'offrir des services de médiation à condition que l'une et l'autre partie soient d'accord pour les demander ou les demandent conjointement. Les médiateurs pourraient être choisis par les parties ou désignés par la CRTFP à même le personnel de la CRTFP ou à partir d'une liste d'agents compétents des relations de travail dressée en consultation avec les parties. D'après des renseignements communiqués au Groupe de travail, un nombre très élevé de griefs qui se seraient autrement rendus à l'arbitrage, dans certains gouvernements, ont été résolus par les parties grâce à la médiation. Ce point peut être particulièrement important si la recommandation du Groupe de travail concernant les griefs de classification est acceptée.

Griefs collectifs

52. Il y a eu des cas où un grand nombre d'employés ont présenté un grief portant essentiellement sur la même question ou pour lesquels, en l'absence de disposition aux employés de présenter un grief pour que soit résolu un problème. Même si une décision à propos d'un tel grief devrait logiquement s'appliquer à tous les griefs semblables, chacun doit actuellement suivre toutes les étapes, y compris l'arbitrage si la question est arbitrable. On peut ainsi perdre beaucoup de temps à moins que les parties soient d'accord pour mettre les griefs en attente jusqu'à ce qu'une décision soit prise à l'égard de l'un des griefs.

53. Le Groupe de travail recommande que, à la demande de l'une ou l'autre partie, la CRTFP soit habilitée à entendre un grief représentatif ou le nombre minimum nécessaire pour avoir une bonne idée de l'objet du litige. La Loi devrait prévoir la mise en attente des autres griefs et les décisions arbitrales définitives devraient ensuite s'appliquer à tous.

Choix des arbitres

54. À l'heure actuelle, la CRTFP désigne les arbitres, travail recommandé que les parties soient autorisées

de l'unité. La LRTFP ne comprend pas de telle disposition. Le Groupe de travail ne voit aucune raison de maintenir une telle distinction entre les secteurs public et privé et recommande donc que la LRTFP exige également un tel devoir de représentation équitable par les syndicates.

Cadre de la procédure de grief et d'arbitrage

46. On reconnaît généralement que l'organisation du travail et l'attribution des tâches comptent parmi les principales responsabilités de la gestion. Cet état de fait implique que la gestion puisse mettre en place des systèmes et des critères relatifs à la classification des postes. Le Groupe de travail n'a pas perdu de vue le fait que les représentants des employés insistent fortement pour que l'application des schémas de classification soit soumise aux procédures de grief et d'arbitrage; il en est venu à la conclusion qu'une telle mesure contribuerait à rendre le système de classification davantage juste et équitable. Il conviendrait toutefois d'évaluer de façon poussée les conséquences apparemment pratiques d'une telle mesure avant de prendre une décision. Dans le même ordre d'idées, le Groupe de travail recommande que le gouvernement étudie ce qui se fait en la matière au niveau provincial et sous d'autres juridictions et que, sous réserve des conclusions auxquelles il en sera arrivé, les schémas de classification soient sujets aux procédures de grief et d'arbitrage. Si des modifications importantes surviennent au sein des groupes professionnels à la suite d'autres propositions soumises dans le cadre de Fonction publique 2000, il sera essentiel d'instaurer une période de transition raisonnable avant de mettre en oeuvre les modalités d'attribution en matière de classification.

47. En outre, le Groupe de travail recommande que la cité (actuellement régie par la LEBFP) soient assujettis aux dispositions concernant les griefs et l'arbitrage en vertu de la LRTFP, tout comme la suspension et le congédiement pour motifs disciplinaires.

Modalités de recours

48. Le Groupe de travail a entendu un certain nombre d'observations selon lesquelles, au cours des années, les mécanismes de recours ont profité. Le système actuel est inutilement complexe et donne lieu à des abus. Le Groupe de travail recommande qu'il n'y ait, dans la mesure du possible, qu'un seul mécanisme de recours pour les employés contre des mesures prises par l'employeur. Ce mécanisme devrait être la procédure de grief aboutissant à l'arbitrage.

49. Tout en proposant qu'il n'y ait qu'un seul mécanisme de recours dans le cadre des relations de travail dans la fonction publique, le Groupe de travail a fait observer que les personnes peuvent également invoquer les dispositions de la Charte des droits et libertés

55. Quelle qu'en soit la source, les décisions arbitrales peuvent avoir des répercussions très importantes et les arbitres qui travaillent seuls peuvent rendre des jugements mal informés. La CRTFP devrait donc avoir le pouvoir de réviser les décisions arbitrales pour en assurer la cohérence et la qualité. Ce pouvoir devrait s'étendre à la sphère de compétence de l'arbitre et à la décision rendue.

Exclusions

56. De nombreux gestionnaires se plaignent des difficultés et des retards excessifs pour exclure les représentants de la gestion de négociation. Le problème semble exister particulièrement aux niveaux inférieurs de gestion. Or, le conflit d'intérêts découlant d'une exclusion refusée peut être grave. Le Groupe de travail recommande donc que le critère des exclusions dans la LRTFP soit élargi pour comprendre toutes les personnes qui doivent exercer d'importantes tâches de gestion. Les postes seraient réputés être exclus jusqu'à ce qu'une objection du syndicat fasse l'objet d'une décision définitive par la CRTFP. Une fois exclu, un poste le resterait jusqu'à ce qu'il y ait un changement dans l'organisation ou un changement dans la répartition des tâches aboutissant à un retrait volontaire par le ministère ou à une contestation du syndicat. Les titulaires suivants seraient donc normalement exclus.

57. Du même coup, le Groupe de travail reconnaît qu'il y a eu beaucoup trop d'exclusions de personnes occupant un poste «de confiance». Par exemple, tous les membres de la catégorie du personnel (PF) sont automatiquement exclus même si les tâches de questions délicates de gestion ou de relations de travail. Le Groupe de travail recommande que cette question soit examinée pour que le nombre d'exclusions soit sensiblement réduit. Le Groupe de travail fait observer que le Code canadien du travail n'exclut, pour des motifs de confiance, que les personnes s'occupant directement de relations de travail.

58. Comme dans le cas des désignations, les exclusions devraient s'appliquer aux postes plutôt qu'aux personnes.

59. Le Comité national mixte (CNM) est un forum en place depuis longtemps en vertu duquel les représentants des syndicats et des employeurs abordent les

Comité national mixte

60. Le Groupe de travail est d'accord avec le rôle consultatif du Conseil national mixte en matière d'élaboration de politiques et la possibilité élargie de consultation qu'il procure. Du même coup, le Groupe de travail reconnaît que les clauses des réputées avoir la même validité que les clauses des conventions collectives. Étant donné la conclusion du Groupe de travail selon laquelle il devrait y avoir moins de mécanismes de réparation, nous recommandons que les griefs relatifs à ces politiques ne soient pas réglés par le Conseil mais suivent plutôt la procédure ministérielle habituelle aboutissant à l'arbitrage par la CRTFP.

61. Même si le CNM joue déjà un rôle utile et positif à titre d'entité consultative et dans la négociation de questions d'application et d'intérêts universels, il peut être désavantagé dans une certaine mesure par son manque de base statutaire. Le gouvernement pourrait ainsi décider d'inclure dans toute législation générale présentée au Parlement, une section particulière définissant cette base statutaire.

Retards dans les règlements

62. Le Groupe de travail recommande le prolongement de l'avis de négociation actuel de 60 jours à 90 jours de façon à allonger le temps de préparation et à réduire, espérons-le, les délais souvent longs entre l'expiration d'une convention et la signature d'une nouvelle. Le Groupe de travail reconnaît toutefois que, pour réduire les délais, il faudra avant tout modifier l'attitude prise par les deux parties à la table de négociation, et, dans une moindre mesure, mettre à leur disposition des instruments leur permettant d'en arriver à un règlement.

Rôle des ministères

63. Le Groupe de travail recommande qu'on envisage sérieusement de trouver des façons de faire participer davantage les cadres supérieurs des ministères aux négociations collectives, et plus particulièrement à l'élaboration des mandats et des compromis à proposer.

64. En outre, le Groupe de travail recommande que le gouvernement étudie la possibilité d'adopter la négociation dite à deux paliers, par laquelle le Conseil du Trésor et les dirigeants syndicaux négocient les

Cadre de la procédure de grief et d'arbitrage

46. On reconnaît généralement que l'organisation du travail et l'attribution des tâches comptent parmi les principales responsabilités de la gestion. Cet état de fait implique que la gestion puisse mettre en place des systèmes et des critères relatifs à la classification des postes. Le Groupe de travail n'a pas perdu de vue le fait que les représentants des employés insistent fortement pour que l'application des schémes de classification soit soumise aux procédures de grief et d'arbitrage; il en est venu à la conclusion qu'une telle mesure contribuerait à rendre le système de classification davantage juste et équitable. Il conviendrait toutefois d'évaluer de façon poussée les conséquences apparemment pratiques d'une telle mesure avant de prendre une décision. Dans le même ordre d'idées, le Groupe de travail recommande que le gouvernement étudie ce qui se fait en la matière au niveau provincial et sous d'autres juridictions et que, sous réserve des conclusions auxquelles il en sera arrivé, les schémes de classification soient sujets aux procédures de grief et d'arbitrage. Si des modifications importantes surviennent au sein des groupes professionnels à la suite d'autres propositions sou-

47. En outre, le Groupe de travail recommande que la cité (actuellement régis par la LBEFP) soient assujettis aux dispositions concernant les griefs et l'arbitrage en vertu de la LRTFP, tout comme la suspension et le congédiement pour motifs disciplinaires.

Modalités de recours

48. Le Groupe de travail a entendu un certain nombre d'observations selon lesquelles, au cours des années, les mécanismes de recours ont profité. Le système actuel est inutilement complexe et donne lieu à des abus. Le Groupe de travail recommande qu'il n'y ait, dans la mesure du possible, qu'un seul mécanisme de recours pour les employés contre des mesures prises par l'employeur. Ce mécanisme devrait être la procédure de grief aboutissant à l'arbitrage.

49. Tout en proposant qu'il n'y ait qu'un seul mécanisme de recours dans le cadre des relations de travail à fait de la fonction publique, le Groupe de travail a observé que les personnes peuvent également invoquer les dispositions de la Charte des droits et libertés.

50. Le Groupe de travail estime qu'il y a trop de paliers dans la procédure actuelle de règlement des griefs. Dans certains cas, une délégation de pouvoirs insuffisante peut être un obstacle au règlement des différends au niveau approprié. En outre, du fait que les cadres supérieurs hésitent à renverser des décisions prises à des niveaux subalternes, un nombre moins élevé de griefs risque de ne pas être réglé avant l'étape de l'arbitrage alors qu'on aurait dû raisonnablement s'entendre auparavant.

et avoir recours à la Commission des droits de la personne.

Procédure de grief et médiation des griefs

51. Le Groupe de travail recommande par conséquent qu'on envisage d'offrir des services de médiation à condition que l'une et l'autre partie soient d'accord pour les demander ou les demandent conjointement. Les médiateurs pourraient être choisis par les parties ou désignés par la CRTFP à même le personnel de la CRTFP ou à partir d'une liste d'agents compétents des relations de travail dressée en consultation avec les parties. D'après des renseignements communiqués au Groupe de travail, un nombre très élevé de griefs qui se seraient autrement rendus à l'arbitrage, dans certains gouvernements, ont été résolus par les parties grâce à la médiation. Ce point peut être particulièrement important si la recommandation du Groupe de travail concernant les griefs de classification est acceptée.

Griefs collectifs

52. Il y a eu des cas où un grand nombre d'employés ont présenté un grief portant essentiellement sur la même question ou pour lesquels, en l'absence de disposition aux employés de présenter un grief pour que soit résolu un problème. Même si une décision à propos d'un tel grief devrait logiquement s'appliquer à tous les griefs semblables, chacun doit actuellement suivre toutes les étapes, y compris l'arbitrage si la question est arbitrable. On peut ainsi perdre beaucoup de temps à moins que les parties soient d'accord pour mettre les griefs en attente jusqu'à ce qu'une décision soit prise à l'égard de l'un des griefs.

Choix des arbitres

53. Le Groupe de travail recommande que, à la demande de l'une ou l'autre partie, la CRTFP soit habilitée à entendre un grief représentatif ou le nombre minimum nécessaire pour avoir une bonne idée de l'objet du litige. La Loi devrait prévoir la mise en attente des autres griefs et les décisions arbitrales définitives devraient ensuite s'appliquer à tous.

54. À l'heure actuelle, la CRTFP désigne les arbitres, habituellement parmi ses membres. Le Groupe de travail recommande que les parties soient autorisées

45. Le Code canadien du travail exige, entre autres choses, d'un agent négociateur qu'il n'agisse pas d'une manière qui soit arbitraire, discriminatoire ou de mauvaise foi dans la représentation des employés

Devoir de représentation équitable

44. Même si le Groupe de travail n'est pas convaincu que les votes de grève doivent se faire au scrutin secret, il se rend compte que une telle obligation peut constituer une protection importante pour les employés. La CRTFP devrait avoir le pouvoir d'accueillir des plaintes d'employés alléguant que les agents négociateurs ont recours à des pratiques injustes ou intégulière, de faire enquête et de rendre une décision. Une telle disposition pourrait protéger les droits des employés sans imposer une réglementation lourde.

Vote de grève

43. Le Groupe de travail reconnaît l'argument selon lequel le lock-out compense le droit de grève. Toutefois, le droit de grève dans la fonction publique est partiellement entravé et, du fait que les perdants en cas de lock-out sont en particulier les Canadiens et Canadiennes, le Groupe de travail ne voit pas de nécessité de prévoir particulièrement le lock-out. Il remarque que d'autres mesures ont été utilisées avec succès dans le passé pour régler des problèmes, comme les grèves rotatives.

42. Les sanctions en cas de grève illégale devraient être aussi élevées que celles qui sont prévues dans le Code canadien du travail. Le Groupe de travail ne voit pas pourquoi il y aurait un écart entre la pratique dans le secteur public et le secteur privé dans ce cas.

Sanctions en cas de grève illégale

41. L'employeur soutient que les régimes de classification de la fonction publique, de même que les couts éventuels et d'autres répercussions si bon nombre de conventions collectives aboussaient à une diversité de régimes de classification, le Groupe de travail n'en est pas arrivé à la conclusion que les régimes de classification devraient être négociables. Étant donné cependant la frustration engendrée par l'application des régimes de classification, le Groupe de travail recommande que, sous réserve des conclusions de l'étude de l'incidence des grèves formulées en matière de classification, l'application des normes de classification aux personnes soit assuétie à la procédure de grief et d'arbitrage (voir paragraphe 46).

40. Au moment où il a adopté la LRTFP en 1967, le Parlement a reconnu les différences fondamentales entre le rôle du secteur public et celui du secteur privé. Le Groupe de travail n'a trouvé aucune raison de croire que ces différences sont moins importantes aujourd'hui qu'elles ne l'étaient au moment où la Loi a été adoptée. Par conséquent, nous recommandons que le gouvernement conserve le droit d'organiser la fonction publique, d'attribuer les tâches et de classer les postes comme le prévoit à l'heure actuelle la

39. Le Groupe de travail a entendu des points de vue très divers et vigoureux au sujet du cadre de négociation. Certains syndicats désirent vivement être assuétés au Code canadien du travail pour échapper au cadre plus restreint de la LRTFP. Le désir de modifier le régime de négociation collective n'est attribuable en grande partie qu'à un petit nombre de questions, notamment les régimes et les modes de classification.

38. Ces limites au cadre de la négociation collective découlent de décisions délibérées du Parlement. Par exemple, dans la Loi sur l'emploi dans la Fonction publique (LEFP), les normes et modes de sélection sont des prérogatives de la Commission de la Fonction publique et sont associés au «principe du mérite» à titre de pierre angulaire de la dotation et de l'avancement dans la fonction publique. Pareillement, le renvoi pour incompétence et incapacité et en raison de certaines activités politiques interdites fait l'objet de dispositions législatives dans la même loi. En outre, les modalités de mutation, de mise en disponibilité et de probation sont prévues en vertu de la LEFP. Toutes ces dispositions découlent du souci du législateur de préserver une fonction publique professionnelle et apolitique.

37. La LRTFP prévoit que l'employeur a le «droit ou... l'autorité... quant à l'organisation de la fonction publique, à l'attribution des fonctions aux postes et à la classification de ces derniers». D'autres dispositions excluent de la négociation des questions qui exigeraient des modifications à une loi comme la Loi sur la pension dans la Fonction publique.

Cadre de négociation

36. La CRTFP devrait fournir des conciliateurs, des médiateurs ou des spécialistes de la recherche des faits, soit à même son propre personnel, soit à partir de listes de professionnels du secteur privé ou du Service fédéral de médiation et de conciliation, établies après consultation. Peu importe la voie choisie pour le règlement du différend, la CRTFP devrait avoir le pouvoir discrétionnaire de désigner des services de conciliation ou de recherche des faits à tout moment en vue d'aider les parties.

Le droit de grève serait acquis sept jours après l'acceptation par la CRTFP du rapport d'un bureau de conciliation ou d'un conciliateur, ou suite à l'avis écrit de la CRTFP qu'un tel organisme ne sera pas désigné.

33. En vertu de la procédure actuelle, chaque partie peut demander l'arbitrage à n'importe quelle étape du processus de négociation. La CRTFP ne peut que se variantes de l'arbitrage.

(c) que les parties soient autorisées, si elles y consentent, à avoir recours à un arbitre unique, à l'arbitrage des propositions finales ou à d'autres

la CRTFP désignerait un président.

(b) que des conseils d'arbitrage soient constitués par les parties et soient composés de trois représentants, soit deux choisis respectivement par chacune des parties et un président choisi à son tour par les deux représentants. En cas de désaccord, la CRTFP désignerait un président.

(a) que l'arbitrage obligatoire soit applicable à toutes les questions qui peuvent légalement faire l'objet de négociation;

travail recommandée :

32. L'arbitrage n'est plus tellement populaire depuis quelques années surtout du fait qu'il ne peut s'appliquer qu'aux échelles de salaire, aux heures de travail, aux congés et aux normes disciplinaires. Pour améliorer l'équité de l'arbitrage à titre de moyen de règlement des différends, surtout pour les unités de négociation qui ne peuvent tellement compter sur la voie de la conciliation et de la grève parce qu'un trop grand nombre de postes sont désignés, le Groupe de travail recommande :

31. Le Groupe de travail a conclu que le processus actuel de règlement des différends manquera de souplesse et, plutôt que d'aider les parties à s'entendre, les encouragera à ne pas prendre de décision et à s'en remettre plutôt à un d'autre pour imposer une solution. Les propositions qui suivent sur l'arbitrage et la conciliation visent donc à ce que les parties disposent de l'aide nécessaire quand elles en ont besoin et de la façon qu'elles le désirent, tout en les obligeant d'abord à s'entendre elles-mêmes.

Règlement des différends

Les mesures proposées ci-dessus visent essentiellement à instituer un processus plus ouvert et plus ordonné qu'à l'heure actuelle pour régler la question complexe des services essentiels.

les critères qui ont été établis au préalable.

(g) L'organisme, quel qu'il soit, auquel seront attribuées ces responsabilités, devrait avoir le pouvoir et la responsabilité, pendant une grève, de s'assurer que les services essentiels sont maintenus selon les critères qui ont été établis au préalable.

(f) Le processus de désignation devrait avoir lieu entre les rondes de négociation collective plutôt qu'au début de la négociation comme à l'heure actuelle.

(e) Ce ne serait plus les personnes qui seraient désignées, mais plutôt les postes.

rière servant de point de départ.

(d) Par la suite, les services essentiels devraient être déterminés de la même façon, la situation antérieure servant de point de départ.

35. Voici certaines caractéristiques de cette procédure :
- Les parties seraient libres, par consentement mutuel, de demander toute une série de services de médiation, de conciliation ou de recherche des faits.
 - Les parties seraient libres de choisir l'arbitrage volontaire pour une partie ou l'ensemble des questions. Des variantes comme l'arbitrage des propositions finales seraient également disponibles par consentement mutuel.
 - La CRTFP aurait la discrétion à tout moment de désigner des services de médiation, de conciliation ou de recherche des faits dans une tentative d'aider les parties à résoudre leurs différends. Elle pourrait faire de même à la demande de l'une ou l'autre des parties seulement.
 - Le mode définitif de règlement des différends serait, soit un conciliateur, soit un bureau de conciliation à la suite d'une entente entre les parties ou, faute de quoi, à la discrétion de la CRTFP.
 - La CRTFP aurait le pouvoir de refuser une demande de désignation d'un conciliateur ou d'un bureau de conciliation ou, avant la nomination d'un tel organisme, de désigner un médiateur pour aider les parties.
 - La CRTFP aurait le pouvoir de renvoyer aux fins de clarification le rapport d'un conciliateur ou d'un bureau de conciliation.
34. Si on décide de ne pas recourir à l'arbitrage, la procédure de conciliation et de grève s'appliquerait. Cette dernière devrait toutefois être améliorée. Dans sa forme actuelle, les parties n'ont d'autres recours que le bureau de conciliation pour régler leur différend. Or, en vertu du Code canadien du travail, les parties disposent d'une latitude considérable pour choisir leur propre procédure. En outre, en vertu du Code canadien du travail, le ministre du Travail a une grande latitude pour intervenir et donner des directives lorsque les parties ne peuvent s'entendre. Le Groupe de travail recommande que l'option de la conciliation et de la grève en vertu de la LRTFP soit modifiée pour qu'elle ressemble le plus possible à ce qu'on trouve dans le Code canadien du travail. Le rôle du ministre du Travail en vertu du Code devrait être rempli par le président de la CRTFP.
33. En vertu de la procédure actuelle, chaque partie peut demander l'arbitrage à n'importe quelle étape du processus de négociation. La CRTFP ne peut que se conformer à cette exigence, même si les parties n'ont pas sérieusement tenté de résoudre le plus grand nombre de questions possible. Le Groupe de travail propose que la CRTFP dispose d'une plus grande souplesse à cet égard. Du même coup, la CRTFP devrait avoir le pouvoir non seulement d'offrir aux parties, à leur demande, des services de médiation, de conciliation et de recherche des faits, ou de ne pas les offrir, mais aussi d'imposer ces services à sa discrétion.

20. Si les recommandations de ce rapport étaient appliquées, la négociation collective dans la fonction publique ressemblerait beaucoup plus au modèle moins réglementé du secteur privé.
21. Certaines des personnes que nous avons consultées ont dit que nous devrions aller jusqu'au bout et assujettir la négociation collective dans la fonction publique au Code canadien du travail. Le Groupe de travail a réfléchi à cette possibilité mais a conclu que, sous une forme ou sous une autre, il faudrait adopter des dispositions législatives particulières régissant la fonction publique. C'est pourquoi le Groupe de travail recommande l'«allègement» de la LRTFP plutôt qu'un transfert de compétences assorti de modifications législatives, lesquelles auraient des effets probablement plus perturbateurs.
22. Les recommandations qui suivent visent à atteindre les objectifs suivants :
 - offrir de meilleurs moyens de déterminer les services essentiels et donc de désigner les postes à cet égard;
 - mettre à la disposition des deux parties ainsi que de la CRTFP une panoplie d'instruments de médiation, de conciliation, d'arbitrage et autres lorsqu'ils sont nécessaires, et qui soient le mieux conçus possible pour aider les parties;
 - offrir un meilleur équilibre dans les forces respectives de négociation des parties;
 - faire en sorte que le personnel des ministères puisse participer davantage aux relations de travail et à la négociation collective;
 - minimiser la réglementation;
 - éliminer les «irritants» dans le système.
23. Le Groupe de travail ne s'est pas mis à la tâche avec l'idée préconçue que ses recommandations devaient se conformer aux prémisses de Fonction publique 2000 concernant la déréglementation, l'allègement du contrôle central et l'élargissement des responsabilités des personnes. C'est cependant à quoi nous avons abouti après de longues discussions avec les diverses parties intéressées et entre nous. C'est pourquoi les recommandations exposées ci-après visent à mettre en place un régime plus souple et moins strict qui devrait du même coup être plus équitable.

15. L'iniquité perçue d'une telle situation est accentuée par les restrictions de la LRTFP sur ce qui peut faire l'objet d'un arbitrage, soit uniquement les échelles de salaire, les heures de travail, les congés et la discipline. Les syndicats peuvent donc légitimement soutenir qu'ils doivent négocier tout l'éventail des questions négociables sans être vraiment en mesure d'interrompre les services, mais s'ils choisissent la voie de l'arbitrage plutôt que celle de la conciliation et de la grève, ils savent qu'ils sont ainsi privés du droit de porter en arbitrage neutre de nombreux points de désaccord.
16. Le cadre de la négociation collective constitue un point important de désaccord. Les syndicats désirent en général négocier des questions exclues en vertu de la LRTFP comme les normes et les processus de sélection, les systèmes de classification, les régimes de retraite et l'évaluation du rendement. Comme ces questions sont négociables en vertu du Code canadien du travail, certains syndicats proposent que le Code soit adapté pour la fonction publique. L'emploi, pour sa part, maintient que ces points sont des droits de gestion ou, comme dans le cas des normes de sélection pour la dotation et du principe du mérite, sont des aspects régis par la loi étant donné les besoins particuliers de la fonction publique.
17. Le Groupe de travail s'est aussi rendu compte que les cadres n'ont pas une bonne formation en matière de relations de travail. La consultation syndicale-patronale en milieu de travail se résume souvent à la communication de décisions déjà prises. Lorsque les représentants syndicaux et les cadres locaux s'entendent, ils n'ont souvent ni l'un ni l'autre l'autorité de prendre les véritables décisions. Le Groupe de travail est d'avis que, si des améliorations sont apportées à cet égard, on contribuerait beaucoup à établir une relation beaucoup plus saine entre la direction et les représentants des employés.
18. Ceux qui sont le plus touchés par les lacunes du régime actuel de relations de travail sont ni les syndicalistes ni le Conseil du Trésor, mais les simples fonctionnaires. Ce sont eux qui doivent patienter pour toucher leurs avantages pendant que les négociations s'étendent sur 18 mois et parfois plus après l'expiration d'une convention collective. Ce sont également eux, ainsi que les cadres des ministères, qui doivent subir les conséquences lorsque des frictions et des conflits ne peuvent être résolus à l'échelle du ministère.
19. Sans vouloir minimiser la complexité que revêt l'application d'un régime de négociation collective au sein de l'État, le Groupe de travail estime qu'on peut apporter un certain nombre d'améliorations pratiques au régime de façon à mieux servir les intérêts des fonctionnaires sans porter atteinte aux principaux intérêts du gouvernement à titre d'employeur.

Aperçu de l'état actuel des relations de travail

1. Aucune des personnes qui se sont adressées à nous n'a laissé entendre que la négociation collective dans la Fonction publique canadienne est en état de crise ou sur le point de s'effondrer. Par contre, on s'entendait aussi généralement pour dire que la relation entre les syndicats et la direction depuis à peu près une décennie donne lieu à plus de confrontation, d'agressivité et de frustration. L'une et l'autre partie pensent que le processus de négociation collective ne fonctionne pas aussi rondement qu'il le devrait.
2. Certains des problèmes sont d'ordre structurel. Du côté de l'employeur, la centralisation du pouvoir de négociation aux mains du Conseil du Trésor est considérée comme essentielle étant donné l'importance de maintenir une approche cohérente dans l'ensemble de la fonction publique. L'une des conséquences de cette situation a été de creuser un fossé entre le Conseil du Trésor et les soucis opérationnels des cadres des ministères, lesquels se sentent impuissants à modifier le cours de la négociation collective et sont mal informés par l'autorité centrale. Du côté syndical, des structures complexes et lourdes, surtout dans les grands syndicats, compliquent la vie des chefs syndicaux, qui ne peuvent parler en toute confiance au nom des éléments de leur syndicat et qui ne peuvent négocier avec un mandat sûr.
3. A certains égards, de l'avis du Groupe de travail, il y a bon nombre de points communs entre les syndicats et l'employeur. Les limites fixées relativement au cadre et à la procédure de négociation collective dans la fonction publique sont souvent une source de frustration pour les deux parties. Certaines des positions de la LRTFP, lesquelles semblaient raisonnables en 1967, paraissent aujourd'hui paternalistes et indûment normatives. Elles semblent souvent privilégier la procédure plutôt que le bon sens, rendre plus difficile la recherche de solutions aux problèmes et ne pas encourager suffisamment les parties à s'entendre sans intervention extérieure.
4. Parmi les problèmes les plus importants dans la négociation collective dans la fonction publique fédérale, il y a les restrictions au droit de grève là où l'employeur a désigné tous les postes de contrôleur de la circulation aérienne à amener les cadres dans l'ensemble du gouvernement à désigner un trop grand nombre d'employés pour accomplir des «services essentiels», ce qui a en fin de compte privé divers groupes de l'arme de négociation qu'est la menace de grève. Il semble que l'on puisse mettre en doute l'intention originale des articles de la LRTFP portant sur la désignation de postes quant au fait

pas être celui d'une confrontation dans un match où il y a un gagnant et un perdant, mais celui d'une recherche de l'équilibre optimal des avantages, de sorte que les deux partenaires dans l'association, c'est-à-dire les employés et la population, soient favorisés le plus possible.

7. Au départ, le Groupe de travail a délibérément décidé de ne pas se perdre dans les détails et de donner son avis sur des questions de grande portée concernant le régime de négociation collective. Nos recommandations doivent donc être suivies d'un examen plus approfondi par des spécialistes avant de pouvoir être adoptées. En outre, le présent rapport précède les conclusions définitives d'un certain nombre d'autres groupes de travail, lesquelles pourraient avoir de profondes répercussions sur des aspects particuliers de notre travail. Par exemple, la structure des unités de négociation et d'autres sujets d'intérêt pour les syndicats dépendent des conclusions d'autres groupes, soit celui de la structure de professions et de la classification, celui de l'adaptation de la main-d'œuvre et celui de la rémunération et des avantages sociaux.
8. Après avoir entendu les parties intéressées, le Groupe de travail a conclu qu'en général, on obtiendra de meilleurs résultats en prescrivant et en imposant le moins de solutions possibles, ainsi qu'en élaborant toute une panoplie d'instruments de négociation sociale pour aider les parties à s'aider elles-mêmes. Ce principe transparaît dans un certain nombre de recommandations.
9. Le Groupe de travail a aussi reconnu qu'il y a des écarts importants entre la négociation collective dans le secteur privé et celle dans le secteur public. Dans ce dernier cas, les syndicats sont moins préoccupés de la capacité de l'employeur à payer et des conséquences possibles de règlements trop généreux sur la santé future de l'entreprise. Les effets négatifs des grèves et des lock-out sont ressentis non pas tant par l'employeur que par la population. Par ailleurs, la relation est foncièrement inégale étant donné que l'employeur est également le gouverneur : celui-ci est donc en mesure de prescrire les règles de la négociation collective et de la législation et, en cas de grève, il a le choix de présenter au Parlement les modalités d'un règlement légifère.
10. Cela étant dit, le Groupe de travail en est venu à penser que le régime actuel accentue les écarts entre la négociation collective dans les secteurs privé et public, et que, en réduisant les diverses directives et les prétendues protections, loin de mettre en péril les intérêts de la population, on ferait probablement en sorte que le système dans son ensemble fonctionne beaucoup mieux qu'à l'heure actuelle.

le groupe professionnel et la structure de classification actuels, cette recommandation devrait être appliquée à la suite d'une période préparatoire appropriée.

(ii) Il faudrait regrouper les dispositions concernant les recours. Il faudrait notamment que la procédure de règlement des griefs et d'arbitrage puisse s'appliquer au renvoi pour incompétence et incapacité et à la rétrogradation, tout comme au congédiement pour motifs disciplinaires.

(iii) Les politiques approuvées par le Conseil national mixte (CNM) ne devraient pouvoir faire l'objet de griefs que par l'entremise de la procédure habituelle de règlement des griefs dont la dernière étape est l'arbitrage par la CRTFP.

(iv) Les services de médiation demandés conjointement par les parties devraient être fournis par la CRTFP avant l'arbitrage.

h) Griefs collectifs (alinéa 52) :

La CRTFP devrait être autorisée à entendre un grief (ou un nombre représentatif) à la demande de l'une ou l'autre partie plutôt qu'un grand nombre de griefs semblables. La décision prise s'appliquerait à tous.

i) Révision des décisions arbitrales (alinéa 53) :

La CRTFP devrait être autorisée à réviser les décisions arbitrales, afin qu'elles soient cohérentes et équitables.

j) Exclusions (alinéa 56) :

(i) Les postes, et non les personnes, devraient être exclus.

(ii) Devraient être principalement exclus les postes comportant d'importantes tâches liées à la gestion.

(iii) Le nombre d'exclusions visant des postes comportant des fonctions «confidentielles» est excessif et devrait être considérablement réduit.

Le Groupe de travail recommande la révision de l'exclusion d'employés préposés à des fonctions «confidentielles» sauf dans le cas des postes concernant la gestion des relations de travail.

(iv) Les exclusions devraient être considérées en vigueur au moment où elles sont proposées jusqu'à ce que la CRTFP rende une décision contraire.

k) Conseil national mixte (CNM) (alinéa 59) :

Le Groupe de travail reconnaît le rôle consultatif important joué par le CNM en matière d'élaboration des politiques et souhaite l'accroître, mais recommande que les griefs concernant les politiques du CNM suivent la procédure prévue à l'échelle du ministère et de la CRTFP.

l) Avis de négociation (alinéa 62) :

La période d'avis de négociation devrait être prolongée de 60 à 90 jours.

Objectifs et esprit

m)Rôle du ministère dans la négociation collective (alinéa 63) :

(i) Le rôle du ministère dans la négociation devrait être accru surtout pour ce qui est de l'élaboration des positions de l'employeur à l'égard des négociations ainsi que pour ce qui est des négociations qui suivront.

(ii) Le gouvernement devrait envisager sérieusement la négociation à deux paliers.

(iii) Il devrait incomber aux ministères de régler la plupart des griefs en arbitrage, sauf ceux qui ont des repercussions sur l'ensemble de la fonction publique.

n) Commission des relations de travail dans la Fonction publique (CRTFP) (alinéa 66) :

Les agents de négociation devraient être consultés pour la nomination du président, du vice-président et des présidents suppléants de la CRTFP.

o) Formation des cadres (alinéa 69) :

(i) Les cadres devraient recevoir une bonne formation théorique en matière de relations de travail.

(ii) L'employeur devrait mettre à la disposition des cadres des interprétations complètes des nouvelles conventions collectives, et leur donner la formation nécessaire.

p) Consultation (alinéa 70) :

Il faudrait améliorer la consultation à l'échelle des ministères et de l'ensemble de la fonction publique en élargissant l'étendue de la consultation et en veillant à ce qu'elle se produise au début du processus d'élaboration des politiques. Les cadres supérieurs devraient se montrer disposés à la consultation.

4. Le Groupe de travail s'est inspiré des objectifs et du principe de Fonction publique 2000 selon lequel les relations avec les employés devraient manifestement tenir compte de leur bien-être et de leurs intérêts.

5. Le Groupe de travail est d'avis que l'objectif d'un régime de relations de travail pour le secteur public, ou même pour le secteur privé, ne doit pas être de délimiter un cadre en vue d'un affrontement ou d'une épreuve de force économique entre le syndicat et le patronat. L'objectif doit plutôt être d'établir une pro-cessus pour fixer les règles et les conditions du service d'une manière juste et équitable envers les employés, qui sont représentés par leurs unités de négociation, et envers la population canadienne, qui est représentée par le gouvernement et dont nous sommes tous les employés.

6. Par conséquent, l'esprit qui doit guider un régime de relations de travail dans la fonction publique ne doit

Rapport du Groupe de travail sur les relations de travail

Introduction

1. A la mi-décembre 1989, le Premier ministre a lancé «Fonction publique 2000» pour moderniser la Fonction publique canadienne. Le Groupe de travail sur les relations de travail est l'un des neuf groupes établis à ce moment-là. Le présent rapport expose les objectifs, la méthode, les conclusions et les recommandations de ce groupe.

2. On trouvera en annexe les documents suivants :

- Annexe A Membres du Groupe de travail
- Annexe B Nature du mandat, décrit dans un «Exposé des questions» qui a été largement diffusé par le Groupe de travail
- Annexe C Une liste des personnes qui ont été invitées à écrire au Groupe ou à le rencontrer

Résumé des recommandations

3. On trouvera ci-après un résumé des principales recommandations qui font l'objet d'un exposé plus détaillé dans la partie principale du rapport à partir de l'alinéa indiqué entre parenthèses.

a) Structure des unités de négociation (alinéa 24) :

(i) Le Groupe de travail réaffirme le droit des employés de s'associer dans leurs meilleurs intérêts s'il devait y avoir des modifications importantes aux catégories professionnelles et à la structure de classification à la suite de FP2000. (ii) Il devrait y avoir une période de transition qui serait suivie de la détermination des unités de négociation appropriées et de l'accréditation des agents de négociation par la Commission des relations de travail dans la Fonction publique (CRTFP).

b) Droit de grève (alinéa 27) :

(i) Le Groupe de travail réaffirme le droit fondamental à la grève mais recommande des mesures pour protéger la population dans le cas des services publics considérés comme essentiels. (ii) Le Groupe de travail propose que soient établis des critères pour définir les services essentiels et qu'un organisme soit institué pour administrer ces critères et déterminer le nombre d'employés désignés pour exercer les tâches essentielles. (iii) La désignation devrait avoir lieu entre les rondes de négociation et devrait s'appliquer aux

postes et non aux personnes, et rester en vigueur jusqu'à ce que les fonctions changent.

c) Règlement des différends (alinéa 31)

(i) Le Groupe de travail estime que l'objectif prépondérant du processus de règlement des différends doit être d'aider les parties à régler entre elles les différends. (ii) Les agents de négociation devraient opter pour l'arbitrage obligatoire ou la conciliation et la grève au début des négociations, mais les parties et la CRTFP devraient avoir la possibilité d'avoir recours à un éventail plus vaste de modalités au moment opportun pour faciliter le processus de négociation. (iii) Le cadre de l'arbitrage devrait être aussi étendu que celui de la négociation.

(iv) La CRTFP ne devrait imposer d'arbitrage ou de conseils d'arbitrage particuliers que lorsque les parties ne peuvent s'entendre sur une ou des personnes. (v) La CRTFP devrait avoir les pouvoirs suivants : a) Fournir sur demande des services de médiation, de conciliation ou de recherche des faits, pour imposer ces services lorsque les négociations échouent. b) Offrir des services d'arbitrage seulement s'il est évident que d'autres méthodes sont inutiles et que les négociations sont à l'impasse.

c) Fournir des services d'arbitrage, y compris l'arbitrage des propositions finales, à la demande des deux parties lorsque la voie de la conciliation et de la grève a été retenue, et lorsqu'il semble que les autres méthodes n'aboutiront pas à un accord.

d) Sanctions en cas de grève illégale (alinéa 42) :

Rendre les sanctions équivalentes à celles prévues dans le Code canadien du travail. e) Voie de grève (alinéa 44) :

Il doit y avoir un scrutin obligatoire et secret. Toutefois, la CRTFP doit faire enquête et rendre une décision lorsque des employés se plaignent d'irrégularités. f) Devoir de représentation équitable (alinéa 45) :

La Loi sur les relations de travail dans la Fonction publique (L.RTFP) devrait imposer aux syndicats employés, comme il est prévu dans le Code canadien du travail. g) Griets et arbitrage (alinéa 46) :

(i) Comité tenu de l'examen de ce qui a pu être observé dans les autres secteurs de la fonction publique, la procédure de règlement des griets et d'arbitrage devrait pouvoir s'appliquer au plan de classification de l'employeur. Si des modifications importantes se produisent en ce qui concerne

1999

1999

1999
1999
1999
1999
1999

Rapport du Groupe de travail sur les relations de travail

Document de travail

Fonction publique 2000

le 6 août 1990

salariatal avec l'autorisation du Conseil du Trésor, sans que le ministère ait besoin d'en informer le Parlement.)

Au cours des années, les années-personnes indiquées dans le Budget des dépenses principal ont servi à mesurer les variations de la taille de la fonction publique. Les objectifs applicables à l'ensemble de la fonction publique sont souvent établis en fonction de cette mesure, p. ex. une réduction de 2 pour 100 ou une augmentation de 1 pour 100 des années-personnes.

Contrôle exercé par les ministres et les ministères

Le pouvoir de dépenser les crédits accordés par le Parlement est dévolu aux ministres, qui doivent en rendre compte au Parlement. Les ministres délèguent ce pouvoir aux gestionnaires de leur ministère, lesquels doivent à leur tour rendre des comptes au ministre ou à un fonctionnaire de rang supérieur.

Le ministre établit des règles régissant l'utilisation des ressources au sein du ministère. En général, ces règles visent à garantir la meilleure utilisation possible des ressources limitées dont dispose le ministère. Il peut arriver que les systèmes mis en place à cette fin constituent des entraves à l'exécution efficace des programmes encore plus rigoureuses que les mécanismes centraux qui s'appliquent à l'ensemble de l'administration fédérale. On ne devrait recourir à la «réglementation centrale» (y compris aux mécanismes de contrôle imposés par l'administration centrale d'un ministère) que lorsque cela est indispensable à l'intérêt supérieur de l'ensemble. Il importe donc que les ministères examinent les mécanismes en place pour s'assurer que, si des mesures de contrôle centrales sont en vigueur, elles servent des intérêts supérieurs.

La gestion des ressources n'est pas influencée uniquement par les relations avec le Parlement. Le pouvoir exécutif (par l'intermédiaire du Conseil du Trésor) exerce lui aussi un contrôle sur les ressources à l'aide des pouvoirs précis qui lui sont conférés par la Loi sur la gestion des finances publiques (article 31, sur les dotations d'un chapitre) et de son pouvoir plus général en matière de gestion des ressources. (La Loi sur la gestion des finances publiques donne au Conseil du Trésor le pouvoir d'agir pour le Conseil privé de la Reine à l'égard de toutes les questions de gestion financière.)

Le contrôle exercé par le Conseil du Trésor s'inscrit dans le cadre de la structure des crédits approuvée par le Parlement, c'est-à-dire qu'il représente un niveau supplémentaire de contrôle parlementaire. Dans un crédit donné, le Conseil du Trésor établit une dotation distincte pour l'élément salarial du budget, qui se trouve ainsi «cloisonné». Il peut également établir une dotation distincte pour toute autre partie d'un crédit et indiquer de façon plus précise les objets pour lesquels les fonds en question peuvent être dépensés. Les dotations ne peuvent être modifiées sans l'autorisation du Conseil du Trésor. Elles restreignent par conséquent la marge de manœuvre dont disposent les ministères pour déterminer l'utilisation de leurs ressources.

Toutefois, le Conseil du Trésor ne se contente pas, loin de là, de cloisonner la partie salariale d'un crédit. Il limite également le nombre des personnes qui peuvent être employées, c'est-à-dire les «années-personnes».

Dans le système de limitation des années-personnes, le Conseil du Trésor autorise les ministères à utiliser un certain nombre d'années-personnes (une année-personne étant définie comme l'emploi d'une personne durant 12 mois ou l'équivalent) au cours d'un exercice donné. Les ministères reçoivent des budgets salariaux qui correspondent aux années-personnes attribuées et sont protégés par le Conseil du Trésor contre les insuffisances de leur budget salarial à condition de ne pas dépasser le plafond d'années-personnes autorisé. Cette protection est maintenue même dans certains cas où le déficit est attribuable à des facteurs dépendant de la volonté du ministère (p. ex. reclassifications, réorganisations ou améliorations des services).

Les années-personnes autorisées par le Conseil du Trésor sont indiquées, à titre d'information, dans le Budget des dépenses principal déposé au Parlement. Le Conseil du Trésor peut, au cours de l'exercice, autoriser des rajustements du plafond ainsi fixé. Le Parlement en est informé au moyen d'un Budget des dépenses supplémentaire uniquement si un ministre demande au Parlement un supplément de crédits salariaux. (Si les fonds peuvent être trouvés ailleurs dans le même crédit, par exemple dans les coûts de fonctionnement, ils peuvent être transférés à l'élément

pour des organismes particuliers. Cette orientation en fonction des objets établit donc le cadre d'une chaîne de responsabilité des résultats qui part du Parlement et s'étend à toute la fonction publique.

Du point de vue technique, le financement des programmes comprend à la fois les dépenses législatives et les dépenses votées. Toutefois, comme il a été mentionné, nous nous pencherons uniquement sur les dépenses votées relevant des programmes. Le Parlement vote des crédits pour les fins particulières indiquées dans la structure de programmes. Toutefois, en plus de son rôle d'octroi des crédits en fonction des objets prévus, le Parlement exerce un contrôle supplémentaire lorsqu'un programme comporte des dépenses totales importantes, c'est-à-dire de plus de 5 millions de dollars, en capital ou en paiements de transfert.

Le diagramme ci-dessous illustre la façon dont le Parlement vote les crédits d'un programme :

CRÉDITS

Dépenses de fonctionnement (ou de programme)

Programme
Dépenses en capital
(si elles dépassent 5 millions de dollars)

Paiements de transfert (s'ils dépassent 5 millions de dollars)

Le montant de ces crédits ne peut être modifié sans l'autorisation expresse du Parlement. En réalité, c'est comme si le Parlement séparait par des «cloisons» les fonds à dépenser à des fins déterminées. Ces cloisons (les crédits) limitent la latitude du gouvernement et de ses ministères en matière de gestion des ressources. Les limites établies n'ont pas été haussées depuis 1970-1971, bien que la partie III du Budget des dépenses fournisse maintenant au Parlement des renseignements beaucoup plus détaillés sur les dépenses en capital et les paiements de transfert.

Les programmes sont les éléments de base utilisés pour présenter les plans de dépenses du gouvernement au Parlement. Ils sont fortement axés sur l'objet ou le but poursuivi, qui découle habituellement d'une loi précise. Il s'agit là d'une caractéristique importante du point de vue de la gestion des ressources. Cela signifie en effet que le Parlement vote des crédits pour des objets précis plutôt que

(intérêts canadiens à l'étranger et programme des expositions internationales). Les budgets accordés aux différents ministères sont ventilés par programme (ensemble d'activités entreprises en vue d'un objectif commun). Il arrive souvent qu'un ministère soit chargé d'un seul programme -- p. ex. Transports Canada (ministère) ou Revenu Canada, Impôt (programme de l'impôt) -- mais d'autres ministères sont responsables de plusieurs programmes -- p. ex. Agriculture (gestion et administration; agro-alimentaire; grains et oléagineux) ou Affaires extérieures (ministère).

Comme nous l'avons mentionné, notre examen de la gestion des ressources porte principalement sur l'élément dépenses votées des plans de dépenses et sur la façon dont les ministères exercent les pouvoirs de dépenser correspondants.

Tout au long de l'exercice, le gouvernement puise dans les «réserves» prévues, en déposant chaque fois un Budget des dépenses supplémentaire au Parlement, qui accorde alors l'autorisation de dépenser nécessaire en adoptant une loi de crédits.

Le total des dépenses votées comprend les grandes dépenses en capital, certains paiements de transfert importants (comme l'aide publique au développement) et les paiements faits à des sociétés d'Etat non autosuffisantes comme Radio-Canada.

Les dépenses votées désignent plus généralement les dépenses engagées pour les activités quotidiennes de l'Etat, y compris les dépenses de fonctionnement, les dépenses en capital, les traitements et les paiements de transfert pour lesquels le Parlement n'a pas accordé d'autorisation permanente de dépenser. Dans leur cas, le Parlement accorde, en adoptant une loi de crédits, l'autorisation de dépenser au maximum un certain montant au cours d'un exercice. Cette autorisation expire à la fin de l'exercice, et les fonds autorisés qui n'ont pas été dépensés alors deviennent «pérимés».

Les dépenses législatives constituent de loin la partie la plus importante du budget. Il s'agit des dépenses que le Parlement a déjà autorisées en adoptant certaines lois. Elles comprennent par exemple les paiements d'allocations familiales, les prestations de sécurité de la vieillesse, les frais relatifs à la dette publique et les versements aux provinces au titre des soins de santé et de l'enseignement postsecondaire. Bien que le contrôle financier de ces dépenses et la rigueur de leur gestion soient très importants, elles ne sont pas touchées normalement par les questions de gestion des ressources étudiées par le Groupe de travail.

Les caractéristiques essentielles du système actuel

L'utilisation des ressources par la fonction publique est contrôlée à trois échelons distincts : le Parlement, le pouvoir exécutif (Conseil du Trésor), le ministre et son ministère.

Contrôle exercé par le Parlement

Un principe fondamental de notre démocratie parlementaire veut qu'aucune dépense ne soit effectuée sans l'autorisation préalable du Parlement.

Le gouvernement fédéral planifie et comptabilise ses recettes et ses dépenses dans le cadre d'un exercice qui va du 1^{er} avril au 31 mars. Il informe le Parlement de ses plans de dépenses en présentant un « Budget des dépenses principal » bien avant le début de l'exercice.

Pour l'exercice 1990-1991, les dépenses prévues du gouvernement s'établissent à près de 148 milliards de dollars, répartis comme suit* :

| <u>Budget des dépenses principal</u> | | <u>Milliards de dollars</u> | |
|--|-------|-----------------------------|------|
| Dépenses législatives | 103,3 | Dépenses votées | 44,3 |
| <hr/> | | <hr/> | |
| Total du Budget des dépenses principal | | 147,6 | |
| <hr/> | | <hr/> | |
| Autres dépenses prévues | | | |
| Réductions des dépenses législatives annoncées dans le Budget | (1,0) | | |
| Réserves | 2,4 | | |
| Provision pour pérémpctions | (1,2) | | |
| <hr/> | | <hr/> | |
| Total des dépenses budgétaires | | 147,8 \$ | |

*Partie I du Budget des dépenses de 1990-1991.

ANNEXE C

Les caractéristiques essentielles du système actuel

La responsabilité des résultats présente cependant d'autres dimensions. Le Parlement confie des tâches précises à certains organismes centraux. Pour s'en acquitter, ces organismes ont besoin de la participation des ministères ou de leurs renseignements. Le sous-ministre doit alors rendre compte au ministre, qui est lui-même responsable de l'intégrité des renseignements fournis à l'organisme central. Le rôle du Conseil du Trésor dans l'attribution des ressources en fournit un exemple. Les ministères fournissent au Conseil du Trésor les renseignements sur les programmes, les résultats et l'efficacité, entre autres choses, dont il a besoin pour déterminer les priorités de dépenses et établir le budget du gouvernement. Dans ce cas comme dans d'autres situations semblables, les ministères n'ont pas à rendre compte au Conseil du Trésor de l'obtention de résultats précis, mais ils sont responsables de la qualité des renseignements fournis au Conseil du Trésor au sujet de ces résultats.

En résumé, le système proposé devrait se traduire par une structure de responsabilité claire, de l'employé en première ligne jusqu'au sous-ministre en passant par tous les paliers de l'organisation. Selon la nature des résultats et la source de délégation des pouvoirs, le sous-ministre devra rendre des comptes soit au ministre, soit à un organisme central. Outre cette responsabilité directe liée aux résultats, le sous-ministre devra aussi assumer la responsabilité, par l'intermédiaire du ministre, de l'intégrité des renseignements fournis par son ministère aux organismes centraux pour les aider à s'acquitter de leur mandat général.

Conclusion

En conclusion, donc, le système de gestion des ressources du gouvernement doit faire en sorte que les gestionnaires soient personnellement responsables des résultats qu'ils doivent atteindre. Un système de reddition de comptes du genre décrit précédemment est conçu justement à cette fin et doit être mis en oeuvre à l'échelle de l'administration.

Deux points méritent d'être signalés au sujet des mécanismes de reddition de comptes dans l'administration :

a) Il existe déjà dans l'administration fédérale des systèmes de reddition de comptes de ce genre. Nous devons veiller à ce que ces systèmes soient maintenus et étendus à tous les ministères et organismes.

b) Il ne suffit pas d'avoir des systèmes de reddition de comptes qui fonctionnent : il faut aussi que le Parlement et le public aient en permanence l'assurance que ces systèmes existent et qu'ils fonctionnent. En conséquence, l'incombe aux sous-ministres de veiller à être en mesure de fournir cette assurance.

sont dotés de systèmes intégrés de ce genre et les utilisent comme outils fondamentaux de gestion et de reddition de comptes.

Structure de responsabilité

Le système de reddition de comptes décrit précédemment crée une chaîne de responsabilité dans un ministère. Tout employé, peu importe son niveau, doit rendre compte à son supérieur immédiat de certains résultats convenus. Ce supérieur doit à son tour rendre des comptes à son supérieur et ainsi de suite jusqu'au niveau du sous-ministre. La structure de responsabilité est donc assez claire, chaque personne devant rendre compte directement à quelqu'un de tous les résultats. Cela vaut autant pour les résultats directs d'un programme que pour les résultats généraux d'une organisation. (Les exigences d'ordre général -- par exemple les objectifs en matière d'emploi -- rendent parfois les résultats de programmes plus difficiles à atteindre dans le secteur public.)

Malheureusement, la structure de responsabilité n'est pas toujours aussi nette au niveau des sous-ministres. Si chaque employé d'un ministère est en fin de compte responsable devant le sous-ministre, celui-ci doit rendre compte à plusieurs personnes ou organismes de tout l'éventail des résultats des programmes et du ministère dont il est responsable. Sur quoi repose alors la structure de responsabilité?

Le sous-ministre est responsable des résultats obtenus et doit rendre des comptes à la personne ou à l'organisme auquel le Parlement a confié la responsabilité de ces résultats. En pratique, cela veut dire que le sous-ministre est habituellement comptable à son ministre des résultats des programmes. Il peut aussi devoir rendre compte aux organismes centraux de la réalisation ou de la contribution à l'obtention des résultats communs à toute l'administration dont ces organismes sont responsables devant le Parlement. Par exemple, les sous-ministres doivent rendre compte au Conseil du Trésor de bon nombre d'aspects de la gestion des ressources humaines. Ce lien de responsabilité est dû au fait que le Parlement a confié cette responsabilité au Conseil du Trésor en vertu de la Loi sur la gestion des finances publiques (LGF) et que le Conseil du Trésor l'a confiée à son tour aux sous-ministres.

Des responsabilités globales précises peuvent également être confiées aux sous-ministres directement par le Parlement, par voie législative. Le contrôle des engagements exigé au paragraphe 32(2) de la LGFP en est un exemple. Les résultats de programmes prennent souvent la forme de réalisations précises, tandis que les objectifs généraux portent souvent sur la manière de réaliser les objectifs de programmes. On peut dire dans ce cas que le sous-ministre doit rendre compte au ministre des résultats atteints et aux organismes centraux de la façon dont les résultats ont été obtenus.

L'un des éléments clés de tout système intégré de reddition de comptes est un ensemble de renseignements utiles servant de base à la prise de décisions et à la reddition de comptes.

Ce système d'information doit répondre à un certain nombre de besoins :

- Il doit fournir des renseignements qui facilitent la prise de décision à l'étape de la planification au niveau tant de l'organisation que des employés.

- Il doit aussi permettre de suivre les progrès tout au long de la période de mise en oeuvre afin que les rajustements voulus puissent être apportés.

- Il doit enfin fournir une analyse des résultats obtenus (et des ressources utilisées) pour permettre une évaluation définitive des progrès et alimenter le cycle de planification suivant.

Bien que de toute évidence ces renseignements soient importants pour la bonne mise en oeuvre de n'importe quel programme, ils revêtent une importance encore plus grande dans leur dimension de suivi, à mesure qu'on délègue plus de pouvoirs et que le contrôle central se trouve réduit.

Il s'ensuit que le rôle des organismes centraux, qui ont toujours exercé un contrôle central, doit s'orienter vers le suivi ou la surveillance à mesure que la délégation des pouvoirs s'accroît. Cette évolution exigera de ces organismes un changement appréciable d'attitude et de méthodes. La mise en place du nouveau régime nécessitera donc un effort assez intense de sensibilisation.

Il importe par conséquent de veiller à ce que les systèmes d'information nécessaires soient en place pour répondre aux besoins des gestionnaires tant à l'étape de planification initiale que pendant le suivi des résultats. Il est tout aussi important que les rôles et les responsabilités, en matière de contrôle et de suivi, soient clairement définis et bien compris de tous.

Systèmes actuels

Bien que le système de reddition de comptes décrit précédemment puisse sembler révolutionnaire, il revient tout simplement à intégrer différents mécanismes ou processus déjà en place dans tous les ministères. Un certain nombre d'organismes

b) Processus d'évaluation et descriptions de poste

Dans le système proposé de reddition de comptes, les employés seraient tenus personnellement responsables des résultats atteints avec un niveau de ressources déterminé. Les processus de planification en vigueur servent généralement à déterminer les résultats et les ressources pour l'organisation, mais c'est l'établissement d'objectifs lors de l'évaluation du rendement qui personnalise ces plans. En fait, donc, les plans ministériels déterminent le cadre de reddition des comptes au niveau de l'organisation, et le système d'évaluation fournit le moyen d'établir des objectifs pour les employés et de les rendre comptables de leur réalisation.

Bien que le processus d'évaluation constitue un moyen assez efficace de déterminer les résultats personnels, il a aussi d'autres objectifs, notamment la détermination des besoins de formation, du plan de carrière et de la relève. L'aspect reddition de comptes n'est donc qu'un des éléments d'un processus d'évaluation plus large et doit être envisagé en conséquence. Il en constitue toutefois un élément déterminant.

L'énoncé des résultats établi dans le cadre du processus d'évaluation s'appuie sur tous les objectifs exposés dans la description de poste, sans toutefois, normalement, les répéter.

Une description de poste jette les bases d'un «contrat» de travail. Elle donne des précisions sur les responsabilités qu'un employé assume en acceptant un poste et, au moins de façon générale, sur les résultats qu'on attend de lui. À titre de contrat de travail, la description de poste établit aussi la base du système de reddition de comptes et précise les «critères de rendement» généraux (c.-à-d. ce que l'employé est censé accomplir) en fonction desquels l'employé sera évalué. Il n'est pas nécessaire, lorsqu'on fixe des objectifs précis pour une période donnée, de répéter ce qui figure dans la description de poste. Les résultats doivent plutôt être définis en fonction des objectifs clés de la période de planification et peut-être donner une dimension plus spécifique à certains objectifs de la description de poste.

Des liens étroits existent entre les descriptions de poste et le système de reddition de comptes. Les deux s'appuient l'un sur l'autre. Cela suppose une certaine cohérence entre l'énoncé des fonctions dans la description de poste et les objectifs fixés pour une période donnée. Si, pour une raison quelconque, cette cohérence n'est pas assurée, l'employé peut se retrouver avec des objectifs contradictoires et n'être finalement tenu comptable d'aucun. Il est donc important d'assurer la cohérence voulue à cet égard.

la fonction publique et une fraction encore plus faible des ressources. Il pourrait bien être nécessaire, dans ces cas bien circonscrits, de se concentrer davantage sur les intrants que sur les résultats pour établir le cadre de reddition de comptes.

Dans la définition des résultats qui serviront de base à un système de reddition de comptes, il est extrêmement important d'être conscient des limites des critères établis et de s'assurer que tout écart par rapport à ces critères est décidé en toute connaissance de cause. L'essentiel est que tous les intéressés soient conscients de leurs responsabilités et des résultats attendus et qu'ils en conviennent dès le départ.

Éléments d'un système intégré de reddition de comptes

Les propositions précédentes se traduiraient par une réorientation du système actuel de reddition de comptes, mais elles ne nécessiteraient pas obligatoirement sa refonte. En fait, les mécanismes en place -- les systèmes de planification et d'établissement des budgets, d'évaluation du rendement des employés et d'information -- devraient pouvoir répondre entièrement aux exigences d'un système intégré de reddition de comptes. Les processus actuels de planification et d'établissement des budgets continueront de former la base de l'obligation de rendre compte des organisations, obligation qui serait ensuite retrasmise au niveau de l'employé par le biais du mécanisme d'évaluation, à la lumière des descriptions de poste. Un réseau d'information constitue le dernier élément clé d'un bon système de reddition de comptes. Ce réseau fournirait les renseignements nécessaires à la prise de décisions et permettrait de suivre l'obtention des résultats.

a) Processus de planification et d'établissement des budgets

Le processus de planification et d'établissement des budgets des ministères est déterminant pour tout système général de reddition de comptes. C'est en effet le processus qui sert à déterminer les buts et objectifs au niveau d'une organisation, objectifs auxquels on se réfère ensuite pour évaluer les réalisations.

Dans le cadre de la planification et de l'établissement des budgets en fonction d'objectifs stratégiques à long terme, on fixe les objectifs à court terme d'un ministère ou organisme et de toutes ses composantes. Le processus de planification sert également à établir le budget de chaque centre de responsabilité pour une période donnée, ce qui crée un lien direct entre les niveaux de ressources à fournir et les résultats à atteindre.

lorsque les gestionnaires et leurs subalternes négocient les résultats à atteindre.

b)

Les résultats doivent être contrôlables; pourtant, il est probable que nous fonctionnerons de plus en plus en «partenariat» avec d'autres.

À mesure que nous orientons vers des ententes de partenariat selon lesquelles la responsabilité de la prestation de biens et de services est partagée avec des tiers, nous devons aussi partager le contrôle des programmes. Le critère de sélection de résultats contrôlables semble donc être en contradiction avec de telles ententes.

Deux options paraissent alors possibles. On peut tout d'abord déterminer les résultats attendus de la collaboration, en reconnaissant à la fois qu'il s'agit d'efforts partagés et qu'il convient de parler d'«influence» plutôt que de «contrôle». Autre solution, on peut définir les résultats en fonction de la contribution fédérale au projet. Dans ce dernier cas, il est possible que la définition des résultats définis reflète davantage les intrants (ou les résultats des efforts de chacun) que les résultats du projet. Cependant, là encore, si les intérêts prennent conscience de la situation dès le début et l'acceptent, on peut assurer la reddition de comptes. En outre, il est important en pareil cas de reconnaître d'emblée le caractère coopératif des efforts et d'en tenir compte.

c)

La reddition de comptes doit être liée aux résultats, non aux processus ou aux intrants.

Comme nous l'avons vu dans l'exemple précédent, lorsqu'une personne n'exerce pas de contrôle, il est parfois nécessaire de définir les résultats en fonction des intrants plutôt que des extrants. Il faut aussi reconnaître dans certains cas qu'il peut exister une hiérarchie de résultats appropriés selon la nature et le degré du contrôle exercé. Étant donné que, selon les situations, le gouvernement fédéral peut exercer directement un plein contrôle ou être réduit à faire valoir son influence ou la persuasion, la nature des résultats sélectionnés peut varier.

On fait également valoir que, pour certaines fonctions du gouvernement, il est difficile, sinon impossible, de déterminer des résultats avec précision. Les organismes d'élaboration des politiques sont souvent cités en exemple. Certes, de tels organismes peuvent exister, mais ils représentent probablement une petite partie (moins de 20 pour 100) de

celles qui figurent dans les descriptions de poste, doivent servir de base implicite, des résultats précis et stimulants devant être clairement formulés pour le court terme.)

- L'énoncé des résultats doit porter sur un petit nombre de résultats essentiels attendus d'une personne ou d'un organisme. Il peut ainsi rester simple et significatif.

- Les résultats doivent être formulés clairement et tenir compte de la différence entre l'essentiel et le souhaitable. (L'accent principal doit être mis sur les résultats des programmes, et non sur les exigences des processus ou de la politique centrale.)

- Les résultats spécifiés doivent être contrôlables. (Un gestionnaire ne doit être tenu responsable que des éléments qu'il peut contrôler.)

- Les prévisions de résultats doivent correspondre à un niveau de ressources convenu. (Comme l'obtention des résultats dépend des ressources disponibles, il faut convenir des niveaux de ressources dès le départ. L'évaluation ultérieure des résultats doit elle aussi tenir compte du niveau d'utilisation des ressources.)

Défs

Même si ces critères de sélection des résultats paraissent simples, il y a des cas où la diversité des critères ou d'autres exigences externes peuvent rendre le choix difficile. Cela tient en partie à la complexité inhérente de la gestion dans le secteur public, de la même façon que, au fond, les gestionnaires de la fonction publique ont à faire face quotidiennement à une foule d'autres ambiguïtés ou tensions. Il importe toutefois de prendre conscience de ces tensions et d'en tenir compte lors de la sélection des résultats visés.

Les cas les plus évidents de risques de tensions se rapportent aux critères suivants :

- a) Les résultats doivent être convenus entre les parties et poser un défi.

Lorsqu'elle choisit les résultats dont elle aura à rendre compte, toute personne est naturellement portée à choisir des résultats faciles à atteindre. Ainsi, elle est sûre d'obtenir le mérite qui l'accompagne la réalisation des objectifs fixés. Cependant, on ne respecte pas alors le critère du choix d'objectifs stimulants. Il convient de ne pas l'oublier

D'importants progrès ont été réalisés depuis la Commission Glassco, au niveau tant de la délégation des pouvoirs que du système de reddition de comptes dans l'administration fédérale. Il est cependant de mise, dans le cadre de l'initiative Fonction publique 2000, d'examiner non seulement les niveaux de délégation, mais aussi le système de reddition de comptes, non pas tant pour réinventer la roue que pour affiner, si possible, l'application du système en fonction des besoins actuels.

Caractéristiques d'un système de reddition de comptes

Il n'est ni possible ni souhaitable d'élaborer dans le détail un système de reddition de comptes applicable uniformément dans toute la fonction publique fédérale. On peut cependant définir certaines conditions générales essentielles à la mise en oeuvre du système et décrire certaines de ses caractéristiques fondamentales.

Tout système de reddition de comptes doit être directement lié non seulement au niveau de pouvoir mais aussi au style et au mandat des gestionnaires. Par conséquent, comme le gouvernement cherche à instaurer un cadre de gestion qui donne aux gestionnaires plus de liberté dans la prise de décisions, en fonction des exigences des programmes, tout en mettant l'accent sur la réalisation des résultats visés, le système de reddition de comptes doit lui aussi être centré sur les résultats.

Un système de ce genre doit être axé sur les résultats clés, et tous les intéressés doivent bien le comprendre. En un mot, pour être efficace, le système doit rester simple. De plus, pour que la structure de responsabilité soit claire, il faut que le système indique comment les responsabilités de chacun se rattachent aux responsabilités de l'organisation et définisse avec précision la responsabilité de chaque gestionnaire.

Un système de reddition de comptes qui satisfait à ces conditions et qui présente les caractéristiques décrites précédemment pourrait répondre aux besoins de chaque ministère et organisme ainsi que de l'administration dans son ensemble.

Spécification des résultats

L'élément le plus important pour la bonne mise en oeuvre de tout système de reddition de comptes basé sur les résultats est la détermination d'un ensemble de résultats.

Il faut sélectionner les résultats selon les critères suivants si l'on veut qu'ils soient significatifs et puissent être utilisés dans un système de reddition de comptes :

- Les résultats doivent être simultanés, convenus entre les parties et explicites, mais pas nécessairement quantifiables. (Les exigences permanentes, comme

exigences d'un système adéquat de reddition de comptes, en insistant tout particulièrement sur les résultats.

Historique

La notion d'une fonction publique caractérisée par une importante délégation de pouvoirs et un système de responsabilité bien défini est loin d'être nouvelle.

Dès 1962, la Commission Glassco la préconisait en ces termes :

Par-dessus tout, les ministères doivent, dans le cadre d'un mandat clairement défini, être entièrement responsables de l'organisation et de la réalisation de leurs programmes et disposer de pouvoirs proportionnés à leurs responsabilités. Ils doivent être assujettis à des mesures de contrôle destinées à protéger les intérêts généraux du gouvernement lorsqu'ils dépassent ceux des ministères. Toutefois, les ministères ne doivent pas être soumis à des contrôles externes ayant un objet général.

La Commission Lambert, en 1979, a formulé les commentaires suivants sur la responsabilité (qu'elle appelait «imputabilité») :

Après avoir déterminé ses priorités, élaboré un plan financier et attribué les ressources nécessaires à la réalisation des politiques et des programmes établis à la lumière de ses priorités, le gouvernement doit donner aux ministères et aux organismes la responsabilité de mettre ses plans en oeuvre. Bien que le gouvernement puisse établir certaines lignes directrices et mesures de contrôle et conserver certains droits en matière d'orientation, c'est aux ministères et organismes qu'il revient de gérer leurs activités de façon à atteindre leurs objectifs au mieux avec les ressources dont ils disposent. L'élément fondamental d'un tel système de gestion est la nécessité pour le centre de tenir les parties constituantes entièrement comptables de la façon dont elles s'acquittent des responsabilités qui leur ont été confiées. Le Parlement doit de son côté tenir le gouvernement également responsable de la gestion des affaires de la nation.

Ce thème, repris maintes fois par la suite, a en fait inspiré des initiatives particulières du gouvernement. L'exemple le plus récent en est le projet d'accroissement des pouvoirs et des responsabilités ministériels (APRM) du gouvernement actuel.

Il ne s'agit donc manifestement pas d'une idée nouvelle. Il faut aussi bien voir qu'une grande partie du système actuel repose sur cette notion.

Responsabilité

Introduction

Le Groupe de travail sur la gestion des ressources a élaboré une philosophie destinée à guider la gestion des ressources dans la fonction publique fédérale :

Un système responsable de gestion des ressources répondant aux besoins des ministres et du gouvernement doit :

- promouvoir une gestion efficace;
- obliger les gestionnaires à rendre compte des résultats obtenus; et
- reposer sur le principe de la confiance en une fonction publique non partisane, objective et professionnelle au niveau tant des gestionnaires que des employés;

tout en respectant l'autorité suprême du Parlement en matière de dépenses.

En conformité avec cette philosophie, un bon système de gestion des ressources doit atteindre quatre objectifs :

- favoriser un service de qualité et une exécution efficace des programmes en fonction de buts et d'objectifs clairement établis;
- inciter à une gestion efficace en accordant le plus de souplesse possible dans la gestion des ressources;
- promouvoir une délégation maximale du pouvoir de décision, jusqu'aux plus bas niveaux possibles, avec une structure de responsabilité clairement définie; et
- limiter la réglementation centrale aux cas où elle est nécessaire aux intérêts supérieurs de la fonction publique.

Cette annexe traite du deuxième élément de la philosophie, soit la nécessité de rendre les gestionnaires comptables des résultats obtenus. Elle tentera de définir les

L'obligation de rendre compte

ANNEXE B

tout en mettant davantage l'accent sur les résultats et sur l'obligation d'en rendre compte. Les travaux de Fonction publique 2000 portent non seulement sur la gestion des ressources -- l'objet du présent rapport -- mais sur toute la gamme des questions de gestion qui se posent ou se poseront dans la fonction publique.

délégation et un mécanisme de reddition de comptes, ils concluent un protocole d'entente (PE) régissant la conduite à adopter durant la période visée par l'entente.

Bien que le programme d'APRM soit limité du fait qu'il a été mis en place dans le cadre de contrôle actuel, il a entraîné une réduction considérable du fardeau administratif des ministères grâce à la fois à l'accroissement général des pouvoirs délégués et aux PE conclus avec certains ministères. À ce jour, six PE ont été signés. Le processus se poursuit, sept autres PE étant actuellement à l'étude.

Rapport de 1987 du vérificateur général

En 1987, le vérificateur général a examiné une nouvelle fois l'état de la gestion financière dans l'administration fédérale. Il a constaté une nette amélioration des systèmes de contrôle financier, mais a insisté sur la nécessité de réaliser d'importants progrès dans l'élaboration d'une gestion financière fondée sur le rattachement des objectifs, des résultats et des ressources. Une fois de plus, il a souligné que les gestionnaires devaient assumer la responsabilité de la gestion financière et être tenus comptables des résultats obtenus :

Plusieurs des ministères qui ont fait l'objet d'une vérification ont fait des progrès considérables au cours des deux dernières années. Mais l'engagement et la direction des cadres supérieurs ne doivent rien perdre de leur vigueur pour que les gestionnaires de tous les niveaux soient conscients de leurs responsabilités financières, qu'ils aient en main tous les outils qui leur permettront de les assumer et qu'ils rendent compte des résultats obtenus.

Conclusion

Le régime actuel de gestion des ressources dans la fonction publique a été façonné non seulement par l'évolution des besoins du Parlement et des gestionnaires de la fonction publique, mais aussi par les examens externes effectués au fil des années. Bien que l'un de ces examens ait conduit au renforcement des contrôles centraux, la principale constatation a été que l'éventail actuel des programmes et des initiatives de l'Etat pouvait être géré et exécuté avec une efficacité maximale si tout contrôle central superflu était supprimé et si les gestionnaires recevaient des pouvoirs suffisants. Il a également été signalé dans tous les cas qu'un régime de ce genre ne pouvait être efficace que s'il existait un mécanisme permettant de bien rendre les gestionnaires comptables de leurs décisions et de l'exercice de leurs pouvoirs.

Telle est précisément l'orientation de l'Initiative Fonction publique 2000. L'un de ses principaux objectifs est de réduire les contrôles administratifs centraux afin de donner aux sous-ministres et aux gestionnaires une plus grande liberté de gestion,

- les nombreuses contraintes auxquelles les gestionnaires doivent faire face en matière d'administration et de procédures;
- la faiblesse des incitations -- mais le nombre élevé de facteurs désincitatifs -- à une gestion productive.

Si certaines de ces entraves peuvent être attribuées à la nature même de l'administration publique, le vérificateur général a bien souligné qu'il importait de supprimer les contrôles excessifs exercés sur les pouvoirs des gestionnaires et d'établir un mécanisme permettant de rendre ces derniers comptables des résultats : « Nous ne préconisons pas un retour à un principe « d'autonomie illimitée » des gestionnaires ou à une réduction sans discernement des règlements et des contrôles. En l'absence d'incitations, lesquelles existent dans le secteur privé, il faudra continuer d'exercer des contrôles centraux dans le secteur public pour atteindre un niveau satisfaisant de prudence, de probité et d'équité. Il faut avant tout tenter de retrouver l'équilibre entre le besoin d'un contrôle central et le besoin d'un niveau satisfaisant de pouvoirs gestionnels, de façon à ce que les gestionnaires puissent être responsables et rendre compte. »

Ce rapport n'a pas entraîné non plus immédiatement des changements énormes dans le système de gestion. Il a cependant contribué à faire comprendre la nécessité de supprimer les contrôles superflus et de déléguer plus de pouvoirs aux gestionnaires afin de leur permettre d'exécuter leurs programmes de la façon la plus efficace et la plus productive possible. Il a certainement été pour beaucoup dans le lancement, quelques années après, de l'initiative d'accroissement des pouvoirs et des responsabilités ministériels (APRM).

Accroissement des pouvoirs et des responsabilités ministériels (APRM)

L'APRM a été lancé en 1986 par le Conseil du Trésor afin de donner aux ministres et aux gestionnaires supérieurs les pouvoirs accrus et la souplesse dont ils ont besoin pour s'adapter à l'évolution des situations et assurer une gestion efficace, tout en les rendant davantage responsables de l'obtention des résultats. Dans le cadre de ce programme, le Conseil du Trésor a examiné toute une série de lignes directrices et de systèmes de contrôle en vue de supprimer ceux qui n'étaient plus justifiés. Il en est résulté une rationalisation importante, qui a réduit le fardeau administratif dans tous les ministères.

De plus, le Secrétaire du Conseil du Trésor (SCT) a entrepris de négocier avec certains ministères la délégation de pouvoirs accrus, lorsqu'il y avait lieu, tout en veillant au maintien de l'obligation de rendre des comptes aux ministres et au Parlement. Une fois que le SCT et un ministère se sont entendus sur les niveaux de

L'examen approfondi effectué par la Commission Lambert lui permit de présenter en 1979 un rapport dans lequel elle recommandait d'apporter des changements radicaux au système de gestion de l'Etat. Le grand axe de ses recommandations n'était pas entièrement inconnu : il fallait déléguer plus de pouvoirs aux gestionnaires de la fonction publique. La Commission faisait observer que le système exigeait fondamentalement que les parties constituantes du gouvernement soient dotées des pouvoirs nécessaires pour exécuter leurs fonctions le plus économiquement et le plus efficacement possible.

La Commission Lambert se penchait également sur la question connexe de l'obligation de rendre compte, qu'elle appelait «imputabilité». Elle notait que, lorsque des pouvoirs importants étaient délégués, l'usage de ces pouvoirs requerrait un niveau correspondant d'imputabilité. La délégation de pouvoirs sans imputabilité constituait pour ceux qui la conféraient, qu'il s'agisse du gouvernement ou du Parlement, une abdication de leur propre responsabilité. L'une des recommandations de la Commission était de transformer le Conseil du Trésor en un Conseil de gestion, expressément chargé de tenir les ministères comptables de leur gestion.

Peu importe les raisons, le rapport Lambert n'entraîna pas les changements radicaux envisagés par ses auteurs. Il renforça toutefois, chez les fonctionnaires et dans le public, la conviction que la délégation des pouvoirs à des échelons inférieurs de la fonction publique pouvait conduire à une meilleure gestion des programmes de l'Etat.

Le gouvernement adopta un certain nombre de recommandations de la Commission Lambert (ainsi, il avait déjà accepté de créer le Bureau du contrôleur général avant la présentation du rapport Lambert). Ces recommandations perdirent toutefois de leur intérêt lorsque le gouvernement entreprit d'instituer le système de gestion des secteurs de dépenses (SGSD).

Rapport de 1983 du vérificateur général

Comme il a été mentionné, le rapport de 1976 du vérificateur général avait entraîné un renforcement des contrôles centraux exercés dans l'administration fédérale. Son rapport de 1983 préconisait le contraire :

Dans un chapitre consacré aux obstacles à une gestion productive dans la fonction publique fédérale, le vérificateur général indiquait trois entraves importantes :

- les répercussions des priorités politiques sur la recherche d'une gestion productive;

La Commission formulait en outre toute une série de recommandations concernant la responsabilité envers le Parlement, préconisant au fond de réorienter les crédits et le Budget des dépenses en fonction de leurs objets ou fins.

Le gouvernement souscrivit dans l'ensemble aux recommandations de la Commission Glasco, y compris au principe de l'autonomie de gestion des gestionnaires, et entreprit de les mettre en oeuvre. Les organismes centraux commencèrent à mettre l'accent sur les questions à long terme plutôt que sur les opérations particulières, les contrôles rigoureux exercés au niveau central cessèrent, et les ministères reçurent des pouvoirs accrus de gestion des ressources.

En 1970, la structure du Budget des dépenses fut modifiée afin de correspondre à l'«objet» de chaque programme, ce qui permit de ramener le nombre des crédits parlementaires d'environ 500 en 1963-1964 à un peu plus de 200 en 1970-1971. Cette réduction s'inscrivait dans le cadre de la tendance à l'accroissement des pouvoirs des ministères et gestionnaires en matière de gestion des ressources.

Rapport de 1976 du vérificateur général

Alors que les recommandations d'accroissement des pouvoirs faites par la Commission Glasco étaient mises en oeuvre, l'exigence parallèle de responsabilité des gestionnaires se trouvait relativement négligée, en partie parce qu'aucun moyen n'avait été élaboré à cette fin. Dans son rapport de 1976, le vérificateur général se voyait forcé de conclure que «le Parlement -- et, en réalité, le gouvernement -- ne contrôle plus de façon efficace l'utilisation des deniers publics, ou semble près de perdre ce contrôle». Le vérificateur général ajoutait : «La détérioration du contrôle des deniers publics semble ... remonter à au moins 15 ans.» Aussi, le vérificateur recommandait-il la création du Bureau du contrôleur général et, parallèlement, le renforcement du rôle de l'agent financier supérieur de chaque ministère.

L'une des principales réactions du gouvernement à ce rapport consista à charger une Commission, la Commission Lambert, d'étudier le contrôle financier dans l'administration fédérale. À un niveau moins officiel, toutefois, le rapport du vérificateur général se traduisit non seulement par une réticence accrue des organismes centraux à déléguer des pouvoirs aux ministères, mais également par une tendance de plus en plus marquée à leur imposer des contrôles centraux afin d'éviter des critiques analogues à l'avenir.

Commission Lambert

La Commission Lambert reçut pour mandat d'étudier la gestion financière dans la fonction publique, principalement à la suite des observations formulées par le vérificateur général dans son rapport de 1976.

Avant la Commission Glassco, en 1960, la conception fondamentale de l'administration et de la gestion des ressources n'avait subi aucun changement durant une période considérable. La gestion des ressources avait été guidée par la Loi du revenu consolidé et de la vérification (1931), puis par la Loi sur l'administration financière (1951). Durant cette période, la gestion des ressources du gouvernement fédéral reposait essentiellement sur un contrôle centralisé des dépenses de l'Etat exercé par le ministère des Finances, sous réserve, par la suite, des vérifications effectuées par le Bureau du vérificateur général. Ce régime, qui se doublait d'un contrôle centralisé de la gestion du personnel exercé par ce qu'on appelait alors la Commission du service civil, ne laissait aux ministères et aux gestionnaires de la fonction publique qu'une liberté de décision restreinte concernant la gestion des ressources relatives à leurs activités.

Toutefois, l'étendue et la complexité des activités de l'Etat augmentèrent à tel point au cours de cette période qu'on en vint à s'interroger sur la capacité du gouvernement de jouer son rôle de direction et de contrôle. Ces inquiétudes entraînèrent en 1960 la création de la Commission royale d'enquête sur l'organisation du gouvernement (ou Commission Glassco), chargée d'étudier les méthodes de gestion employées dans la fonction publique.

Les recommandations de la Commission étaient fondées sur un accroissement des pouvoirs des sous-ministres et des gestionnaires de la fonction publique ainsi que sur une réduction du contrôle central de la gestion des finances et du personnel. La Commission recommandait par ailleurs que chaque ministère soit obligé de rendre compte de la gestion des ressources financières qui lui étaient confiées.

Outre l'accroissement de la délégation des pouvoirs et des responsabilités, la Commission recommandait de séparer le Conseil du Trésor du ministère des Finances. Il incomberait désormais au Conseil du Trésor d'établir, dans une optique moins restrictive qu'auparavant, des politiques et des normes générales de planification financière et de contrôle des dépenses.

Dans son rapport, la Commission faisait remarquer que les ministères devaient, dans le cadre d'attributions clairement définies, être totalement responsables de l'organisation et de l'exécution de leurs programmes et être dotés de pouvoirs correspondant à cette responsabilité. Ils devaient être assujettis à des contrôles visant à protéger les intérêts supérieurs du gouvernement, mais être libérés de tout contrôle extérieur ne s'inspirant pas de ce but général.

Gestion des ressources dans la fonction publique fédérale

Perspective historique

Indications générales

Le régime actuel de gestion des ressources dans l'administration fédérale est le fruit d'une évolution qui se déroule depuis des années sous l'effet de plusieurs influences. Parmi les plus importantes figurent évidemment, d'une part, l'évolution des besoins du Parlement du point de vue du contrôle des dépenses publiques et d'autre part, les besoins des gestionnaires de la fonction publique, chargés de mettre en oeuvre la gamme toujours plus complexe des programmes fédéraux.

D'importantes initiatives, qui visaient à réaliser les changements voulus, ont découlé des grands examens entrepris pour le compte du gouvernement par des commissions établies expressément à cette fin ou des études effectuées dans le cadre des activités courantes de l'État (p. ex. les activités du vérificateur général). Les trente dernières années ont vu se dérouler un certain nombre d'examens aux résultats parfois contradictoires. Tous ont cependant contribué sensiblement à modeler le régime actuel de gestion des ressources, ainsi que l'indiquent les paragraphes suivants.

Notre approche générale de la gestion des ressources est donc tributaire en grande partie de ces grands examens ou études, mais de nombreux éléments du régime actuel sont la conséquence directe des critiques précises formulées dans la presse, dans les rapports annuels du vérificateur général ou à la Chambre des communes, pour ne citer qu'eux. Lorsque des erreurs ou des abus particuliers étaient dénoncés, même s'il s'agissait d'une situation exceptionnelle ou peu fréquente, la tendance a souvent été d'établir des mesures de contrôle applicables à un organisme donné ou à l'ensemble de l'administration, afin que la situation dénoncée ne se reproduise plus. Dans bien des cas, le remède a été pire (et plus coûteux) que le mal. Par exemple, la découverte de quelques abus dans le recours aux services de taxi a entraîné la mise en place d'un système de contrôle extrêmement lourd.

Perspective historique

ANNEXE A

- Que dans le cas des initiatives conjointes ou, par exemple, un service à assurer le financement initial qui permet à un autre d'améliorer ou d'accroître sa productivité, les économies fassent l'objet d'un partage équitable. Non seulement le partage inciterait à améliorer la productivité, mais il favoriserait une gestion collégiale.
 - Que, si un ministère mène des activités lui permettant de recouvrer des coûts ou de générer des recettes, il conserve la totalité ou, à tout le moins, une partie de ces dernières.
 - Que, dans un souci d'optimisation des ressources gouvernementales, et plus particulièrement du matériel et des installations, on encourage les ministères à partager ces éléments d'actif. Cependant, le ministère devrait profiter des gains de productivité qui en découleraient.
- Le Groupe de travail a pris acte de l'annonce faite le 15 décembre par le président du Conseil du Trésor, qui mentionnait la mise en œuvre au cas par cas de certaines des propositions des deux premières recommandations précédentes. L'annonce faisait aussi état de l'élaboration d'une politique de gestion de l'actif. Le Groupe de travail recommande :
- Que le Conseil du Trésor encourage l'élaboration d'une politique de gestion de l'actif prévoyant le partage des ressources, de la façon décrite dans notre dernière recommandation.
 - Que les mesures incitatives annoncées par le président du Conseil du Trésor s'appliquent automatiquement à tous les ministères et organismes. Cela éliminerait la nécessité d'étudier chaque cas individuellement.

annuel, accompagné d'une étude et d'une comptabilité beaucoup plus poussées dans le cadre d'un cycle. Ces options semblent présenter la possibilité de rationaliser le système, tout en assurant une information et un contrôle satisfaisants du Parlement.

Le Groupe de travail n'est pas en mesure pour l'instant de recommander une solution de rechange à l'actuel système de budget annuel. Toute recommandation devrait être précédée d'une consultation approfondie de tous les intéressés (y compris le Parlement et le vérificateur général).

Néanmoins, nous recommandons : que le Conseil du Trésor examine la question de l'annualité du cycle budgétaire en consultation avec le Parlement et le vérificateur général en vue d'aborder l'étude des problèmes signalés.

L'absence d'incitation à une meilleure gestion des ressources

Contexte et questions

Les questions abordées jusqu'ici dans ce rapport ont porté sur les contraintes qui paraissent faire obstacle à une gestion efficiente et efficace des ressources. Une autre question mérite cependant d'être étudiée. Certains employés ont fait valoir au Groupe de travail que le système actuel présentait des désincitations, ou tout au moins une absence d'incitations à une meilleure gestion des ressources. Parmi les exemples fréquemment cités, mentionnons l'« appropriation » par les services centraux (les organismes centraux, l'administration centrale, etc.) des économies réalisées grâce à un accroissement de la productivité. D'autres employés ont relevé qu'on demandait aux ministères d'accroître leurs recettes, mais que celles-ci n'étaient pas portées à leur crédit, même lorsque cela s'accompagnait d'une hausse des coûts d'administration.

Recommandations

Le Groupe de travail s'est penché sur la question des « incitations ». Il a convenu que, de façon générale, il y avait lieu d'intégrer au système des mesures incitant à gérer les ressources avec efficience et efficacité. En conséquence, nous concluons et recommandons :

- Que les centres de responsabilité qui réalisent des économies grâce à des améliorations de productivité soient normalement autorisés à les conserver.

Le Groupe de travail est conscient de la nécessité, quelle que soit l'option envisagée, de respecter le besoin légitime du Parlement d'autoriser les dépenses et ce, à la lumière de renseignements à jour, factuels et significatifs. Il est assurément nécessaire de fournir des renseignements annuels au Parlement. Certaines des options que nous avons envisagées offraient la possibilité d'un examen parlementaire

Les ministères pourraient demander des crédits pluriannuels (peut-être triennaux). Le Parlement accorderait un financement pour des périodes plus longues et la fréquence du processus budgétaire se trouverait réduite pour les ministères.

Les ministères pourraient demander des crédits annuels, mais avec l'autorisation du Parlement de dépenser sur une période plus longue, peut-être deux ans. Cela atténuerait en partie les pressions, tout en maintenant le processus annuel d'octroi des crédits.

On pourrait maintenir les crédits annuels, mais modifier les rapports au Parlement. Les ministères pourraient, par exemple, fournir des renseignements détaillés par le biais de la Partie III peut-être une fois tous les trois ans seulement. Ils ne fourniraient chaque année que de brèves mises à jour ou des rapports sur les écarts notables par rapport aux plans.


Le Groupe de travail a étudié plusieurs solutions de rechange au cycle budgétaire annuel suivi actuellement, notamment :

Conclusions et recommandations

Les membres des groupes de sensibilisation ont mentionné que le processus budgétaire annuel prenait énormément de temps. Il oblige à produire des rapports détaillés dans la documentation de base et la Partie III du Budget des dépenses principal -- même pour les programmes stables dont les niveaux de financement ne changent guère ou pas du tout et qui s'écartent peu des plans antérieurs. Le Parlement, par ailleurs, se voit inondé chaque année de tous ces documents. Par conséquent, il n'a guère la possibilité de procéder à un examen plus sélectif des plans de dépenses de programmes particuliers en fonction de ses propres priorités.

Bien des fonctionnaires doivent gérer d'importantes initiatives à long terme, qu'il s'agisse de projets d'immobilisations, de programmes permanents de contribution ou d'autres projets de longue durée. Parce qu'elles sont à long terme, ces initiatives sont souvent soumises à de nombreuses influences externes qui se répercutent sur leur calendrier d'exécution ou d'achèvement.

FIGURE 3 : CRÉDITS DE CAPITAL
Répartition des crédits de capital selon le montant



Répartition en valeur des crédits de capital selon le montant






FIGURE 2 : SUBVENTIONS ET CONTRIBUTIONS



Le Groupe de travail a étudié la possibilité que l'adoption d'un seul crédit par programme permette quand même au Parlement d'autoriser des dépenses pour des fins particulières, tout en laissant aux gestionnaires une plus grande marge de manœuvre dans l'utilisation des fonds à ces fins. En 1979, le Comité des comptes publics avait recommandé l'adoption d'un crédit unique par programme, mais sa recommandation n'avait pas eu de suite.

Dans certains cas, le crédit unique par programme comprendrait de très grosses dépenses en capital ou en paiements de transfert. Le Parlement pourrait vouloir continuer d'exercer un contrôle distinct sur ces dépenses.

Par conséquent, la solution de rechange consiste à relever le «seuil» des crédits distincts afin d'instituer dans les faits le concept du crédit unique par programme, sauf dans les cas de dépenses très élevées en capital ou en paiements de transfert.

Nous avons étudié la répartition actuelle des crédits de capital et de paiements de transfert (voir les figures 2 et 3 des pages suivantes), pour constater que 80 pour 100 des crédits étaient inférieurs à 250 millions de dollars et que ces 80 pour 100 en nombre représentaient moins de 20 pour 100 de la valeur des dépenses dans chaque domaine.

Si le seuil passait de 5 millions à 250 millions de dollars, 80 pour 100 de ces crédits échapperaient à un contrôle distinct. Le Parlement continuerait cependant d'exercer un contrôle distinct sur 80 pour 100 des dépenses.

On pourrait modifier légèrement les seuils en raison de l'intérêt que le Parlement a toujours porté aux **paiements de transfert**. Dans leur cas, un seuil fixé à 100 millions de dollars soustrairait 40 pour 100 des crédits existants à un contrôle distinct. Les 60 pour 100 de crédits qui n'échapperaient pas à un contrôle représenteraient encore 90 pour 100 de la valeur des dépenses.

En conséquence, le Groupe de travail recommande :

Que le seuil d'établissement de crédits distincts soit porté à 250 millions de dollars pour les dépenses en capital et à 100 millions de dollars, pour les paiements de transfert dans le cadre d'un programme.

Question : annuallité du processus budgétaire

Un cycle budgétaire annuel fixe empêche les gestionnaires de prendre les «meilleures» décisions de programme, car il impose des contraintes à l'utilisation efficiente des ressources. Il se peut qu'un cycle annuel constitue une entrave inutile aux opérations d'une administration moderne.

Les ministères continueraient aussi de fournir des renseignements financiers détaillés au Parlement par le biais des Comptes publics. En conséquence, le Groupe de travail recommande :

Que le Conseil du Trésor donne la marge de manœuvre nécessaire aux ministères et à leurs gestionnaires en approuvant le report automatique à l'exercice suivant de jusqu'à 2 pour 100 du budget de fonctionnement inscrit au Budget des dépenses principal.

Le Conseil du Trésor a veillé à ce que ses dispositions existantes de report soient compatibles avec le cadre financier du gouvernement. Il tiendra également à s'assurer de la compatibilité de cette proposition de report automatique.

La gestion des ressources et le Parlement

Question : structure des crédits

Les mesures de contrôle distinctes qui s'appliquent aux dépenses en capital et aux paiements de transfert (subventions et contributions) empêchent les ministères d'exécuter leurs programmes avec toute l'efficacité possible. En cours d'année, les ministères disposent d'une marge de manœuvre limitée pour réaffecter des fonds entre crédits lorsque l'évolution des besoins l'exige. Ce problème persiste même lorsque les fonds votés par le Parlement sont destinés au même programme ou à la même fin générale. Nous sommes d'avis qu'un crédit unique pour chaque programme serait la formule la plus susceptible de fournir aux ministères et à leurs ministères la marge de manœuvre nécessaire pour établir les stratégies les plus efficaces et les plus productives d'exécution de leurs programmes. Cette souplesse se traduirait par une productivité accrue et un meilleur service au public.

Analyse et options

Depuis quelques années, le niveau et la qualité des renseignements fournis au Parlement se sont considérablement améliorés grâce à l'institution de la Partie III du Budget des dépenses principal. Étant maintenant mieux renseigné sur les dépenses des ministères, le Parlement n'est peut-être plus obligé de contrôler séparément les dépenses en capital et les paiements de transfert tout au long d'un exercice. Cela permettrait de réduire considérablement le nombre de postes du Budget des dépenses supplémentaire, en particulier de ceux qui risquent de présenter peu d'intérêt pour les parlementaires.

- en approuvant un report de 3 pour 100 du budget non salarial de F & E, au cas par cas, à condition que la demande en soit faite au plus tard le 1^{er} février.

Bien que ces mesures représentent un progrès appréciable, l'obligation pour les gestionnaires de présenter leurs demandes bien avant la fin de l'exercice (au plus tard le 15 décembre et le 1^{er} février respectivement) pour profiter de ces deux dispositions en limite les avantages. Dans les groupes de sensibilisation, les gestionnaires ont fait valoir que, pour offrir une souplesse véritable, il faudrait que les dispositions de report puissent être fondées sur les données de fin d'exercice ou presque. Les neuf mois de données disponibles en janvier pour respecter la première échéance de février sont souvent insuffisants pour étayer les décisions à prendre.

Analyse

Encore une fois, le Groupe de travail a envisagé diverses options, allant du statu quo à la non-péréemption des crédits. Nous avons reconnu cependant qu'il fallait dans tous les cas maintenir un délicat équilibre entre la souplesse de gestion et le contrôle gouvernemental des dépenses annuelles, d'une part, et le droit incontesté du Parlement de contrôler les dépenses, d'autre part. Dans les circonstances, donc, c'est l'extension du mécanisme administratif actuel, permettant de reporter une partie des fonds condamnés à la péréemption, qui paraît l'option la plus indiquée. Combinée au système du budget de fonctionnement décrit précédemment, cette disposition de report donnerait aux gestionnaires la possibilité de réaménager non seulement la combinaison des intrants mais aussi, dans une certaine mesure, le profil temporel des dépenses afin de parvenir à l'utilisation la plus efficiente et la plus efficace des ressources disponibles.

Conclusions et recommandations

Nous avons conclu que l'option de report automatique présentait plusieurs avantages. Par exemple, elle éliminerait nombre des distorsions découlant de la péréemption des fonds en fin d'exercice. Les gestionnaires seraient mieux en mesure d'ajuster leur charge de travail à leurs budgets et d'éviter la pratique qui consiste à acheter des biens et services avant d'en avoir besoin. Pour sa part, le Parlement conserverait tout son pouvoir de contrôle, car on recourrait à un Budget des dépenses supplémentaire pour faire autoriser le report de fonds à l'exercice suivant.

- en approuvant une disposition de report de capital qui permet aux ministères de transférer jusqu'à 5 pour 100 de leur budget d'immobilisations (à concurrence de 75 millions de dollars) à l'exercice suivant, à condition d'en demander la permission au plus tard le 15 décembre; et
- Conscient de ce problème, le Conseil du Trésor a pris des mesures constructives afin d'assouplir le transfert des fonds inutilisés d'un exercice à l'autre :

En fin de compte, les rigidités du système actuel de gestion des ressources risquent d'empêcher les gestionnaires de dépenser judicieusement et de mettre en oeuvre leurs programmes avec toute l'efficacité possible.

En vue d'équilibrer les ressources disponibles en fonction de la charge de travail observée dans ces situations, les gestionnaires achètent parfois des biens et services dont l'acquisition attendrait normalement l'exercice suivant. Les décisions de dépense peuvent donc dans certains cas être inspirées par l'existence de soldes risquant d'être périmés plutôt que par un souci d'optimisation de l'usage des fonds.

Bien des gestionnaires se croient obligés d'épuiser leur budget avant la fin d'un exercice. Ils craignent qu'autrement on ne pense que leurs programmes n'avaient pas besoin de tous leurs fonds au départ (ce qui justifierait des compressions budgétaires) ou qu'ils ont été mal gérés. Il arrive que des projets subissent des retards inévitables au cours d'un exercice (p. ex., des travaux projetés sont retardés de manière à s'étendre sur deux exercices). Cela libère des fonds dans une année mais crée des pressions budgétaires l'autre année.

Question

Le problème de la pérémpion des crédits : incidences sur la gestion des ressources

Plusieurs questions seraient à examiner avec soin dans le cadre du passage au nouveau système. Par exemple, la taille de la fonction publique continuera d'intéresser le public. Aussi, le gouvernement doit-il trouver un moyen de présenter des renseignements utiles à ce sujet. En outre, la phase de transition pourrait bien comporter une période d'adaptation au cours de laquelle les ministères étudieraient les incidences économiques des mesures que les contraintes artificielles d'années-personnes les auront obligés à prendre par le passé. Si, à la suite d'examen de ce genre, il était décidé de convertir des crédits de fonctionnement en crédits salariaux, la taille de la fonction publique augmenterait. Des mesures spéciales pourraient se révéler nécessaires pour assurer une approche ordonnée du contrôle de toute croissance importante, le cas échéant, du secteur public.

Budget de fonctionnement proposé

1. Eléments

Budget unique

- traitements
- dépenses de fonctionnement
- dépenses en capital
- secondaires

Répartition nominale entre traitements et autres dépenses.

(Grosses dépenses en capital traitées à part.)

2. Les ministères resteraient «assurés» contre les coûts de personnel indépendants de leur volonté, comme les hausses de rémunération négociées ou les avantages sociaux établis par le Conseil du Trésor.

3. Les transferts seraient permis entre les traitements et les autres postes, en fonction d'un «facteur de conversion» établi.

Contrôle actuel des ressources

1. Eléments

- Années-personnes
- Dépenses de fonctionnement
- Dépenses en capital (programme) de plus de 5 millions de dollars
- traitées séparément

2. Le Conseil du Trésor finance tous les coûts salariaux, c'est-à-dire les traitements, primes de rendement, primes de bilinguisme, indemnités de vacances et de cessation de fonctions, congés de maternité, primes de poste et autres indemnités.

3. Les ministères ne sont pas libres d'effectuer des transferts entre les traitements et les autres postes.

FIGURE 1

Lors de la mise en œuvre du système, le Conseil du Trésor devrait négocier avec les ministères les détails techniques du calendrier et de l'application du système de budget de fonctionnement.

Que le gouvernement élimine le contrôle des années-personnes et adopte des «budgets de fonctionnement» uniques à compter de 1992-1993, afin de favoriser une utilisation plus productive des ressources et de mettre l'accent sur le coût réel de l'exécution des programmes gouvernementaux.

Le Groupe de travail estime que le système du budget de fonctionnement offrirait une méthode plus efficace de gestion des ressources dans la fonction publique fédérale que le système actuel de contrôle des années-personnes. En conséquence, nous recommandons :

Conclusions et recommandations

Le budget de fonctionnement est une idée très simple. Sa mise en œuvre posera toutefois des défis au niveau technique. Chaque ministère devra négocier un accord avec le Secréariat du Conseil du Trésor, au cas par cas. Les accords devront définir le niveau des ressources disponibles et la répartition entre la composante salariale et les autres dépenses. Ils devront aussi traiter des effets de l'inflation et de la charge de travail de base à laquelle se rapportera le niveau de financement, entre autres choses.

Chacun de nos groupes de sensibilisation a discuté à fond de cette idée. Gestionnaires et employés ont appuyé sans réserve la notion de budget de fonctionnement. Cette méthode offre à leur avis d'importantes possibilités d'améliorer la mise en œuvre de programmes pour lesquels on dispose de ressources limitées. Ils ont aussi reconnu que le passage à ce système ne dégagerait pas plus de ressources et que les gains de productivité éventuels dépendraient dans une large mesure de la qualité de leurs systèmes d'information de gestion.

L'utilisation de fonds salariaux entraîne des coûts directs et des dépenses pour certains organismes centraux, par exemple Travaux publics Canada au titre des locaux. Le facteur de conversion serait probablement fixé aux alentours de 30 pour 100, c'est-à-dire que le transfert d'un dollar des «traitements» au «fonctionnement» entraînerait l'inscription d'un crédit de 1,30 \$ à ce dernier poste. Inversement, une augmentation d'un dollar de la composante salariale exigerait une réduction de 1,30 \$ des dépenses de fonctionnement.

La méthode du « budget de fonctionnement »

Le Groupe de travail a étudié diverses options de contrôle, notamment : le maintien du contrôle actuel des années-personnes; l'institution de budgets salariaux distincts pour chaque programme; et l'établissement d'un budget de fonctionnement unique pour les ressources qu'exige l'exécution des programmes. Nous avons même envisagé la possibilité d'éliminer tous ces contrôles.

L'idée de contrôler les coûts par le biais d'un « budget de fonctionnement » unique pour chaque programme était la seule option qui, de l'avis du Groupe de travail, offrait la dose appropriée de souplesse, tout en maintenant un contrôle convenable sur les diverses catégories de dépenses.

L'Angleterre et l'Australie ont déjà adopté cette méthode, à laquelle elles donnent l'appellation de « dépenses courantes » (*running costs*) : il s'agit d'un système dans lequel un budget de fonctionnement unique pour les ministères englobe les budgets de personnel, de fonctionnement et de dépenses en capital secondaires d'un programme donné. L'élimination du contrôle des effectifs et du cloisonnement entre les composantes a accru l'efficacité et permis aux gestionnaires de se concentrer davantage sur les coûts d'exécution des programmes. Pour faciliter la compréhension de ce concept, nous avons décidé de l'appeler « budget de fonctionnement ».

La méthode du budget de fonctionnement éliminerait le contrôle des années-personnes. Chaque programme ministériel serait doté d'un budget distinct appelé budget de fonctionnement, qui comprendrait les traitements, les dépenses de fonctionnement et les dépenses en capital secondaires. Les ministères auraient toute liberté de transférer des fonds entre ces diverses ressources afin de parvenir à l'utilisation la plus efficace et efficiente des ressources dans l'exécution de leurs programmes. Ce faisant, les gestionnaires des ministères devraient peser les conséquences financières à court et à long terme de toutes leurs décisions, y compris les coûts de personnel relevant de leur autorité (comme la reclassement et les heures supplémentaires).

La figure 1 présente le système de contrôle existant et celui envisagé dans un régime de budget de fonctionnement. Le système ne prévoit qu'un seul budget, avec une répartition nominale des traitements et des autres dépenses de fonctionnement. Les fonds pourraient être transférés de l'un à l'autre, mais en fonction d'un taux appelé « facteur de conversion ». Ce facteur de conversion est nécessaire parce que les crédits d'un ministère ne comprennent pas toutes les composantes du budget salarial (p. ex. le coût des avantages sociaux) et que

De même, des programmes productifs de recettes, qui pourraient aider à réduire le déficit, sont limités par le manque d'années-personnes. Nous sommes d'avis que les restrictions d'années-personnes obligent à sous-traiter certains services à un coût qui dépasse celui de la prestation interne de ces services par des fonctionnaires.

Les discussions de nos groupes de sensibilisation ont confirmé ces opinions. Manifestement, donc, les restrictions d'années-personnes empêchent les gestionnaires de combiner leurs ressources de façon optimale afin de mettre en oeuvre leurs programmes avec une efficacité maximale.

2. Le contrôle des années-personnes dégage les gestionnaires de la responsabilité des composantes salariales de leur budget (souvent la majeure partie de ce dernier).

Plus particulièrement, les gestionnaires mettent l'accent sur le nombre d'employés plutôt que sur les coûts de personnel. Par exemple, ils se soucient peu des coûts de personnel parce qu'un employé à 80 000 \$ par an et un autre à 30 000 \$ par an ne consomment chacun qu'une année-personne. En outre, comme ils ne se préoccupent pas des coûts de personnel, les gestionnaires se concentrent uniquement sur les coûts de fonctionnement et de capital dans l'exécution de leurs programmes, ce qui rend difficile une véritable reddition de comptes.

3. Les années-personnes ne donnent pas une mesure exacte de la «taille» de la fonction publique.

Les données ou les prévisions d'années-personnes ne tiennent pas compte des employés des sociétés d'Etat (même si elles dépendent des fonds publics), des Forces armées, de certains organismes parlementaires, du Parlement lui-même, de la GRC et d'autres petites composantes du secteur public.

En raison de l'omission de ces organismes, les chiffres d'années-personnes ne donnent pas de la taille du secteur public une image aussi exacte que le grand public pourrait le penser.

Analyse

Pour ces raisons, le contrôle des années-personnes ne constitue pas le meilleur outil de gestion des ressources. Un système qui mettrait l'accent sur le contrôle du coût de prestation des services (plutôt que des effectifs) et qui obligerait les gestionnaires à tenir compte des coûts de main-d'œuvre et à être responsables de ceux qui relèvent de leur autorité serait plus indiqué. Un tel système favoriserait une gestion plus efficiente.

L'importance accordée aux années-personnes empêche les gestionnaires d'utiliser la meilleure combinaison de ressources (travail, fonctionnement, capital) pour s'acquitter de leur mission et peut déboucher sur des pratiques anticonomiques. Par exemple, les ministères n'arrivent pas parfois à répondre à la demande de programmes à frais entièrement recouverts par manque d'années-personnes, bien que ces activités n'occasionnent aucun coût supplémentaire au contribuable.

1. Les années-personnes constituent un moyen de contrôle artificiel qui met l'accent sur la taille de la fonction publique plutôt que sur les coûts d'exécution des programmes gouvernementaux.

Comme l'indique l'annexe C, le Conseil du Trésor contrôle les années-personnes et les budgets. Selon le Groupe de travail, le système actuel de contrôle des années-personnes présente trois problèmes fondamentaux :

Question

Les outils fondamentaux de contrôle budgétaire : années-personnes, dépenses de fonctionnement et dépenses, en capital secondaires

De ces hypothèses découlent les commentaires, observations et recommandations des sections suivantes.

4. L'approche générale de la gestion des ressources doit continuer de tenir compte des priorités de l'ensemble du gouvernement, des mandats des ministères, des attentes du public et de la nécessité d'assurer des services de qualité aux Canadiens considérés individuellement.

3. Il faut maintenir la responsabilité budgétaire. Par conséquent, les ministères doivent continuer de mesurer et de suivre l'utilisation qu'ils font des ressources ainsi que les résultats qu'ils en tirent.

2. Nos propositions doivent déboucher sur des dépenses plus judicieuses -- et non plus considérables. Elles ne doivent pas alourdir le déficit à long terme. Elles doivent plutôt rendre les opérations du gouvernement plus productives et efficaces.

1. Le pouvoir suprême du Parlement en matière d'autorisation des dépenses et de contrôle des fonds publics doit être respecté. Les crédits parlementaires continueront d'être rattachés à des programmes axés sur un objet particulier.

Le Groupe de travail reconnaît aussi que le gouvernement continuera vraisemblablement de faire face à des restrictions de dépenses, et qu'il restera nécessaire pour la fonction publique de mettre en oeuvre ses programmes de manière plus efficiente et efficace. Par conséquent, nous avons adopté les hypothèses suivantes, sur lesquelles reposent nos travaux et nos recommandations.

Dans tous les cas, nous avons évalué le système existant et les options de changement à la lumière de la philosophie et des principes de gestion des ressources exposés au début du rapport. Nous avons aussi supposé, dans la formulation de nos recommandations, que **tous les ministères** avaient ou auraient en place un système intégré de reddition de comptes qui **fonctionnerait**.

Le Groupe de travail a étudié avec soin plusieurs éléments du système actuel de gestion des ressources qui pourraient être améliorés ou qui font obstacle à une gestion efficace des ressources.

Pour une meilleure gestion des ressources

Comme bien d'autres dans le cadre de l'Initiative Fonction publique 2000, nos groupes de sensibilisation ont souligné que bien gérer signifierait prendre des risques calculés, ce qui supposait une plus grande tolérance face à l'erreur.

- On peut innover sans prendre de risques.
- Une gestion sans risques est une bonne gestion.

Le mythe d'un «monde sans erreur»

Les discussions de nos groupes de sensibilisation ont confirmé que la pérémpion des crédits budgétaires était attribuable à des causes diverses, dont plusieurs étaient indépendantes des décisions des gestionnaires. Cependant, il est clair que ces derniers cherchent à éviter les pérémpions, s'ils en ont la moindre possibilité. Parfois, cela les amène à effectuer des dépenses qu'ils auraient pu cibler plus efficacement en l'absence des pressions de fin d'exercice.

- des contraintes artificielles à une gestion efficace.
- Le Groupe de travail estime que certaines de ces rigidités ou contraintes ont pour origine des idées fausses ou des mythes au sujet de ce qui constitue une bonne gestion des ressources, notamment :

Le mythe des années-personnes

- Le nombre d'années-personnes est une bonne mesure de la taille de la fonction publique.
- Le nombre d'années-personnes constitue un bon indicateur du coût de fonctionnement de la fonction publique.
- L'élimination des contrôles exercés sur les années-personnes est la solution à tous les problèmes.
- Le contrôle des années-personnes permet de contenir la croissance de la fonction publique.

Les discussions de nos groupes de sensibilisation et les avis des membres du Groupe de travail ont confirmé que la notion d'année-personne (l'équivalent de 12 mois d'emploi d'une personne) ne constituait pas vraiment une bonne base pour mesurer la taille de la fonction publique. Qui plus est, les années-personnes ne donnent qu'une idée incomplète du coût de l'exécution des programmes et, dans bien des cas, en présentent un tableau trompeur.

Le mythe de la péremption des crédits

- La péremption de certains crédits entraîne automatiquement une réduction du budget du programme.
- La péremption de crédits est l'indice d'une mauvaise gestion.
- Une bonne politique budgétaire mise sur la péremption de crédits en fin d'exercice.

Il ressort des commentaires des sous-ministres que plusieurs ministères se sont déjà occupés de systèmes de reddition de comptes qui incorporent les principes décrits précédemment. Nous avons également constaté que différents ministères avaient élaboré des systèmes particuliers dans ce domaine en fonction de besoins opérationnels variés. Il y a lieu d'encourager tous les ministères à s'inspirer du succès des autres.

En conséquence, le Groupe de travail recommande :

Que tous les ministères et organismes qui ne l'ont pas déjà fait se dotent d'un système intégré de reddition de comptes mettant l'accent sur la responsabilité personnelle dans l'obtention des résultats, ainsi que l'indique le rapport.

Il importe également que non seulement les ministères aient des systèmes de reddition de comptes, mais aussi que le Parlement et le public aient en permanence l'assurance que ces systèmes sont en place et fonctionnent. Les sous-ministres devraient y veiller.

L'annexe B décrit plus en détail le régime de reddition de comptes que nous proposons.

Les caractéristiques essentielles du système actuel

L'annexe C expose certaines caractéristiques essentielles de l'actuel système de gestion des ressources dont tout effort de réforme devra tenir compte. Cette annexe traite des questions clés que constituent les relations du gouvernement avec le Parlement, les responsabilités de l'Exécutif (Conseil du Trésor) et les activités des ministères.

Les recommandations qui suivent tiennent entièrement compte des caractéristiques du système actuel et des principes qui le sous-tendent.

Mythes

Nos pratiques actuelles de gestion des ressources ne sont pas forcément conformes à une philosophie ou à un ensemble de principes du genre de ceux que nous avons exposés. En fait, le système actuel se caractérise par :

- l'absence d'une délégation cohérente des pouvoirs à un niveau suffisamment bas, correspondant à celui de la reddition de comptes;

- La structure de responsabilité doit être définie le plus clairement possible.

Dans un ministère, un fonctionnaire doit habituellement rendre des comptes directement à son supérieur hiérarchique, et ainsi de suite jusqu'au sous-ministre. Celui-ci est généralement responsable des résultats de programmes directement envers le ministre (et le ministre envers le Parlement). Cependant, le sous-ministre doit simultanément rendre compte directement à d'autres (p. ex. le Conseil du Trésor, la Commission de la fonction publique et le Parlement lui-même en vertu de lois générales) de l'exercice des responsabilités confiées par ces organismes ou personnes, et notamment du respect et de la réalisation de grands objectifs globaux ou gouvernementaux. En outre, les organismes centraux doivent souvent compter sur l'apport des ministères pour s'acquitter de leurs responsabilités directes (p. ex. la responsabilité du Conseil du Trésor en matière d'affectation des ressources). Le sous-ministre est alors responsable devant le ministre -- et le ministre devant l'organisme central -- de l'intégrité, de la qualité et de l'actualité des renseignements provenant de son ministère.

Bien que les ministres soient comptables devant le Parlement, on ne saurait s'attendre à ce qu'ils soient au courant ou responsables de tout ce que font les membres de leur ministère, surtout si ces derniers ne se conforment pas aux procédures ou politiques établies. Dans ces cas-là, on peut s'attendre à ce que le ministre ait à rendre compte des politiques générales de son organisme, mais c'est à la personne directement en cause de rendre compte de ses actes.

Les conditions préalables à l'amélioration de la reddition des comptes sont déjà en place

Les processus et structures en place devraient permettre aux ministères et organismes de répondre aux exigences d'une reddition de comptes intégrée. Par exemple, les processus actuels de planification et de budgétisation peuvent demeurer la base du système de reddition de comptes au niveau de l'organisation. L'obligation de rendre compte peut alors être ramenée au niveau personnel par le truchement du processus d'appréciation et des descriptions de postes en place. Enfin, le réseau d'information existant devrait pouvoir fournir les renseignements nécessaires à la prise de décisions et au suivi des progrès accomplis dans la réalisation des résultats.

La question continuant de susciter des préoccupations, le Groupe de travail a procédé, dans le cadre de son examen de la gestion des ressources, à une évaluation détaillée des exigences de reddition de comptes dans l'administration fédérale. Pour ce faire, nous avons examiné divers aspects de l'obligation de rendre compte dans la fonction publique. Nous nous sommes reportés aux études antérieures de la question et avons examiné des éléments du système de reddition de comptes que la plupart des ministères utilisent actuellement. Le président du Groupe de travail a aussi demandé par écrit à tous les sous-ministres leur opinion personnelle sur la question et leur a indiqué dans les grandes lignes certaines des principales exigences envisagées alors pour renforcer l'obligation de rendre compte.

Compte tenu de tous ces renseignements et après mûre réflexion, le Groupe de travail convient qu'un bon système de reddition de comptes doit reposer sur les principes et les caractéristiques qui suivent :

- L'obligation de rendre compte doit être axée sur les résultats. Elle doit être globale et mettre l'accent sur la responsabilité personnelle.
- La réussite du système repose avant tout sur le choix des résultats dont il doit être rendu compte. En conséquence :
 - Les résultats doivent être stimulants, convenus entre les parties, explicites et, si possible, quantifiables.
 - Les énoncés de résultats doivent mettre l'accent sur un nombre restreint de résultats clés.
 - Les résultats précisés doivent être généralement contrôlables par ceux qui ont à en rendre compte.
 - Les résultats à atteindre doivent être clairs et faire la différence entre l'essentiel et le souhaitable.
 - Les résultats à atteindre doivent être liés à un niveau convenu de ressources.

La gestion des ressources fait intervenir de nombreuses variables. La gestion des ressources du secteur public doit tenir pleinement compte de la nécessité de fournir au Parlement suffisamment d'information pour lui permettre de contrôler convenablement les dépenses. Elle doit tenir compte simultanément de la demande de services exprimée par le public, tout en favorisant une amélioration constante de l'efficacité déployées dans la prestation de ces services afin de réduire le plus possible le fardeau imposé aux contribuables.

Une autre variable qui influe sur la gestion des ressources est l'évolution de la société canadienne et de ses exigences à l'endroit du gouvernement fédéral. Notre système de gestion des ressources doit donc être suffisamment souple pour s'adapter à cette évolution dans le cadre décrit précédemment et ne saurait limiter la capacité de réaction du gouvernement face à ces changements.

Un exemple de l'évolution de nos besoins et de la capacité de réaction du gouvernement à leur égard est la globalisation croissante des enjeux. Alors que le gouvernement a encore la structure qu'il s'était donnée dans les années 1950 et 1960 pour traiter de problèmes sectoriels précis (p. ex., agriculture, énergie, etc.), les questions auxquelles les gouvernements ont à faire face deviennent de plus en plus «horizontales», prenant des dimensions non seulement intersectorielles et interministérielles, mais encore interprovinciales et internationales.

L'obligation de rendre compte, pierre angulaire d'une gestion efficace des ressources

Un aspect clé de la philosophie de gestion des ressources que préconise le Groupe de travail est que les gestionnaires doivent avoir à la fois le pouvoir d'utiliser les ressources voulues pour obtenir des résultats et l'obligation d'en rendre compte. Nous croyons que cette obligation est à la base même d'une gestion efficace et responsable des ressources dans le secteur public.

Cette question de la reddition de comptes n'est pas nouvelle. Elle a été mise en relief par Glassco en 1962, par Lambert en 1979 et par plusieurs vérificateurs généraux par la suite. En outre, elle a été au cœur d'initiatives gouvernementales particulières comme l'actuelle initiative d'accroissement des pouvoirs et des responsabilités ministériels (APRM) lancée par le gouvernement en place.

Des progrès importants ont manifestement été accomplis dans la délégation des pouvoirs et des responsabilités en matière de gestion des ressources. Un des objectifs de l'initiative FP2000 consiste toutefois à déterminer si d'autres progrès sont possibles, sur le plan non seulement de la gestion des ressources, mais aussi d'autres questions intéressant les fonctionnaires et, en fin de compte, du service au public.

Les recommandations de notre Groupe de travail s'inscrivent dans le droit fil d'un processus amorcé il y a près de trente ans avec la Commission Glassco. Le rapport Glassco et les examens et initiatives qui ont suivi relèvent tous d'une tendance à la délégation de pouvoirs et de responsabilités accrues aux gestionnaires, parallèlement un renforcement de l'obligation de rendre compte. (L'annexe A résume brièvement cette évolution de la gestion des ressources et les principaux examens qui en ont influencé le cours.)

Perspective historique

- Les ministères se sont imposé eux-mêmes certaines des restrictions et contraintes actuelles à une gestion efficace.
- Il ne suffit pas de rationaliser le système de gestion des ressources. Il faut aussi améliorer les systèmes de personnel et d'administration.
- Les systèmes de gestion des ressources et les systèmes financiers devraient servir les besoins des gestionnaires et des employés. De nombreux gestionnaires considèrent actuellement qu'ils sont soumis à ces systèmes.
- Un objectif fondamental de l'initiative FP2000 devrait être de mieux faire correspondre les niveaux d'autorité et de responsabilité de chaque employé.

Les sections ultérieures reflètent les conclusions et commentaires des groupes de sensibilisation. Voici quand même certains des points généraux soulevés par les participants :

Les groupes de sensibilisation ont témoigné d'un intérêt authentique pour l'initiative FP2000. Chacun était manifestement désireux de participer au projet, et les échanges ont été ouverts, honnêtes et constructifs.

Les groupes de sensibilisation nous ont permis en particulier d'échanger librement des points de vue variés sur les avantages des diverses propositions, leurs effets possibles et les obstacles à leur mise en œuvre.

langues officielles, les lois sur l'accès à l'information et la protection des renseignements personnels, ainsi que la Charte des droits et libertés.

En conséquence, le Groupe de travail recommande :

- 1) Que le Conseil du Trésor produise un énoncé clair de la philosophie de gestion du gouvernement reprenant les principes et les objectifs du Cadre de gestion des ressources exposé dans ce rapport.

Le processus de consultation

La consultation des employés et des gestionnaires de la fonction publique et des représentants syndicaux a constitué un volet important des activités du Groupe de travail.

La consultation des syndicats

Le Groupe de travail a communiqué avec les dirigeants des quinze syndicats de la fonction publique au début de mars. Il leur a expliqué ses objectifs et décrit les questions examinées. Il a offert de rencontrer les représentants syndicaux afin de connaître leur opinion sur toutes les questions touchant la gestion des ressources. Cinq syndicats ont répondu, et trois se sont réunis avec les représentants du Groupe de travail.

Malgré leur caractère préliminaire, les discussions ont permis d'échanger beaucoup de renseignements utiles. Les représentants syndicaux ont reçu une documentation détaillée décrivant les principales questions examinées par le Groupe de travail et ont convenu d'en faire l'étude et de nous faire part de leurs commentaires. Jusqu'ici, les représentants syndicaux n'ont pas fait valoir de préoccupations majeures au sujet des questions étudiées.

La consultation des employés et des gestionnaires

Lorsqu'il s'agit de définir des problèmes et de mettre à l'épreuve des propositions d'amélioration, les gestionnaires et les employés de la fonction publique sont notre meilleur atout. Aussi, le Groupe de travail a-t-il constitué onze groupes de sensibilisation couvrant toutes les régions du pays. Plus de 200 personnes, dont l'apport a été inestimable, y ont participé.

Nous sommes convaincus que la philosophie et les principes formulés ci-après contribueront à l'instauration d'un meilleur système de gestion des ressources pour les années à venir.

Un système responsable de gestion des ressources répondant aux besoins des ministres et du gouvernement doit :

- promouvoir une gestion efficace;
- obliger les gestionnaires à rendre compte des résultats obtenus; et
- reposer sur le principe de la confiance en une fonction publique non partisane, objective et professionnelle au niveau tant des gestionnaires que des employés;

tout en respectant l'autorité suprême du Parlement en matière de dépenses.

En conformité avec cette philosophie, un bon système de gestion des ressources doit atteindre quatre objectifs :

- favoriser un service de qualité et une exécution efficace des programmes en fonction de buts et d'objectifs clairement établis;
- inciter à une gestion efficace en accordant le plus de souplesse possible dans la gestion des ressources;
- promouvoir une délégation maximale du pouvoir de décision, jusqu'aux plus bas niveaux possibles, avec une structure de responsabilité clairement définie; et
- limiter la réglementation centrale aux cas où elle est nécessaire aux intérêts supérieurs de la fonction publique.

L'application de ces principes instaurera les conditions nécessaires à une profonde transformation culturelle fondée sur des valeurs et des attitudes nouvelles. Cependant, cette transformation devra s'accompagner d'un programme bien conçu d'éducation et de formation destiné à plusieurs cibles différentes, notamment le Parlement, le gouvernement, le public et évidemment nos employés et leurs syndicats. Cela est d'autant plus important qu'il faut non seulement satisfaire aux exigences législatives et répondre aux besoins des programmes, mais encore s'acquitter des responsabilités générales qui constituent aussi un aspect fondamental de la fonction publique -- notamment la nécessité d'assurer l'équité en matière d'emploi, d'assurer l'application régulière de la loi et de respecter la Loi sur les

Le but de Fonction publique 2000 dans son sens le plus large est de transformer les processus et les pratiques de gestion dans la fonction publique du Canada afin qu'elle puisse relever les défis des années à venir.

Plus particulièrement, les objectifs de l'initiative consistent à promouvoir une fonction publique qui :

- se caractérise par son professionnalisme, sa haute compétence, son impartialité et le sens du service au public;

- considère ses employés comme un atout précieux à mettre en valeur;

- donne le plus de pouvoirs possible aux employés et aux gestionnaires de première ligne; et

- offre la possibilité d'avoir des formes d'organisation différentes afin de répondre à des besoins divers, tout en s'inscrivant dans le cadre d'une seule et même fonction publique.

Ces objectifs ont orienté les travaux du Groupe de travail sur la gestion des ressources et les contrôles budgétaires.

Le cadre de gestion des ressources

Le Groupe de travail avait à l'origine pour mission d'examiner les «contrôles budgétaires». Ses membres ont toutefois jugé cette tâche trop restrictive. Aussi ont-ils décidé d'étendre leur examen à tous les aspects de la gestion des ressources -- seule façon, selon eux, de répondre aux objectifs de Fonction publique 2000.

Le Groupe de travail a commencé par définir la philosophie et les principes qui devaient orienter l'étude des questions de gestion des ressources, afin de disposer d'un cadre pour l'évaluation du système actuel, ainsi que de critères pour la validation de ses recommandations d'amélioration.

6) Que le Conseil du Trésor favorise l'élaboration d'une politique de gestion des éléments d'actif comportant le partage des ressources, ainsi que l'indique le rapport, et que les mesures d'incitation annoncées le 15 décembre 1989 par le président du Conseil du Trésor s'appliquent automatiquement.

Le Groupe de travail estime que le système de gestion des ressources doit comporter des mesures incitatives favorisant une bonne gestion. Nous prenons acte des initiatives annoncées récemment par le président du Conseil du Trésor et proposons que leur application devienne automatique.

7) Que tous les ministères et organismes qui ne l'ont pas déjà fait se dotent d'un système intégré de reddition de comptes mettant l'accent sur la responsabilité personnelle dans l'obtention des résultats, ainsi que l'indique le rapport.

Cette recommandation part de la conviction qu'il est possible d'améliorer l'efficacité et le service en donnant aux fonctionnaires la possibilité de choisir la meilleure combinaison de ressources pour exécuter les programmes. Le système actuel de contrôle des années-personnes ne permet pas cette souplesse parce qu'il limite artificiellement une des composantes, la main-d'œuvre, en restreignant le nombre d'employés, mais sans trop se préoccuper des coûts correspondants.

3) Que le Conseil du Trésor donne plus de marge de manœuvre aux ministères et à leurs gestionnaires en approuvant le report automatique, à l'exercice suivant, de jusqu'à 2 pour 100 du «budget de fonctionnement» établi dans le Budget des dépenses principal.

Cette recommandation reflète le point de vue du Groupe de travail selon lequel la rigidité des règles actuelles de pérémpion fausse la gestion des ressources. Conscient de ce problème, le Conseil du Trésor a déjà pris des mesures pour permettre le report des crédits périmés. Cette recommandation donnerait plus de souplesse à ces dispositions, dont l'utilité s'est révélée limitée.

4) Que les dépenses continuent d'être orientées selon leur objet et que le seuil d'établissement de crédits distincts soit porté à 250 millions de dollars pour les dépenses en capital et à 100 millions de dollars pour les paiements de transfert dans le cadre d'un programme.

Cela maintiendrait l'orientation des crédits parlementaires selon leur objet, tout en donnant aux ministères plus de liberté dans l'utilisation des grandes catégories de ressources afin de répondre aux besoins des programmes. Le relèvement des seuils donnerait au Parlement un pouvoir de contrôle par crédit distinct sur les dépenses en capital et les paiements de transfert lorsqu'ils sont suffisamment importants pour avoir en fait un objet propre.

5) Que le Conseil du Trésor étudie la question de l'annualité du cycle budgétaire en consultation avec le Parlement et le vérificateur général, et examine les options précises de budgétisation pluriannuelle proposées par le Groupe de travail.

Le Groupe de travail estime que des crédits pluriannuels offriraient la possibilité d'améliorer la gestion des ressources conformément à la philosophie et aux principes établis précédemment. Cependant, des modifications du système actuel pourraient être lourdes de conséquences pour le contrôle parlementaire des dépenses. Aussi estimons-nous que toute proposition de changement devrait être élaborée en consultation avec le Parlement et le vérificateur général.

- promouvoir une délégation maximale du pouvoir de décision, jusqu'aux plus bas niveaux possibles, avec une structure de responsabilité clairement définie; et

- limiter la réglementation centrale aux cas où elle est nécessaire aux intérêts supérieurs de la fonction publique.
- Les recommandations du Groupe de travail, et bien d'autres propositions issues de l'ordonnance de 2000, donneraient aux gestionnaires plus de pouvoir et de souplesse de décision. Cela s'accompagnerait toutefois de l'obligation pour les gestionnaires de rendre compte de leurs résultats. Le Groupe de travail énonce trois principes à cet égard :

- L'obligation de rendre compte doit être axée sur les résultats. Elle doit être globale et mettre l'accent sur la responsabilité personnelle.
- La réussite du système repose avant tout sur le choix des résultats dont il doit être rendu compte.
- La structure de responsabilité doit être définie le plus clairement possible.

Les ministères sont invités à incorporer des mécanismes de reddition de comptes présentant ces caractéristiques à leurs systèmes de planification, de budgétisation, d'appréciation du rendement et d'information de gestion. Il s'agira dans bien des cas de réaménager les processus déjà en place.

S'appuyant sur cette philosophie et ces principes, le Groupe de travail recommande :

- 1) Que le Conseil du Trésor produise un énoncé clair de la philosophie de gestion du gouvernement.

Cet énoncé devrait reprendre les principes et les objectifs du Cadre de gestion des ressources exposé dans ce rapport.

- 2) Que le gouvernement élimine le contrôle des années-personnes et adopte des «budgets de fonctionnement» uniques dont la mise en oeuvre commencerait en 1992-1993, afin de favoriser une utilisation plus productive des ressources et de mettre l'accent sur le coût réel de l'exécution des programmes gouvernementaux.

Ce rapport présente les résultats des travaux que le Groupe de travail sur la gestion des ressources a entrepris dans le cadre d'un projet plus vaste, Fonction publique 2000, qui vise à préparer la fonction publique à mieux relever les défis des années à venir.

Le Groupe de travail a procédé à un examen détaillé, non seulement des outils particuliers de contrôle budgétaire mis en oeuvre à l'heure actuelle, mais aussi des aspects plus généraux de la gestion des ressources, notamment les éléments d'actif, les ressources financières et les ressources humaines. Pour s'acquitter de sa tâche, le Groupe de travail a mené des consultations approfondies auprès d'un large éventail de fonctionnaires pour s'assurer que ses recommandations auraient un effet sensible et positif sur l'efficacité de l'exécution des programmes.

Le Groupe de travail a élaboré une philosophie de gestion des ressources ainsi qu'un ensemble de principes de fonctionnement à la lumière desquels toutes les questions de gestion des ressources ont été examinées :

Un système responsable de gestion des ressources répondant aux besoins des ministres et du gouvernement doit :

- promouvoir une gestion efficace;
- obliger les gestionnaires à rendre compte des résultats obtenus; et
- reposer sur le principe de la confiance en une fonction publique non partisane, objective et professionnelle au niveau tant des gestionnaires que des employés;

tout en respectant l'autorité suprême du Parlement en matière de dépenses.

En conformité avec cette philosophie, un bon système de gestion des ressources doit atteindre quatre objectifs :

- favoriser un service de qualité et une exécution efficace des programmes en fonction de buts et d'objectifs clairement établis;
- inciter à une gestion efficace en accordant le plus de souplesse possible dans la gestion des ressources;

POUR DISCUSSION

FONCTION PUBLIQUE 2000 : RAPPORT DU GROUPE DE TRAVAIL
SUR LA GESTION DES RESSOURCES
ET CONTRÔLES BUDGÉTAIRES

Le 7 août 1990

- conception, organisation, évaluation statistique, interprétation et analyse, mais pas d'examen;
- élaboration de normes statistiques, classification, registres, et cadres d'échantillonnage; et
- dissémination de large bases de données statistiques pour un accès général dans des modes électroniques.

"Services statistiques" ne s'applique pas à l'examen obligatoire de propositions de collecte d'informations ministérielles, qui est la responsabilité de Statistique Canada.

- (11) Dans cette politique, par "télécommunications" on entend les transmissions utilisées pour la communication par des moyens électroniques, électroniques ou électromagnétiques, y compris de moyens vocaux (par exemple téléphone, radio), par messages (par exemple télégraphe, téléimprimante, message électronique ou systèmes de courrier électronique, transfert de fonds), par image (par exemple télécopieur, vidéo), par données informatiques, conférences informatisées, systèmes de bureautique à l'appui des réseaux (par exemple réseaux locaux) et d'autres types de données (par exemple télémétrie). Le rôle de l'ATG a été réexaminé à ce moment en relation avec une fonction possible d'architecte pour les télécommunications au gouvernement.

L'ATG obtient des services de télécommunications sur demande au Canada et aux États-Unis. Le gouvernement a l'intention de convertir l'Agence des télécommunications gouvernementales en organisme opérationnel spécial.

AEC fournit des installations de télécommunications internationales au nom du gouvernement du Canada.

- (12) Le gouvernement a l'intention de suspendre ce programme à partir du 31 décembre 1990.

(13) Comprend :

- Service central de transport
- Service central de retrait
- Service central d'assurance
- Service des voyages du gouvernement
- Service de la circulation outre-mer
- Service d'information de la gestion du parc automobile

Note : Le service d'information de la gestion du parc automobile deviendra facultatif à partir du 1^{er} avril 1991.

- (1) Les annonces payées des ministères, comme les avis publics concernant des appels d'offres, des ventes, des audiences publiques, des offres d'emploi, des heures de bureau et des adresses, peuvent être placées directement avec les médias à condition de ne pas utiliser une agence de publicité.
- (2) Obligatoire avec des dispositions spéciales facultatives, y compris la passation directe de contrats par des ministères avec des entrepreneurs, dans des circonstances spéciales.
- (3) Bien que des ministères maintiennent des services audio-visuels internes, des services audio-visuels du secteur privé sont disponibles par l'intermédiaire d'ASC. Le gouvernement a l'intention de rendre ces services disponibles par le service facultatif d'ASC à partir du 1^{er} avril 1992, sous la direction d'un organisme opérationnel spécial.
- (4) Le gouvernement a l'intention de consolider et de convertir le Bureau des services de vérification et le Bureau de consultation administrative en organisme opérationnel spécial.
- (5) Les autres services de communication comprennent : participation à la planification stratégique, évaluation environnementale, rédaction, mise en forme, gestion de projets multimediatiques, évaluation, conception graphique, et services créatifs.
- (6) Cela se rapporte à l'administration des rémunérations des employés.
- (7) Le gouvernement a l'intention de confier la prestation de ce service à un organisme opérationnel spécial.
- (8) Comprend :
 - acquisitions en sciences et génie
 - acquisitions commerciales
 - approvisionnement d'articles en stock
 - recherche et développement et autres activités scientifiques relatives à l'approvisionnement
 - acquisition de véhicules de direction
 - contrats non concurrentiels de plus de 2 000 \$ pour d'anciens fonctionnaires recevant une pension
 - autres services tels que des services de personnel temporaire et de commissionnaires
- (9) Le gouvernement a l'intention de confier la prestation de ce service à un organisme opérationnel spécial.
- (10) "Services statistiques" signifie l'élaboration de l'information statistique grâce à des enquêtes ou à l'utilisation de données administratives, y compris :

| | | |
|---|---|--|
| F | - | Voyages |
| F | F | Vérification (4) |
| F | O | Traduction de langues écrites (voir Interprétation) |
| F | F | - international |
| F | F | - au Canada et aux États-Unis |
| | | Télécommunications (11) |

| | | |
|---|-----|---|
| F | O | Expositions (7) |
| O | RFR | Formation et perfectionnement du personnel (9) |
| O | O | Gestion de compensation (6) |
| F | O | Gestion de la circulation (13) |
| F | F | Gestion des éléments d'actif des biens meubles |
| F | F | Gestion des installations (TPC offre des services aux utilisateurs) |
| F | F | Formation en gestion |
| F | O | Imprimerie (7) |
| F | O | Interprétation de langues parlées (voir aussi Traduction) |
| F | O | Location d'oeuvres d'art |
| O | O | Normes de technologie d'information |
| F | O | Panneaux |
| F | O | Production audio-visuelle (3) |
| F | O | Publications (7) |
| O | O | Publicité |
| F | F | Receveur général: services connexes |
| F | F | Recherches sur l'opinion publique |
| O | O | Responsabilité des valeurs |
| F | F | Services financiers, administratifs et autres |
| O | O | Services juridiques aux ministères |
| F | O | Services locaux (TPC fournit des services aux locataires à TPC) |
| F | RFR | Services statistiques aux ministères (10) |
| F | RFR | Systèmes d'information de gestion du personnel |

Les tableaux des pages suivantes décrivent les types de services communs offerts par les OSC énumérées à l'annexe 2. Il est important de préciser que ces services, qu'ils soient obligatoires ou facultatifs, sont généralement accompagnés de directives très détaillées et de systèmes de rapport et de contrôle qui ont un impact sur les ressources ministérielles.

SERVICES COMMUNS OFFERTS PAR OSC

SERVICES

STATUT ACTUEL, STATUT PROPOSÉ

| | | | |
|--------------------------------------|-----|---|---|
| Acquisitions: | O | O | |
| a. biens (8) | O | O | |
| b. services spéciaux (8) | O | O | |
| Architecture et génie | O | | F |
| (A et G) pour biens immobiliers | | | |
| Autres contrats de construction liés | F | | F |
| aux services d'impartition (appels | | | |
| d'offre et octroi seulement) | F | | |
| Autres services de communication | F | | F |
| (5) | | | |
| Autres services relatifs aux biens | F | | F |
| immobiliers | | | |
| Bassin des affectations temporaires | F | | F |
| (BAT) (12) | | | |
| Conseils en gestion (4) | F | | F |
| Contrats de construction liés aux | O | | F |
| services de A et G de TPC | | | |
| Contrats de relations publiques | F | | F |
| Dépouillement de la presse | F | | F |
| Disposition (biens excédentaires) | O | | F |
| Disposition (biens immobiliers excé- | O | | O |
| dentaires) | | | |
| Entreposage | RFR | | F |
| Entretien et réparations de matériel | F | | F |
| de bureau | | | |

Sécurité
Services aux employés
Services communs
Technologie d'information
Vérification interne
Voyages
Réception

DOMAINE DES POLITIQUES ADMINISTRATIVES ET DES SERVICES COMMUNS

ÉLÉMENTS CONNEXES

DOMAINES DE POLITIQUES

Accès à l'information et protection de la vie privée

Accès à l'information et protection de la vie privée

Cession d'administration

Biens immobiliers

plan d'investissement
disposition
observation foncière
aménagement
sécurité
taux et adéquat
accès pour handicapés
patrimoine immobilier
protection de l'environnement
Interface provincial/municipal

Communications

Évaluation de programme

Examen des acquisitions

Gestion de projet

Principaux projets de la Couronne

Gestion des risques

Gestion des risques et garanties
compensation et restitution
à titre gracieux

Gestion du matériel

Gestion du matériel
véhicules à moteur
Meubles et accessoires

Gestion financière

Impartition

Non-diffusion de renseignements

Programme extra-muros de sciences et de technologie

LISTE DES MEMBRES DU GROUPE DE TRAVAIL

M^{me} Margaret Catley-Carlson
Sous-ministre
Santé et Bien-être Social Canada
Présidente

M^{me} Raymonde Dubois
Chef de cabinet
Bureau du Sous-ministre
Santé et Bien-être social
Canada

M. Ghislain Leblond
Sous-ministre associé
Agriculture Canada

M. Clifff MacKay
Sous-ministre adjoint
Industrie, Sciences et
Technologie Canada

M. Reid Morden
Directeur
Service canadien du ren-
seignement de sécurité
technologie de reproduction

M. Richard Paton
Secrétaire adjoint
Division de la gestion administrative
Secrétariat du Conseil du Trésor

M^{me} Monique Plante-Boyd
Directeur général
Direction générale des
communications
Santé et Bien-être social
Canada

M. Derek Sweet
Fonction publique 2000

M. Frank Swift
Vice-président
Agence de promotion
économique du Canada
atlantique
Nouveau-Brunswick

M^{me} Anne Wallis
Coordonnatrice administrative
Santé et Bien-être social Canada
Archiviste national du
Canada

Annexes

- c) l'étendue de la délégation de tous les pouvoirs à l'intérieur des ministères, comparée à la situation au 1^{er} avril 1990;
- d) le progrès accompli dans la transformation de services communs obligatoires en services facultatifs;
- e) le degré de rationalisation des initiatives en matière de politiques administratives
- i) du Conseil du Trésor
 ii) des organismes de services communs
 iii) des ministères
- Le Groupe de travail devrait se réunir en automne 1991 pour étudier l'ébauche de rapport, évaluer les progrès accomplis par rapport au cadre de travail et, si besoin est, pour présenter de nouvelles recommandations.

Les gestionnaires de programmes sont les mieux placés pour juger et décider de la mise en oeuvre des politiques administratives. Le Groupe de travail estime qu'il est nécessaire de donner à ces gestionnaires le maximum d'initiative et de pouvoir décisionnel. Il est essentiel que leur jugement soit facilité par la formation et l'appui nécessaires. Conformément à la recommandation formulée dans le chapitre 5, concernant le besoin de déléguer "vers le bas et vers l'extérieur", le Groupe de travail recommande :

17. que les ministères accordent une priorité élevée à l'élaboration d'un système interne de communications compatible avec les initiatives gouvernementales en matière de communications. Ce procédé assurera que tous les employés ministériels connaissent et comprennent les principes des politiques administratives nouvelles ou modifiées, leur niveau de délégation, où s'adresser pour obtenir de l'aide, et les répercussions des changements sur l'exécution des programmes ministériels;
18. que les ministères fournissent ou appuient la formation requise, pour assurer que tous les employés tirent plein parti de leurs pouvoirs accrus;

V. Responsabilité de la mise en oeuvre

19. qu'un rapport d'évaluation soit préparé à l'intention du Conseil du Trésor, une fois par an pendant les trois prochaines années.
- Le rapport d'évaluation se servira des critères d'évaluation suivants :

- a) l'étendue de la délégation de pouvoirs administratifs accrus accordés par le Conseil du Trésor et les ministères (aux clients), comparée à la situation au 1^{er} avril 1990;

- b) l'étendue de la délégation de pouvoirs accordée par ASC, et par TPC;

12.

que le gouvernement fédéral adopte de nouveaux principes applicables aux politiques administratives et basés sur le maximum d'encouragement, de pouvoirs et de responsabilités pour les gestionnaires de tous niveaux, et que les organismes centraux et les ministères révisent leurs politiques administratives et leurs services communs dans cette optique. Grâce à ce procédé, les politiques administratives et les services communs créeront un meilleur équilibre entre les exigences administratives d'envergure gouvernementale et le besoin de souplesse ministérielle et administrative;

13.

que le Secrétariat du Conseil du Trésor travaille de concert avec l'Agence de formation du personnel, le Centre de perfectionnement des cadres et d'autres organisations appropriées, afin d'élaborer les programmes de formation nécessaires à la mise en oeuvre des recommandations du présent rapport;

14.

que le Secrétariat du Conseil du Trésor et les ministères élaborent de vastes programmes de communication afin d'assurer que tous les employés soient au courant des politiques nouvelles ou modifiées, de leur niveau de délégation de pouvoirs, et des répercussions de ces politiques sur leurs responsabilités;

B)

Organismes de services communs

Les services communs doivent répondre aux critères de pouvoir administratif et de souplesse, ainsi qu'aux critères d'économie, de prudence et de probité. Le groupe de travail recommande:

15.

que tous les services communs fassent l'objet de révisions périodiques dans le cadre d'une série d'évaluations interministérielles dirigées par le SCT, avec la participation du Secrétariat du Conseil du Trésor/Bureau du Contrôleur général, des OSC et des ministères-clients;

16.

que les OSC revoient toutes leurs opérations de façon régulière, afin de réviser les niveaux de délégations accordés aux ministères et de s'assurer que leurs services sont fournis de façon à répondre aux besoins de leurs clients;

C)

Ministères

A) Organismes centraux

Les politiques administratives et les rôles des organismes de services communs doivent permettre l'exécution efficace et rentable des programmes ministériels. Ils doivent laisser suffisamment de place à l'initiative et permettre aux prises de décision finales de se faire aux niveaux appropriés. L'application de directives gouvernementales générales doit se limiter aux cas où elles apportent un avantage certain ou une "valeur ajoutée" au processus de prise de décisions.

Le groupe de travail estime que le Secrétariat du Conseil du Trésor devrait entreprendre une révision des politiques administratives pour mieux équilibrer les éléments de prudence, de probité et d'économie, en se posant les questions suivantes:

1. Est-il nécessaire que cette politique soit appliquée à l'échelle gouvernementale ministérielle? Sommes-nous en train de créer inutilement un règlement gouvernemental ministériel pour répondre aux besoins particuliers d'une opération spéciale et limitée?
- ii. Quels sont les coûts engagés par les ministères et le gouvernement pour la mise en oeuvre de cette politique?
- iii. Comment cette politique touchera-t-elle les opérations ministérielles ou la gestion ministérielle? Est-elle pratique? Fonctionnera-t-elle? Y a-t-il des raisons d'appuyer cette politique?

- iv. Dans quelle mesure la politique proposée réduit-elle les pouvoirs de la gestion? Peut-elle être associée pour aider les gestionnaires de premier niveau à accomplir leurs fonctions ou à atteindre leurs objectifs de programme?

- v. Augmente-t-elle ou réduit-elle le volume d'écritures administratives ou le travail courant de bureau?
- vi. Peut-elle être communiquée et comprise aisément?

- vii. Cette politique permettra-t-elle aux gestionnaires de premier niveau de prendre la décision finale, selon les circonstances?

De façon plus précise, le groupe de travail recommande:

effectuée par ces comités est le rapport déposé le 30 mai 1990 par le sous-comité des modalités de paiement. Celui-ci avait pour mandat de repérer les meilleures modalités appliquées au processus des comptes créditeurs, de communiquer de l'information aux ministères afin de leur permettre d'adapter les modalités suggérées, et de présenter au Conseil des chefs comptables des recommandations touchant aux modalités de paiement. Leur rapport contient de bonnes recommandations, conformes à l'esprit de FF 2000 et qui, une fois mises en place, élimineront le fouillis administratif dont il est question dans notre rapport. Voici quelques exemples de leurs recommandations :

- que les ministères régulent les fournisseurs réguliers sur une base mensuelle plutôt que transaction par transaction;

- que le Conseil des chefs comptables adopte un système de vérification des comptes basé sur la présence de certains risques, et qu'il communique au Bureau du Contrôleur général des renseignements et des critères qui permettront à la révision des politiques de se faire sur un plan plus pratique;

- que les ministères se servent de bons de petite caisse pour les remboursements de frais de voyage intérieurs à 100 \$ et qu'ils adoptent un système selon lequel les avances de voyage intérieures à 100 \$ provisionneraient des comptes de petite caisse chaque fois que cela sera rentable;

- que les ministères et les organismes appliquent le meilleur moyen de modifier le degré de vérification des demandes de remboursement de voyage selon les articles 33 et 34 de la Loi sur l'Administration financière, afin d'obtenir la plus grande rentabilité possible.

Le Groupe de travail appuie totalement les efforts et les recommandations de ce sous-comité et encourage d'autres groupes dans le gouvernement à prendre des initiatives analogues.

IV. MISE EN OEUVRE

Les changements proposés par le Groupe de travail soulèvent des défis importants. Vaincre l'inertie d'une culture régie par la présence de règlements demandera un effort soutenu de la part des organismes centraux, des organismes de services communs et des ministères, ainsi que l'appui des ministères face à la notion d'accroissement de délégation de pouvoirs. De plus, des mesures précises devront être prises pour s'assurer que les OSC s'adaptent à leur nouveau rôle suivant une façon méthodique qui minimisera l'impact de ces changements sur les employés.

Avant d'aborder les options propres au groupe de travail, nous aimerions souligner d'autres initiatives prises à la même époque que le sondage de RP 2000. Un bon exemple de l'excellent travail

III. INITIATIVES CONNEXES

Le groupe de travail est, depuis le début de ses travaux, conscient de ces problèmes éventuels. Plusieurs de ses recommandations en tiennent d'ailleurs compte. Souvent, les craintes de risques d'embaras sont exagérées et reflètent la tendance traditionnelle au gouvernement de ne pas faire confiance aux fonctionnaires ou de ne pas croire qu'ils peuvent faire face à leurs responsabilités. Avec une formation convenable, de bons moyens de communication, de meilleures responsabilités et l'appui des ministres, les ministères devraient être en mesure de créer suffisamment de garanties et d'offrir plus d'options et de délégations.

Mais il faut également reconnaître que l'élimination des risques d'erreurs est extrêmement coûteuse. Il faut pour cela mettre en oeuvre des systèmes complexes, tels que la vérification de chaque demande de remboursement de frais de voyage. Cette situation limite le potentiel de délégation, ce qui signifie que les gestionnaires supérieurs passent plus de temps en écritures pour des petites dépenses qu'en gestion. Cela signifie également que les groupes consultatifs, les organismes de services ou les organismes centraux servent à contre-vérifier tout ce que les gestionnaires font. Toutes ces opérations époussent des ressources déjà rares à un moment où les ministères ont du mal à trouver les ressources nécessaires à l'exécution de leurs programmes de base.

L'un des problèmes de mise en oeuvre les plus complexes auxquels le gouvernement fédéral doit faire face dans les domaines des politiques administratives et des services communs, est la gestion des risques d'erreurs et les difficultés que ceux-ci peuvent créer aux ministères. Un grand nombre de politiques et de services obligatoires actuels ont été mis sur pied pour répondre au besoin de centraliser les pouvoirs décisionnels, ou de soumettre les opérations à des contrôles qui réduiraient les critiques du public, ou tout au moins fourniraient des moyens de défense faciles. Si un changement de rôles des OSC entraînait un plus grand nombre de changements de délégations de pouvoirs ou des changements importants de délégations de pouvoirs, les critiques de la division de problèmes, les critiques exigeraient certainement un plus grand nombre de points de contrôle ou la centralisation.

II. RISQUES


Ce chapitre contient un plan d'action conçu pour mettre en oeuvre les recommandations du groupe de travail et suivre de façon systématique les progrès effectués.

I. INTRODUCTION À LA MISE EN OEUVRE

Mise en oeuvre


Chapitre 6

Figure 3
Délégation de pouvoir dans 14 ministères concernant les BCL



DG: Directeur général (AC et régions)
 GCR: Gestionnaire de centre de responsabilité (AC et régions)

Figure 2
Délégation de pouvoir aux quatre postes, dans 14 ministères,
pour 5 champs d'activité
 (Consultation, Non-consultation, Biens, BCL et Accueil)



DG: Directeur général (AC et régions)

GCR: Gestionnaire de centre de responsabilité (AC et régions)

Figure 1
Résultats de l'enquête sur la délégation de pouvoir dans les ministères

| | Consultation | | | | Non-consultation | | | | | | | | Biens | | | | BCL | | | |
|--------------------------|--------------|-----|-----|-----|------------------|------|-----|------|-----|------|------|------|-------|----|----|---------|------------|--|--|--|
| | 1* | 2* | 3* | 4* | 1* | 2* | 3* | 4* | 1* | 2* | 3* | 4* | 1* | 2* | 3* | 4* | | | | |
| Ministère | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Revenu Canada - Taxation | E | E | E | E | E | E | E | E | 50k | 50k | 50k | 50k | P | P | P | P | P | | | |
| Revenu Canada - D et A | 25k | P | P | P | 50k | 2k | 50k | 15k | 40k | 15k | 40k | 25k | P | P | E | P | 100\$ P | | | |
| EIC | 10k | P | 10k | P | 10k | P | 10k | 2k | P | P | P | P | P | P | E | E | 200\$ | | | |
| Transport | 30k | P | 50k | P | 50k | P | E | P | P | P | E | P | E | P | E | E | P | | | |
| Agriculture | 50k | 15k | 50k | 25k | 50k | 15k | 50k | 25k | 75k | 25k | 75k | 50k | E | E | E | E | 500\$ P | | | |
| SCC | E | P | E | E | E | P | E | P | E | E | E | E | E | E | E | E | 500\$ P | | | |
| SBSC | E | 20k | E | 20k | E | 8k | E | 20k | E | 10k | 100k | 25k | E | P | E | E | 500\$ P | | | |
| P et O | E | E | E | E | E | 100k | E | 100k | E | 100k | E | 100k | E | E | E | E | 500\$ P | | | |
| AINC | 50k | 50k | 50k | 50k | 60k | 60k | 60k | 60k | 40k | P | 40k | 40k | E | P | E | E | 500\$ P | | | |
| EC | 50k | P | 25k | 10k | E | 50k | E | 25k | P | P | P | P | E | E | E | 1k | 500\$ 1k P | | | |
| Com | P | P | E | P | P | P | P | 5k | P | E | E | E | E | P | P | E | P | | | |
| C et CC | 15k | 10k | 10k | 1k | 15k | 10k | 10k | 1k | 20k | 20k | 10k | 2k | P | E | E | E | P | | | |
| CFP | 25k | 10k | P | P | 50k | 15k | P | P | 25k | 10k | P | P | E | E | E | P | P | | | |
| SÉ | 10k | 5k | 10k | P | 10k | 10k | 25k | P | 10k | 10k | 25k | 2k | P | P | P | 250\$ P | 250\$ P | | | |
| E** | 4 | 2 | 5 | 3 | 5 | 1 | 6 | 1 | 4 | 6 | 4 | 2 | 8 | 6 | 10 | 9 | 4 | | | |
| 76-99 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | | | |
| 51-75 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | | | |
| 26-50 | 4 | 3 | 3 | 1 | 4 | 2 | 1 | 2 | 1 | 6 | 2 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | | | |
| 1-25 | 5 | 5 | 4 | 4 | 7 | 7 | 6 | 6 | 7 | 7 | 5 | 4 | 0 | 0 | 4 | 5 | 1 | | | |
| | 1 | 6 | 2 | 6 | 1 | 4 | 1 | 5 | 3 | 4 | 3 | 4 | 6 | 8 | 4 | 5 | 1 | | | |
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |

L'enquête touche 14 ministères, 5 champs d'activité et quatre postes* (2 à l'administration centrale et 2 dans les régions)

Administration centrale
1* Directeur général
2* Gestionnaire de centre de responsabilité
Régions
3* Directeur général
4* Gestionnaire de centre de responsabilité

E - Délégation entière
P - Pas de délégation

** Pourcentage de pouvoir délégué aux ministères

V.

RECOMMANDATIONS

- vérifier des échantillons de transactions (par exemple, des contrats, des factures) plutôt que de pré-autoriser les transactions, afin de respecter le principe de responsabilité. Les ministères peuvent également recourir à des groupes de vérification et d'évaluation pour juger de l'efficacité des procédures et des écritures, repérer les méthodes de gestion améliorées et les souligner comme exemples!
- élaborer et mettre en oeuvre des programmes de formation et de perfectionnement à l'appui de ces changements!
- chaque fois que cela est possible, mettre en oeuvre des systèmes automatisés d'acquisition, d'impartition et de gestion des biens, afin de simplifier les procédures, de réduire les écritures, et donc de libérer des ressources qui pourront être consacrées à l'exécution de programmes.

de reconnaissance (officiels ou non) qui pousseront ces changements à se produire;

évaluer, en termes de ressources, les répercussions de la délégation de pouvoirs accrus d'impartition et de fonctions propres aux services communs sur les services d'appui au ministère - surtout au niveau régional - pour assurer que les gestionnaires puissent réagir à l'accroissement des pouvoirs et de la souplesse;

11. Que les sous-chefs revoient les structures internes de délégation de pouvoirs, de procédures et de responsabilités afin d'assurer que les gestionnaires bénéficient du plus grand degré possible de pouvoir et de souplesse pour gérer les programmes et fournir des services au public ou au ministères-clients.

10. Que les sous-chefs s'assurent que l'accroissement des pouvoirs et de la souplesse des politiques provenant des organismes centraux soit communiqué convenablement, et qu'il soit accompagné des mêmes pouvoirs, souplesse et responsabilités pour les gestionnaires.

Le groupe de travail recommande:

D'autres recommandations portant sur les communications et la formation apparaissent au chapitre suivant sur la mise en oeuvre.

beaucoup plus avec les politiques administratives et les rôles des services communs, et doivent vouloir assumer de plus grandes responsabilités dans ces domaines.

Ce genre de problème ne se produit pas que dans le gouvernement. Le groupe de travail a assisté à un exposé fort intéressant où IBM décrit ses propres difficultés d'organisation et les initiatives qui ont été prises pour offrir un milieu de travail plus innovateur. La conclusion de leurs travaux a été que pour neutraliser la tendance à devenir axé sur les procédures et régi par les règlements, il faut adopter une très forte initiative dans laquelle les gestionnaires et les dirigeants de l'organisation peuvent renforcer et récompenser les changements désirés.

Les défis du changement

Un changement d'attitude vis-à-vis des politiques administratives et des services communs étant particulièrement difficile dans le gouvernement, il est absolument indispensable que les échelons supérieurs fassent preuve d'un réel engagement. L'appui du sous-ministre et de toute l'équipe de gestion est essentiel pour offrir une bonne orientation et une attention soutenue face à ce genre de problème.

Le besoin d'appui et d'attention de la part des échelons supérieurs est d'autant plus important que l'accroissement des pouvoirs et de la souplesse est généralement lié aux questions de responsabilité. Les objectifs de RP 2000 ne pourront être atteints que si les changements recommandés sont associés à un vaste programme de communication visant l'ensemble de l'organisation, et s'engagent de la participation de tous les employés. Pour faciliter les changements liés aux objectifs de RP 2000, les ministères devraient :

- mettre sur pied un vaste programme de communication pour engager le personnel dans le processus de changement, en recherchant leurs opinions, en reconnaissant les domaines susceptibles d'amélioration et en trouvant des moyens de changer les méthodes de gestion qui entravent l'esprit d'initiative ou créent des obstacles inutiles;

- entreprendre une révision des procédures et chercher des moyens de simplifier les systèmes en réduisant les contraintes imposées aux gestionnaires et en éclaircissant les notions de pouvoir, de responsabilité et d'obligation de rendre des comptes;

- élaborer des programmes de communication encourageant les valeurs ou les principes clés qui permettront aux gestionnaires et aux employés de comprendre comment le ministère s'adaptera à ses nouveaux pouvoirs, et simplifiant et créant des programmes et des initiatives

existe une différence marquée entre les pouvoirs de signature d'un DG et ceux d'un GCR, ces derniers étant en général beaucoup moins élevés que ceux d'un DG.

Le tableau 2 résume les résultats des 14 ministères et des 5 domaines ayant fait l'objet du sondage. Seulement 29 p. 100 des postes observés avaient reçu les pleins pouvoirs de signature, et 32 p. 100 des pouvoirs n'avaient pas du tout été délégués. Personne ne s'attendait à ce que les pleins pouvoirs soient délégués à tous les postes, mais il a été très surprenant de trouver des ministères qui n'avaient délégué aucun pouvoir à ces postes. Dans certains ministères, le pouvoir de signature de contrats des directeurs régionaux et des gestionnaires de centres de ressources était terriblement restreint.

Dans le contexte des discussions du Groupe de travail sur l'accroissement de la délégation accordée par ASC, les chiffres du tableau 3 expliquent pourquoi les gestionnaires se plaçaient du système de délégation de pouvoirs dans leurs propres ministères. Le pouvoir de signature de commandes d'achats locaux (500 \$ au moment du sondage) montre que près de la moitié des directeurs généraux et des gestionnaires de centres de ressources ne possédaient pas la délégation offerte par ASC.

Dans de nombreux cas, les gestionnaires ne possédant que des pouvoirs de signature restreints et devant faire face à de nombreuses procédures bureaucratiques, ils sont souvent incapables de transmettre de la souplesse à leur personnel, et dans certains cas, ils ne le désirent même pas. C'est là une des principales causes de la baisse de moral dans la fonction publique.

IV. CONCLUSIONS

Il est clair, d'après les réactions obtenues par le Groupe de travail et les expériences d'autres organisations procédant actuellement à des changements de procédures administratives, qu'il existe de nombreux obstacles à franchir. Ces obstacles peuvent être causés par la culture des ministères, par les styles de gestion et les positions adoptées par les ministères dans des domaines tels que les ressources, les communications et la formation.

De nombreux ministères deviennent actuellement conscients du besoin de rationaliser leurs modes de gestion. Cette orientation a été facilitée dans une certaine mesure par le concept de l'APRM, ainsi que par RP 2000. Toutefois, il n'est pas encore prouvé que les ministères ont pu accorder le temps, l'énergie et l'engagement qui leur permettront aux changements de se produire. Si les ministères ne fournissent pas un effort considérable pour réviser leur façon de mettre en œuvre leurs propres méthodes et pratiques de gestion, nombre des objectifs de RP 2000 ne seront pas atteints dans les domaines des politiques administratives et des services communs. En outre, les gestionnaires et les employés doivent se familiariser

genre, il va devenir essentiel que le message qui descend la chaîne hiérarchique exprime l'aspect responsabilité - que les gestionnaires à leur tour vont devoir avoir plus de responsabilités, et qu'une formation plus poussée sera nécessaire pour les rendre plus responsables."

Il est probable que dans la plupart des ministères, les fonctions de soutien seront les plus touchées par les changements imposés par les organismes centraux et les ministères. Pour jouer ce nouveau rôle, les groupes hiérarchiques et les groupes de soutien devront accorder une grande importance à la formation et à la communication.

III. LA GESTION MINISTÉRIELLE : LE PROBLÈME DE LA DÉLÉGATION

Beaucoup d'information erronée circule à propos de la délégation ministérielle. L'un des aspects les plus intéressants des travaux du Groupe de travail était que ni les organismes centraux ni les ministères ne connaissent les degrés de délégation des divers pouvoirs. Il était évident que le fait de savoir si les pouvoirs étaient suffisants ne préoccupait vraiment que ceux qui pensaient ne pas en posséder suffisamment pour fonctionner.

Points saillants

Pour comprendre et résumer les données reçues, le Groupe de travail a rédigé le tableau I, qui compare les délégations auprès de 14 ministères, dans 5 domaines (les contrats de consultation, les contrats de non-consultation, les contrats de biens, les pouvoirs d'achats locaux, et la réception). L'étendue de la délégation totale a été déterminée en prenant quatre niveaux dans chaque ministère et en établissant pour chacun d'entre eux le niveau de délégation dans chaque domaine.

Parmi les 14 ministères étudiés, quatre seulement avaient délégué la plupart des pouvoirs aux niveaux de directeur général (DG) et de gestionnaire de centre de responsabilité (GCR). La majorité des ministères n'avaient délégué aucun pouvoir, ou n'en avaient délégué qu'une petite partie. Dans l'ensemble, à l'intérieur d'un ministère, le niveau de pouvoirs d'un DG régional est plus bas que celui d'un DG de l'administration centrale. Il en est de même pour le GCR régional et le GCR dans une administration centrale. Il

réformes ministérielles, il faudrait mettre l'accent sur la formation et la diffusion des nouvelles politiques et de leurs répercussions. De plus, il ressortait clairement de nos groupes d'étude organisationnelle que de nombreux employés s'en remettaient totalement à leurs supérieurs pour connaître les règles et les aider à fonctionner à l'intérieur d'un système gouvernemental très complexe. Si les employés sont censés accepter plus de pouvoirs et de responsabilités dans des domaines tels que l'impartition et les acquisitions, il va se créer un besoin supplémentaire de formation ou de spécialisation et de consultation chez les groupes de soutien.

Les extraits suivants sont très représentatifs des commentaires de nombreux gestionnaires hiérarchiques à Ottawa et dans les régions. Ces personnes doivent faire face à tant de demandes et d'exigences liées à leur programme qu'elles se tiennent dans une très grande mesure aux divers groupes administratifs internes:

"Je trouve cela à la fois étrange et intéressant, mais je connais si peu de règlements. Tout ce que je fais, c'est d'aller vers quelqu'un et de dire 'j'ai besoin de ceci, ou je veux faire cela. Dites-moi comment faire.' Ils me disent comment faire, et je fais tout ce qu'ils me disent de faire tant que j'obtiens le résultat attendu, qui est ce que j'ai demandé en premier. Je ne me préoccupe pas vraiment de leurs règlements. Je ne sais donc même pas comment je procéderais pour changer ces règlements si je le voulais, parce que je ne les connais pas."

"Pour un gestionnaire qui reçoit toute cette nouvelle délégation de pouvoirs, c'est en fait une arme à double tranchant. Tout le monde s'attend à ce que je devienne un expert en tout. Je ne parviens pas à retenir toutes les connaissances que je devrais avoir en dotation ou en contrôle de contrat. Je me rends compte que je suis submergé par tous ces détails. J'ai de la chance maintenant parce que j'ai un employé de soutien. Mais beaucoup d'autres services n'en ont pas. Je ne peux pas être un expert en tout."

"Ne sous-estimez jamais le mérite de la formation - il ne s'agit pas d'apprendre comment faire quelque chose que vous n'avez jamais fait - quoiqu'il y ait un peu de ça - c'est le changement de toute une façon de penser - vous n'êtes pas habitué à cela la première fois qu'on vous le donne."

"Que la délégation de pouvoirs soit proportionnelle à la formation".

"Je pense qu'en même temps que le gouvernement tente de déléguer plus, d'augmenter les pouvoirs décisionnels et d'accroître les niveaux d'autorisation et d'autres choses du

auraient malgré tout tendance à recourir à ASC parce qu'il y avait là les années-personnes et les spécialisations qu'il serait difficile de reproduire au niveau ministériel. Voici certains de leurs commentaires :

"S'ils augmentent le pouvoir des ministères, nous aurons plus de travail... cela prend un certain temps avant que les gens puissent offrir des conseils et proposer des solutions de rechange."

"C'est toujours bien de voir qu'on donne quelque chose aux ministères et que les ministères le prennent, mais cela signifie aussi un certain volume de travail. Nous devons respecter les règles telles qu'elles sont appliquées en ce moment à ASC, nous devons faire les soumissions correctement... et cela demande du personnel et de l'expérience que vous n'avez pas dans les ministères." (Winipeg)

"C'est très bien de décentraliser les contrôles, mais si les années-personnes ne viennent pas avec la décentralisation, vous ne rendrez pas les choses plus efficaces - peut-être même ferez-vous le contraire - parce que nous n'avons tout simplement pas le personnel pour appliquer tout ça. Si vous transférez les contrôles et les responsabilités, vous devez également transférer les années-personnes." (Halifax)

"J'espère qu'ils seront prudents et qu'ils examineront les conséquences des changements avant de les faire. Sachez, quelques-unes des ramifications à l'interieur des ministères, et combien d'années-personnes et de dollars seront nécessaires pour faire le travail dans les ministères."

Compte tenu de ces préoccupations, il sera important que le gouvernement et les ministères fédéraux reconnaissent les répercussions qu'entraînera l'accroissement des responsabilités et des délégations sur les ressources existantes. Bien qu'il soit sans conteste rentable de réduire les écritures administratives et le nombre d'organismes engagés dans des acquisitions et des dépenses en services locaux de faible valeur pécuniaire, il faut cependant noter que les effets de nombreux groupes de soutien ont été réduits, de sorte qu'il serait très difficile d'augmenter leur charge de travail sans réduire les opérations d'autres secteurs.

4. Le rôle des gestionnaires et des groupes de soutien ministériels.

La plupart des participants des groupes d'étude organisationnelle estimaient que parallèlement à des changements de politiques des organismes centraux, à une augmentation des délégations et à des

Dans nos groupes d'étude organisationnelle, les participants se sont énormément préoccupés des répercussions qu'une plus grande délégation de pouvoir peut avoir sur les ressources, et des conséquences possibles sur le développement des spécialisations et les besoins en formation à l'intérieur des ministères. En général, ils étaient en faveur de plus de souplesses et de responsabilités pour l'impartition, les acquisitions et certains autres domaines, mais faisaient preuve d'une plus grande prudence que ce à quoi le groupe de travail se serait attendu. Ils se préoccupaient réellement, compte tenu des ressources à leur disposition, de leur capacité à effectuer un plus grand nombre de fonctions. Dans certains cas, les gestionnaires faisaient remarquer qu'ils aimeraient avoir un plus grand pouvoir d'acquisition, mais ils

3. Obstacles au changement: répercussions sur les ressources

ministères et les gestionnaires à mettre à l'adaptation aux changements. Formation soient élaborés aussi souvent que possible pour aider les dans tous les domaines d'acquisition et de développement des personnes et des organisations. Ils ont suggéré que le Trésor et celles des divers ministères. Ils ont suggéré que le par l'intermédiaire des publications du Conseil et des recommandations de 2000 large diffusion des conclusions et des recommandations de 2000 problèmes, les gestionnaires ont fortement appuyé le principe d'une central dans une région ou à Ottawa. Pour éliminer certains de ces obtenir (même pour une petite somme) l'autorisation d'un bureau vis à un client régional de ne pas être dispersés, ils doivent à leur est difficile d'exercer leurs responsabilités vis-à-vis d'un autre élément de l'administration des organismes de services surveillent lors d'une cause du système de délégation de leur propre ministère, ils leur est difficile d'exercer leurs responsabilités vis-à-vis d'un autre élément de l'administration des organismes de services surveillent

"Je pense que le vrai problème dans la plupart des régions est de tout garder à Ottawa. À cause de la mainmise sur les responsabilités, les régions ont un pouvoir d'impartition très limité. Il me semble que tout cela ne marchera pas à moins que tout le système ne soit nettoyé... Éloignons-nous des contrôles nationaux."

"J'ai une belle feuille de délégations d'autorité de mon ministère, qui couvre tout. Pourtant, je ne peux pas vraiment dépenser un sou sans demander l'autorisation d'une autre personne ou d'un comité du ministère."

Dans de nombreuses réunions, les participants estimaient que les ministères pourraient faire des progrès significatifs en simplifiant au maximum leurs procédures, en réduisant les écritures administratives, en éliminant la lourde chaîne de responsabilités, en se débarrassant de tous les obstacles, en éliminant et en évitant le chevauchement de tâches et les vérifications excessives du travail à chaque étape du processus. Deux gestionnaires supérieurs régionaux s'expriment en ces termes:

crainte des erreurs, il faudra faire preuve d'un leadership et d'un dévouement continus à l'intérieur des ministères.

2. Le besoin de rationalisation des changements parallèles dans les organismes centraux et les organismes de services

Le Conseil du Trésor a déjà entrepris de rationaliser et de réduire les règlements administratifs. Si les recommandations fournies par ce groupe de travail sont toutes mises en oeuvre, le rôle des organismes de services communs changera considérablement. Le défi des prochaines années sera de voir les ministères suivre cette même route. Beaucoup de ministères préparent leur protocole d'entente dans le cadre de l'APRM ont constaté qu'un grand nombre des irritants auxquels ils devaient faire face étaient causés par leurs propres règlements et n'avaient que peu de rapport avec les exigences du Conseil du Trésor ou de quelque autre organisme central.

Au cours des discussions des groupes d'étude organisationnelle, les gestionnaires d'Ottawa et des régions se sont inquiétés du fait que les ministères ayant obtenu l'accroissement de leurs responsabilités étaient peu motivés à les déléguer vers le bas et avaient tendance à recréer des "mini-Conseils du Trésor".

La plupart des participants aux discussions des groupes d'étude organisationnelle ne savaient toujours pas qu'avec les récents changements survenus à l'ASC, le niveau d'autorisation des acquisitions était passé de 1 000 \$ à 2 500 \$. Beaucoup d'entre eux n'étaient pas au courant des accroissements de responsabilité et des options offertes aux ministères dans le cadre de RF 2000 dans des domaines tels que les contrats, la réception et la sécurité. Ils n'avaient pas non plus entendu parler des déréglementations mises en vigueur par le Conseil du Trésor il y a plus d'un an et de la présentation en décembre 1989 d'organismes opérant de façon particulière. Certains se sont inquiétés du fait que les changements survenus en mars dans le cadre de RF 2000 se déroulaient dans les bureaux centraux mais que les opérations régionales n'en profiteraient pas.

Les participants de plusieurs groupes d'étude organisationnelle ont remarqué que les processus internes d'acquisition avaient été simplifiés avant que les ministères puissent réellement bénéficier de leur accroissement de responsabilités. Cela se traduisait par la réduction du nombre de signatures et de niveaux d'autorisation exigés, et du nombre de personnes devant vérifier un document avant qu'il ne puisse passer à l'étape suivante. À propos des contrats et des acquisitions, les participants étaient en faveur de l'accroissement de délégation mais soulignaient que ces accroissements n'étaient qu'une des façons (bien qu'importante) de répondre efficacement aux besoins du ministère.

Les participants des groupes d'étude organisationnelle ont énoncé quatre grandes questions touchant à la gestion ministérielle.

Quatre grands problèmes

1. La culture de la gestion dans un ministère

Le problème le plus envahissant qu'ont reconnu les gestionnaires est l'existence dans la plupart des ministères d'une culture, caractérisée par la présence de règlements et l'absence de risques. De nombreux facteurs viennent contribuer à cette culture, tous particuliers au secteur public:

- Les politiques des organismes centraux ont, jusqu'à présent, encouragé dans les ministères une orientation axée sur le contrôle et la conformité, par opposition à l'obtention de résultats ou la réalisation d'objectifs de programme;

- Les sous-ministres et les administrateurs supérieurs, dont l'emploi du temps fait l'objet de tant de pression, ont tendance à se servir d'équipes ministérielles pour exercer la surveillance nécessaire pour leur éviter, ainsi qu'au ministre, les situations fâcheuses, et pour répondre aux besoins des organismes centraux;

- à cause du milieu en vase clos qu'est le gouvernement, les erreurs font l'objet d'une grande publicité et le ministre ou les gestionnaires supérieurs peuvent être obligés d'en répondre. À cela viennent s'ajouter le rapport annuel du vérificateur général et les rapports internes de vérification qui, en général, conseillent l'établissement d'un plus grand nombre de contrôles et de règlements plutôt que de trouver des domaines où les règlements pourraient être simplifiés;

- dans le passé, la réaction typique du gouvernement (organismes centraux et ministères) face aux problèmes était de créer de nouvelles règles ou de nouveaux contrôles limitant les pouvoirs de tout le monde, et de renforcer ouvertement la culture caractérisée par l'absence de risques.

À cause de certaines de ces tendances observées dans le gouvernement, les gestionnaires et les employés ont souvent le sentiment que l'innovation n'est pas récompensée et qu'on les décourage systématiquement de créer des "problèmes" que quel qu'un des niveaux supérieurs serait obligé d'expliquer. Pour aller au-delà de cette culture basée sur l'absence de risques et vaincre la

Les travaux du groupe de travail sur les politiques administratives et les services communs ont tout d'abord mis l'accent sur le rôle des organismes centraux et des ministères de service. Au fur et à mesure que notre travail progressait, il devenait évident que les gestionnaires tenaient également leurs propres ministères responsables d'une grande partie des problèmes qu'ils ressentaient dans leurs fonctions de gestion.

Les thèmes de délégation inadéquates à l'intérieur des ministères et de communication insuffisante des nouvelles options de politiques sont ressortis dans les sondages effectués par le secrétariat du groupe de travail 2000 auprès des conseils régionaux. Ces questions ont également été soulevées dans diverses réunions organisées par Paul Teller, John Edwards et le personnel du Secrétariat. Finalement, ces problèmes ont souvent été mentionnés dans les réunions des groupes d'étude organisationnelle tenues par le groupe de travail dans l'ensemble du pays en mai 1990.

Tout en démontrant une attitude très positive vis-à-vis de l'accroissement des responsabilités dans des domaines tels que les contrats, les acquisitions et les services communs, les gestionnaires étaient très prudents face aux conséquences que ces changements pourraient avoir sur les ressources. Nombre d'entre eux se sont demandés si leurs bureaux, relativement petits, pourraient effectivement tirer plein parti de leurs responsabilités accrues, et ils ont souligné le besoin pressant d'accompagner ces changements de moyens de communications et de formation efficaces. L'un des gestionnaires du groupe d'étude organisationnelle s'exprimait en ces termes :

"J'aimerais appuyer ce que les autres ont dit et attirer votre attention sur deux points particuliers. Le genre de changement dont on parle est un changement fondamental du style de gestion dans la fonction publique fédérale. Il ne s'agit pas ici de jouer avec le système et de transférer la bureaucratie d'un organisme central à un autre endroit (par exemple, un ministre). Il s'agit ici d'un véritable changement en profondeur. Si les gens ne sentent pas et ne comprennent pas cette nuance, alors ça ne marchera pas."

Si les ministères ne fournissent pas un effort considérable pour revoir la façon dont ils élaboreront leurs propres pratiques et méthodes de gestion, un grand nombre de objectifs de RP 2000 ne seront pas atteints dans les domaines des politiques administratives et des services communs.

Chapitre 5

Gestion ministérielle

Trésor peut devoir établir des règles spéciales pour restreindre la croissance des organisations ministérielles d'A et G. Le Groupe de travail conclut que le plein choix est préférable, bien qu'il conserve le principe de la passation de contrats centralisée pour des professionnels privés d'A et G.

VII. RECOMMANDATIONS

Le Groupe de travail recommande :

8. Que les opérations du programme de propriété véritable soient "révisées pour fournir davantage de souplesse et d'autonomie locales dans les relations propriétaire-localitaire, c'est-à-dire :

- 8.1 élaborer des normes locales bilatérales particulières qui donnent la priorité aux exigences locales du localitaire, relativement aux fonctions qui fournissent un service direct au public;

- 8.2 fournir à des localitaires le choix d'assurer des services locaux, soit directement avec des entrepreneurs, soit par TPC, à condition que TPC conserve le niveau minimal de contrôle nécessaire pour protéger l'intégrité structurelle de ces bâtiments;

- 8.3 redéfinir des services locaux afin d'inclure autant d'activités que possible dans cette catégorie et transférer des fonds pour ces domaines additionnels, de TPC aux localitaires;

- 8.4 conserver l'ACCORD (Administration et contrôle et données régionales) comme système obligatoire pour de petits marchés de construction et de service, mais en l'adaptant de façon à ce que les localitaires aient accès au système lorsqu'ils désirent conclure un marché directement.

9. Que les opérations des services d'A et G de TPC soient désignées "facultatives" en vertu de la politique des services communs du Conseil du Trésor à partir du 1^{er} avril 1992, à condition que :

- le système SPC (Sélection et évaluation préalable des qualités d'experts-conseils) soit la seule méthode d'engagement de professionnels du secteur privé pour les services d'A et G;

- le gouvernement assure que des ministères n'utilisent pas le statut "facultatif" pour créer des organisations internes d'A et G.

Les clients de TPC acceptent sa compétence technique et son besoin de gérer de grands projets. Des préoccupations du ministère responsable sont axées sur le coût et l'opportunité de la réponse de TPC pour des attributions plus petites. Les organismes responsables considèrent qu'ils sont souvent en mesure de gérer de petits projets et la passation de contrats de construction connexe qui ne demandent que des conseils de la part d'A et G et estiment qu'aucune valeur n'est ajoutée par le projet de TPC et la gestion du contrat dans ces circonstances.

La possibilité de changer des services d'A et G du statut obligatoire à facultatif a été discutée avec TPC. Pour diverses raisons, TPC n'appui pas le changement à ce stade. TPC a soutenu que de plus petits projets sont nécessaires pour la formation du personnel; que les services facultatifs entraîneraient des pressions pour rétablir des groupes techniques dans les ministères; que la possibilité du choix éroderait progressivement la capacité de TPC de maintenir un centre de compétence d'A et G disponible pour régler les exigences uniques du gouvernement; et, que même si les ministères utilisaient le système SPFC de TPC, il y a suffisamment de pouvoirs dans l'utilisation de ce système pour entraîner certains risques de problèmes relatifs à la passation de contrats.

Le groupe de travail a tenu compte des préoccupations du TPC, mais a conclu que des petits projets d'A et G sont un irritant important pour les clients et que les raisons invoquées par TPC ne sont pas suffisantes pour maintenir le statut obligatoire des services d'A et G. Le groupe de travail estime que certains des risques associés au passage à un service facultatif ne peuvent être compensés par l'utilisation du système SPFC et assurer que les ministères l'utilise convenablement. En outre, le groupe de travail estime que TPC surestime l'incidence de son organisation sur le passage de services obligatoires à des services facultatifs. Il est probable que la plupart des ministères continueront à utiliser TPC soit parce que ce procédé est plus facile, soit parce qu'il ne nécessite pas le déploiement d'un personnel ministériel peu nombreux afin de gérer les services. Les domaines dans lesquels les ministères entreprendront le plus probablement de travail sont les besoins réduits ou spécialisés en matière de projets où les capacités de TPC ne sont pas très fortes. Finalement, le groupe de travail pense que grâce au retrait d'un grand nombre de ces irritants, la relation entre TPC et le ministère s'améliorera et que TPC sera en mesure de concentrer son énergie sur les fonctions d'A et G à valeur ajoutée les plus essentielles.

Cependant, le groupe de travail reconnaît que pour fonctionner dans un milieu plus compétitif, TPC peut demander des "libertés" spéciales dans le cadre des politiques actuelles de gestion gouvernementales. En outre, si la libération des années-personnes mise en oeuvre dans l'ensemble du gouvernement, le Conseil du

qu'actuellement, le système ACCORD fournit des possibilités aux entrepreneurs de travailler avec le gouvernement à un niveau de "sécurité" dans le processus de passation de contrats. Il régit également une certaine confusion quant aux rôles relatifs futurs de TPC et d'ASC dans cette passation de contrats, particulièrement en fonction du modèle Vision 2000 d'ASC. Il s'agit d'un domaine qui devrait être examiné par le Secrétariat du Conseil du Trésor et les ministères concernés.

V. SERVICES D'ARCHITECTURE ET DE GÉNIE (A et G)

Les services d'architecture et de génie (A et G) sont un des services immobiliers fournis par le programme des services de TPC. Sauf en ce qui concerne les services d'A et G, tous les autres services importants sont désignés comme facultatifs en vertu de la politique des services communs du CT.

Les services A et G de TPC sont chargés de fournir des services professionnels et techniques pour la conception, la construction et la gestion de projets d'insertion et d'infrastructure fédérale. Dans la plupart des cas, TPC fonctionne comme un gestionnaire de projet clés en mains pour ses clients employant des professionnels de secteurs privés pour réaliser la majorité des fonctions de conception et des entreprises privées pour la réalisation de toute la construction.

En 1987-1988, dans le cadre du programme de consolidation d'A et G approuvé par le Cabinet, quelque 900 membres du personnel professionnel, technique et administratif chargés du travail d'A et G à EC (Parcs), TC (AIR) et AINC, étaient transférés à TPC. En outre, tous les services de TPC étaient convertis à partir du 1^{er} avril 1988, d'un recouvrement partiel du coût à un autofinancement complet en utilisant des structures de tarifs (basées sur le marché) approuvées par le Conseil du Trésor, les ministères recevant des enveloppes augmentées pour régler leurs nouvelles dépenses. Au cours des dernières années, A et G de TPC et ses clients se sont adaptés aux changements administratifs, financiers, organisationnels et culturels nécessaires pour faire fonctionner une entreprise d'un milliard de dollars et de 2 300 employés sur une base commerciale.

Un autre domaine important de réforme pour A et G de TPC a été l'utilisation, depuis le 1^{er} avril 1989, du système de sélection et d'évaluation préalable des qualités d'experts-conseils (SPEC) comme procédé de passation de contrats pour des architectes, des ingénieurs et d'autres professionnels touchant au domaine immobilier. Il s'agit d'un système équilibré qui protège le principe du droit public aux possibilités de soumissionner pour des marchés gouvernementaux, fonctionne de façon efficace et minimise le patronage bureaucratique et politique.

d'édifices avec plusieurs occupants, et d'emplacements éloignés plutôt que d'emplacements urbains.

Plutôt que de créer une formule unique ou que de concevoir un seul financier particulier, le groupe de travail pense que les locataires et TPC devraient élaborer des solutions propres à l'édifice et aux locataires basées sur le rôle des deux parties comme suit :

- Le propriétaire (TPC) devrait assumer l'entière responsabilité de fournir l'installation requise et de maintenir son intégrité organisationnelle. Le propriétaire devrait approuver ou vérifier à posteriori tous les changements apportés aux cadres intérieurs de l'installation et assurer l'intégrité structurelle et veiller à ce que d'autres normes techniques soient respectées.

- Le propriétaire devrait assurer que les dispositions administratives sont en place (par exemple offrir des services locaux) pour permettre aux locataires d'organiser directement ou d'engager les services immobiliers de TPC pour fournir des services locaux rapides et efficaces pour le compte du locataire.

Le locataire devrait être chargé et avoir le choix de déterminer l'autonomie et le pouvoir qu'il souhaite dans cette relation en vue d'exécuter des services locaux. Le locataire devrait être responsable des normes et des procédures techniques établies suivants lorsqu'il exécute des services locaux directement et pour obtenir l'approbation requise du propriétaire.

Bien que les locataires aient le pouvoir de passer un contrat directement pour des services locaux en vertu de ces recommandations, cela ne réduirait pas la responsabilité des locataires devant suivre les méthodes d'appel d'offre publique du gouvernement. Actuellement, pour des contrats de construction supérieurs à 60 000 \$, un avis public (journaux, périodiques) sont utilisés et devraient continuer à l'être. Pour des contrats inférieurs à 60 000 \$, TPC utilise son système ACCORD (Administration et contrôle de contrats et données régionales) qui est une méthode informatisée permettant de créer de courtes listes d'offre d'entrepreneur. Le groupe de travail estime que le système ACCORD devrait être conservé dans les nouvelles ententes, mais lorsque cela convient, les locataires devraient avoir un accès direct au système.

TPC a demandé si ACCORD devait être rendu obligatoire pour le ministère responsable qui assure actuellement leurs propres services similaires de passation de contrats. TPC a noté

"En ce qui concerne les services locaux, notre ministère estime posséder une grande compétence étant donné que nous avons 450 bureaux dans l'ensemble du pays. Nous pensons pouvoir nous en occuper nous-mêmes."

IV. CONCLUSIONS

Le groupe de travail reconnaît la difficulté inévitable que pose la relation propriétaire/locataire dans le meilleur des cas, et que la réforme mise en oeuvre en 1989 a dans de nombreux cas encore affectée des opérations journalières de TPC et des locaux. Deux changements mis en oeuvre par suite des recommandations à court terme du groupe de travail devraient aider TPC à fournir des services plus sensibles aux clients. Le changement dans la définition de "contrats compétitifs" pour inclure les cas pour lesquels une soumission reçue de la part d'un soumissionnaire public, éliminera le besoin d'obtenir l'approbation du CT pour de nombreuses petites locations à bail. De même, les changements dans la définition de "compétitif" pour des contrats de service de non-consultation pour inclure "meilleure valeur" de même que "moindre coût" fourniront de plus grandes possibilités d'engager de meilleurs entrepreneurs de nettoyage de qualité.

Bien que ces changements améliorent l'exécution du programme, le groupe de travail conclut que des réformes additionnelles sont nécessaires si les gestionnaires du programme doivent avoir la capacité d'assurer que leurs exigences sont satisfaites de façon opportune. Ces réformes devraient prendre place dans deux secteurs - la priorité que TPC accorde pour répondre aux besoins de location des locaux et la suppléance accordée aux locaux pour assurer des services locaux.

Dans son mandat visant à fournir des espaces productifs pour les locaux et à optimiser l'investissement dans son portefeuille, TPC est souvent pris entre deux objectifs contradictoires. À l'occasion, la pression exercée sur TPC pour remplir des installations libres appartenant à la Couronne peut l'empêcher sur les besoins des locaux en matière d'emplacements pour servir des clients. Accorder la priorité aux besoins du locataire en matière d'emplacements peut accroître les coûts du programme de TPC, mais le contraire est un cas d'économie dans un programme de soutien tout en produisant des résultats ne sont économiques ni pour l'organisme organisateur ni pour le public. Accorder la priorité aux exigences des locaux en matière d'emplacements spécialisés aux locaux d'exercer une discipline et de faire preuve de discrétion dans la formulation claire des besoins.

Il n'y a pas de formule unique pour fournir une autonomie accrue du locataire concernant des services locaux. Les situations varient largement selon l'importance et les capacités du locataire, selon qu'il s'agit d'édifices appartenant à la Couronne plutôt que d'édifices loués, d'édifices avec un seul occupant plutôt que

III. PRÉOCCUPATION DES GESTIONNAIRES

Les citations suivantes illustrent certains des points de vue exprimés par des gestionnaires relativement aux problèmes de prestation de services du programme de biens immobiliers de TPC :

"Un des principaux problèmes est survenu lorsque nous avons eu besoin de nouveaux espaces. TPC n'est pas en mesure de répondre suffisamment rapidement. Les points que nous devons suivre et le fait que nous ne puissions même pas parler à l'agent immobilier."

"TPC est un piètre propriétaire et il est encore pire comme gestionnaire de la location. Nous finissons par devoir gérer nos propres locations à bail. Le système n'apporte aucun soutien. Nous devons presque passer par la loi sur l'accès à l'information pour obtenir un exemplaire du bail de notre édifice."

"Les ministères sont toujours obligés de justifier des choses de façon continuelle. Nous avons besoin d'espace pour des tables à dessin ou d'espace pour rencontrer des clients. La réponse de TPC est vous n'avez pas droit à une salle de réunion pour les clients. Je suppose que nous n'avons pas le droit d'avoir des clients."

"Nous avons besoin de déménageurs de façon pressante et ce service doit être imparté par TPC. Nous ne pouvons le faire nous-mêmes. Il n'est question que d'environ 500 \$ peut-être, par jour et pour deux hommes, par exemple. Pourquoi devons-nous passer par TPC au coût de 500 \$ pour engager deux hommes? Et TPC ne fera pas un appel téléphonique. Il doit voir la véritable demande."

"J'ai souvent eu l'impression que les imputations de TPC étaient ridicules. J'ai voulu faire construire un comptoir et je ne savais pas que je devais passer par TPC. Mais TPC a alors déclaré que cela coûterait 3 000 \$. Je l'ai fait construire par quelqu'un d'autre au coût de 600 \$. J'ai presque été renvoyé, mais j'avais économisé 2 400 \$."

"Pour commander un moniteur à TPC, celui-ci nous compte 15 p. 100 et il passe alors un marché par l'intermédiaire d'ASC qui lui charge 4 p. 100. La transaction lui rapporte donc 11 p. 100 parce que nous avons commis l'erreur d'envoyer la demande à TPC en premier lieu."

"Au lieu de dire à TPC ce que nous voulons, pourquoi ne pas simplement le dire à l'entrepreneur?"

Le programme de biens immobiliers de TPC est particulièrement névralgique étant donné qu'il comprend l'administration centrale de tous les ministères, les lieux de travail d'environ deux tiers des fonctionnaires, les points de service de nombreux programmes avec un volume élevé de clients utilisateurs (EIC, CNRC, SBESC). Ces installations sont également très visibles étant principalement installées dans des zones urbaines avec presque 50 p. 100 du portefeuille immobilier dans la Région de la Capitale nationale. Les objectifs du programme consistent à fournir des milieux de travail sécuritaires et productifs pour les locataires tout en optimisant les investissements en éléments d'actifs de biens immobiliers. Le programme doit également envisager sa contribution à des objectifs plus vastes tels que la "présence fédérale" et le développement économique dans des collectivités locales.

Dans le cadre de ce programme, TPC joue le rôle de propriétaire chargé de l'acquisition et de la gestion des installations alors que les ministères utilisent les installations. Le rôle de locataires chargés d'indiquer leurs exigences et demander des renouvelations aux propriétaires. La plupart des locataires sont logés "sans frais", alors que TPC reçoit des fonds pour des immobilisations et de l'ÉB pour des édifices appartenant à la Couronne et pour les paiements d'édifices loués. Cependant, les locataires reçoivent des fonds pour des "services locatifs" qui ne sont pas basés sur des changements intérieurs apportés à l'édifice pendant l'occupation et il dispose des pleins pouvoirs sur la façon dont les fonds des services locatifs sont affectés. Cependant, comme dans le cas de relations privées normales propriétaires-locataires, TPC (le propriétaire) doit approuver des changements et fournir les services locatifs en utilisant son propre personnel ou des entrepreneurs sous sa direction. Par le passé, le programme a été étroitement contrôlé par le Conseil du Trésor en raison de la sensibilité publique à l'égard de la qualité et à la quantité d'installations de bureaux fournies aux fonctionnaires. Depuis le 1^{er} janvier 1989, le CT a délégué le pouvoir à TPC en ce qui concerne la politique et les normes de logements et a accru les pouvoirs en 5 volets de TPC pour des locations à bail concurrentielles. Au cours de la dernière année, TPC a délégué au plan interne d'avantage de ses pouvoirs accrus obtenus du CT à ses opérations régionales afin de permettre à son personnel de mieux servir les locataires.

Malgré ces changements, le groupe de travail a constaté une certaine frustration du client à l'égard du système, particulièrement face à la lenteur de la réponse de TPC dans l'acquisition d'installation, le processus coûteux et écrasant permettant d'effectuer des renouvelations dans le cadre des services locatifs, la location et la qualité de certaines installations et l'absence de contrôle sur la qualité des services de nettoyage en général.

1. INTRODUCTION À TPC À TITRE D'ORGANISME DE SERVICES COMMUNS

Il est essentiel que le ministère des travaux publics (TPC) soit efficace pour le fonctionnement de tous les ministères. À titre de propriétaire, il incombe à TPC de fournir des installations essentielles pour la santé professionnelle et personnelle des fonctionnaires et pour la prestation de services aux clients des organismes locaux. À titre d'organisme de services, la compétence professionnelle de TPC est essentielle dans la planification, l'acquisition, la conception, la construction et l'exploitation du portefeuille large et diversifié d'installations de terrains fédéraux servant à l'exécution de programmes gouvernementaux.

Par suite des résultats obtenus par divers groupes d'étude et de travail, TPC a été dans un constant état de réforme depuis environ 25 ans, ce qui a entraîné un certain nombre de nouvelles initiatives de gestion. Depuis 1986, avec le soutien du Cabinet et du Conseil du Trésor, TPC a été séparément engagé dans la mise en œuvre d'un programme de réforme massif, cohérent et intégré, axé sur l'amélioration de ses services aux clients et aux locataires, de son efficacité organisationnelle et de son engagement envers ses propres employés. La réforme a englobé une redéfinition du rôle et de la structure des programmes de TPC, une restructuration organisationnelle fondamentale, le passage de nombreuses opérations financières d'un mode de crédit à un mode d'autofinancement et l'ensemble des méthodes de passation de contrats. Bien que les éléments structurels de la réforme aient été mis en œuvre et qu'ils soient maintenant à l'étape de la mise au point, le changement culturel requis - à l'égard d'un meilleur service au client et au locataire et à l'égard d'une forme commerciale d'exploitation - prendra plus de temps.

Le Groupe de travail appuie l'orientation des réformes de TPC pour améliorer sa réceptivité à la prestation de services et aux besoins du client. Cependant, le Groupe de travail estime qu'il existe des domaines particuliers de la réforme qui devraient être accélérés et mis au point afin de fournir une plus grande autonomie aux organismes locaux de TPC et une plus grande possibilité de choix pour les utilisateurs des services d'architecture et de génie (A et G) de TPC.

II. AUTONOMIE DU LOCALITAIRE - PROGRAMME DES BIENS IMMOBILIERS

Dans le système fédéral, l'administration de programmes spéciaux des biens immobiliers est affectée aux ministères utilisateurs et l'administration est affectée à TPC et gérée par le biais de son programme de biens immobiliers. (Les organismes chargés de l'administration sont appelés "responsables" et possèdent les attributs de la propriété; les organismes logés dans les édifices de TPC sont appelés "locataires".)

Travaux publics Canada

Chapitre 4

5. Outre ce qui a été mentionné ci-dessus, qu'ASC envisage un certain nombre d'initiatives à court terme ayant comme but principal de réorienter ASC plus franchement vers le service au client et la satisfaction du client. Ces initiatives pourraient comprendre :

5.1 Qu'ASC, pour des exigences hautement spécialisées ou relativement particulières, fournisse immédiatement une délégation plus significative et sélective aux ministères clients, selon le type de biens et le client.

5.2 Rétablir un système de cartes de crédit afin d'éliminer le procédé de réquisition et les écritures de facturation, et pour faciliter la collecte de données.

5.3 Rétablir des portefeuilles de clients, au moins pour les utilisateurs intensifs.

5.4 Rétablir un moyen simple de traiter de l'approvisionnement à faible valeur monétaire pour l'approvisionnement d'articles en magasin.

6. Qu'ASC établisse et maintienne un centre de compétence d'experts dans lequel des ministères peuvent réaliser des acquisitions telles que requises, obtenir des conseils et recevoir une aide relative à des problèmes.

7. Qu'ASC élabore des propositions, dans une période d'un an, d'une nouvelle méthode devant remplacer le système existant basé sur les revenus, afin de promouvoir un système d'approvisionnement rentable et de réduire les coûts de facturation interne. Tout nouveau système doit tenir compte du nouveau rôle et des nouvelles fonctions d'ASC en vertu du régime proposé ci-dessus.

Le degré de délégation, la mesure dans laquelle les ministères prennent cette délégation en charge et l'automatisation des approvisionnements de faible valeur pécuniaire détermineront l'incidence sur la charge de travail régionale d'ASC. Actuellement, seulement un peu plus de 30 p. 100 des transactions régionales sont inférieures à 1 000 \$, environ 54 p. 100 inférieures à 2 500 \$. Les pourcentages comparables pour le bureau central d'ASC sont de 25 et de 28 p. 100. Étant donné que le pouvoir de prendre des décisions dans la fonction publique se déplace vers le bas et à l'extérieur dans l'ensemble des ministères, il devrait y avoir de plus grandes possibilités pour les opérations régionales du client. D'autre part, l'extension du concept ouvert de soumission peut avoir tendance à contrer la régionalisation.

Dans un examen d'ASC, le groupe de travail a été impressionné par les efforts produits par ASC pour revoir son rôle et proposer une vision pour les années 1990 qui changera et améliorera ces types et niveaux de services. On estime que les recommandations suivantes sont conformes et compatibles à cette direction. Le but est d'accroître la souplesse dont dispose les gestionnaires et les employés en matière d'approvisionnement tout en maintenant les avantages d'une fonction centrale d'approvisionnement. Les responsabilités et le mandat actuels d'ASC dans ce domaine.

VI. RECOMMANDATIONS DÉTERMINANTES CONCERNANT ASC

On recommande :

3. Que le gouvernement et ASC s'engagent fermement à fournir, de façon progressive, une plus grande délégation du pouvoir d'achat au ministre, par type de biens et par client. Par conséquent, d'ici le 1^{er} avril 1991, le niveau de base de délégation à des ministères clients passera de 1 000 \$ à 2 500 \$. Au cas où le système mentionné dans la recommandation 4 ne puisse être mis en oeuvre pour une raison donnée, la délégation augmentera à 10 000 \$ d'ici le 1^{er} avril 1994.

4. Qu'au cours des 4 prochaines années, ASC établisse une méthode d'approvisionnement dans laquelle ASC fournit à des ministères un accès illimité à un système basé sur la technologie qui permet aux clients d'assurer une plus grande partie de leurs propres achats. Pour le moins, le système doit fournir l'accès électronique aux offres permanentes et à d'autres transactions contractuelles fondamentales, de même qu'à une collecte de données suffisantes pour qu'ASC puisse remplir ses fonctions et ses responsabilités. En effet, ce procédé fournirait au ministre une délégation pour ainsi dire illimitée lui permettant de réaliser ses propres transactions en utilisant l'information et les ententes contractuelles préalablement approuvées fournies par ASC.

disponibles dans le commerce et achetées en petites quantités, ou produits qui sont suffisamment complexes pour justifier une passation de contrats à titre d'articles personnalisés).

ASC espère que finalement les clients seront en mesure de choisir d'entrer ou de sortir du système à divers niveaux de valeur pécuniaire ou de volume, pour diverses parties de leurs organisations ou à un emplacement géographique choisi, dans tous les cas au choix du client.

V. CONCLUSIONS

Les raisons fondamentales de l'établissement d'ASC - le besoin de promouvoir une solide compétence d'expert en matière d'approvisionnement et de tirer partie des économies d'échelle et de la gestion centralisée de l'approvisionnement (par opposition à la simple émission de contrats) - et les objectifs visant à appuyer la prudence et la probité ainsi que d'autres objectifs nationaux déterminants, restent valides. Cependant, la nature et le degré de satisfaction du client font clairement ressortir que certains changements sont nécessaires dans la méthode qu'ASC applique à son travail, dans les fonctions particulières qu'ASC remplit pour appuyer ses objectifs et, particulièrement, dans la façon dont il sert ses clients.

Par exemple, la nécessité d'assurer une plus grande compétitivité et ouverture dans le processus de soumission peut aboutir à une différence d'objectifs entre ASC et le client, dans lequel le client peut ne pas avoir acquis le produit dont il avait réellement besoin. Cependant, il est clair que des questions d'opportunité, de niveaux de service et de préoccupations régionales doivent continuer à être opposées à des économies d'approvisionnement et de coût total de durée de vie. L'achat en gros et la concurrence peuvent nettement produire d'importantes économies de même que la conservation de l'intégrité, de l'équité et de l'ouverture. Avec des dépenses d'approvisionnement de l'ordre de milliards, les économies pour le contribuable peuvent être importantes. La question touche la méthode permettant d'atteindre cet équilibre.

Des méthodes d'approvisionnement automatisées proposées dans le cadre de Vision 2000 d'ASC dans le but d'accentuer l'orientation sur le service aux clients, doivent se poursuivre. ASC doit fournir un service plus sensible et plus rapide, de façon à ce que les gestionnaires qui prennent des décisions considèrent ces méthodes comme une option valable permettant d'atteindre leurs objectifs. En outre, le système automatisé devrait libérer des ressources en années-personnes d'ASC et ainsi permettre de consacrer une plus grande attention à la gestion du système d'approvisionnement, de l'administration des contrats, de la planification de l'approvisionnement, de l'analyse, de la disposition, etc.

Bien que le système ait pour but d'offrir une méthode automatisée de commande de même qu'une méthode de passation de contrats personnalisée sans papier, l'inclusion dans Vision 2000 de certaines acquisitions n'est pas prévue actuellement. Ces acquisitions comprennent les produits qui ne conviennent pas eux-mêmes à un système automatisé de commandes (par exemple produits

Afin de traiter ces domaines difficiles, ASC encourage un nouveau rôle pour le ministère dans lequel ASC deviendrait, dans une large mesure, un conseiller et un animateur en encourageant l'élaboration de systèmes communs, en encourageant le partage de l'information dans le gouvernement et en créant des outils opérationnels. Ce programme est appelé Vision 2000. Selon ASC, Vision 2000 mènera à l'introduction d'un système basé sur les technologies grâce auquel le client, le fournisseur et le personnel d'ASC peuvent agir réciproquement dans la mesure où les clients peuvent réaliser autant de leurs propres achats qu'ils le jugent souhaitable. En outre, ASC deviendrait un centre de compétences expert auquel les clients peuvent recourir pour effectuer des acquisitions au besoin.

IV. VISION 2000

Tant qu'ASC est dirigé par sa forme actuelle d'autofinancement destinée à optimiser des transactions pour financer ses opérations, ASC ne peut affecter de ressources nécessaires pour fournir une meilleure gestion des approvisionnements et une meilleure planification des acquisitions, et ne peut non plus déléguer un volume important de transactions sans perte grave de recettes. Par conséquent, il est nécessaire de changer le système actuel d'autofinancement afin de créer un système d'approvisionnement plus souple.

La frustration répandue relativement à la rigidité et aux anomalies évidentes de la structure actuelle des frais peut être responsable de l'étonnante attitude fortement négative envers l'autofinancement. (Par opposition, il y a très peu de plaintes au sujet de l'autofinancement de services facultatifs.)

"Si je recours à ASC pour des contrats dans le cadre de ma propre limite déléguée, imposez-moi alors des frais pour me décourager à l'utiliser. Mais si je suis obligé de passer par ASC, ne me giflez pas en m'imposant 15 p. 100".

Relativement à la question de l'imputation de services obligatoires, un autre gestionnaire s'est plaint de la façon suivante :

"Il existe un principe relatif à cet autofinancement voulant qu'ASC, simplement parce que vous lui versez des frais, se sentira plus redevable envers vous. C'est un non-sens".

est répartie dans les ministères clients eux-mêmes. Actuellement, les bureaux régionaux d'ASC ont généralement une plus grande délégation que leurs clients qui doivent envoyer leur demande à leur propre administration centrale. Un gestionnaire régional donne un exemple qui illustre parfaitement les problèmes subéquents qu'il éprouve :

"Nous trouverons souvent qu'une des exigences demande une approbation de la part du bureau central. La demande entre dans le processus d'acquisition d'Otawa et nous finissons avec une compagnie d'une autre province fournissant un ordonnateur personnel à notre bureau à Winnipeg. Le service après vente étant inexistant, bien que nous ayons pu l'assurer localement, nous aurions pu avoir un meilleur service".

Par conséquent, toute augmentation de la délégation par ASC demanderait une mesure correspondante dans les ministères afin d'en tirer un avantage. La question est approfondie dans le chapitre 5.

En ce qui concerne la question du mandat législatif d'ASC, ce dernier craint qu'une importante augmentation de la délégation sans système de contrôle puisse compromettre sa responsabilité en vertu de la Loi sur les approvisionnements et services pour la gestion de l'approvisionnement gouvernemental. En vertu des lois actuelles, les pouvoirs ministériels accrus demandent des responsabilités accrues. La question réside dans la façon dont le ministère client peut être tenu responsable. De nombreux pouvoirs sont actuellement délégués par le gouvernement d'après la responsabilité au moyen de protocoles d'entente, de vérifications et de pénalités postérieures à une transaction dont aucune ne doit être nécessairement écrasante. ASC devrait utiliser ces méthodes plutôt que de contrôler les transactions.

Le rôle des organismes de services communs (et des organismes centraux) devrait consister à permettre aux gestionnaires de prendre les bonnes décisions. Ce rôle s'étendra à leur fournir les bons outils, l'information nécessaire (par exemple les offres permanentes), à communiquer d'une façon efficace des objectifs généraux qui doivent être atteints dans le cadre de leurs opérations, et à fournir une formation et un soutien si nécessaire. ASC devrait devenir un organisme de services consultatifs en matière d'approvisionnement et d'information.

III. AUTOFINANCEMENT

Les frais de service pour l'approvisionnement peuvent également créer un volume énorme de frictions entre le ministère et ses clients. Mise à part la nature de la structure des frais, les clients ont toujours l'impression de devoir payer les frais pour un service qu'ils ne peuvent refuser qu'ils considèrent comme un appui des objectifs qui dépassent leurs propres buts. Un gestionnaire régional a déclaré :

"Nous utilisons des manomètres très spécialisés pour la vérification des pipelines et nous savons exactement ce dont nous avons besoin. Il existe une base de fournisseurs très limitée et nous leur faisons part de nos exigences. ASC modifie ensuite notre cahier des charges pour répondre au processus d'appel d'offre et sollicite des soumissions à l'échelon national. Nous savons cependant qu'il n'existe que deux fabricants au Canada et qu'un seul peut modifier la conception de son produit pour répondre à nos besoins. Quelle est la plus-value?"

Il est évident que les ministères aimeraient réaliser leurs propres transactions d'après les offres permanentes et un système de catalogage électronique. En outre, ils estiment être mieux qualifiés pour traiter plus efficacement les services spécialisés dans des cas où la compétence d'expert existe dans le ministère.

À l'opposé, la préoccupation régionale quant à une délégation accrue repose sur le nombre de ressources et de compétences d'expert dans les ministères. Un membre du groupe d'étude organisationnelle explique cette situation ainsi :

"Nous n'avons pas de personnes en surplus pour le moment. Dans le meilleur des cas, nous y arriverons à peine. Si nous devons donc nous en tenir aux instructions et aux règlements tels qu'ils existent actuellement, nous devons appliquer le processus d'appel d'offre correctement, veiller à ce que les personnes ouvrent les soumissions correctement, nous devons avoir des corbeilles à soumission et un groupe d'observateurs, nous devons tout avoir et cela demande des années-personnes, mais nous ne les avons pas".

Un autre gestionnaire a déclaré :

"Nous n'avons qu'une seule personne possédant la compétence d'expert requise. Si cette personne part ou tombe malade, tout s'arrête. ASC dispose de suffisamment de personnes formées pour combler ce type de lacune".

Une plus grande délégation de la part d'ASC demanderait une formation et des communications étendues avec des gestionnaires et des employés ministériels. Ce principe est particulièrement vrai lorsqu'ASC fournit un tampon contre diverses pressions - tant internes qu'externes. Ces pressions proviennent de sources très diverses, les fournisseurs, les régions, les impératifs de la politique commerciale et les objectifs nationaux entre autres. En cas de changements importants d'ASC, ces pressions ne disparaîtraient pas mais seraient appliquées directement aux ministères.

Une question secondaire concernant la délégation des pouvoirs de passation des contrats est la mesure dans laquelle la délégation

I. INTRODUCTION A APPROVISIONNEMENTS ET SERVICES CANADA (ASC) A TITRE D'ORGANISME DE SERVICES COMMUNS.

ASC a été établi pour fournir les biens et services requis par les ministères. Cependant, au cours des vingt dernières années, ASC a été chargée d'un nombre croissant d'autres objectifs. Une grande partie, sinon la plupart, de ces objectifs étaient introduits en réponse à diverses questions (par exemple développement régional, équité en matière d'emploi, petite entreprise), souvent sans se préoccuper convenablement de l'incidence sur les coûts et les services. Le ministre d'ASC avec l'appui de ses collègues du Cabinet, tente actuellement de rationaliser les 40 ou 50 objectifs nationaux qui ont fait d'ASC une forme hybride d'OSC avec certaines responsabilités assimilables aux programmes.

II. OBSERVATIONS

On considère généralement qu'ASC possède un bon dossier de suivi dans le maintien de l'intégrité du processus d'approvisionnement (prudence et probité) et dans la réalisation d'économies en matière d'achats. Cependant, de récentes études telles que les études des services hiérarchiques d'ASC, le rapport du VG de 1989 et cette étude de RP 2000 indiquent qu'ASC s'est trop concentré sur ces deux aspects au détriment du service au client. Par conséquent, le ministre doit maintenant trouver un équilibre optimal entre ces deux aspects.

En particulier, les problèmes cernés à ASC concernent son rôle à titre d'intermédiaire. Même pour des articles de faible valeur pécnuniaire par exemple, des ministères se trouvent dans l'impossibilité de traiter directement avec des fournisseurs pour discuter de leurs besoins. Un participant au groupe ministériel d'étude organisationnelle a déclaré :

"Nous ne pouvons tout simplement pas obtenir le type de service que nous voulons. Les entreprises ne nous envoient même pas un catalogue parce qu'elles savent qu'avec le système d'appel d'offre d'ASC, nous ne prenons pas les décisions. Et si cela doit venir d'Ottawa, le représentant de l'entreprise n'obtiendra pas une commission couvrant le temps qu'il a passé avec nous".

Cette situation entraîne un manque de contrôle et un sentiment de désaffection du processus de consultation qui est nécessaire pour assurer que les fournisseurs éventuels comprennent les besoins des clients. Les ministères estiment qu'ils "font tout le travail" et qu'ASC est souvent une étape superflue dans le processus, particulièrement pour les articles de faible valeur pécnuniaire et les produits spécialisés. Dans le dernier cas, on estimait qu'ASC apportait une très faible plus-value. Voici un bon exemple de cette situation :

Approvisionnement et Services Canada

Chapitre 3

Conséquences :

Étant donné que tout changement dans le statut des services communs demande l'approbation du Conseil du Trésor, le SCT devra entreprendre un examen des conséquences entraînées par le changement de statut de ces services communs afin d'assurer que tout changement est rentable pour le gouvernement fédéral.

III. RECOMMANDATIONS DÉTERMINANTES POUR LES SERVICES COMMUNS

Le groupe de travail a proposé des changements à l'état d'un certain nombre de services communs. Ces changements sont indiqués à l'annexe 3. Conformément à la philosophie de RP 2000, le groupe de travail recommande également que les principes suivants régissent le fonctionnement des services communs :

1. Afin de fournir aux employés un encouragement suffisant pour exécuter des programmes et fournir des services au public, que tous les services communs soient "rendus facultatifs si possible" (voir annexe 3). À cette fin, le groupe de travail recommande que quatre services obligatoires (c'est-à-dire Disposition des biens de la Couronne, Centre des voyages, Traduction et Banque d'art) soient rendus facultatifs.

2. Que le SCT entreprenne une étude conjointement avec les OSC et les ministères sur la façon de rendre ces quatre services communs facultatifs de façon rentable.

ministères sous la forme d'un crédit pour frais de service d'ASC. Malgré cette amélioration de la politique, le groupe de travail estime que les gestionnaires ministériels devraient recevoir la pleine valeur du produit de la disposition et du transfert de biens et que des mécanismes doivent être établis pour permettre aux ministères d'échanger ou de vendre des biens directement au secteur privé ou à d'autres ministères.

Service central des voyages :

La nécessité d'un service central des voyages est mentionnée dans le cadre des progrès rapides dans la technologie moderne. Voici un exemple cité au cours d'une récente réunion du groupe d'étude organisationnelle :

"Les voyages constituent une question intéressante. Des personnes comptent sur moi pour négocier un marché de centaines de milliers de dollars, mais, je dois passer par un service central des voyages pour obtenir un simple billet me permettant d'aller à Toronto".

D'après les cinq principes mentionnés dans le chapitre 1, le groupe de travail a conclu que l'état obligatoire du service central des voyages doit être éliminé. Etant donné que le contrat du service central des voyages doit être renouvelé dans environ un an et demi, ce sera l'occasion d'examiner le besoin d'un service central des voyages.

Traduction :

Le groupe de travail recommande que la traduction dans les deux langues officielles devienne un service facultatif, assujéti à une mise en oeuvre graduelle dans l'achat de services de traduction par des ministères. Toutefois, la prestation de services de traduction dans des langues internationales autres que les deux langues officielles, a toujours été considérée comme un service valable difficile à obtenir dans le secteur privé. Par conséquent, il devrait rester obligatoire.

Banque d'art :

Une évaluation de la Banque d'art a été récemment réalisée par le Secréariat du Conseil du Trésor. L'évaluation recommandait que la location d'art devienne un service facultatif. La plupart des personnes enquêtées dans cette évaluation souhaitaient une plus grande souplesse dans la location d'art. Le groupe de travail préconise d'ailleurs d'options dans la location d'art bien qu'ils continuent à soutenir les objectifs du Conseil du Canada dans le rôle de la Banque d'art qui consiste à aider la collectivité artistique. Par conséquent, le groupe de travail estime que la Banque d'art doit devenir un service facultatif.

La réforme du cadre des services communs, bien qu'issue de principes généraux, entraîne d'importants compromis dans les objectifs gouvernementaux et les questions financières et administratives relativement complexes. Les groupes d'étude organisationnelle ont illustré ce point par l'observation suivante :

"La décentralisation est excellente, mais quels sont les divers ministères qui entreprendront la coordination de certains objectifs nationaux tels que l'équité en matière d'emploi, le développement régional et 50 autres objectifs nationaux?"

D'après une analyse préliminaire de la situation, une enquête auprès des fonctionnaires dans l'ensemble du pays est conformément aux principes établis dans le chapitre I, le Groupe de travail a examiné l'état obligatoire de tous les services communs et a recommandé les changements indiqués à l'annexe 3. Cependant, le Groupe de travail a conclu que la prestation de 4 services communs particuliers exige une attention et une analyse approfondies. Il s'agit des services suivants :

Disposition des biens de la Couronne :

Le Groupe de travail craint que les gestionnaires ne soient pas suffisamment encouragés à disposer des biens excédentaires. Dans le cadre du système actuel, les ministères doivent passer par la disposition des biens de la Couronne à ASC pour disposer d'un bien ou même pour fournir un bien excédentaire à un autre ministère. Jusqu'à décembre 1989, aucun produit de la vente de tels biens ne revenait au ministère, mais était plutôt dépensé en frais de service d'ASC ou reversé au Trésor. La mesure dans laquelle la disposition des biens est découragée par les faits qu'ont relatés des gestionnaires dans les endroits éloignés et qui ont trouvé plus rentable de jeter des biens excédentaires ou voire, dans certains cas, les jeter dans les poubelles parce que le coût de disposition était nettement supérieur aux recettes qui pouvaient en être tirées.

Un autre exemple qui a retenu l'attention du Groupe de travail était le cas d'un gestionnaire qui possédait un certain nombre d'ordinateurs désuets. Les bureaux de districts d'un autre ministère, qui ne pouvaient acheter des ordinateurs, voulaient utiliser ces ordinateurs. Cependant, lorsque le gestionnaire a demandé à son groupe des Services administratifs s'il pouvait donner ces ordinateurs à ce ministère, il a été informé que les ministères ne pouvaient transférer des biens sans les déclarer excédentaires. Dans ces conditions, le gestionnaire a estimé qu'il ne valait pas la peine de gaspiller du temps et des efforts pour poursuivre la démarche.

En décembre 1989, le gouvernement fédéral a annoncé que 30 p. 100 des produits de la vente des biens excédentaires seraient remis aux

- service de qualité au client;
- incitation à fournir des résultats qui sont aussi efficaces que rentables; et,
- réponse souple aux exigences opérationnelles changeantes des ministères clients.

Au cours de récentes réunions du groupe d'étude organisationnelle, un participant a très clairement indiqué sa conception du niveau de contrôle que les OSC exercent sur un présumé ministère client :

"Ils n'ont aucune idée de nos affaires ni de qui nous servons et de plus ils nous disent ce que nous pouvons et ne pouvons pas faire dans l'exécution de notre programme. Le service qu'ils nous fournissent est basé sur un manuel de règlement, non pas sur le fait que ce service atteigne ou non les objectifs de notre programme".

Les valeurs et les objectifs de RP 2000 tels qu'énoncés dans le chapitre 1, tentent de rétablir l'équilibre de la relation entre les OSC et leurs clients. Ce but sera atteint en fournissant un milieu qui favorise des responsabilités et un rendement administratif amélioré dans l'ensemble de la fonction publique avec une orientation particulière sur le service au public et l'amélioration de la productivité.

Le principe central de ces changements est que les objectifs de RP 2000 soient atteints de la meilleure façon possible en confiant autant de pouvoir que possible aux employés et aux gestionnaires, de même que par des ententes nouvelles ou plus souples entre les OSC et les ministères organisationnels. À cette fin, les services suivants sont déjà passés d'"obligatoires" à "facultatifs" :

- La fonction d'imprimerie d'ASC a été changée pour un statut entièrement "facultatif" à titre d'organisme opérationnel spécial à partir de 1992.

Le système d'information de la gestion du parc automobile (décision du Conseil du Trésor sur la politique en matière de véhicule automobile d'ASC).

En outre, ASC a récemment augmenté ses délégations fondamentales aux ministères faisant passer les achats de 500 \$ à 1 000 \$ et à 2 500 \$ lorsqu'ils étaient accompagnés d'exigences particulières en matière de rapport. Malgré ce changement, on reconnaît qu'on ne peut obtenir de succès sans dispositions similaires dans les ministères entre le bureau chef et les fonctions de personnel et les centres de responsabilité relativement à la prestation de services.

I. INTRODUCTION AUX ORGANISMES DE SERVICES COMMUNS

Un organisme de services communs (OSC) est un ministère, un organisme, une direction ou une division entièrement ou principalement engagée dans des activités centralisées afin d'appuyer le programme de ministères et d'organismes. Le rôle principal de l'OSC est la prestation de services au client de même que l'établissement de certaines normes de prudence et de probité. Les services communs fournis par les OSC sont généralement divisés en deux catégories. (Par le passé, il y a également eu une catégorie "droit de refuser au premier niveau", mais qui a été éliminée) :

- Service commun obligatoire : un service que les ministères clients doivent obtenir d'un OSC.

- Service commun facultatif : un service que des clients peuvent obtenir d'un OSC ou d'un autre fournisseur. (Dans certains cas, les normes concernant les biens et services sont obligatoires, mais la sélection du fournisseur est facultative.)

II. OBSERVATIONS

Environ 40 services communs (se reporter à l'annexe 3) sont fournis par 12 OSC. La prestation de ces services entre dans le cadre de politiques administratives (se reporter à l'annexe 2) établies par le Conseil du Trésor. Les services sont également assujettis à diverses dispositions financières, y compris l'autofinancement et les crédits. Ces contrôles étaient à l'origine établis et appliqués aux OSC afin d'assurer que le gouvernement institue des centres de compétences d'expert dans des domaines particuliers, tirait les avantages des économies d'échelle, encourageait les objectifs nationaux de façon conforme et maintenait un processus équitable, transparent et écartant le risque.

Le groupe de travail reconnaît que le gestionnaire et les employés des OSC se consacrent à l'accomplissement des mandats actuels de leurs ministères et qu'ils travaillent avec assiduité et loyauté pour atteindre tous les objectifs qui leur ont été fixés. Néanmoins, une recherche approfondie dans le domaine de services communs a révélé que ces mêmes objectifs ont entraîné de nombreux problèmes organisationnels. En particulier, l'étude de la politique des services communs de 1985, le groupe de travail Nielsen et maintenant le groupe de travail RP 2000 ont tous conclu que les avantages visés des OSC n'avaient pas été suffisamment pondérés en fonction d'autres critères d'importance égale.

Ces critères comprennent :

• opportunité;

Rôle des organismes de services communs

Chapitre 2

à l'échelle de la Fonction publique à pour but de fournir un meilleur service au public canadien.

Les principes énoncés ci-dessus doivent être considérés comme les facteurs déterminants pour l'évaluation de politiques administratives et de politiques de services communs visant à compléter des principes bien établis tels que la prudence, la probité et l'économie. La Fonction publique peut veiller à ce que les fonctionnaires aient les pouvoirs et les encouragements suffisants pour exécuter leurs programmes et servir le public de la meilleure façon possible.

un tableau à feuilles mobiles. Je ne peux pas obtenir les outils ou prendre les petites décisions dont j'ai besoin pour faire fonctionner les choses. Donnez nous les pouvoirs et les responsabilités des budgets qui permettent d'exécuter le programme".

Obtenir les bons encouragements

Les gestionnaires doivent être prêts à prendre des risques calculés pour obtenir de meilleurs résultats (tirer des leçons de l'expérience). L'innovation doit être encouragée et récompensée, alors que les échecs ne doivent pas signifier le retour aux entraves. La recherche de meilleurs moyens de faire des choses disparaîtra rapidement si les fonctionnaires sont fustigés pour avoir commis des erreurs. Comme l'a dit un gestionnaire :

"C'est ce qui conduit à ce que j'appelle le syndrome de la "prudence" dans les ministères. Nous avons si peur de commettre une erreur et qu'un des organismes centraux s'en prennent à nous, que nous nous incrustons dans la bureaucratie au niveau du ministère - juste dans l'éventualité".

On devrait reconnaître et récompenser la créativité et le succès. Il devrait y avoir des normes élevées en matière d'excellence et on devrait récompenser et reconnaître (bien et rapidement) les gestionnaires qui dirigent dans l'esprit de RP 2000 (délégation, autorisation, attention aux ressources humaines, satisfaction des clients, témoignages, innovateurs).

V. CONCLUSIONS

Les politiques administratives et les politiques en matière de services communs du gouvernement doivent évoluer rapidement pour atteindre l'objectif de Fonction publique 2000 (RP 2000). Bien que les objectifs fondamentaux orientés sur l'économie, l'équité, la probité et l'uniformité dans l'ensemble de la Fonction publique doivent rester constants, les moyens de les atteindre doivent changer.

De l'administration à la gestion :

L'initiative RP 2000 accélérera le processus de changement dans les politiques administratives et les politiques de services communs déjà en cours au Conseil du Trésor. Ce passage de l'"administration" à la "gestion" devrait procurer une plus grande souplesse pour gérer en mettant l'accent sur les résultats. Ce changement dans la culture ministérielle

- une modification à un contrat régional existant qui doit être effectuée par le biais de l'administration centrale. Le besoin était connu en juillet, mais il a fallu attendre jusqu'en janvier pour que toute l'affaire passe par le processus;

- les formulaires et les écritures sans fin pour qu'une partie du gouvernement en débite une autre (par exemple la facturation d'ASC et de TPC);

- le temps qu'il faut faire réparer une fenêtre qui fuit ou une poignée de porte en passant par un organisme de services;

- le temps qu'il faut obtenir deux ordinateurs dans le but de lancer une activité hautement prioritaire parce qu'il faut utiliser ASC;

- la nécessité que des gestionnaires obtiennent l'approbation du comité pour un contrat ou l'achat d'un ordinateur, même lorsque la dépense est sous le niveau de leur propre pouvoir.

H. L. Latramboise, ancien sous-ministre adjoint de Travail Canada, a appelé cette tendance au gouvernement l'"anti-gestion". On peut également l'appeler "tracasseries administratives". Quel que soit le nom qu'on lui donne, elle rend les gestionnaires et les employés fous, et elle conduit souvent à un comportement anti-productif et à un travail improductif.

- Les gestionnaires devraient avoir les pouvoirs

Les politiques devraient fournir les pouvoirs qui sont suffisamment souples pour être adaptés aux besoins d'organismes individuels.

Le principe déterminant à suivre dans la formulation de politiques est qu'on devrait déléguer autant de pouvoirs et de souplesse que possible aux ministères et au personnel, que ce soit par une délégation accrue, une déréglementation ou l'élimination de contraintes ou d'irritants externes. Comme des participants à la direction des groupes opérationnels l'ont déclaré :

"Je peux signer des contrats pour d'importantes sommes d'argent, dans les centaines de milliers de dollars, pour que quelqu'un fasse quelque chose pour nous, pour assurer la formation, ou pour autre chose, mais je ne peux pas sortir et acheter une machine à écrire pour ma secrétaire, ni même acheter

"En tant que directeur général des services médicaux, j'ai tant que perdre moins de temps à pousser du papier et à consacrer à mon travail d'une façon intelligente. Je n'ai pas le temps de mettre sur pieds un comité pour étudier le problème. Le client demande une réponse immédiate, pas dans trois mois".

Donner le choix aux gestionnaires

Les gestionnaires devraient avoir le choix. Les politiques ne devraient pas être un ensemble de règles ni être directives, mais plutôt offrir des choix aux gestionnaires.

Compte tenu de leur connaissance du milieu de travail, les gestionnaires sont les mieux placés pour faire preuve d'un jugement solide et pour prendre des décisions appropriées en mettant ces politiques en oeuvre. Comme des gestionnaires régionaux l'ont déclaré au cours de discussions du groupe d'étude organisationnelle :

"Si, à titre de gestionnaire organisationnel, vous pouvez concevoir un moyen de mieux le faire, vous pouvez mieux le faire, vous êtes autorisés à le faire. Je pense que c'est ce type de discipline qui doit régir les OSC".

"Mon message est le suivant : Je suis un gestionnaire et j'ai la capacité de gérer - Ça ne me dérange pas d'être tenu responsable. Donnez moi les outils pour gérer".

Nettoyer le fouillis

Ce qu'on appelle le "fouillis" est ce qui irrite le plus les gestionnaires. Ce terme s'applique à la surabondance de procédures, de vérifications et de mises au point, de comités, d'autorisations, de facturation et de méthodes de vérification complexes, et toutes ces tracasseries auxquelles ils doivent faire face et qui leur rapportent si peu. Les gestionnaires acceptent généralement le besoin de politiques centrales et d'organismes de services, mais sont plus mécontents des types de problèmes suivants :

• La nécessité de remplir une demande de remboursement de frais de déplacement s'élevant à 15 \$, alors qu'il en coûtera probablement six fois plus en écritures. Pourquoi ne pas utiliser la petite caisse à cette fin?

• Ne pas être en mesure d'assurer un contrôle ou de faire quoique ce soit au sujet de postes de dépenses relativement mineurs.

• Pas suffisamment de délégation, particulièrement dans les régions.

• Le processus d'approvisionnement est souvent trop lent et le niveau de dépenser est généralement impropre pour répondre aux besoins opérationnels.

• Le manque de communication interne, le temps qu'il faut à ASC pour coordonner des marchés et des achats de même que le rôle d'approvisionnement et Services à titre d'intermédiaire.

• Ne pas être en mesure de gérer leurs propres espaces de bureau. Les plaintes touchaient le temps de réponse, la qualité du service, la qualité du travail, la communication impropre et le coût élevé de TPC.

• Dans le domaine des autres services communs, on se préoccupait du temps qu'il faut pour recevoir les services ou les factures, ou des différences d'objectifs entre les OSC et les ministères.

IV. PRINCIPES SOUTENANT LES POLITIQUES

Afin d'obtenir une meilleure gestion administrative, le groupe de travail estime que de nouveaux principes sont nécessaires pour guider les politiques et les méthodes des organismes centraux, des organismes de services communs (OSC) et des ministères. Les principes proposés sont les suivants :

• Service de soutien au public

Les politiques administratives doivent permettre aux fonctionnaires de consacrer moins de temps aux écritures et de se concentrer davantage sur les besoins de leurs clients. L'information devrait être facilement "assimilable". Le processus doit rester simple afin d'éviter le passage de la bureaucratie d'un domaine à un autre.

Compte tenu des ressources disponibles, les changements doivent assurer la prestation du meilleur service possible au public canadien. Les décideurs devraient également penser "service" et "satisfaction du client" et ils devraient être reconnus et récompensés comme il se doit. Comme un gestionnaire régional à Montréal l'a déclaré, il est nécessaire d'améliorer la prestation du service :

Les gestionnaires à tous les niveaux dans l'ensemble des ministères sont confrontés à un processus décisionnel à plusieurs paliers et à des règlements détaillés qui interviennent dans leurs opérations journalières et dans la prestation opportune de leurs programmes au public. Les participants aux groupes opérationnels jugent que la meilleure solution consistait à réduire autant que possible le volume d'écritures, d'éliminer les approbations embarrassantes et la duplication ainsi que la vérification excessive du travail.

Les principaux irritants mentionnés par la plupart des employés dans les activités des groupes opérationnels sont indiqués ci-dessous :

III. POURQUOI DES CHANGEMENTS SONT NÉCESSAIRES

Afin d'en arriver à des conclusions valides et admises, le groupe de travail rencontre les deux plus importants organismes de services communs (ASC et TPC) et trois grands syndicats (IPFP, ASSE, AFPC). En outre, avant d'émettre son rapport final, le groupe de travail voulait assurer que les principales recommandations reflétaient les points de vue des employés de la fonction publique. À cette fin, cinq groupes opérationnels ont été constitués (deux à Ottawa, un à Montréal, un à Winnipeg et un à Halifax). Quelque cent employés ont participé aux discussions des groupes opérationnels. Leur participation a été très utile pour le groupe de travail dans la formulation de son rapport final et de ses recommandations.

II. CONSULTATIONS

• simplification des procédures relatives aux déplacements : Un comité mixte du Secrétaire du Conseil du Trésor et du Bureau du contrôleur général examine les procédures relatives aux déplacements de ce comité simplifieront le traitement des demandes de remboursement de frais de déplacement.

• Le Conseil du Trésor a convenu de donner aux gestionnaires le choix de remplacer la vérification des empreintes digitales par une vérification du nom dans les casiers judiciaires d'après une évaluation des risques, et d'étendre à dix ans la validité du niveau I et du niveau II des autorisations de sécurité;

• L'égalité d'accès par des compagnies de taxi aux affaires gouvernementales; des gestionnaires, particulièrement dans les régions, s'inquiétaient du temps et des écritures nécessaires en ce qui concerne l'autorisation des frais de réception. Le Conseil du Trésor a convenu d'accroître les options pour les gestionnaires;

I. Introduction

L'étendue des activités de ce groupe de travail (l'annexe 1 donne la liste des membres du groupe de travail) comprend toutes les principales politiques administratives (environ 18 champs d'activité dont la liste est dressée à l'annexe 2) actuellement émises par le Conseil du Trésor, de même que le rôle des organismes de services communs qui fournissent environ 40 services communs aux ministères. Le principal objectif de l'étude était de faciliter la prestation de services améliorés au public canadien grâce à une souplesse, des responsabilités et des pouvoirs accrus pour tout le personnel, en se basant sur le principe que les employés régionaux et les employés opérationnels sont le mieux placés pour prendre les décisions les plus judicieuses.

Étant donné le nombre important et la grande diversité de ces champs d'activités, le groupe de travail n'a pas eu le temps d'examiner en profondeur toutes les champs d'activités des organismes de services communs (OSC). Le groupe de travail s'est plutôt concentré sur les champs d'activité déterminants que les fonctionnaires ont cernés comme des activités présentant un grand intérêt. Le groupe de travail a élaboré des principes permettant de guider l'évaluation de ces champs d'activités. En ce qui concerne les champs d'activité où d'importants changements ont déjà été entrepris par le SCT ou lorsqu'il n'y a pas de plaintes, le groupe de travail ne juge pas nécessaire de faire d'autres observations.

On doit également noter que le groupe de travail a déjà fait des recommandations en vue de traiter immédiatement certains problèmes opérationnels déterminés. Ces changements, qui étaient inclus dans le rapport d'étape daté du 30 avril 1990 et présenté au président du Conseil du Trésor, sont les suivants :

- doubler le pouvoir de passation de contrats pour des contrats concurrentiels, passant à 200 000 \$ pour des services de consultation et à 400 000 \$ pour des services de non-consultation

- accroître le pouvoir d'achat ministériel de 500 à 1 000 \$ pour tous les ministères et à 2 500 \$ pour ceux qui concluent une entente avec ASC;

- déléguer aux ministères tout pouvoir de radiation de créances;

- durée des contrats de personnel temporaire étendue de huit (8) à vingt (20) semaines;

- une politique révisée en matière de taxi qui confère l'entière responsabilité au sous-chef de ministère afin de réduire la charge administrative et accroître

**Politiques administratives
et services communs
pour FP 2000 - Principes**

Chapitre 1

les trois prochaines années.

et le besoin de suppléer administrative et ministérielle.

13. Que le Secrétariat du Conseil du Trésor travaille avec l'Agence de formation du personnel, le Centre de perfectionnement des cadres et d'autres organisations appropriées, afin d'élaborer les programmes de formation nécessaires pour mettre en oeuvre les recommandations du présent rapport.

14. Que le Secrétariat du Conseil du Trésor et des ministères élaborent des programmes étendus afin d'assurer que tous les employés sont au courant des politiques nouvelles ou changées, de leur niveau de pouvoir et des répercussions de ces politiques sur leurs responsabilités.

Recommandations pour les organismes de services communs

15. Que tous les services communs soient étudiés périodiquement dans le cadre d'une série d'évaluations interministérielles de programmes dirigées par le SCT, avec la participation à l'équipe d'étude du Secrétariat du Conseil du Trésor et du Bureau du contrôleur général, des OSC et des ministères clients.

16. Que des OSC étudient toutes leurs opérations de façon régulière pour réviser leur niveau de délégations de pouvoir aux ministères et pour assurer que leur services sont fournis de façon adaptée aux besoins des clients.

Recommandations pour les ministères

17. Que des ministères accordent une priorité élevée à l'établissement d'une orientation compatible vers les communications afin d'appuyer des initiatives d'envergure gouvernementale en matière de communications. Ce procédé assurera que tous les employés du ministère connaissent et comprennent les principes des politiques administratives nouvelles ou modifiées, leur niveau de pouvoir, les moyens d'obtenir de l'aide et les répercussions des changements sur la prestation de programmes ministériels.

18. Que des ministères fournissent ou appuient la formation requise pour assurer que tous les employés sont en mesure de profiter au maximum des pouvoirs accrus fournis.

Responsabilité de la mise en oeuvre

19. Afin de mettre en oeuvre ces recommandations, on recommande en outre de préparer un rapport d'évaluation pour le Conseil du Trésor sur une base annuelle, pendant

8.4 conserver l'ACCORD (Administration et contrôle et données régionales) comme système obligatoire pour de petits marchés de construction et de service, mais en l'adaptant de façon à ce que les locataires aient accès au système lorsqu'ils désirent conclure un marché directement.

9. Que les opérations des services d'A et G de l'IPC soient désignées "facultatives" en vertu de la politique des services communs du Conseil du Trésor à partir du 1^{er} avril 1992, à condition que :

- Le système SPFC (Sélection et évaluation préalable des qualités d'experts-conseils) soit la seule méthode d'engagement de professionnels du secteur privé pour les services d'A et G;

- Le gouvernement assure que des ministères n'utilisent pas le statut "facultatif" pour créer des organisations internes d'A et G.

D. Recommandations sur la gestion ministérielle

10. Que des sous-chefs assurent qu'une souplesse et des délégations de pouvoir accrues que des organismes centraux accordent sont correctement communiquées et qu'elles correspondent à des délégations de pouvoir, une souplesse et des responsabilités équivalentes pour les cadres.

11. Que des sous-chefs étudient des structures internes de délégation de pouvoir, des procédures et des responsabilités afin d'assurer que des cadres disposent du maximum de souplesse et de pouvoir possibles pour gérer des programmes et fournir des services au public ou aux clients ministériels.

E. Recommandations sur les mises en oeuvre

Recommandations pour les organismes centraux

12. Que le gouvernement fédéral adopte de nouveaux principes applicables aux politiques administratives basés sur le maximum d'encouragement, de pouvoir et de responsabilité correspondante pour des cadres de tous les niveaux, et pour que des organismes centraux et des ministères étudient leurs politiques administratives et leurs services communs en fonction de ces principes. Ce procédé assurera que des politiques administratives et des services communs créent un meilleur équilibre entre des exigences administratives d'envergure gouvernementale

immédiatement une délégation plus significative et sélective aux ministères clients, selon le type de biens et le client.

5.2 Etablir un système de cartes de crédit afin d'éliminer le procédé de réquisition et les écritures de facturation, et pour faciliter la collecte de données.

5.3 Etablir des portefeuilles de clients, au moins pour les utilisateurs intensifs.

5.4 Etablir un moyen simple de traiter de l'approvisionnement à faible valeur monétaire pour l'approvisionnement d'articles en magasin.

6. Qu'ASC établisse et maintienne un centre de compétence d'experts dans lequel des ministères peuvent réaliser des acquisitions telles que requises, obtenir des conseils et recevoir une aide relative à des problèmes.

7. Qu'ASC élabore des propositions, dans une période d'un an, d'une nouvelle méthode devant remplacer le système existant basé sur les revenus, afin de promouvoir un système d'approvisionnement rentable et de réduire les coûts de facturation interne. Tout nouveau système doit tenir compte du nouveau rôle et des nouvelles fonctions d'ASC en vertu du régime proposé ci-dessus.

C. Recommandations sur TPC

8. Que les opérations du programme de propriété véritable soient "révisées pour fournir d'avantage de souplesse et d'autonomie locales dans les relations propriétaire-locataire, c'est-à-dire :

8.1 élaborer des normes locales bilatérales particulières qui donnent la priorité aux exigences locales du locataire, relativement aux fonctions qui fournissent un service direct au public;

8.2 fournir à des locataires le choix d'assurer des services locaux, soit directement avec des entrepreneurs, soit par TPC, à condition que TPC conserve le niveau minimal de contrôle nécessaire pour protéger l'intégrité structurelle de ces bâtiments;

8.3 redéfinir des services locaux afin d'inclure autant d'activités que possible dans cette catégorie et transférer des fonds pour ces domaines additionnels, de TPC aux locataires;

VII. RECOMMANDATIONS

a. Recommandations sur une politique des services communs

1. Afin de fournir aux employés un encouragement suffisant pour exécuter des programmes et fournir des services au public, que tous les services communs soient "rendus facultatifs si possible (voir annexe 3). À cette fin, le groupe de travail recommande que quatre services obligatoires (c'est-à-dire Disposition des biens de la Couronne, Centre des voyages, Traduction et Banque d'art) soient rendus facultatifs.

2. Que le SCT entreprenne une étude conjointement avec des OSC et des ministères, sur la façon de rendre ces quatre services communs facultatifs de façon rentable.

b. Recommandations pour ASC

3. Que le gouvernement et ASC s'engagent fermement à fournir, de façon progressive, une plus grande délégation du pouvoir d'achat au Ministère, par type de biens et par client. Par conséquent, d'ici le 1^{er} avril 1991, le niveau de base de délégation à des ministères clients passera de 1 000 \$ à 2 500 \$. Au cas où le système mentionné dans la recommandation 4 ne puisse être mis en oeuvre pour une raison donnée, la délégation augmentera à 10 000 \$ d'ici le 1^{er} avril 1994.

4. Qu'au cours des 4 prochaines années, ASC établisse une méthode d'approvisionnement dans laquelle ASC fournisse des ministères un accès illimité à un système basé sur la technologie qui permet aux clients d'assurer une plus grande partie de leurs propres achats. Pour le moins, le système doit fournir l'accès électronique aux offres permanentes et à d'autres transactions contractuelles fondamentales, de même qu'une collecte de données suffisantes pour qu'ASC puisse remplir ses fonctions et ses responsabilités. En effet, ce procédé fournirait au Ministère une délégation pour ainsi dire illimitée lui permettant de réaliser ses propres transactions en utilisant l'information et les ententes contractuelles préalablement approuvées fournies par ASC.

5. Outre ce qui a été mentionné ci-dessus, qu'ASC envisage un certain nombre d'initiative à court terme ayant comme but principal de réorienter ASC plus franchement vers le service au client et la satisfaction du client. Ces initiatives pourraient comprendre :

5.1 Qu'ASC, pour des exigences hautement spécialisées ou relativement particulières, fournisse

actuels de service. ASC appelle cette initiative Vision 2000. On estime que les recommandations suivantes sont conformes et compatibles à l'Initiative Vision 2000 d'ASC. Les recommandations ont pour but d'accroître la souplesse des cadres en matière d'approvisionnement tout en conservant les avantages d'une fonction d'approvisionnement centrale et le mandat et les responsabilités actuels d'ASC dans ce domaine.

IV. TRAVAUX PUBLICS CANADA : LE PROGRAMME DE PROPRIÉTÉ VÉRIFIABLE/ SERVICES D'A et G

Les services fournis par TPC préoccupaient davantage les cadres que tout autre domaine des services communs. Des cadres étaient particulièrement ennuyés par la rigidité du système actuel dans le règlement de réparations et de services mineurs (c'est-à-dire nettoyage) dans des édifices gouvernementaux tous ou appartenant à l'État. Ils se sont également beaucoup préoccupés du niveau de service fourni par les Services d'architecture et de génie (A et G) de TPC, spécialement pour de petits travaux ou des exigences ministérielles particulières. Compte tenu de la préoccupation des cadres, le groupe de travail a conclu que seul un changement important dans les relations entre TPC et le Ministère améliorerait la situation. La meilleure façon d'y parvenir est de fournir au Ministère le choix de recourir aux services localisés et aux services d'A et G actuellement fournis par TPC.

V. GESTION MINISTÉRIELLE

À mesure que les travaux du groupe de travail avançaient, il devenait de plus en plus évident que les politiques et les méthodes administratives ministérielles étaient un obstacle important à l'accroissement de la souplesse et du pouvoir. D'après des enquêtes ministérielles et des réunions de groupes organisationnels, il était clair que les ministères ne déléguaient pas une grande partie du pouvoir existant aux ministères par des organismes centraux et des OSC. En outre, des cadres ont souligné que de nombreux procédés qui leur causaient des problèmes découlaient de décisions administratives internes. Par conséquent, le groupe de travail a élaboré deux recommandations traitant de ce sujet délicat.

VI. MISE EN ŒUVRE

Afin d'aider la mise en œuvre de changements dans des politiques administratives et des services communs, des organismes centraux, des OSC et des ministères doivent produire des efforts concertés. Une exigence importante en matière de mise en œuvre pour les trois groupes concernera la formation et les communications. De plus, on doit prendre des mesures appropriées pour permettre aux OSC et à leur personnel de se régler et de s'adapter à leurs nouveaux rôles.

Le rapport de ce Groupe de travail comporte nos conclusions et nos recommandations. Les sections suivantes résument ces conclusions et présentent les recommandations détaillées du Groupe de travail.

I. THÈMES CLÉS

Afin de créer une meilleure gestion administrative, le Groupe de travail estime que de nouveaux thèmes sont nécessaires pour guider les politiques et les méthodes des organismes centraux, des organismes de services communs (OSC) et des ministères. Les thèmes proposés sont les suivants :

- Orientation sur l'amélioration du service au public
- Donner le choix aux cadres
- Écouter des employés afin d'éliminer des problèmes inutiles
- Déléguer le pouvoir au niveau le plus près de la prestation de services
- Créer les encouragements appropriés en vue de l'innovation.

II. ORGANISMES DE SERVICES COMMUNS

Le Groupe de travail a étudié un certain nombre de services communs. Nous avons conclu en général que les principes fondamentaux sur lesquels les services communs obligatoires ont été établis (c'est-à-dire économies d'échelle, centralisation) doivent être remis en question compte tenu de la technologie changeante, des méthodes de gestion et des exigences ministérielles opérationnelles changeantes. Ces changements ont permis d'établir des moyens plus rentables de fournir des services.

Le gouvernement fédéral devrait insister davantage sur le choix et la souplesse pour des cadres et des ministères en déterminant le statut de services communs. Par conséquent, le Groupe de travail recommande un passage important des services obligatoires aux services facultatifs.

III. APPROVISIONNEMENT PAR LE MINISTÈRE DES APPROVISIONNEMENTS ET SERVICES DU CANADA (ASC)

Un des principaux organismes de services communs (OSC) dans le gouvernement fédéral est l'Approvisionnement et Services Canada (ASC). Le Groupe de travail s'est principalement orienté sur la fonction d'approvisionnement ou d'acquisition d'ASC. En étudiant ASC, le Groupe de travail a réagi positivement aux efforts qu'ASC a produits en examinant son rôle et en proposant une vision des années 1990 qui changera et améliorera son type et son niveau

Ce groupe de travail a étudié les politiques administratives et les services communs du gouvernement fédéral, afin de déterminer comment ils pouvaient être modifiés pour appuyer les objectifs de l'année 2000.

Dans le gouvernement fédéral, des employés consacrent beaucoup de temps et de ressources à s'occuper d'administration interne et de procédures bureaucratiques encombrantes qui ont été établies par des ministères et des organismes de services communs (OSC). Les politiques administratives et la structure des services communs dans le gouvernement fédéral ont sérieusement restreint le pouvoir de cadres et ont empêché tous les fonctionnaires de consacrer leur pleine énergie à la prestation de programmes et de services.

La principale conclusion tirée des travaux de ce groupe de travail est que des employés ont un pouvoir limité sur de nombreux aspects déterminants de leur travail. Dans des domaines tels que l'espace de bureau ou l'acquisition de biens et de services, les fonctionnaires ont peu de pouvoir ou ils doivent recourir à des OSC. Pour réparer un tapis ou une fenêtre qui fuit, des ministères doivent faire appel aux travaux publics du Canada (TPC). Pour acheter une machine à écrire ou un ordinateur qui coûte plus de 1 000 \$, ils doivent passer par des approvisionnements et services Canada (ASC). Pour louer des œuvres d'art, faire traduire leur travail ou aliéner du matériel, ils doivent recourir à d'autres OSC. Les domaines qui touchent le plus les fonctionnaires sont ceux qui entraînent relativement peu de dépenses, celles-ci étant souvent critiques pour leur permettre d'exécuter leurs programmes avec rapidité et efficacité.

Après avoir observé et consulté des fonctionnaires dans l'ensemble du Canada et étudié des méthodes appliquées dans le secteur privé, le groupe de travail sur les politiques administratives et les services communs a conclu que le gouvernement fédéral devrait adopter une nouvelle méthode pour la formulation de politiques administratives et la prestation de services communs. De tels services et politiques devraient améliorer les services au public en permettant aux fonctionnaires de consacrer moins de temps aux écritures administratives et davantage à s'orienter sur les besoins de leurs clients. Ces services et ces politiques devraient procurer plus de choix, de pouvoir et de responsabilité aux cadres, afin de déterminer la meilleure façon de gérer des programmes et des activités en fonction des exigences du programme. Le groupe de travail estime qu'une telle méthode serait également plus rentable pour la fonction publique parce qu'elle réduirait les paliers inutiles du processus décisionnel et placerait le pouvoir plus près du point de prestation des programmes.

**Sommaire
et
recommandations**

Table des matières

| | |
|---|----|
| Sommaire et recommandations | i |
| Chapitre 1. Politiques administratives et services communs pour FP 2000 - Principes | 1 |
| Chapitre 2. Rôle des organismes de services communs | 8 |
| Chapitre 3. Approvisionnements et Services Canada (ASC) | 13 |
| Chapitre 4. Travaux publics Canada (TPC) | 20 |
| Chapitre 5. Gestion ministérielle | 28 |
| Chapitre 6. Mise en oeuvre | 38 |
| Annexe 1 | |
| Annexe 2 | |
| Annexe 3 | |

POUR DISCUSSION

FONCTION PUBLIQUE 2000 : RAPPORT DU GROUPE DE TRAVAIL
SUR LES POLITIQUES
ADMINISTRATIVES ET RÔLE DES
ORGANISMES DE SERVICES
COMMUNS

Le 13 juillet 1990

La direction doit porter une attention particulière aux transactions avec les clients, car il s'agit du moment et du lieu les plus susceptibles d'influer sur la perception que ces derniers se font de l'organisation. Des ressources doivent être affectées au développement et à l'amélioration du milieu où l'on traite avec les clients (les installations, l'accès, etc.).

Les normes et les cours de formation élaborés devront mettre l'accent sur la clientèle.

5) La technologie du soutien du service

La haute direction doit prendre un engagement ferme non seulement à l'égard de l'utilisation de la technologie, mais également à l'égard de la restructuration des pratiques.

La technologie devrait être considérée à elle seule comme un élément de la démarche entreprise à l'échelle de l'administration à l'égard de l'amélioration de la fonction publique et de la philosophie de service axé sur la clientèle.

Nous devons modifier notre attitude qui consiste à ne recourir à la technologie que pour exécuter les mêmes tâches plus rapidement et plutôt nous efforcer de faire des choses différentes, de diverses manières. Il faut que le personnel qui traite directement avec le public dispose d'une technologie qui lui permette d'offrir un bon service.

6) Suivi interne et externe

Nous devons assurer le suivi du service au public et de la satisfaction de ce dernier, et réduire la surveillance de l'observation des règles.

Il est nécessaire de définir clairement et de bien gérer les attentes des clients.

Les données sur la satisfaction des clients devraient être mises à la disposition de tout le personnel.

Nous devons établir des systèmes de renseignement sur le terrain et nous servir de ces derniers pour améliorer le service.

Au centre du gouvernement, on n'accorde pas assez d'importance à la nécessité de faire varier les politiques en fonction des régions.

3) La manière de gérer les gens

L'amélioration de la gestion de "notre plus importante ressource" nécessitera :

- Des systèmes de classification simplifiés accordant plus de valeur aux facteurs du service au public.
- La réduction du nombre de niveaux dans la catégorie de la gestion afin de faciliter la déstratification organisationnelle.

- Une responsabilité accrue de la gestion en matière de déploiement du personnel et de répartition des tâches.
- Une dotation simplifiée et plus rapide (recrutement et sélection).

- L'amélioration des critères de sélection et le service au public comme critère essentiel.
- La simplification et le règlement plus rapide des procédures de grief.

- La participation des gestionnaires opérationnels aux négociations collectives afin que soient considérés les facteurs concernant le service.

- De meilleures récompenses et une plus grande reconnaissance pour bons services et l'inclusion de ces récompenses et de cette reconnaissance dans les appréciations de rendement.

- L'amélioration des programmes de formation et de perfectionnement avec insistance sur le service.

4)

Organisation du service au client

- Les systèmes et procédures doivent être mis à l'essai en fonction de certains critères concernant la pertinence du service et être sans cesse simplifiés en fonction de la clientèle plutôt qu'en fonction d'un système.

- Nous devons veiller à ce que les structures organisationnelles ne soient pas trop hiérarchisées, de manière que les décisions soient prises par des gens qui sont en contact avec les clients.

- La direction doit entreprendre de changer de façon importante la philosophie de "commande et de contrôle" en ayant recours d'avantage à la délégation, à la confiance et aux autorisations.
 - Il faut que la direction suscite des attentes à l'égard de la création d'un climat où l'on appuie l'innovation, et qu'elle en prenne la responsabilité.
 - Les cadres supérieurs doivent accepter que le fait d'exiger une gestion sans erreur nuit à la qualité du service au public.
 - Il nous faut un leadership soutenu, durable, persistant et déterminé à fournir un service exceptionnel aux clients et à établir un climat interne dans lequel la valeur des gens figure au premier plan.
 - La direction doit montrer son engagement à l'égard d'une relation ouverte de collaboration avec le public.
 - Pour assurer notre succès, il est essentiel que la direction obtienne et retienne les appuis politiques pour ces changements.
- 2) La consultation des clients : façonner les besoins en matière de politique et de service au client.**
- L'élargissement de l'éthique et du processus de consultation est nécessaire.
 - Les consultations doivent devenir une partie intégrante des valeurs auxquelles souscrit visiblement la fonction publique et doivent être encouragées ouvertement par la direction.
 - Les fonctionnaires doivent suivre une formation afin de bien connaître le processus de consultation.
 - Des consultations ne doivent être entreprises que s'il y a une volonté réelle d'écouter et de s'adapter aux changements proposés.
 - Le public veut être assuré que le processus sera ouvert et authentique; il sent qu'il a le droit de donner son opinion sur la façon dont le processus est mené et sur les questions qui devraient être débattues; il ne voit pas pourquoi il devrait être exclu de l'organisation et du lancement des débats sur des questions qui l'intéressent.

(c) Les ateliers

Les discussions en ateliers ont été axées principalement sur les questions liées à la consultation plutôt que sur la prestation des services. Les participants étaient des cadres supérieurs fédéraux, quelques représentants du monde des affaires et d'organismes non gouvernementaux, des universitaires et des chercheurs ayant de l'expérience dans le domaine ou ayant manifesté de l'intérêt à cet égard. Huit ateliers, composés d'environ vingt-et-un participants chacun, ont été tenus. En outre, le Forum des politiques publiques a parrainé deux autres ateliers : le Forum Bryce-Lambert et une séance qui a réuni des dirigeants d'associations industrielles.

(d) Les sondages téléphoniques

Afin de compléter les renseignements qualitatifs obtenus au moyen des groupes d'étude, le groupe de travail a procédé à un sondage téléphonique auprès d'un échantillon représentatif de fonctionnaires.

En particulier, 1 248 fonctionnaires fédéraux, en tout, ont été sondés par téléphone. Cet échantillon était composé de 425 employés traitant directement avec le public, 422 cadres moyens et 401 cadres supérieurs.

CONCLUSIONS

Aperçu des principaux messages

Les conclusions du groupe de travail, qui n'ont pas été rédigées dans leur version définitive, laissent entrevoir une stratégie de changements comprenant une campagne menée de façon coordonnée sur un certain nombre de fronts.

1) L'engagement de la haute direction : façonner la culture et les valeurs communes

- Nous devons nous efforcer de procéder à une modification en profondeur et à long terme de notre culture et de nos valeurs communes, modification qui nous permettra de réorienter (sans les abandonner) nos "habitudes de contrôle" actuelles.
- Nous devons passer d'un mode d'opération secret et tourné vers l'intérieur à une orientation ouverte et tournée vers l'extérieur, à l'interne comme à l'externe.

Des symposiums ont été organisés et dirigés par le Centre canadien de gestion (CCG) au nom du groupe de travail sur le service au public. Sept groupes d'environ 25 cadres supérieurs et clients des ministères y ont été invités.

(b) Les symposiums

Trente groupes d'étude comptant au total trois cent cadres moyens et employés traitant directement avec le public de douze villes ont participé à ce programme de travail.

(a) Les groupes d'étude

Quatre initiatives liées à ces questions ont été mises en œuvre pour recueillir des informations et les idées des fonctionnaires :

Programme de travail sur le terrain

Quel est leur point de vue à l'égard de la qualité du service offert au public? Que peut-on faire pour améliorer le service?

un service au public et à déboucher sur des recommandations visant à l'améliorer et ce, dans les limites de temps fixées et large la notion de "service au public" afin d'y inclure à la fois la prestation de services directs et la consultation du public à l'égard de la conception et de la mise en oeuvre des programmes, en supposant que pareilles consultations renhausseraient la satisfaction du public à l'égard de la qualité du service. Dans le cadre du programme de recherche, on s'est inspiré des questions suivantes :

SYNOPSIS DU RAPPORT DU GRUPPE DE TRAVAIL SUR LE SERVICE AU PUBLIC

CONTEXTE

Le groupe de travail sur le service au public est l'un des dix groupes mis sur pied dans le cadre de l'opération publique 2000, un programme lancé par le Premier ministre, en décembre 1989, en vue de revitaliser la fonction publique.

Le présent résumé du rapport contient des conclusions provisoires et les recommandations seront intégrées cet automne dans leur projet de rapport.

OBJECTIFS

Les objectifs du groupe de travail sur le service au public étaient les suivants :

1. Passer en revue la documentation sur le sujet et mener des consultations sur la notion de service au public afin d'arriver à une (des) définition(s) satisfaisante(s) dans le contexte du secteur public;
2. examiner les travaux effectués jusqu'à maintenant en matière d'amélioration du service et de renforcement de la satisfaction dans les secteurs public et privé, en vue de tirer profit de l'expérience d'autres organisations;
3. mener des recherches (recueillir des données secondaires et primaires) afin d'établir des méthodes de mesure et des points de repère concernant la qualité réelle et perçue du service au public fourni par les institutions fédérales. C'est à partir de ces points de repère que l'on déterminera si des progrès ont été accomplis;

4. examiner les pratiques et les attitudes qui prévalent à l'égard de la consultation du public en ce qui a trait à l'élaboration des politiques et à la prestation des programmes;

5. consulter des échantillons de groupes représentatifs d'employés, de syndicats et autres afin de tirer profit de leur point de vue et de leurs recommandations;

6. formuler des recommandations à l'égard du mandat touchant le service au public (service, satisfaction, consultation, communication).

MÉTHODOLOGIE


Le groupe de travail a entrepris un grand programme de recherche et d'analyse destiné à mieux comprendre certaines questions liées

Le 9 août 1990

SOMMAIRE

FONCTION PUBLIQUE 2000 : RAPPORT DU GROUPE DE TRAVAIL
SUR LE SERVICE AU PUBLIC

POUR DISCUSSION



paperaiserie, d'étendre les pouvoirs des ministères et des gestionnaires axiaux ainsi que d'améliorer la gestion des ressources et du personnel.

Les membres des groupes de travail ont sollicité les points de vue des fonctionnaires de leurs ministères respectifs sur la façon d'améliorer la gestion de la fonction publique. Ils ont échangé avec les syndicats de la fonction publique et recueilli les commentaires de milliers de fonctionnaires.

LA SUITE

Les recommandations des groupes de travail ne sont pas le reflet de la politique ou de la position officielles du gouvernement. Celui-ci étudiera les analyses et les recommandations, de même que les réactions qu'elles susciteront, du point de vue plus vaste de l'orientation future de la fonction publique. À cette étape-ci, le gouvernement désire informer le personnel de la fonction publique des résultats des travaux et entendre tous les points de vue dans son étude des diverses questions.

Au début de septembre, une réunion aura lieu avec les syndicats pour entendre et discuter leurs réactions aux rapports. Les employés sont aussi invités à discuter avec leurs gestionnaires des changements qui s'imposent et à proposer des façons de mieux servir le public.

Les rapports et les quelque 300 recommandations qu'ils renferment alimenteront la poursuite de consultations sur d'éventuels changements administratifs et législatifs. Les suggestions et les commentaires seront transmis au Secrétariat de Fonction publique 2000 et permettront au gouvernement d'arrêter sa position à l'égard de la réforme de la fonction publique, tant en ce qui touche les modifications législatives que le plan d'action à long terme pour réaliser le changement et le renouveau.

DOCUMENT D'INFORMATION SUR FONCTION PUBLIQUE 2000

Fonction publique 2000 est une initiative annoncée par le Premier ministre, M. Brian Mulroney, le 12 décembre 1989. Elle vise à renouveler la fonction publique afin qu'elle soit en mesure d'offrir les meilleurs services possible aux Canadiens, à l'aube du 21^e siècle.

Le Premier ministre a demandé au président du Conseil du Trésor, M. Robert de Cotter, de voir à la bonne marche de ce projet dont l'exécution a été confiée à M. Paul Tellier, greffier du Conseil privé. Ce dernier dispose d'un petit secrétariat relevant de M. John Edwards, directeur de Fonction publique 2000.

Au départ, Fonction publique 2000 englobait 9 groupes de travail regroupant plus de 90 sous-ministres, sous-ministres adjoints et hauts fonctionnaires régionaux. Un dixième groupe de travail, chargé des questions de formation et de perfectionnement, a été créé à la fin mai.

LISTE DES GROUPES DE TRAVAIL

Service au public
Système de classification et structure des groupes professionnels
Rémunération et avantages sociaux
Dotation
Relations de travail
Adaptation de la main-d'oeuvre
Gestion des ressources et contrôles budgétaires
Politiques administratives et rôle des organismes de services communs
Catégorie de gestion
Formation et perfectionnement

RÉALISATIONS

Les groupes de travail ont parcouru des études et des rapports existants, y compris des sondages et des examens auprès des fonctionnaires.

Le 30 avril 1990, M. de Cotter a publié un rapport d'étape faisant état des questions à l'étude et dévoilant 40 recommandations et décisions qui ont pour but de réduire la

Les rapports publiés aujourd'hui comprennent des documents d'information résumant les principales recommandations formulées par les groupes de travail et énonçant les progrès accomplis à ce jour.

« Les membres des groupes de travail ont fait preuve de diligence dans la préparation de ces rapports, a souligné M. de Cotret. Ils ont soulevé des questions fondamentales et il importe maintenant de communiquer les résultats de leur démarche à tous les intéressés tandis que cette initiative essentielle se poursuit. »

- 30 -

Pour de plus amples informations:

Yvon Bureau
Fonction publique 2000
Tél.: (613) 952-6720



Communiqué News Release

À publier immédiatement
le 14 août 1990

CONSULTATIONS SUR LES RAPPORTS DE FONCTION PUBLIQUE 2000

Le président du Conseil du Trésor, M. Robert de Cotret, a annoncé aujourd'hui la publication des rapports des groupes de travail de Fonction publique 2000. Ces rapports sont transmis aux ministères et aux organismes fédéraux, aux syndicats de la fonction publique ainsi qu'à d'autres groupes intéressés. Le gouvernement étudiera les analyses et les recommandations de même que les réactions qu'elles susciteront, du point de vue plus vaste de l'orientation future de la fonction publique.

« La publication de ces rapports aujourd'hui vise deux objectifs : informer le personnel de la fonction publique des résultats des discussions des huit derniers mois et obtenir d'autres points de vue concernant cette première partie de Fonction publique 2000, a déclaré M. de Cotret.

« Les recommandations des groupes de travail ne sont pas le reflet de la politique ou de la position officielles du gouvernement. Je veux favoriser encore plus la discussion et obtenir plus de réactions à l'égard de ces rapports, de façon que le gouvernement entende tous les points de vue avant de prendre, à l'autome, d'importantes décisions visant à renouveler la fonction publique et à améliorer le service au public. »

Les groupes de travail ont déjà traité de certaines préoccupations avec les syndicats de la fonction publique et ont recueilli les points de vue de nombreux employés partout au pays au moyen de sondages, d'entrevues téléphoniques, de rencontres avec des groupes de discussion, de réunions et de demandes de suggestions, en particulier en ce qui a trait au service au public. Un comité spécial formé de gens d'affaires, d'universitaires, d'experts-conseils et de représentants de diverses associations a aussi été consulté.

The Commission has been established to investigate the circumstances surrounding the death of the late Senator Jean-Jacques Lussier, who was shot on the steps of the Parliament Building in Ottawa on November 1, 1982. The Commission is composed of three members: a Chairman, a Vice-Chairman, and two members-at-large. The Commission's mandate is to conduct a thorough and impartial investigation into the facts of the case and to report its findings to the public.

The Commission has held several public hearings and has received numerous submissions from interested parties. It has also conducted extensive research into the security of the Parliament Building and the procedures for the protection of Senators. The Commission is currently reviewing the evidence and will issue its final report in the near future.

The Commission is committed to transparency and accountability in its work. It will make all of its findings and recommendations available to the public in a clear and accessible format. The Commission's report will provide a detailed account of the events leading up to the shooting and the Commission's conclusions regarding the responsibility for the tragedy.

The Commission is also conducting a review of the security of the Parliament Building and the procedures for the protection of Senators. This review will identify any weaknesses in the current security arrangements and recommend measures to improve the safety of the building and its occupants. The Commission's findings and recommendations will be made available to the public in a separate report.

The Commission is grateful for the cooperation and assistance of all those who have provided information and support during the course of its investigation. It will continue to work diligently to uncover the truth and ensure that the lessons learned from this tragedy are put into practice.

For more information, please contact the Commission's public information officer at (416) 927-3000.

POUR DISCUSSION

DES

RAPPORTS ET SOMMAIRES

GROUPE DE TRAVAIL

Fonction publique 2000, Ottawa, Ontario KIA 0A3 Téléphone (613) 952-7551 Télécopieur (613) 954-6017

Le 14 août 1990

FP2000

